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IntroduCtIon
The Hungarian Labour Market Yearbook series was launched 14 years ago by 
the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Science with support 
from the National Employment Foundation (OFA). The yearbook presents the 
main characteristics of Hungarian employment policy and each year features 
an in-depth analysis of a topical issue. From the outset, the editorial board has 
striven to bring relevant and useable information on trends in the Hungarian la-
bour market, the legislative and institutional background of employment policy, 
and up-to-date findings from Hungarian and international research to policy 
makers, civil servants, government officials, higher education and research in-
stitutions, and the press and electronic media.
It was an important consideration that the research published in the year-
book series would also provide a good source of knowledge for higher educa-
tion on the topics of labour economics and human resources management. The 
yearbook presents the main characteristics and trends of the Hungarian labour 
market in an international comparison using available statistical information, 
conceptual research and empirical analysis in a clearly structured and easily ac-
cessible format. Continuing the previous editorial practice, we selected an area 
that we consider especially important from the perspective of understanding 
labour market trends in Hungary and effective evidence-based policy making. 
The current volume examines the characteristics of public sector employment.
For the first time in its history, the publication of the Labour Market Re-
view was delayed by more than six months. The reason for this was the lack of 
funding – despite our best efforts. We remain committed to providing the best 
possible information with the yearbook series to anyone with an interest in the 
Hungarian labour market and commitment to evidence-based policy making.
The Yearbook has four main parts.
1. The Hungarian labour market in 2012–2013
The Hungarian economy was characterised by a deepening of the second wave of 
the crisis followed by a weak growth from mid-2012 until the end of 2013. The 
country’s annual GDP in 2013 was 1.2 per cent higher than in 2012. Expand-
ing car production and export, as well as the intensifying of internal demand all 
played an important role in the growth. Economic investment increased for the 
first time since the crisis mainly thanks to infrastructure developments financed 
from EU sources but household consumption also expanded underpinned by 
rising real wages and strengthening consumer confidence.
the hungarian labour market
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The overall activity rate reached 65% in 2013, which has been its highest val-
ue in this millennium; however, it is still lower than the EU average. Using the 
ILO definition the mean unemployment rate was 10.3 per cent in 2013, 0.7 per-
centage points lower than in 2012. However, the number of unemployed school 
leavers went up: the monthly average number of unemployed school leavers reg-
istered was 66,025 people, 7.4 per cent higher than in 2012. The employment 
and unemployment rate improved in 2013, the former grew by 1.6 per cent and 
the latter fell by 2.6 per cent between the first and the last quarter. The favour-
able employment and unemployment statistics are somewhat dampened by the 
fact that they are mainly due to a very substantial increase in public works. The 
number of people in public works employment* has increased steadily in the 
past three years and with the launch of public works winter projects it reached 
172 thousand in the last quarter of 2013. In addition to public works, labour 
migration from Hungary also had important implications for unemployment 
and employment rates. The number of people working abroad while maintain-
ing their residency status in Hungary has increased threefold in the last five 
years, their number was near 100,000 in the last quarter of 2013. In 2008 60 
per cent of registered job vacancies were non-subsidised; in 2013 this fell to 20 
per cent. The steady increase of subsidised vacancies within all registered job 
vacancies started with the introduction of the new public works policy. Nev-
ertheless, the number of reported job vacancies increased on average by 14 per 
cent compared to 2012 suggesting that economic growth was picking up. At 
the same time an increasing proportion of newly created jobs are part-time or 
fixed-term. Part-time employment went up by more than 50 per cent between 
2008 and 2013, the number of workers on a fixed-term contract, predominantly 
short-term, was 42% higher in 2013 than in 2008.
Thanks to above-inflation nominal pay rises in recent years, real wages have 
increased by nine per cent compared to 2008. In contrast, average gross pay in 
the public sector has been falling more or less steadily: overall by 15 per cent 
in the past five years. Various measures were introduced in 2013 that increased 
wages: a more than five per cent pay rise for public workers, wage adjustment of 
health care workers and a new career model for teachers in 2013, a 5.4 and 5.6 
per increase of the minimum wage and guaranteed minimum pay respectively. 
The labour market was less tight in 2013 than in previous years. This is also sug-
gested by the fact that redundancy was down from its peak at 60.2 per cent (sec-
ond quarter of 2010) at 58 per cent in the second quarter of 2013 which then 
fell to 54 per cent by the end of the year. The number of people who handed 
in their notice doubled in the last quarter of 2013 in comparison to the same 
period in 2012, which might also indicate a more favourable labour market.
* Average headcount based on the Ministry of Interior’s Employment and Public Works 
Database.
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In summary, it might be argued that the labour market improved in 2013 
compared to 2012, however this was mainly due to the massive expansion of 
public works employment rather than economic growth.
2. In Focus
The topic of this year’s In Focus is the public sector which is a relatively neglect-
ed area of research compared to the private sector. It examines the public sec-
tor from a dual perspective: on the one hand, it looks at its labour market pro-
cesses, and on the other hand it explores its institutional background. In Focus 
is comprised of an introductory and four thematic chapters. The short intro-
duction gives a brief overview of the topic, highlights the main current issues 
in Hungary and abroad, provides a review of earlier literature, and presents the 
topics of the main chapters.
Chapter 1 summarises the key facts. Köllő’s study examines the size and com-
position of the public sector and the development of public sector wages in 
Hungary. In international comparison the most prominent feature of the pub-
lic sector in Hungary is the very large fluctuation of the wage differential be-
tween the public and private sector (unprecedented among OECD countries), 
and – in the light of current trends – the widening pay disadvantage between 
similar employees (in terms of demographic characteristics, education, labour 
market experience) in the public and private sector. The chapter also address-
es the impact of pay rises and decreases on relative wages, the development of 
graduate pay over the career-span and the methodological difficulties in defin-
ing and measuring the public sector. The chapter includes two boxed texts (brief 
highlights). Neumann and Varadovics present the trends in the size and wages 
of state/local government owned corporations. According to their findings the 
restrictions affecting the public sector since 2006 or the economic downturn hit-
ting the private sector between 2008 and 2010 had no effect on wage dynamics 
in this sector. Scharle addresses a particular segment of the broader public sec-
tor: the size and cost of public works employment. She provides an overview of 
the number of participants and the cost of public works programmes between 
2000 and 2013 and compares this – in terms of its size – to other parts of the 
public sector and the practices of other countries.
Chapter 2 examines the public sector primarily from a labour economics per-
spective. Most of the more recent research presented here addresses the interac-
tion between the different labour markets and labour market flows. The study 
by Altwicker-Hámori and Lovász examines the wage differential between the 
private and public sector at different segments of the wage distribution in the 
decades before and after the large pay rise in 2002. The authors set out to an-
swer the following questions: who are at a relative disadvantage in the public 
sector and who benefitted most from the pay rise? Also, did the wage increase 
really make public sector employment a more attractive option for the highly 
the hungarian labour market
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educated? Or differently, did the pay rise have a lasting effect on public-private 
sector wage differentials? Was it effective? Lovász’s boxed text addresses labour 
market discrimination in the public and private sector: the gender pay gap and 
occupational segregation in the hiring process and promotions.
The other three subchapters investigate the interactions between the labour 
markets of the public and private sector. Telegdy examines the effect of the 2001–
2002 pay increases on corporate compensations. He has shown that a 10-per-
cent higher public sector presence in a given labour segment increases wages by 
1.5 per cent. The spill-over effect is particularly strong for low-paid corporate 
workers in occupations with a high concentration of public sector workers, in 
the service sector, or if they were hired after the large pay rise. In his paper Köllő 
examines the effect of large wage gap variations between the private and public 
sector (especially the large pay rises before and after the 2002 general election) 
on the number and quality of private sector workers moving to public sector 
jobs. An increase of one per cent in public sector pay for a given gender and age 
increased the average wage of workers moving from the private sector by over 
0.5 per cent compared to stayers. The effect was much stronger for young people 
than older workers. The heavy decline in the inflow to the public sector damp-
ened the effect of positive selection on the public sector workforce. Elek and 
Szabó explore labour flow in the opposite direction: they examine the number, 
composition and future labour market behaviour of people leaving the public 
sector, including the probabilities of re-employment in jobs that match their 
education. The re-employment intensity of people who are made redundant in 
the public sector is about 5–25 per cent lower – on average they take this much 
longer to find a new job compared to people who lost their job in the private 
sector. At higher education levels the difference disappears. People who move 
from the public to the private sector are not significantly more likely to be over-
qualified for their new job than people who move jobs within the private sector 
– if the effect of education is controlled for.
The study by Molnár and Kapitány investigates the distinctive selection mech-
anisms of the public sector. They present non-monetary motivations, risk-min-
imising family strategies that support the decision to work in the public sector. 
Their boxed text examines whether the general trend that public sector workers 
are more satisfied than others is also valid in Hungary.
Chapter 3 addresses the institutional background of the public sector labour 
market. Due to limited space this publication does not aim to present public 
sector labour law and the system of interest reconciliation in a comprehensive 
way, instead the focus is on the latest trends. Nacsa’s subchapter reviews the most 
important changes in labour law after 2010: the rules of dismissal without cause, 
their repeal by the Constitutional Court, the new regulations from 2011 that 
in essence re-established the pre-repeal situation through the dismissal causes 
of loss of confidence and unworthiness. Berki presents the mechanisms of in-
introduction
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terest reconciliation and wage determination in the public sector highlighting 
the post-2010 changes. The sub-chapter provides a detailed description of dif-
ferent wage systems, compares the main similarities and differences between 
different employment statuses, wage levels (internal differentiation of pay scales, 
differences, other pay components), and changes within the last three years. The 
other main focus of the sub-chapter is the national consultation and collective 
bargaining in the public sector. (The main topics are: operational and non-op-
erational forums – the implementation gap, subjects of interest reconciliation, 
the lack of collective agreements, collective agreements that are ending, consul-
tation and direct action.) In the discussion Berki provides an assessment of the 
relationship between unilateral wage determination (legislation) and interest 
reconciliation/collective bargaining. The boxed text in this sub-chapter consid-
ers the collective agreements of the central and local government owned corpo-
rations, and the likely effect of recent (2012) legislation that limits the scope of 
collective bargaining in “community owned” companies.
The next subchapters present a European outlook on public sector reforms. 
Váradi adopts a human resources management approach to describe the objec-
tives and instruments of the new public management and the neo-Weberian ap-
proach that seeks to comply simultaneously with the requirements of efficiency 
and impartiality that ensure a professional and fair functioning of the public 
service. Developments in the early 2000s were in line with this and they in-
creased flexibility but still preserved most of the security elements. However, 
the financial and economic crisis hampered these – quite diverse – initiatives. 
The countries that got into financial difficulties gave up more and more of the 
security elements without any coherence or clear direction in their policy mak-
ing. Only some of the rich and stable countries could implement countercycli-
cal measures in public sector employment as well. Edelényi and Neumann give 
an overview of public sector labour law models, wage determination systems 
and the role of social dialogue in the European Union, as well as recent chang-
es and responses to the 2008 economic and financial crisis. Before the crisis in 
the Member States of the European Union there were two opposite models of 
public sector employment statutes: statutes based on Prussian or Napoleonic 
traditions and the statutes of the Anglo-Saxon countries based on common law 
traditions. Accordingly there were also two main models in wage determina-
tion: unilateral wage determination and collective bargaining. However, there 
exist other forms of interest reconciliation and in the German-French model 
different groups have different status in the public sector. In addition to the 
direct impact of the economic crisis (budget restrictions, redundancies and 
pay cuts/freezes), wage determination systems also underwent major changes: 
unilateral wage determination is clearly on the rise and agreements are being 
decentralised. In line with the objectives of New Public Management, the com-
position of the public sector workforce changed, the number of jobs “protected” 
the hungarian labour market
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by status laws is falling and the number of people employed under private sec-
tor labour law is growing as well as the number of people in different atypical 
forms of employment.
The other study by Neumann and Edelényi focuses on the local government 
sector. In accordance with the practices of New Public Management, an increas-
ing number of public services are provided by private or non-profit organisa-
tions – in a variety of forms – and the boundaries between sectors have become 
blurred. The first part of the sub-chapter gives an overview of privatisation, out-
sourcing/insourcing and public procurement practices in some Member States 
of the EU. The involvement of the private sector raises questions around the 
interaction of different labour market regulations: differences in the regulation 
of transfer of undertakings and employment clauses in procurement contracts 
between countries. On the other hand, the sub-chapter attempts to map simi-
lar practices in Hungary: it reviews the management, service provision and in-
terest reconciliation practices of local governments, and the local government 
motives and counter-motives behind privatisation, outsourcing and insourcing 
practices. It also addresses the key trend of recent years: the transfer of local 
government services to central government management and then to religious 
organisations. Changes in the employment status and working conditions of 
affected employees are also discussed. The boxed text for this sub-chapter pre-
sents the employment implications of outsourcing and insourcing and transfer 
to religious organisations through two case studies from 2012.
Chapter 4 of In Focus combines labour economics and institutional approach-
es to present selected job markets within the public sector. Varga discusses 
teachers’ pay, selection and attrition, while Köllő and Szabó address doctors’ 
pay, gratuities and attrition as well as the characteristics of interest reconcili-
ation in the health care sector including a regional outlook on similar pro-
cesses in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. The two studies by Berki, 
Czethoffer and Szabó look at the employment situation of people who leave 
their career for different reasons. One of the studies examines the career path 
of nurses and other health care professionals after they leave the national health 
sector. The other sub-chapter explores the career path of law enforcement and 
armed forces staff after retirement: whether they worked, if yes in what occu-
pations and how much they earned. Both studies review the main legislative 
changes affecting these occupations: the new pay scale in the health care sec-
tor and the abolition of early retirement pension that resulted in possibly the 
greatest protest of all to the post-2010 government measures which affected 
the public sector.
The time horizon of the sub-chapters in In Focus is different: labour econom-
ics analyses generally cover the period between 2008 and 2010, statistical data 
are usually available until 2013, and even the descriptive studies attempt to ad-
dress – where possible – the most recent trends.
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3. The institutional environment of the labour market between 
September 2012 and January 2014
There were various changes in the institutional environment of the labour mar-
ket in 2013 that also affected the tax and contribution burden of employment. 
The most important change was the introduction of an employment promotion 
package by the job protection action plan that replaced the Start cards. School 
leavers under the age of 25 years, people under 25 or over 55 years, long-term 
jobseekers, women on, or returning from, maternity leave, unskilled workers, 
mothers with three or more children returning to work, and employers in free 
enterprise zones can receive a discount on the contribution payment.
Public works employment continued at a high rate similarly to previous years. 
However, unlike in previous years, at the end of 2013 it increased even further 
instead of entering a decline. While the average headcount was 140 thousand 
during most of 2013, in December it settled at around 200 thousand. In the 
winter months the programmes also allow basic skills development for approxi-
mately 50 thousand people. Weekly pay was replaced by a monthly wage for pub-
lic workers. A wage minimum was introduced for supervisors in public works.
There were important changes towards the end of the period which affected 
net wages. As of 2013 the tax system became truly single-rate and the upper 
limit for pension contribution was also abolished. A new contribution discount 
scheme was introduced for families to supplement the existing family tax dis-
count scheme. As a result low-earners with multiple children have been able to 
take better advantage of available discounts for children from 2014. The child 
care allowance was amended to include new measures for people who are hav-
ing children and people who return to work following parental leave.
The accreditation of businesses employing people with disabilities became 
simpler and their funding system changed as well. The rules of public sector 
employment were amended for people who are eligible for old age pension. They 
can no longer claim their state pension while in employment; however they re-
tain their pensioner status. Health care workers and tutors in art and vocational 
education are exempt from the new rules.
4. Statistical data
This section gives detailed information on the main economic trends, popula-
tion, labour market participation, employment, unemployment, inactivity, wag-
es, education, labour demand, regional disparities, migration, labour relations 
and social welfare assistance as well as an international comparison of selected 
labour market indicators following the structure developed in previous years.
The data in the chapter come from two main sources: on the one hand the 
regular institutional and population surveys of the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO): Labour Force Survey (LFS), institution-based labour statistics (ILS), 
labour force accounting census (LFAC); on the other hand the register of the 
the hungarian labour market
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National Labour Office (NLO) and its data collections: the unemployment reg-
ister database (NES REG), short-term labour market forecast (PROG), wage 
tariff surveys (WTS), and the NLO’s Labour Relations Information System 
(LRIS). More information is provided on these at the end of the statistics sec-
tion. In addition to the two main data providers, the Central Administration 
of National Pension Insurance has provided the data on old age and disability 
pensions and assistance. Finally, some tables and figures are based on informa-
tion from the online databases of the CSO, the National Tax and Customs Ad-
ministration (NTCA) and the Eurostat.
All tables and figures in this chapter can be downloaded in Excel format fol-
lowing the links provided. All tables with labour market data published in the 
Hungarian Labour Market Yearbook since 2000 are available for download 
from the following website: http://adatbank.krtk.mta.hu/tukor.
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eConomIC envIronment and employment
The Hungarian economy was characterised by a deepening of the second wave 
of the economic crisis followed by weak growth from mid-2012 until the end 
of 2013. The country’s GDP fell by 1.7 per cent in 2012, which was the largest 
decline among the Visegrád countries (Figure 1). Both external and internal 
factors played a role in this. The Eurozone went into recession again in 2012 
and the weakening of Hungary’s main export markets meant a contraction 
of international trade. Household consumption declined1 as a result of a de-
crease in the real value of wages and cash transfers as well as the reduction of 
debt accumulated before the crisis. Unused capacities and limited credit sup-
ply prompted businesses to postpone or limit their investments.
Figure 1: GDP growth in the region (percentage change  
compared to the same period in the previous year)
Source: Eurostat online database.
The economy of the European Union was characterised by a slow recovery 
from the recession in 2013; annual economic output effectively stagnated 
(+0.1 per cent). The German economy – considered the engine of the Euro-
pean economy – expanded by 0.4 per cent and this also had a positive impact 
on the Hungarian economy whose output grew in the last three quarters of 
2013 compared to the same periods of the previous year. The annual GDP of 
Hungary was 1.2 per cent higher than in 2012.
Expanding car production and export, as well as the intensifying of inter-
nal demand all played an important role in the growth. Economic investment 
increased for the first time since the crisis mainly thanks to infrastructure 
developments financed from EU sources but household consumption also ex-
panded underpinned by rising real wages and strengthening consumer con-
1 The annual consumer price 
index was 5.7 per cent in 2012 
(NBH, 2013a).
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fidence (NBH, 2013c). The economic performance of East-Central Europe 
improved gradually in 2013, and the region’s growth exceeded the EU aver-
age in the last quarter of 2013. The improving economic performance had 
a positive impact on employment in the region. Of the Visegrád countries 
Hungary and the Czech Republic achieved the greatest improvement in em-
ployment between the last quarter of 2012 and the last quarter of 2013, while 
employment in Slovakia stagnated during the same period. By the end of 2013 
employment rates in all Visegrád countries – apart from Slovakia – exceeded 
their pre-crisis level (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Employment rates in the Visegrád countries,  
quarterly, population aged 15–64 years
Source: Eurostat online database (lfsq_ergan).
The economically inactive population decreased by nearly 10 per cent in Hun-
gary between 2008 and 2013, which can be considered a positive develop-
ment in recent years. This was due to a decline in the number of 15–64-year 
olds by about 100,000 and a nearly four-per-cent increase in the activity rate. 
The unemployment rate peaked at 11.9 per cent as a result of the crisis in the 
first quarter of 2010 and remained above 10.5 per cent for almost two and a 
half years. Unemployment began to rise again during the 2012 recession in 
Hungary and reached 11.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2013. The employ-
ment and unemployment rate improved in 2013, the former grew by 1.6 per 
cent and the latter fell by 2.6 per cent between the first and the last quarter. 
It is worth noting that although the employment rate of 15–64-year olds 
was around 60 per cent in the last quarter, which is the highest value since 
the early 1990s, it is still well below the European Union average (Figure 3).
The favourable employment and unemployment statistics are somewhat 
dampened by the fact that they are mainly due to a large increase in public 
works (Figure 4). From January 1, 2011 earlier public works programmes were 
replaced by a new public works scheme that makes participation in a public 
works project a special form of employment. The number of people in public 
works employment2 has increased steadily in the past three years and with 
2 Average headcount based 
on information from the Em-
ployment and Public Works 
Database [in Hungarian: Fog-
lalkoztatási és Közfoglalkozta-
tási Adatbázis] of the National 
Labour Office compiled for the 
Ministry of Interior.
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the launch of winter public works projects reached 172 thousand in the last 
quarter of 2013.
Figure 3: Main labour market indicators (axis on the right: unemployment rate)
Source: KSH Stadat.
Figure 4: Number of people in employment, population aged 15–64 years
Source: Own calculations based on CSO Stadat and brief report on Earnings.
An increasing number of people are working abroad because of the crisis and 
this has important implications for unemployment and employment figures. 
Some of the migrant workers are settled abroad and planning to stay long-
term or indefinitely, however a sizeable group of migrants are commuting or 
only planning a short stay, or they moved recently and some of their family 
are still in Hungary. The latter group of workers are still part of the house-
holds in Hungary and thus they are also observable by the CSO’s Labour 
Force Survey; their number was only 28,977 at the beginning of 2008, nearly 
2,000 people less than the number of foreign nationals employed in Hungary. 
Although the exact number of Hungarian nationals working abroad cannot 
be determined on the basis of the CSO’s Labour Force Survey, certain trends 
can be identified. It is clear that labour migration had already been on the rise 
before the crisis, which only intensified this trend (Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Balance of Hungarian nationals working abroad and foreign nationals 
working in Hungary, population aged 15–64 years, 2008–2013
Source: Own calculation based on basic data from the CSO Labour Force Survey.
The number of people working abroad while maintaining their residency sta-
tus in Hungary has increased threefold in the last five years, their number 
being near 100,000 in the last quarter of 2013. Two thirds of them work in 
German-speaking countries; 46 per cent of migrants work in Austria (more 
than 44,000 people). The majority of people working in Austria live near the 
border to Hungary; which also supports the argument that the CSO Labour 
Force Survey is most suitable to detect cross-border commuters. People work-
ing in the United Kingdom also represent a fairly large share at just over nine 
per cent. It is worth noting that 46 per cent of the migrant workers observed 
by the Labour Force Survey have a vocational or vocational training school 
qualification, substantially higher than their share in the total population. 
The share of people with a vocational qualification increased at the expense 
of people with only primary education who are much underrepresented com-
pared to their share within the total population aged 15–64 years. There are 
differences in the composition of migrant workers by education level across 
countries. In Germany and Austria there are more males with vocational or 
secondary education while in the United Kingdom the share of graduates and 
females is higher. It is important to emphasise that Hungarian citizens who 
work abroad but do not appear in these surveys might be significantly differ-
ent from the observed population in terms of the demographic characteristics.
The number of foreigners employed in Hungary fell slightly after the cri-
sis and stabilised – at this lower level. It is not possible to determine the na-
tionality of foreign employees on the basis of the CSO Labour Force Survey, 
only the country where their parents were born. Based on this it might be 
concluded that at least 44 per cent of foreign nationals employed in Hungary 
have parents who are ethnic Hungarians born outside Hungary. Foreigners 
employed in Hungary have a higher education level than Hungarians work-
ing abroad and the total working age population. Employment in Hungary 
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and the retention of jobs is promoted by the job protection action plan. This 
has supported job creation and job retention for disadvantaged people on the 
labour market by providing social contribution tax discounts and training 
subsidies since January 2013. One of these clearly defined groups is unskilled 
people who are the most excluded from the labour market (see Figure 6) (the 
social contribution tax is reduced from 27 per cent to 12.5 for employers who 
hire them). As a result of the expansion of public works programmes3 the em-
ployment rate of people with a primary education or lower increased in 2013, 
but despite this growth it has remained below its early 2009-level.
Figure 6: Employment rate by education level, population aged 15–64 years
Source: Own calculation based on CSO Stadat.
Although the largest decline was in the employment of unskilled people, the 
employment rate fell for all education levels apart from graduates compared to 
the first quarter of 2009. In the past four years the employment rate of gradu-
ates grew by three percentage points in the 15–64-year-old active population 
and after a slight drop graduate employment approached its pre-crisis level. 
Other important target groups of the job protection action plan are young 
people aged under 25 years, people aged over 55 years, and employees with 
young children.4 Of these three groups, people aged 55–64 years are the larg-
est group (since the second quarter of 2011) in the working age population 
and their number is continuously rising, while the number of 15–24-year-
olds is rapidly decreasing. Despite this, changes in the employment of young 
people are a lot less favourable than in the 55–64 years age group (Figure 7).
The unemployment rate within each disadvantaged group increased between 
2008 and 2013, the greatest increase (73 per cent) was among mothers with 
young children (Figure 8).
Even before the crisis one in five young people were out of work; their un-
employment rate has increased by 36 per cent since then and reached 24 
per cent in the last quarter of 2013. It is worth noting however, that the un-
employment rate of young people fell substantially, by six percentage points, 
3 Using the Employment and 
Public Works Database Molnár 
et al. (2014) found that half of 
public works participants had 
primary education at most.
4 According to Act CXLVI of 
2012 on the Amendment of cer-
tain legislation for the imple-
mentation of the job protection 
action plan, the employers of 
people returning to work follow-
ing parental leave are entitled 
to reduced rates of contribu-
tion payment: no contribution 
payment is required in the first 
year and 14.5 per cent in the 
second year as opposed to 27 
per cent. This study consid-
ers mothers who have a child 
aged under three years in the 
household disadvantaged in the 
labour market; this definition 
is slightly broader than the of-
ficial definition set out in the 
legislation.
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during the year. Although people aged 55–64 years are in the best situation 
in terms of unemployment, their unemployment rate also increased by 54% 
between 2008 and 2013.
Figure 7: Changes in the employment rate of disadvantaged groups  
in the labour market, 2008–2013 (first quarter, 2008 = 100)
Source: Own calculation based on basic data from the CSO Labour Force Survey.
Figure 8: The unemployment rate of disadvantaged groups in the labour market
Source: Own calculation based on basic data from the CSO Labour Force Survey.
There is a question as to whether older people “crowd out” youngsters from 
the labour market. Is it possible to promote the employment of both groups 
at the same time if one can only grow at the expense of the other? Research 
so far does not give a clear-cut answer. Looking at workplace-level data from 
the public sector, Cseres-Gergely (2013) concluded that there is a crowding-
out effect in employment and wages as well, but it is limited: it affects the 
youngest and least experienced. Using time series data from Belgium Jousten 
et al. (2008) argued that there is no evidence of a crowding-out effect but 
the employment of both groups is sensitive to business cycles, especially the 
employment of younger people. However, there might be other mechanisms 
as well: cost-cutting can be vital for companies during periods of downturn 
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and it might make sense to replace more experienced but higher-paid older 
workers with lower-paid entrants. On the other hand, people retire later due 
to the rising state pension age and therefore there are not enough job vacan-
cies for young entrants.
labour demand and wages
In recent years, labour demand in the different sectors has been largely shaped 
by the effects of the economic downturn and responses to it (Figure 9). The 
construction industry had the largest decline: it had 15 per cent fewer employ-
ees in 2013 than in 2009. Within the market service industries the greatest 
expansion was achieved by the information and communication (22 per cent 
growth) and the administrative and support services (18 per cent increase) 
subsectors between 2008 and 2013. To a large extent this was due to the cre-
ation of service centres by international companies in Hungary that provide 
financial, accounting and IT services to the companies’ own subsidiaries or 
external customers.
Figure 9: Employment in the main industries, population aged 15–64 years  
(first quarter, 2009 = 100)
Source: Own calculation based on basic data from the CSO Labour Force Survey.
Manufacturing in Hungary fell in 2012 and this had implications for labour 
demand as well: in the first quarter of 2013 the number of workers employed 
in manufacturing was two per cent lower than in the previous year. Car man-
ufacturing was especially badly hit but thanks to new investments it recov-
ered quickly and its workforce has increased by more than 30 per cent since 
early 2011. In the second quarter manufacturing started to expand and by 
the end of 2013 the number of workers employed in process manufacturing 
was four per cent higher than in 2009. Employment in agriculture has been 
steadily increasing since 2009 according to the Labour Force Survey, however 
to a large extent this is due to the expansion of the public works programmes.
050,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
Non-subsidised jobs
Subsidised jobs
Reported job vacancies
201320122011201020092008
People
Monthly
tamás bakó
26
From the perspective of labour demand, it is an important question as to 
how many and what types of jobs are created and destroyed. Although not all 
new vacancies are reported to the National Employment Service, their records 
still provide valuable information on the economy (Figure 10). In 2008 60 
per cent of registered job vacancies were non-subsidised; in 2013 this fell to 
20 per cent. The steady increase of subsidised vacancies within all registered 
job vacancies started with the introduction of the new public works policy. 
Nevertheless, the number of reported job vacancies increased on average by 14 
per cent compared to 2012 suggesting that economic growth was picking up.
Figure 10: The number of newly reported subsidised  
and non-subsidised job vacancies
Source: National Employment Service.
The new downturn that followed the brief period of growth in 2010–2011 
encouraged the development of new forms of employment to help adjust-
ment of labour demand. The new Labour Code that entered into force in 
2013 further promoted this process by the regulation of new flexible forms 
of employment (such as stand-by employment, job sharing, and employment 
by multiple employers). Companies in uncertain times and in recession can 
only plan short-term and they not only create fewer new jobs but those jobs 
also tend to be of shorter duration. If employers can only plan short-term 
but with a fair amount of certainty, then more people will be employed on a 
fixed-term contract.
Changes in labour law introduced in 2012 made it possible to terminate 
fixed-term employment contracts (with justification) and dismiss employees 
due to their performance or external factors that make it impossible to retain 
the job. In these cases the general redundancy rules apply, therefore employ-
ees are entitled to a period of notice and redundancy pay, however they do 
not need to be paid their wage for the remaining duration of the fixed-term 
contract. The quickest and cheapest way for flexible adjustment of labour de-
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mand is reducing working time, therefore it is not surprising that in addition 
to the increase in fixed-term employment, part-time employment also became 
much more common (by more than 50 per cent between 2008 and 2013) in 
the years since the crisis (Figure 11).
Figure 11: The rate of people in fixed-term or part-time employment,  
population aged 15–64 years
Source: Own calculation based on basic data from the CSO Labour Force Survey.
The wide fluctuations in fixed-term employment during the year suggest a 
strong seasonal effect and the use of short-term contracts. There is little over-
lap between the two forms of employment; part-time workers tend to have a 
permanent contract. An important difference however, is that the number of 
men and women on fixed-term contracts is very similar, more women work 
part-time and their share is increasing.
For all forms of atypical employment the question of whether their expan-
sion is driven mostly by demand factors (employer’s intention) or supply fac-
tors (employee’s intention) also plays a role. The CSO Labour Force Survey 
asks respondents why they are on a fixed-term contract or work part-time. 
For both forms of employment demand factors seem dominant: people did 
not find another job even though they would have liked to. For fixed-term 
contracts the demand factor is much stronger and the number of people who 
said that they did not want a permanent contract is negligible. More broad-
ly seasonal and casual employment can also be attributed to the demand ef-
fect: it can be assumed that most workers have no other option but to accept 
these jobs. The expansion of public works employment also played a key role 
in the increase in the number of fixed-term contracts (Figure 12). Most peo-
ple indicated subsidised employment as the main justification for a fixed-term 
contract in 2013.
For part-time employment the supply effect is somewhat more prominent, 
a relatively large number of people do not want to or – due to other commit-
ments (studies, family) – cannot have a full-time job (Figure 13).
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Figure 12: Reason for fixed-term employment contract,  
population aged 15–64 years
Source: Own calculation based on basic data from the CSO Labour Force Survey.
Figure 13: Reason for part-time employment, population aged 15–64 years
Source: Own calculation based on basic data from the CSO Labour Force Survey.
The number of people who could not find full-time employment was steadily 
increasing even during the period of growth in 2010–2011. This suggests that 
involuntary (demand-driven) part-time employment might have other drivers 
than economic cycles. Although the number of involuntary part-time work-
ers (people who could not find full-time employment) increased on average 
by three per cent compared to 2012, if only the last quarters are compared 
there is a substantial (15 per cent) drop between 2012 and 2013. In terms of 
sectors, part-time employment is more common in agriculture and services. 
In addition to quantitative adjustment discussed so far, wage adjustment is 
also important. The behaviour of public and private sector is quite different 
in this respect (Figure 14).
According to CSO’s wage statistics, average nominal wages fell in the private 
sector during the second half of 2009,5 however thanks to above-inflation pay 
rises in recent years, real wages have increased by nine per cent compared to 
2008. In contrast, average gross pay in the public sector has been falling more 
5 The CSO employment statis-
tics differentiate between the 
gross monthly earning and gross 
regular monthly earning of 
employees. The latter excludes 
any bonuses and additional pay, 
and if we use this figure in the 
analysis, there is no fall in the 
average nominal wage. The dif-
ference suggests that the first 
response of companies to the 
external shock brought about 
by the downturn was cutting 
bonuses and other payments 
to employees.
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or less steadily: overall by 15 per cent in the past five years. Various measures 
were introduced in 2013 that increased wages: a more than five per cent pay 
rise for public workers, the wage adjustment of health care workers and a new 
career model for teachers in 2013, a 5.4 and 5.6 per increase of the minimum 
wage and guaranteed minimum pay respectively.
Figure 14: Gross real wages (first quarter, 2009 = 100)
Source: Own calculation based on CSO Stadat.
The crisis and fragile growth made companies very cautious when increas-
ing wages; therefore it is worth using the Kaitz-index6 that is the ratio of the 
minimum wage to the median or mean wage (Figure 15). The greater its value, 
the bigger the negative employment effect (Dolton–Bondibene, 2012). The in-
crease of the minimum wage by more than 25 per cent between January 2011 
and 2012 boosted the value of the Kaitz index; however its 2013 value of 42 
per cent, calculated using the national average wage, is not especially high – 
it puts Hungary in the mid-field by international comparison.
Figure 15: Value of Kaitz index, population aged 15–64 years (quarterly)
Source: Own calculation based on CSO employment statistics.
The impact of the minimum wage on employment might have been mitigated 
by new forms of taxation and funding for companies introduced by the job 
protection action plan, in addition to the wage compensation scheme. Em-
6 Due to the asymmetrical dis-
tribution of wages, the median 
wage is lower than the average 
wage, so the Kaitz index calcu-
lated with the median wage is 
higher than the index calculated 
with the mean wage. However, 
there is a strong correlation 
between the values of the two 
indexes in a given country at 
different times.
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ployment was growing steadily in manufacturing and services in the first three 
quarters of 2012 then fell slightly from the fourth quarter until the end of the 
second quarter in 2013 and then starting growing again. This suggests that 
the minimum wage rises between 2011 and 2012 did not have a substantial 
impact on employment or only affected a relatively small number of employers 
negatively. This is also supported by the fact that labour market institutions 
provide more opportunities for wage adjustment to Hungarian companies, 
who tend to use these (NBH, 2013b). Gál et al. (2013) argue that Hungary 
experienced the largest wage-adjustment after the 2008 crisis among the 20 
OECD countries which they examined, however in terms of quantitative ad-
justment it was the third lowest.
labour supply
The overall activity rate reached 65% in 2013, which is its highest value in this 
millennium; however, it is still lower than the EU average. Recent increase in 
activity was largely due to government measures (review of disability pensions, 
increase of state pension age). To explore how much further labour market ac-
tivity can potentially increase, it might be useful to disaggregate inactive people 
into different groups. One of these groups is people who want and are availa-
ble to start work (within two weeks). Figure 16 shows that the number of these 
inactive people who can be termed “passive jobseekers” increased from 2.6 per 
cent in early 2008 to four per cent in early 2013, then it fell below three per cent.
Figure 16: Inactive but wants to work and is available to start work;  
population aged 15–64 years
Source: Own calculation based on basic data from the CSO Labour Force Survey.
In terms of disadvantaged groups in the labour market, the share of passive 
jobseekers was highest in the group of 55–64-year olds and lowest among peo-
ple on parental leave by the end of the period. The higher the share of passive 
jobseekers, the more likely it is that the activity rate will increase further if 
wages go up. The large fall in inactivity in 2012 diminished in 2013 (Figure 
17). At the beginning of 2013 outflow from inactivity into registered unem-
ployment was rising, however later in the year this trend became less intense.
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Figure 17: Changes in inactivity and flows to/from non-subsidised employment  
and unemployment, 2008–2013, population aged 15–64 years  
(excluded: subsidised employment)
Source: IE databank, calculation using Cseres-Gergely’s (2011) method consistent 
with stock and flow.
A positive development was the substantial fall in the inflow into inactiv-
ity from non-subsidised employment during 2013 compared to its very high 
level at the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013. Available data show that 
the flow into registered unemployment is greater than the flow into inactiv-
ity from subsidised employment (Figure 18).
Figure 18: Changes in inactivity and flows to/from subsidised employment  
and unemployment, 2008–2013, population aged 15–64 years  
(excluded: non-subsidised employment)
Source: IE databank, calculation using Cseres-Gergely’s (2011) method consistent 
with stock and flow.
Labour supply is also affected by taxation and this has undergone major chang-
es over the past few years. In 2011 a single-rate – 16 per cent – personal in-
come tax was introduced alongside generous family tax breaks; in 2012 the 
tax refund to low-paid workers was abolished and “super gross” personal in-
come taxation (where personal income tax is paid on gross income before the 
deduction of any social security contributions) was being phased out; in 2013 
“super gross” was abolished together with the upper limit of personal pension 
contribution. When considering the impact of labour taxation on labour sup-
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ply it is useful to examine decisions concerning the number of hours worked 
(intensive margin) and decisions concerning entry into the labour market (ex-
tensive margin) separately because the first is mainly influenced by changes 
in the marginal tax rate, while the latter is affected by the actual tax rate on 
the attainable wage for a given employee. It is not yet possible to fully assess 
the impact of tax reforms due to the short time scale, however a number of 
earlier studies (Bakos et al., 2008, Benczúr et al., 2012a) found that changes 
in the marginal tax rates do not have a significant impact on the labour sup-
ply of lower paid people, however high-paid people (earning above 2 million 
forints/year) were more sensitive to changes in taxation. Benczúr et al. (2012b) 
found that at the extensive margin, taxes had a stronger effect on disadvan-
taged groups in the labour market and women of childbearing age.
unemployment
The mean unemployment rate according to the ILO definition was 10.3 per 
cent in 2013, 0.7 percentage points lower than in 2012. The rate of jobseekers 
registered with the NES within the 15–64-year old population was consistent-
ly higher than the unemployment rate based on the ILO definition through-
out the observed period; however it showed a declining trend (Figure 19).
Figure 19: Rate of different out-of-work groups (partly overlapping)  
within the 15–64-year old population (right axis: inactives)
Source: CSO Labour Force Survey (inactives, ILO unemployed, ILO long-
term unemployed) NES register (registered jobseekers).
The monthly average number of registered jobseekers in the records of the Na-
tional Employment Service was 527,624 people in 2013, 31,478 people less 
than in the previous year. However, the number of unemployed school leav-
ers went up: the monthly average number of unemployed school leavers reg-
istered was 66,025, 7.4 per cent higher than in 2012. As Figure 20 indicates, 
the rate of those who had never had a job increased within total unemploy-
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ment after the first quarter of 2012. The share of those who were made re-
dundant in the service sector grew by 11 per cent compared to the first quar-
ter of 2009 and reached 45 per cent by the end of 2013. The manufacturing 
industry recovered from the downturn and this was also indicated by the fall 
in the share of people made redundant in manufacturing among the unem-
ployed: down from 26 per cent in the second quarter in 2009 to just over 15 
per cent at the end of 2013.
Figure 20: Previous work of the unemployed, by sector  
(rate within total unemployment)
Source: Own calculation based on CSO Labour Force Survey.
The labour market was less tense in 2013 than in previous years. This is also 
suggested by the fact that redundancy was down from 57.7 per cent in 2012 
to 55.8 per cent in 2013 as a reason for unemployment. The number of people 
who handed in their notice doubled in the last quarter of 2013 in comparison 
to the same period in 2012, which might also indicate a more favourable la-
bour market.7 The share of people who became unemployed when the public 
works project they were employed in finished shows a substantial increase af-
ter 2010. The large fluctuations in this compared to redundancy as the reason 
for unemployment (Figure 21) suggests that public works programmes can 
only provide short-term solutions to labour market problems.
Figure 21: Changes in reasons for unemployment
Source: Own calculation based on CSO Stadat.
7 The employee handed in no-
tice due to working conditions, 
financial or other reasons.
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An unfavourable development was the growth in long-term unemployment 
(more than one year) that exceeded 35 per cent in 2013. There is increasing 
agreement on the causes of high unemployment and particularly long-term 
unemployment: these are not caused by economic cycles only but also by 
structural reasons. The most important structural factors are those that are 
caused by the mismatch between labour demand and supply. Employers might 
be looking for people with different qualifications or skills than those which 
jobseekers have, or labour demand and supply are concentrated in different 
geographical areas. Large disparities in local unemployment rates suggest that 
low workforce mobility has also played an important role in the growth of 
long-term unemployment. The general education level has been improving 
since the early 2000s and there are fewer people with no or low education 
in the total population and the economically active population. In the first 
quarter of 2000, 3.75 per cent of the long-term unemployed had a degree and 
24.4 per cent had a general secondary education, while in the first quarter of 
2013 the same figures were 9.83 and 29.9 per cent. Although educational at-
tainment is improving, labour demand is shifting even faster towards people 
with higher levels of education. The number of graduates among people in 
employment was 17.05 per cent in the first quarter of 2000 and had already 
reached 27.49 per cent by the first quarter of 2013. People with no or low 
education had a negative, while graduates had a positive, contribution to the 
expansion of employment since the early 2000s. This suggests that labour de-
mand is gradually shifting towards workers with higher levels of education.
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IntroduCtIon
László Neumann
Compared to the market sector, the public sector is a neglected area of re-
search in terms of both the labour market and industrial relations, namely 
the institutions determining the terms and conditions of employment and 
wages. Disproportionately less attention has been given traditionally to the 
public sector in Hungary despite the fact that, as in other Member States of 
the European Union, the employer of one-third to one quarter of employees 
is – directly or indirectly – the state.1 Such a swelling in the size of the public 
sector is connected historically to the expansion of the public-sector services 
and the emergence of the welfare state, even if sometimes we tend to forget 
this in the Eastern European version of it, called “premature” by János Kornai, 
because of the poor quality of the services and inequalities in our access to 
them. Regardless of the positive or negative perception of the community 
services, in many ways they play a key role in the reproduction of the labour 
force, especially through the public education sector, and in the spheres of 
health, cultural and social services.
The reform and modernization of the public sector has been at the centre of 
attention in the world of public policy ever since the 1970s. There is no doubt 
that the traditional Weberian “closed” model of bureaucracy and public ser-
vice provision is expensive, since here public servants and public service pro-
viders have to receive reliable, sustained income of an appropriate standard, 
even after they retire. The price of their incorruptibility and loyalty is also to 
provide them with a so-called “lifelong career” – long-term promotion op-
portunities and ongoing training –, which, at the same time, protects them 
against unjustified dismissal.
Modernization was a necessity brought about by greater or lesser economic 
crises – such as the 2008–2010 financial and economic crisis, or more precisely 
the budget problems emerging as a result. The obvious way of reducing budget 
expenditures is by cutting public service spending. This can be achieved sim-
ply by reducing the number of civil servants, by curbing their benefits and/
or improving their efficiency, for example by bringing the public service HR 
closer to that of the business sector. This is what the so-called New Public 
Management trend does. As a result of the reforms the “closed”, “career-based” 
system is replaced by hiring/dismissal, evaluation and incentives for a posi-
tion or a task – in other words: the “open” public sector. The instruments of 
more flexible employment – already applied before the recent crisis – are not 
limited to fixed-term contracts, but include also the privatization of some 
1 Through the central govern-
ment or various levels of local 
government apparatus or com-
panies owned by the state/local 
governments.
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services or outsourcing some tasks to private companies or to the appearance 
of atypical, precarious employment relations known from the private sector.
The public sector is also a determining entity from the perspective of the 
analysis of labour market phenomena. Since in the public sector the propor-
tion of employed women, university graduates and older people is above the 
average, the level of earnings of public employees and its fluctuation strongly 
influence overall wage inequalities, the wage differentials between gender and 
age groups and the rate of return of higher education. Although the public 
sector is becoming less and less the world of lifelong “retirement jobs”, it still 
offers a relatively safe and predictable career. Both the civil servant body and 
health as well as social services require a sense of vocation and commitment 
from employees, for whom this provides a sense of social usefulness. This 
opens up particular employee preferences and selection mechanisms, whether 
regarding career choices, staying in the profession or leaving it.
Of course the need for commitment and maintaining the “public service 
ethos” – particularly within the bureaucratic body – required also some spe-
cific legal regulation of the employment conditions, and public sector labour 
law was born from the regulations traditionally belonging more to the admin-
istrative law. In the last decades the regulation of public sector employment 
has come closer to that of the private sector driven by the needs of the New 
Public Management, while the labour law of the private sector itself has also 
changed due to the reforms supporting more flexibility.
The public sector is also special from the point of view of industrial rela-
tions since here the state as employer is at the same time the creator of the 
rules regarding negotiations and consultations with trade unions, therefore 
it is difficult to ensure in labour relations – particularly in collective bargain-
ing – the independence of the partners as required in the private sector. In 
fact in areas where state power is exercised in the public sector – to a differ-
ent extent in various countries and ages – the collective rights of employees, 
the freedom of association, the right of collective bargaining and strike can 
be limited. The direct or indirect employer role of the state represents also a 
certain amount of interference in the private sector conditions – beyond the 
fact that public sector wages affect the private sector labour market. There-
fore the state is widely considered to have a role model provider as an employer 
for the private sector, too.
The traditional attitude of the public sector trade union – due to the special 
selection of the employees already described – has been less confrontation-
al than that of the private sector. In the last few decades, however, in many 
Western countries – particularly ones exposed to budget problems during the 
recent crisis – the public sector trade unions have become stronger and more 
“militant” exactly because of the challenges brought about by the moderniza-
tion of the public sector and the crisis management afflicting its employees.2
2 The importance of this issue 
is shown by the fact that the last 
volume of the biennial series 
of the European Commission, 
entitled Industrial Relations in 
Europe, is dedicated mainly to 
the public sector and the crisis. 
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In Focus views the public sector from two perspectives: the labour market 
processes and their institutional background. However, this duality has im-
posed thematic limitations: while the authors of the sub-chapters analyse sev-
eral professional and sectoral areas and subdivisions, they have had to largely 
ignore the perspective of the policies and disciplines dealing specifically with 
these areas – mainly those related to the service performance, quality or ef-
fectiveness. In Focus is structured in four chapters.
In the first chapter János Köllő writes about the most important facts in 
the Hungarian public sector, dealing with areas such as the headcount, the 
composition and the trend of wage level. The most distinctive feature of the 
Hungarian public sector when compared internationally is the extreme fluc-
tuation – unprecedented in the OECD countries – of wage levels relative to 
the private sector, and – in the light of the current trends – the increasingly 
significant wage disadvantage compared to private sector employees with 
similar (demographic, educational, labour market, etc.) characteristics. The 
study also deals with the impact of income hikes and cuts on wage ratios be-
tween different groups, with the specific wage-path of university graduates 
over their life-long career and the methodological difficulties of studying 
public sector statistics. In writings in boxed texts (brief highlights) László 
Neumann and Kitti Varadovics present the trends of state/local government 
owned companies’ headcounts and wages, Ágota Scharle deals with the size 
and costs of a segment of the labour market of the wider public sector – that 
of the public works programme. These two areas deserve special attention 
because in recent years their size has shown a significant increase due to the 
government’s labour market policy and property policy that has reversed the 
previous privatization trend.3
Chapter 2 analyses the public sector mainly from the perspective of labour 
economics. The majority of recent research published here addresses the inter-
action between the various labour markets as well as the labour market flows. 
Most of the studies investigate the issue of the public-private wage gap which 
also influences the quality of the services and workforce selection. The paper 
of Szilvia Altwicker-Hámori and Anna Lovász examines the differences be-
tween private and public sector wages in the various segments of wage dis-
tribution before and after the big 2002 wage hike. The writing in boxed text 
by Anna Lovász deals with labour market discrimination in the public and 
private sector: with the gender wage gap and with occupational segregation 
through hiring and promotion. The next three sub-chapters focus on the in-
teractions between the labour markets of the public and the private sector. 
Álmos Telegdy analyses the influence of the public sector wage increase from 
2001–2002 on business sector wages. János Köllő is concerned with the in-
fluences of the widely varying wage gap between the two sectors – particu-
larly the large increases before and after the 2002 elections – on the number 
3 It should be noted that the ma-
jority of the studies limit their 
analysis to the public sphere – to 
the civil servants referred to un-
der changing names and public 
service employees – in the strict 
sense; it is indicated, if other-
wise. It is also worth noting that 
within the public sector in the 
strict sense different laws have 
been applying to government 
and municipality civil servants 
as well as armed forces person-
nel in executive power and for 
employees providing public ser-
vice (e.g. in health care, educa-
tion, social care.) See in detail in 
sub-chapters 3.1 and 3.2.
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and quality of professionals coming from the private to the public sector. 
The papers of Péter Elek and Péter Szabó show the opposite direction transi-
tions, presenting the composition and subsequent labour market behaviour 
of public sector leavers, including the chances of their re-employment in po-
sitions suitable to their educational attainment. The two papers written by 
György Molnár and Zsuzsa Kapitány contribute to the research on the already 
mentioned specific selection mechanisms of the public sector. One presents 
those non-monetary motivations and risk-minimizing family strategies that 
favour the choice of jobs in the public sector. The second piece a boxed text 
examines whether the general trend, that public sector employees are more 
satisfied than other workers, is valid in Hungary.
Chapter 3 covers the institutional background of the public sector labour 
market. Due to limited space we could not aim to present public sector la-
bour law and the interest reconciliation system as separate treatises, instead 
here too, we focussed on the latest trends. Beáta Nacsa’s sub-chapter reviews 
the most important changes since 2010 from the perspective of labour law: 
the rules of dismissal without justification, their repeal by the Constitutional 
Court, the new regulations from 2011, which has in essence re-established 
– through the dismissal cause of loss of confidence and indignity – the pre-
repeal situation. Erzsébet Berki’s paper presents the mechanisms of interest 
reconciliation and wage determination in the public sector, also highlighting 
the post-2010 changes. The collective agreements’ coverage data of the Statis-
tical Data chapter referring to the public service employees’ field are related 
to this sub-chapter (Table 10.9). The boxed text looks at collective bargain-
ing in the state-local government owned business sector. It also deals with the 
expected effect of the new law that limits the possible themes of collective 
bargaining at “community owned” companies. The next sub-chapters pre-
sent an outlook on the reform efforts of the public sector taking place in Eu-
rope. László Váradi writes from a human resource management approach to 
describe the objectives and instruments of the new public management, and 
the neo-Weberian approaches that seek to simultaneously comply with the 
requirements of efficiency and of impartiality that ensure a professional and 
fair functioning of the public service. Márk Edelényi and László Neumann 
give an overview of the European Union countries’ public sector labour law 
models and wage determination systems and the role of social dialogue, re-
spectively their recent changes, including the reactions following the 2008 
economic and financial crisis. László Neumann and Márk Edelényi’s other 
study focuses on the local government sector. Firstly, it introduces the efforts 
of privatization, outsourcing and reorganizing within the European Union 
countries, as well as their effects on employment and the regulatory attempts 
connected to this. Secondly, it gives a brief review of similar efforts in Hun-
gary and an insight into the labour relations of the local government-run in-
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stitutions and local government-owned companies. This is complemented by 
a boxed text with two case studies from 2012 connected to the sub-chapter 
describing the labour-related consequences of outsourcing – in-sourcing and 
of handing over to the church.
Chapter 4 of In Focus presents the sub-markets of some principal occupa-
tions of the public sphere, combining the institutional approach with that 
of labour economics. Júlia Varga writes about teachers’ wages, selection and 
those leaving the profession, while János Köllő and Imre Szabó consider the 
situation of physicians. The first deals with wages, tips and gratuities and 
with leaving the career path, the latter about the peculiarities of the inter-
est reconciliations of the health sector, also providing, at the same time, a 
regional outlook on similar processes in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia. Erzsébet Berki, Éva Czethoffer and Endre Szabó also publish two 
papers about the labour market position of those leaving their profession. 
They analyse the occupational trajectory of nurses and other health care pro-
fessionals after their departure from the state health care-system and they 
also look at law enforcement employees after their retirement, whether they 
worked, and if so, in what field and how much they earned. In both cases 
they present the regulation changes within the field: the new pay scale in the 
area of health care and the abolition of the early retirement scheme, which 
triggered perhaps the biggest wave of protests of the post-2010 government 
measures in the public sector.
*
The studies in In Focus have various time frames: labour economics analyses 
are largely from 2008 to 2010, the statistics generally are available until 2013, 
and some descriptive studies were also able to attempt to deal with the latest 
developments. Each chapter, then, where possible, shows the main statistical 
data on time series up until 2013 and analyses the changes in the interest rec-
onciliation institutions also up to 2013. In addition – following the tradition 
of the annals – we publish in In Focus the results of previous research that 
have already been published by their authors in professional journals. Their 
publication here is justified by our endeavour to share their important find-
ings on the processes of the public sector in a more comprehensible form with 
the wider public. Although these studies explore the period between 2008 
and 2010, or are based on international data collection that does not have a 
more recent available database, the results – according to the opinion of the 
editors – are still relevant today. Where possible, the authors have updated 
their previous studies with assessments that take into account the changes 
(for example, the effects of the crisis, the growing disadvantage of public sec-
tor salaries against the private sector, the erosion of the job security advan-
tages due to the frequent reorganizations and the further impairment of the 
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principle of irremovability), and have evaluated their relevance in the light 
of these results, respectively the likely deviations resulting from the changes.
The studies do not seek to directly make public policy recommendations, 
although, of course, their approach is far from being value-neutral. In Focus is 
not homogenous in this respect either: the various authors do not only touch 
upon public policy decisions to a different extent, and approach the public 
sector from different disciplines, but they also have different attitudes to the 
very same phenomenon (for example to the modernization of employment re-
lations). The aim of the editors of the book was to bring the authors’ different 
approaches into contention in order to present a diverse picture to the readers 
interested in public policy. Of course, as always in science, and on this occa-
sion too, the authors are the only ones responsible for the views expressed in 
their study and for the possible factual errors and mistakes.
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1. what do we know about publIC seCtor 
employment?
János Köllő
There have been surprisingly few studies looking at the public sector both in 
Hungary and internationally. One of the reasons is the absence of strong exog-
enous shocks: the size and relative earnings in the public sector have changed 
little in most countries and over time and this makes it difficult to differen-
tiate between real and spurious differences, as well as cause and effect. An-
other barrier is the lack of information: data often does not even allow us to 
distinguish between the public and private sectors. Another factor that quite 
possibly contributes to the lack of research interest is the fact that the objec-
tives of decision makers in the public sector are more difficult to define than 
those in the private sector and therefore it is difficult to put forward and test 
behavioural models (that are not based on ad hoc assumptions), and this is a 
serious competitive disadvantage to getting published.
Economists in Hungary are in a favourable position: measures of consecu-
tive governments – including the “Bokros package”, large pay rises before and 
after the 2002 general elections, pay cuts implemented after 2004 and recent 
austerity measures that also affect employment – created quasi experimental 
situations that allow the examination of a range of relationships which would 
be difficult to analyse under more stable circumstances. At the same time the 
availability of statistical data is relatively good. However, as will be argued 
below, even finding the key facts is a challenging task.
Size of the public sector
It is not easy to define who is part of the public sector. The law distinguishes 
between those with a work contract on the one hand, and public servants, civil 
servants, judges and prosecutors, or more recently governmental employees and 
public workers on the other. Those in employment are categorised according to 
the legal source of regulation (i.e. the Labour Code, Public Service Act etc.). A 
similar approach is adopted in the labour statistics of the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (CSO), and the Wage Tariff Survey of the National Labour 
Office. Other sources of economic data distinguish the publicly-funded sector 
and the business sector, the latter including publicly-owned companies. Inter-
national comparison is made practically impossible by the fact that most data-
sets that would be potentially suitable for this only differentiate entire sectors 
that are predominantly public (education, health care, social care), however 
there is a large number of private companies operating in these sectors.1 At 
the same time there are many companies in the private sector that are fully 
1 With the exception of public 
administration where there are 
some international compara-
tive studies (for example OECD, 
2011).
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dependent on public institutions, either because they carry out outsourced ac-
tivities or because they only supply central or local government organisations. 
In Hungary, the picture is further complicated by an unusually large number 
of workers involved in publicly useful work programs. Where possible, they 
are excluded from analysis, however in some datasets it is impossible to sepa-
rate them from regular employees.
Table 1.1 shows that according to the CSO’s labour statistics and the Wage 
Tariff Survey public sector employees made up approximately 30% of the to-
tal number of people working in companies with 5 or more employees and 
government-funded organisations in 2013. Other types of data are available 
from the CSO’s Labour Force Survey. This makes no distinction between 
civil servants and public servants, however it does differentiate based on sec-
tor and ownership. According to this, employees of state-owned corporations 
and public institutions make up 27% of employment as defined by the ILO-
OECD and 33% of employees in 2011. (See Box 1.2 for an estimate of the 
workforce in public/local government-owned corporations). People employed 
in public administration, public education, health care and social care consti-
tuted 28% of employees and 22% of total employment. Although the figures 
vary with the definitions of “public sector” and “employment”, and affected 
by the inclusion or exclusion of public workers, the differences are relatively 
small: according to the latest available figures, approximately 30% of all employ-
ees and around one in four of those in employment worked in the public sector.
Table 1.1: Percentage of public sector workers in total employment  
and employee jobs in 2013 based on various sources
As % of total 
employment
As % of 
employees Time period
Institutional labour statistics
Public sector employees – 29.1a 2013
Wage Tariff Survey
Civil servants, public servants, judges, prosecutors, public workers – 31.4b May, 2013
Civil servants, public servants, judges, prosecutors – 27.2b May, 2013
Labour Force Survey
Employees of public corporations, public institutions, local 
governmentsc 27.2 32.5 1
st quarter, 2013
Employees of central or local government institutions in educa-
tion, health care or social care 22.4 27.8 1
st quarter, 2013
a CSO Stadat Table 2.1.33 (Data from June 23, 2014). The target population is public in-
stitutions, companies with five or more employees and some non-profit organisations.
b Author’s own calculation, observations weighted with coefficients provided by the 
National Labour Office. The target population is public institutions and businesses 
with five or more employees and non-profit organisations.
c Labour Force Survey, author’s own calculation. People in employment includes eve-
ryone who had done at least one hour of paid work in the previous week or who did 
not do any paid work but were away from work only temporarily.
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Naturally, it is considerably more difficult to estimate the number of private 
companies that are closely linked to the public sector. Using data from the 
CSO’s labour force survey Elek and Szabó (2013) concluded that 40% of shifts 
from the public to the private sector between 1998 –2002 did not involve a 
job change, suggesting large-scale outsourcing (for a summary of their study 
see Chapter 2.4 of this In Focus). Later, between 2002–2008, this was a lot 
less common. The number of private companies dependent on government 
purchases cannot be estimated without specialised surveys.
Within the public sector, the share of public administration and educa-
tion is 39 and 36 per cent respectively, while health and social care make up 
25 per cent. Fifty-seven per cent of public sector workers were employed by 
local governments in 2011, however this share had shrunk to 45 per cent by 
2013. Currently, central government constitutes the largest segment of the 
public sector (Table 1.2).
Table 1.2: Distribution of public sector employees by sector and level  
in the first quarter of 2013, in sectors dominated by public provision
Central Government Local Government Total
Public administration 25.2 14.0 39.2
Education 16.3 19.6 35.9
Health care 12.2 8.3 20.5
Social care 1.4 2.9 4.3
Total 55.1 44.8 100.0
Note: The definition of public sector is based on the sector and the ownership status 
of the employer. Figures also include the number of public workers.
Source: CSO Labour Force Survey, 1st quarter, 2013. Author’s calculation.
The probability of employment in the public sector largely depends on gender, 
education and age: in 2011 the share of public sector workers was 19% among 
men and 45% among women; 15% among those with completed primary edu-
cation and a vocational qualification, 27% among those with completed sec-
ondary education, 54% among those with higher education and 82% among 
those who did not complete primary education. The latter figure is so high 
because it includes people in public works programmes. Data from the Wage 
Tariff Survey show that the share of public sector employment increases with 
age (it is 22% among people in their twenties, 26% for those in their thirties, 
36% in their forties and it is 40% among those aged over 50).
Trends in employment and pay over time
The size of the public sector increased from 650 thousand to 800 thousand 
during the years of political transition when a number of activities previously 
carried out by the Party apparatus or state-owned enterprises were transferred 
to publicly-funded institutions (inspection, planning, supervision, welfare and 
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children’s services) and when new types of services were also created. The ex-
pansion was halted by the “Bokros package” launched in March 1995 that also 
resulted in a 10-per cent decrease in the number of public sector employees.
After the turn of the millennium their number started to increase again 
until 2006 when a high budget deficit resulted in measures to reduce employ-
ment (Figure 1.1). However, the size of the public sector declined only up to 
2008 and during the years of the crisis it stabilised – it even increased consid-
erably if the number of public workers is taken into account. The number of 
employees was 3% higher in the public sector in January – March 2011 than 
in the same period three years earlier, while in the private sector there was a 
4.8% fall. Nonetheless, the size of the public sector also later started to de-
cline. Its current size is best compared to its 2000 level when the number of 
public workers was still negligible: data indicates a loss of 130 thousand peo-
ple since that time. If the number of public works participants is included in 
the public sector workforce then an increase can be observed since 2008 and 
particularly since 2013 when public works programmes did not decline dur-
ing the cold season in November and December.
Figure 1.1: Employment in the public sector, 1986–2013 (thousand people)
Note: No comparable data is available on the numbers of the workforce in 
public works programmes before 2010.
Source: CSO Stadat and Wage Tariff Survey 1986, 1989, 1992, 1994–2003.
The employment statistics suggest a high level of instability – a 130-thousand 
increase after transition, followed by a decline of 60 thousand, and then an 
increase of the same magnitude, followed by another decrease by nearly 150 
thousand – but fluctuations in the level of public sector pay were even more 
marked. The public sector pay advantage or disadvantage compared to similar 
employees in terms of gender, age and education in the private sector fluctu-
ated within the range of –22 and +17 percentage points (Figure 1.2).
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Figure 1.2: Regression-adjusted pay advantage/disadvantage  
of the public sector 1986–2013 (percentage points)
Note: Regression estimates: on the left side of the equation it is the logarithm of pay 
and on the right side it is gender, number of years in education, labour market expe-
rience, its square and a public sector variable. The points measure the effect of the 
latter in percentage points.
Source: Wage Tariff Survey, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1994–2011. (Data is from May for each 
year. Prior to 1995 the Wage Tariff Survey only included companies with more than 
20 employees, and until 2000 with more than 10 employees.)
The “Bokros package” worsened the pay position of the public sector by more 
than 10 percentage points relative to the private sector. The narrowing of the 
pay gap continued between 1997–2000 but was later followed by a sharp in-
crease. The increase of the minimum wage by Mr. Orbán’s first Government 
had a strong impact on the public sector because in 2000, 60% of non-gradu-
ate public sector workers were earning less than 50 thousand forints per month, 
the minimum wage in 2002. (The same number was 40% in companies with 
more than four employees in the private sector.) Secondly, before the gener-
al election in May 2002, the Orbán Government significantly increased the 
pay of civil servants. As a result the average real pay increased by 17% in the 
public sector between May 2001 and 2002, compared to seven per cent in 
the private sector. Thirdly and most importantly, when the Medgyessy-led 
Government entered into office in May 2002 they increased the basic pay of 
public servants by 50% in line with their pre-election pledge (the increase was 
endorsed by all parliamentary parties). As a result the average pay of public 
servants increased by 29% in real terms between May 2002 and 2003, com-
pared to an increase of “only” 11% in the private sector. The pay disadvantage 
of the public sector (–6 percentage points in 2002) turned into a substantial 
pay premium: 11-percentage points in 2003 and 17 per cent in 2004.
The pay advantage, however, disappeared within three years. On the one 
hand, as is shown by Telegdy (2013) – summarised in Chapter 2.2 of this In 
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Focus – pay in the private sector, particularly in jobs where workers can easily 
move between sectors, increased faster than average after 2003. On the other 
hand, the austerity measures introduced to reduce the large internal and ex-
ternal deficit in 2006 rapidly eroded the pay advantage of the public sector. 
Finally, the abolition of the additional 13th month pay of civil and public serv-
ants in 2009 meant an immediate drop of 12 percentage points in the rela-
tive pay level of the public sector. This was compounded by an informal but 
effective freeze of the basic pay of civil and public servants at the 2008-level. 
In 2012 the gradual pay increase of doctors and nurses was decided and in 
2013 teachers’ pay also increased, but these had not reversed the worsening 
trend by May 2013: public sector employees were paid 20% less than their 
counterparts – based on gender, age and education – in the private sector; 
just as in 1996, the second year of the “Bokros package”.
On instability in the public sector
This section presents some of the characteristics of Hungarian regulation that 
are essential for understanding the public sector labour market. The first is 
the extreme instability of the public sector’s relative pay level.
As has been shown the relative pay level of the public sector compared to 
the private sector fluctuated between the extremes of a more than 20-per-
centage-point pay disadvantage and a nearly 20-percentage-point wage pre-
mium since 1986. Such fluctuation of the pay gap was unprecedented in the 
European Union before the 2008 financial and economic crisis. (Even since 
then, only Romania experienced a loss of advantage comparable to Hungary, 
see Vasile, 2012.)
 Table 1.3: The range of pay gaps between the public and private sectors  
in selected countries between 1993 and 2000 (percentage points)
Country Minimum Maximum Difference
Austria 1.5 4.3 2.8
Finland –1.3 0.0 1.3
France –3.2 7.7 10.9
Germany 7.9 10.4 2.6
Greece 9.6 21.8 12.2
Holland 3.6 7.5 3.9
Ireland 16.3 21.9 5.6
Italy 10.3 12.1 1.8
Portugal 16.7 23.0 6.3
Spain 13.8 20.3 6.5
Hungary 1993–2000a –22.0 –3.8 18.2
Hungary 2001–2008b –11.6 17.7 29.3
a Compared to companies with more than 20 employees.
b Compared to companies with more than four employees.
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Note: Positive (negative) values indicate the pay advantage (disadvantage) of the 
public sector. Control variable in the Campos and Centeno (2012) study: gender, 
age, square age, education, marital status, years in service. Control variables for the 
Hungarian data: gender, age, square age, education.
Source: European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data from Table 5.1 in 
Campos and Centeno (2012). Values for Hungary are the author’s calculation based 
on data from the Wage Tariff Survey.
As data in Table 1.3 (based on Campos and Centeno, 2012 and our own calcu-
lations) indicate, the difference between the minimum and maximum value 
of the pay gap nowhere exceed 6.5 percentage points between 1993 and 2000, 
apart from in Greece and France. Meanwhile in Hungary the difference was 
18.2 percentage points in the same period and 29.5 percentage points in the 
following eight years. It should also be highlighted that in Greece the pay gap 
reached the 12.2 percentage points range as a result of a steady increase, and 
in France the pay gap ranged between –3 and +8 percentage points. Fluctua-
tions similar to the Hungarian ones – as well as the large pay disadvantage at 
the nadirs – are rather exceptional in developed market economies.2
The effect of pay rises and reductions on relative earnings
The second characteristic can be seen in the differences within the public 
sector: the highly paid benefitted more from the pay rises between 2000 and 
2004; however the decrease during the “Bokros package” in 1994–1996, and 
particularly the decline since 2004 also affected them the most. This is illus-
trated in Figure 1.3 with public servants who make up the largest group in 
the public sector. To create the figure, public servants were ranked into 100 
groups based on their pay for each year. For each percentile the ratio of their 
average pay to the national average was calculated. The graphs of Figure 1.3 
illustrate the changes in these relative pay indicators. A value of 1.0 means 
that the rate of increase or decrease was the same as in the general economy.
The austerity measures of the “Bokros package” had a somewhat stronger 
effect on the high earners except for the highest paid two per cent (99th and 
100th percentiles). In the “years of plenty” between 2000 and 2004, when the 
pay of public servants increased well above the national average, the pattern 
was more complex. There is a relatively large gain at the bottom of the dis-
tribution. There is a rapid increase in pay between the 10th and 70th percen-
tiles, especially towards the higher ranks. In the top third of the distribution 
– where basic pay constitutes a smaller part of pay and thus the effect of an 
increase is also smaller – the rate of pay increase is smaller; however it is still 
about a third higher than the national average.
Pay changes showed a U-shaped curve between 2004 and 2013. The pay of 
the lowest paid workers kept up with the national average thanks to the mini-
mum wage; however higher in the pay hierarchy there are increasing relative 
pay losses with the exception of the highest paid 10%, where towards the top 
2 However, Gimpelson and 
Lukiyanova (2009) find a very 
substantial pay disadvantage 
(26–28 percentage points ac-
cording to their regression es-
timates) in the Russian public 
sector in the early 2000s.
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the data show smaller relative losses. The top two per cent avoided the (rela-
tive) pay decrease affecting the majority of public sector workers altogether 
and they even had a modest increase.
Figure 1.3: Changes in the pay of public servants in comparison  
to the national average by pay percentiles, between different time periods (ratio)
Source: Wage Tariff Survey.
As a result of austerity measures since 2004, public sector pay declined to the 
level of the last “peace year” before the Bokros package. Figure 1.4 shows that 
the lowest paid public sector workers (percentiles 1–10, first decile) earned 
30–40% of the national average in 1994, and 40–50% in 2013. In both years, 
approximately one in four public servants was paid more than the national 
average. At the same time, the distribution of earnings became more bal-
anced: the gradient towards the lower end of the distribution was less steep 
in 2013 than in 1994.
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Figure 1.4: Pay of public servants compared to the national average, 1994, 2013 
(Wage Tariff Survey, percentage)
Note: To calculate the national averages only data from companies with more 
than 20 employees was taken into account. The 200–300 percentage values for 
the 99th and 100th percentiles were not included to ensure clarity of the figure.
Source: Wage Tariff Survey, 1994, 2013.
The age-earnings profile of college/university graduates
The third characteristic is the distinctive age-earnings profile of graduate pub-
lic and civil servants. Earlier studies (see for example Varga’s 2008 paper on 
the teacher labour market) have already highlighted the U-shaped relative pay 
profile of graduate public servants: the pay disadvantage of the youngest and 
the oldest is considerable smaller than in the middle cohorts. This is because 
the regulations set a linear wage path for public servants and civil servants 
while in the private sector graduate – particularly university graduate – pay 
follows a strongly non-linear pattern: starting from a low level it increases 
rapidly then starts to decline towards the end of the career path.
Figure 1.5 shows that graduate school leavers earn 20–30 per cent less than 
their counterparts with a similar education and age in the private sector. Their 
disadvantage increases to 50–60 per cent around the age of 40. The disad-
vantage is smaller in the older cohort, it returns to the 25–30 per cent range. 
The pay disadvantage of college graduates is somewhat smaller, but the rela-
tive age-earnings curve shows a similar pattern.
The U-shaped curve, which essentially resulted from a legislative error in 
the early 1990s that has not been corrected since, has important implications. 
Firstly, young graduates entering public service face a continuous decline in 
relative pay in the first 15 years of their career and thus staying in public ser-
vice means an increasing relative pay loss each year.
40
50
60
70
80
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
Relative earnings Predicted value
University graduates
40
50
60
70
80
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
College graduates
in focus
52
Figure 1.5: Graduate pay in the public sector compared to private sector employees  
of similar age and education, 2013 (percentage)
Source: Wage Tariff Survey, 2013.
Secondly, in austere years, such as 2013, the disadvantage of middle cohorts 
can become extreme. Even if there are a number of non-pay rewards to set 
against the pay disadvantage (such as greater job security, longer holiday enti-
tlement, feeling of usefulness, power in some areas, privileges, gratuities and 
income from corruption in others), according to international experience, a 
pay disadvantage of this extent – 50–60 per cent – is generally not permit-
ted by legislation in developed market economies.
Thirdly, the U-shaped curve is so marked that it can influence the devel-
opment of the relative pay of some birth cohorts in calendar time. If pay goes 
up in the public sector, its effect can be partly or fully offset by the fact that 
young people lose relative to their counterparts in the private sector each year 
until the age of 30–35 years. However, in older groups the effect of age adds 
to the effect of pay increase along the age-earnings profile: after the age of 35 
years graduates in the public sector move closer to private sector employees 
even without a sectoral pay increase.
This is illustrated by Figure 1.6 which follows the development of pay of 
four birth cohorts whose members were 55, 45, 35, or 28 years old in 2003. 
(People who were 25 in 2003, were still secondary school students at the be-
ginning of the observations, therefore a slightly older cohort was selected.) 
The figures are based on information from the Electronic Register of the Cen-
tral Administration of National Pension Insurance (in Hungarian: Országos 
Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság Központi Elektronikus Nyugdíj-nyilvántar-
tási Rendszere; “Kelen” for short) that has enough observations to enable an 
analysis by birth cohorts. The curves show the effect of pay rises before and 
after the 2002 general election. The substantial disadvantage of the two older 
cohorts turned into a significant advantage, while in the case of the younger 
cohorts, the pay increases were enough only to stabilise their position – they 
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were still at a substantial disadvantage compared to their counterparts in the 
private sector even in the best years. This also implies that in years when pay 
is decreasing, younger cohorts are especially worse off.
Figure 1.6: Pay in graduate jobs in selected cohorts, 1998–2008 (percentage)
Indicator: employment status and daily pay calculated from the annual income of 
public servants/civil servants who had been in continuous employment during the 
year, expressed as a percentage of the average of the total sample.
Source: Kelen, 20 per cent sample.
Public sector pay and the gender wage gap
The fourth characteristic that should be highlighted is the impact of pay fluc-
tuations in the public sector on the situation of women. If the size of the two 
sectors, the proportion of women within the sectors and their pay disadvan-
tages remains stable (the latter stabilised after 1993 in Hungary), then there 
will be a linear relationship between public sector pay and the gender pay gap. 
This is a rather trivial relationship, however its strength is noteworthy – this 
is highlighted by Figure 1.7. The horizontal axis of the graph indicates the 
regression-adjusted pay disadvantage (controlled for age and education) of the 
public sector. The vertical axis represents the gender pay gap in the overall econ-
omy using similar controls. The curve and the years indicate how the labour 
market moved within these coordinates in Hungary between 1994 and 2011.
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Figure 1.7: Public sector and the gender pay gap,  
1994–2013 (points on the logarithm)
Source: Wage Tariff Survey.
The points are essentially aligned on a straight line that has a gradient of 0.32. 
In other words, a 10-per-cent decline in the pay level of the public sector, in-
creases the pay disadvantage of women by 3.2 per cent.3 Considering the wide 
fluctuations of relative pay in the public sector, it seems justified to argue that 
the budgetary and political cycles of the past 20 years had the strongest effect 
on the labour market disadvantage of women.
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1.1 Number of employees and average wages in government  
and municipality owned businesses
László Neumann & Kitti Varadovics
Given that the state-municipality owned business 
sector is, as a rule, classified as a part of the mar-
ket sector – since the Labour Code is relevant also 
for employees of this sector –, this “hidden” public 
sector is virtually an unexplored area for statistical 
analysis. It is this shortfall that we have attempted 
to address by analysing data from the individual 
wage surveys conducted by the National Labour 
Office (Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal, NMH) be-
tween 2000 and 2013. These data allow a break-
down of the market sector according to ownership 
structure into enterprises with a majority of state-
local government ownership and to “genuine” pri-
vate companies, where the state or the municipal-
ity has no, or only minority, ownership. Further 
fine-tuning of the analysis is possible if, within 
public assets, we separate state assets from munic-
ipal ones by relying on data from corporate tax re-
turns, which are connected to the wage surveys of 
the KRTK data bank.
We are aware that for methodological reasons 
wage surveys are far from ideal for estimating the 
number of employees, nevertheless, for want of a 
better approach, we have to accept it as a first es-
timate. According to the data, the number of em-
ployees in the government and municipal business 
sector has decreased by 100,000 over the past dec-
ade, but still numbered 190,000 people in 2012 
and 145,000 in 2013 (Figure B1.1.1). Taking this 
into consideration significantly enriches the well-
known institutional statistical data on public sec-
tor employment (see Chapter 1).
Over the decade employment at companies 
owned by the central government decreased sharp-
ly and steadily, but grew at municipally owned en-
terprises. There was a radical change from 2004 
to 2005, the explanation for which as yet remains 
unknown. On figure B1.1.1., up until 2011 (the last 
year when we were able to separate state and mu-
nicipal ownership) we put “unknown” for the num-
ber of employees at companies where there was no 
information on whether the owner was the govern-
ment or a municipality. Such headcount figures dif-
fered each year (ranging between 11 and 39%) and 
the outstanding changes in 2008 and 2011 are, as 
it were, complements of municipal employment, 
therefore we can assume that the outlier data (more 
or less the part over 30,000) also represent munici-
pal companies. With this correction it seems that 
since the 2006 austerity measures the employment 
level at municipality-owned companies has stabi-
lized at around 100,000 employees. It can only be 
increasing because of expanding participation in 
the public works programme, although our esti-
mate based on the wage survey suggests that un-
til 2012 in this sector the increase of the full or 
part time workforce within the public works pro-
gramme did not go beyond 5,000.
Figure B1.1.1: Number of employees at state and 
municipally owned enterprises, 2000–2013 
Source: Wage Tariff Survey and the connected data 
on corporate tax returns from the National Tax and 
Customs Administration of Hungary.
The dynamics of earnings, non-adjusted for infla-
tion, is almost unchanged in this sector, showing a 
steady increase (Figure B1.1.2.a). In the public sec-
tor (public servants and public service employees, 
without the public works programme) however, the 
increasing of wages ceased after 2008 and as a re-
sult of the crisis the dynamics of the genuine pri-
vate sector was broken by 2010. Thus neither the 
government’s austerity measures, nor the impact of 
the crisis prevailed in the sector studied. The only 
marked change can be noted in connection with 
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the central state assets between 2006–2008, when 
the sector fell behind the municipal sector which 
was enjoying a steady increase in earnings, and also 
fell below the private sector. This disadvantage was 
overcome by an outstanding growth in 2009. (We 
do not know the exact reason behind the fluctua-
tion but the assumption is that the Gyurcsány gov-
ernment had the state asset management organisa-
tions implement its austerity measures in the first 
two years, while the successor Bajnai government 
gave in to corporate efforts in this respect.)
Differences between state- and municipality-
owned companies are even more striking when we 
consider the fluctuation of yearly wage increases 
(Figure B1.1.2.b). The minimum wage hike in 2001–
2002 can be perceived in every sector, as can also 
companies’ reactions to it: pay increases were with-
held in the following years. This was a particular-
ly powerful process, causing an explicit decline in 
wages and lasting two years in the sector of munici-
pal enterprises, despite the statistics showing that 
the proportion of low wage earners is no higher here 
than in the private sector or among public servants 
and public service employees. Another noteworthy 
phenomenon is the central government’s “tighten-
ing-loosening” wage policy after 2006, which pro-
duced almost regular two-year cycles.
In order to define income disparity within sectors 
we used the inter-decile wage ratios of gross salaries 
(D9/D1, pertaining to the breakpoints of the first-
second and ninth-tenth deciles) (Figure B1.1.3). As 
was expected, income disparities (the maximum be-
ing 5.1) are greatest in the real private sector, which 
decreased significantly in 2012 and remained low in 
the following year, probably due to the government’s 
“wage compensation” measure that impelled the 
mandatory increase of low wages. The entire govern-
mental-municipal sector is closest to the aggregated 
public sector (excluding public works programmes). 
The minimum wage hike in 2001–2002 squeezed 
the pay scale in the private and the municipal sec-
tor but its impact was hardly visible at companies 
owned by the central government. In 2013 the 
smallest income disparity (3.0) was detected in the 
public sector, which can be explained by the squeez-
ing of the pay scale, which on this occasion was due 
to the minimum wage arriving at a level which ex-
ceeded frozen wages in pay scales. (See sub-chapter 
3.2 of the present volume). Although the indica-
tor of enterprises owned by municipalities and the 
central government has shown great swings over 
the decades – not independently from the annual 
wage increases –, it has nevertheless remained in 
the range between 3.0 and 4.0.
Figure B1.1.2: Average wage and its yearly change at 
state- and municipally-owned companies, 2000–2013
a) Average wage (HUF)
Source: See: Figure B1.1.1.
Figure B1.1.3: Wage differentials (D9/D1)  
in different sectors
Source: See: Figure B1.1.1.
b) Yearly change (percentage)
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1.2 The size and cost of public works employment
Ágota Scharle
One of the characteristics of the public sector in 
Hungary is the large and expanding public works 
sector, which employed more workers than the tex-
tile industry or water management and almost as 
many as the public health care sector in 2010 (Fig-
ure B1.2.1). In Hungary on average 30–40 thou-
sand people worked in some form of public works 
each year between 1996 and 2008. This number 
increased to 60–100 thousand after 2009 and in 
2013 it surpassed 130 thousand. This means that 
on any given day of the year, on average 10–14 per 
cent (21% in 2013) of the registered unemployed 
were employed in public works programmes, and 
this was approximately equal to the total number 
of people in re-training, wage subsidy and other ac-
tive labour market programmes.* The total cost of 
the various public works programmes was around 
0.1–0.2 per cent of the GDP before 2008, which in-
creased to 0.2–0.5 per cent after the launch of the 
“Road to Work” programme.
Figure B1.2.1: Share of public works employment 
within the public sector, 1992–2013
Source: Number of people in public works pro-
grammes: IE CERS HAS Database and Annual 
Reports of the NLO, Cseres-Gergely (2014). Public 
sector workforce: CSO institutional labour statis-
tics and János Köllő’s estimate based on the NLO’s 
Wage Tariff Survey.
According to OECD data from 2010, only Belgium 
had similarly high public spending on public works 
programmes (0.39% of the Hungarian and 0.36% of 
the Belgian GDP). Expenditure in Ireland, France 
and Slovenia was also high, but more modest than 
in Hungary, while other European countries spent 
below 0.1% of their GDP. The number of partici-
pants in public works programmes is also extremely 
high. In Hungary 2.4 per cent of the active popula-
tion worked in some form of public works in 2010, 
in Belgium 3.2 per cent. The number of partici-
pants was also relatively high in Slovakia, Ireland 
and France (1.6, 1.1 and 1.0 per cent respectively), 
while in other countries it was below one per cent.
There have been public works programmes in 
Hungary since 1987. Similar public works pro-
grammes, although under different names and 
somewhat different conditions, were run by local 
councils from 1987, then by labour offices/centres 
from 1990, by the Public Works Council from 1996 
as well as by municipal governments from 1997. 
However, their scope reached this spectacular-
ly high level only after the launch of the Road to 
Work programme in 2009.
According to current regulation, people in public 
works programmes are employees in some respect: 
they pay pension and health care contributions, 
they are entitled to sick leave and annual leave, 
however their pay is somewhat under the statuto-
ry minimum wage.** Municipal governments can 
organise public works programmes for activities 
that promote the “public good”, except for core mu-
nicipal tasks. Therefore, for example health visitor, 
nursery worker and social welfare officer jobs can-
not be filled with public works employees.
Public works provides cheap labour, but only 
that. Therefore it only represents good value for 
municipalities if it is used for tasks that do not re-
* More precisely, the number of people employed in 
public works programmes was compared to the sum 
of registered unemployed and public works partici-
pants.
** Another difference is that (unlike regular employees) 
if they refuse to take part in public works (or hand 
in their notice and leave) they cannot re-register as 
unemployed and claim benefits for 60 days.
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quire substantial capital, highly specialised skills 
and expertise, or major organisation and manage-
ment. On the one hand, this encourages local com-
munities to use highly labour intensive technolo-
gies to carry out the tasks that are most useful to 
them. On the other hand, it also encourages them 
to choose projects that can be efficiently accom-
plished using mainly manual labour. In the first 
case, the municipality is contributing to the pub-
lic good, however in a wasteful manner. In the sec-
ond case, although they are using their resources 
efficiently, there is no guarantee that they are car-
rying out tasks that are most useful for the public. 
Whichever option municipalities follow, the sub-
stantial amount spent on public works fails to max-
imise the public good. ***
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2. wage level and seleCtIon In the publIC seCtor
2.1 Wage differential between the public and private  
sector in Hungary between 2002 and 2008  
– the long term effect of wage increase
Szilvia Altwicker-Hámori & Anna Lovász
Contrary to experiences in Western European countries, in Hungary the av-
erage wage in the public sector is lower than in the private sector. The grow-
ing wage inequality between sectors in the 1990’s resulted in social discontent 
and a decline in the demand for public sector jobs. To alleviate the situation 
the Government made pledges and introduced various measures: in line with 
their election campaign promises they increased the basic wage in the public 
sector on average by 50 per cent. In addition to improving fairness and ap-
peasing public opinion, this also aimed to attract and retain highly qualified 
workers in the public sector. This chapter explores trends in the development 
of the wage gap between the public and the private sector in the context of 
wage reform between 2002 and 2008 using data from the National Employ-
ment Office’s Wage Tariff Survey. It aims to answer the question of whether 
the wage increase helped the public sector to compete for a high quality work-
force. The analysis is limited to public servants because they were affected by 
the 50% wage rise, and it concentrates on trends over time between sectors.
The analysis follows Machado and Mata’s (2005) counterfactual decompo-
sition method using quantile regression that enables us to identify different 
sources of wage differential: those that arise from the different characteristics 
of workers and employers, and the unexplained (residual) difference. The lat-
ter difference provides a better estimate of the real wage differential between 
public and private sector workers than the overall wage gap. The method of 
quantile regression also enables us to analyse the difference at various points 
of the wage distribution, rather than using the means.1 Given that the shape 
of distribution is different in the private and public sector, it is difficult to as-
sess the effect of wage rise for different groups using only the mean.
Wages in the public and private sector
Wage setting in Hungary is under political pressure – this is not unique – 
thus the wage scale is set in a way that ensures that workers in low-skilled 
jobs are not paid too little and highly skilled workers are not paid too much. 
Therefore, the spread of wages in the public sector is smaller than in the pri-
vate sector where the primary aim is competition and wages are based on 
productivity. These differences can be observed on the density estimation of 
1 Difference between average 
wages was examined by Telegdy 
(2007). The average wage was 
18 per cent higher in the public 
sector than in the private sector 
in 2004 as a result of the pay 
rise. Based on estimated unex-
plained wage differentials, pub-
lic sector pay was higher than 
private sector pay in nearly all 
educational and occupational 
categories in 2004 (with the 
exception of graduates where 
the differential was under four 
per cent). This suggests that the 
government was successful in 
aligning and even increasing 
public sector wages.
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wage distribution by sectors and gender (Figure 2.1.1). For the public sector 
(public servants) the distributions are more pointy (condensed), while in the 
public sector the tails of the distributions are flatter. The figures also illustrate 
the problem of fictitious minimum wages (under-reporting of wage) because 
there is a clear peak – particularly for men – at the level of minimum wage 
in the private sector.2
Figure 2.1.1: Unconditional wage distribution in the public and private sector  
by gender, 2002, 2003, 2008
Note: Estimated Kernel-distribution of the logarithm of wage in the private and 
public sector, for women and men, 2002, 2003 and 2008. Public sector refers to 
public servants and the private sector is defined as workers employed by companies 
with at least 20 employees. Wage is real wages, deflated for 2008 prices using the 
consumer price index
Source: Wage Tariff Survey database.
The Government introduced differential wage increases for different groups 
of public sector workers (government officials, police, army and judicature 
employees) between 2001 and 2003. The most significant wage reform was 
implemented in 2002 – an average of 50 per cent wage increase for public 
servants – that affected approximately 20 per cent of the total workforce 
in Hungary. The Government also modified the existing wage scale3 after it 
had become squeezed as a result of the minimum wage increase and there-
2 Various studies look at the 
prevalence and effect of under-
reporting of wages, especially 
“fake minimum wage earners”; 
see for example Elek et al. (2012).
3 The public service pay scale 
has fixed salary bands while the 
civil service pay scale sets out of 
minimum pay level for people 
in the same occupational group 
with the same level of education 
and experience. The pay scale is 
progressive both horizontally 
and vertically: wages increase 
according to 10 educational 
categories (A–J), within each 
educational category pay in-
creases according to experience 
continued
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fore it also changed relative wage. Figure 2.1.1 shows the impact of changes 
on the distribution of wages in the two sectors during this period. In 2003, 
compared to 2002, wage distribution in the public sector moved right as a 
result of large wage increases; however, in 2008 the distributions became 
more similar again. The next section takes a closer look at the changes in the 
relative position of workers in the two sectors and the groups that were most 
affected by the reform.
Data
The empirical analysis uses the database of the Wage Tariff Survey – this is 
an annual, representative, cross-sectional survey – that includes information 
on both private and public sector employees. Public sector institutions include 
public servants, civil servants, judges and prosecutors; however, this analy-
sis focuses on public servants because the 50 per-cent wage increase affected 
only this group. Public servants make up approximately 85–89 per cent of all 
public sector employees. Judges and civil servants have separate wage scales. 
The Wage Tariff database includes a sample of all workers employed by public 
sector organisations. The private sector (business sector) refers to employees of 
businesses in Hungarian, international or public ownership in Hungary. The 
sample was limited to those aged between 25 and 55 years and people work-
ing part-time (less than 36 hours per week) were excluded.4 Businesses with 
fewer than 20 employees were also excluded because under-reporting of wag-
es is most common among small enterprises (Elek et al., 2009, Tonin, 2007).
The database also includes the gross monthly wage of workers as well as the 
total income defined as the monthly average of gross wage and any regular or 
incidental benefits in the previous year. Values for the latter are presented here, 
although trends are very similar for gross wage as well. Income is on 2008 real 
value, deflated using the Consumer Price Index. In addition to wage and in-
come, the analysis uses covariates related to the characteristics of employees 
(education, professional experience, years of service, job) and organisations 
(region, size of organisation). Finally, as a further covariate, variables related 
to the work environment (whether there is a lunch break, type of contract, dif-
ference between actual and official working hours) are also used, even though 
their scope is somewhat limited.
Table 2.1.1 gives an overview of the mean values of the variables in the first 
and last period of the analysis. In 2002 average real wage for both men and 
women was higher in the private sector than in the public sector. In terms 
of education, the education level appears higher in the public sector:5 in the 
public sector approximately 40–49 per cent of women and 42–45 per cent 
of men are graduates, while in the private sector the same number is 10–16 
per cent and 13–16 per cent respectively. Professional experience is broadly 
similar in both sectors; however public sector employees have had a longer 
in 14 grades. In the revised pay 
scale in the lowest educational 
category and grade (A1) pay 
equals the statutory minimum 
wage, and in the highest educa-
tional category with minimal ex-
perience (J1) it is 2.65 times the 
minimum wage. For graduates 
the lowest monthly wage was set 
at 100 thousand forints (in grade 
F1) which was twice the amount 
of the statutory minimum wage.
4 Part-time employees in the 
private sector were not included 
in the data in 2002. The estima-
tion was carried out on the full 
sample of employees between 
2003 and 2008, which produced 
similar results. The samples 
from these years show that the 
proportion of part-time workers 
was really low, on average 3 per 
cent of all workers.
5 This is also true for many other 
countries, such as the United 
States (Poterba and Rueben, 
1994) and Western European 
economies (Dustmann and van 
Soest, 1997, Lucifora and Meurs, 
2004, Melly, 2005).
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tenure with their current employer. It is important to note for the analysis of 
trends over time, that there were no significant changes in the composition 
of the sample within the time frame of the analysis.
Table 2.1.1: Covariate descriptive statistics, 2002 and 2008
Variable
2002 2008
Men Women Men Women
private public private public private public private public
Average incomea (forint, 2008 value) 189,472 155,990 233,020 207,681 188,004 176,512 155,125 132,546
Education (percentage)
Primary school 16 14 13 10 18 13 25 19
Vocational school 45 22 43 20 24 9 25 10
Secondary education 26 21 28 21 41 33 40 32
Degree 13 42 16 49 16 45 10 40
Experienceb (years) 22.2 22.9 22.1 22.5 22.6 23.6 23.7 23.4
Time at current employer (month) 104.6 113.7 94.3 115.2 85.9 133.6 106.0 131.4
Region (percentage)
Central Hungary 31 36 36 39 41 32 36 28
Central Transdanubia 13 7 14 6 14 8 11 10
Western Transdanubia 13 8 11 7 11 8 13 9
Southern Transdanubia 9 10 7 11 7 11 8 10
Northern Hungary 11 11 10 9 9 11 9 14
Northern Great Plain 12 15 12 16 10 16 11 17
Southern Great Plain 12 13 10 13 9 14 11 13
Lunch breakc (percentage) 46 92 50 96 43 98 40 98
Actual working hours (hours/week) 6.8 7.1 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 6.5 6.8
Permanent contract (percentage) 94 94 96 88 94 92 94 97
N 50,859 6,947 53,284 5,465 36,407 22,048 35,689 29,815
a Income is the sum of monthly gross wage and average monthly benefits, Hungarian 
forints, 2008 value, deflated with the annual consumer price index.
b Experience is potential professional experience: age of employee minus years spent 
in education minus six.
c The Lunch break variable indicates whether the work contract provides for a lunch 
break.
Methods
For a closer examination of distributions, the method of quantile regression 
is used (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) that enables us to analyse the effect of co-
variates at different segments of the income distribution.6 While in the OLS 
estimates, the effect of covariates on the dependent variable is measured at 
conditional means, here the extent of income differential between sectors is 
estimated at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th conditional percentiles. There-
fore, we are not measuring average effect but allow for a different sector ef-
fect on the bottom, middle and top parts of the wage distribution. There is 
good reason to do this: more equal wage practise in the public sector might 
6 The method of quantile re-
gression has been applied to the 
analysis of wage differential be-
tween the public and private 
sector among others by Lucifora 
and Meurs (2004), Melly (2005), 
Mueller (1998), Nielsen and 
Rosholm (2001) és Poterba and 
Rueben (1994). Hámori (2008) 
showed that similarly to inter-
national experiences the estima-
tion of pay differential between 
the public and private sector is 
very sensitive to its position in 
the distribution.
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mean that those on the bottom of the wage distribution are better off, while 
those at the top are worse off – this is also shown by the graphs. Quantile es-
timates provide a more accurate picture on how wage for a certain group of 
employees would differ in the private sector.
Total wage differential is decomposed using wage functions by quantile.7 
The Blinder–Oaxaca method (Blinder, 1973, Oaxaca, 1973) decomposes the 
difference between mean wages into a part explained by observable mean 
differences in characteristics and an unexplained, residual part. The method 
of quantile decomposition does not decompose wage differential only at the 
mean but at the quantiles as well. With Machado and Mata’s (2005) meth-
od we are simulating what the income of public sector workers would be if 
they were working in the private sector (and would be paid the same for their 
characteristics), or differently we are looking at a counterfactual income dis-
tribution. Then this distribution will be compared to the actual distribu-
tions of private and public sector by separating the total income difference 
into a part that is explained by different characteristics and an unexplained 
part that is due to the fact that different characteristics are paid differently 
in the two sectors. Results are presented for total differences, differences ex-
plained by different characteristics and residual differences, for each year, by 
quantiles and gender.
Results and conclusions
Part a) of Figure 2.1.2 shows total, explained and unexplained differences 
between the private and public sector for men. The total difference at the 
median was 0.02 in 2002; in other words the median income of men (50th 
percentile) was two percentage points lower in the public sector than in the 
private sector, while in 2003 this difference was 0.17 in favour of the public 
sector. This advantage was diminishing between 2004 and 2008; however 
the advantage of the public sector remained. Looking at the quantiles, a dif-
ferent picture emerges due to the narrow wage structure of the public sector: 
those at the bottom of the distribution in the public sector and those at the 
top in the private sector have a wage advantage. Prior to the wage reform the 
public sector’s disadvantage at the 90th percentile was –0.3. After the reform, 
in 2003, this dropped to –0.07, however it again increased to –0.22 by 2008. 
The public sector had more favourable employee and organisational indica-
tors for each estimated quantile throughout the studied period, especially 
because of the higher education level of employees: the explained difference 
was positive for each quantile.
In terms of the unexplained difference, the private sector has a more sub-
stantial advantage than anticipated on the basis of the raw differences: apart 
from the 10th percentile, the difference is mostly negative. At the median the 
unexplained difference was –0.28 in 2002 that fell to –0.11 as a result of the 
7 Selection bias is an issue when 
estimating the differential be-
tween sectors. Kézdi (2002) 
argues that the working con-
ditions are very different in the 
private and the public sector 
in Hungary: in the public sec-
tor the actual working time is 
shorter, benefits are more pre-
dictable and there is greater job 
security. We try to filter out this 
effect by including variables 
related to working conditions. 
These provide a weak measure 
of workplace characteristics; 
however there was little change 
over time (Table 2.1.1).
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wage reform in 2003, then gradually returned to its pre-reform level at –0.27 
by 2008. Along the income distribution the unexplained difference, in abso-
lute terms, is increasing towards higher incomes and it is very high around the 
top percentiles. The difference at the 90th percentile was –0.75 in 2002 that 
decreased to –0.47 in 2003 and – similarly to other percentiles – it returned 
close to its pre-reform level at –0.62 in 2008. All in all, it can be argued that 
relative income in the public sector improved at each estimated percentile, 
however the unexplained difference at the median (and above) remained nega-
tive. By 2008 income differences returned close to their 2002 levels.
Figure 2.1.2: Quantile decomposition, 2002–2008 (logarithms of income differences:  
total, explained by individual and organisational covariates, and unexplained)
Note: The top part of figure a) and b) shows the unconditional income differences 
in the public sector in comparison to the private sector at different percentiles; 
negative values indicate public sector disadvantage. Graphs in the middle show 
explained differences, and graphs at the bottom depict unexplained income differ-
ences.
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Part b) of Figure 2.1.2 shows the comparison of income difference for wom-
en. Overall, the graphs show similar trends to men with some notable differ-
ences. Women’s situation in the public sector is more favourable than men’s: 
they enjoy a bigger advantage over the private sector between the 10th and 
50th percentiles. However, at the top end of the distribution the total differ-
ence was also –0.3 for women, and by 2008 it was larger than for men, at 
around –0.25. As far as the unexplained differences are concerned, after the 
initial effect of the wage reform these also return close to their original levels.
To put the estimates for Hungary into perspective it is worth highlighting 
that in Germany the estimated unexplained difference between the public 
and private sector for men (between 1984 and 2001) was consistently five per 
cent at the 10th percentile and–17 per cent at the 90th percentile (Melly, 2005). 
The same estimate for Hungary was –10 per cent –75 per cent in 2002, and 
two per cent and –65 per cent in 2008. This suggests that the public sector 
wage around the top end of the distribution is not only low in absolute terms 
compared to Germany – this alone would encourage “brain drain”, especially 
among health care professionals – but is also low in relative terms compared to 
the private sector. In order to retain highly skilled workers in the public sec-
tor, any future strategies should aim to improve the relative situation of highly 
skilled or high level employees. This cannot be achieved through a general 
wage rise for all public servants because its effect on relative wages vanishes 
in the long run; therefore a more targeted approach is needed.
This study has examined the long term impact of the large and rapid public 
sector wage rise implemented in 2003. From a researcher’s perspective, this 
wage rise provided a quasi-experimental opportunity to examine the adapta-
tion process following the rapid increase of relative wage. Data for the analysis 
was available until 2008, and it was clear that the effect of the 50-per-cent wage 
rise in 2003 had been eroded by then; the situation of public sector employ-
ees – especially the highly skilled – did not improve substantially compared 
to the private sector. There have been no similarly large or rapid increases in 
relative wage since 2008; however the measures introduced during the eco-
nomic crisis that affected the public sector – the abolition of the 13th month 
wage, wage freeze – has probably had an adverse effect on the relative situ-
ation of public sector workers and intensified the exit of the highly skilled 
workforce from the sector.
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2.1.1 Do women have better opportunities in the public sector? An analysis of the  
gender pay gap and occupational segregation in the public and private sector
Anna Lovász
In Hungary, similarly to many other countries, a 
large number of working women are employed in 
the public sector. There might be various reasons 
for this: women are more likely to choose tradi-
tional female occupations – teacher, nurse etc. – 
that are mainly in the public sector, or some fea-
tures of public sector jobs (e.g. job security, working 
time and expectations, less stress) are more pop-
ular among women. Furthermore, women might 
prefer public sector jobs because they might think 
they are less likely to face discrimination thanks 
to stricter workplace policies (e.g. pay scales, pro-
motion). However, the latter assertion is difficult 
to prove or quantify because pay (relative to men) 
and occupation depend on a number of other fac-
tors (individual or workplace characteristics pre-
viously highlighted) that are often unobservable.
International findings (Barón and Cobb-Clark, 
2010, Chatterji, Mumford and Smith, 2011, Melly 
2005, Mora and Ruiz-Castillo, 2004) suggest that 
there is less discrimination in the public sector. It 
might be valuable to examine the extent of dis-
crimination by sector; in the event that there is a 
difference, it might have a significant influence on 
women’s decisions. Estimates for the extent of dis-
crimination are compared in two ways: the pay gap 
and the probability of achieving a management po-
sition. The analysis uses data from the Wage Tariff 
Survey covering the period between 2002–2008; 
this is a representative sample of both sectors and 
enables us to take into account both worker and 
institutional characteristics. Table B2.1.1. com-
pares the ratio of women and mean wages in the 
two sectors.
Labour market discrimination can be manifested 
in pay – if a woman with comparable characteris-
tics (productivity) is paid less than a man. Mean 
wage difference is the most commonly used indi-
cator of gender differences in the literature (Altonji 
and Blank, 1999), but unexplained wage differen-
tial is a better approximation of discrimination be-
cause it also eliminates the effect of covariates re-
Table B2.1.1: The ratio of women and mean pay by occupation and sector, 2002–2008
Ratio of women Mean pay (forint)
private sector public sector private sector public sector
Managers: HSCO first digit = 1 0.312 0.653 384,400 370,320
Managers: using more precise definition 0.246 0.713 364,503 333,562
Tertiary independent 0.402 0.754 355,545 235,637
Tertiary and secondary 0.599 0.863 203,527 163,815
Clerical 0.905 0.951 148,094 135,503
Services 0.528 0.728 105,552 117,844
Agriculture 0.258 0.277 101,930 109,655
Manufacturing 0.198 0.118 128,995 126,334
Machine operators 0.232 0.017 137,642 137,324
Unskilled 0.466 0.803 90,956 99,721
Note: The public sector includes public service em-
ployees, civil servants, judges and prosecutors, while 
the private sector includes employees of businesses. 
In the first row managers were defined based on the 
first digit of the HSCO code, in the second row a 
more precise definition was used for each industry. 
Mean pay was computed from individual pay based 
on total monthly gross income (mean of basic pay 
and incidental benefits in the previous year), in 
forints, at 2008 value deflated with the annual con-
sumer price index.
Source: Wage Tariff Survey.
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lated to worker and workplace characteristics. This 
study will estimate individual wage equations us-
ing observable worker and employer characteris-
tics, gender and sector dummy variables, and their 
interaction as control variables. The estimated co-
efficient of the interaction is the measure of the 
unexplained pay differential between the two sec-
tors.* Figure B2.1.1. shows the development of this 
measure over time, while Table B2.1.2. summarises 
the main coefficients of wage equations estimated 
by quantile. In the public sector unexplained wage 
difference is on average 5–6 per cent lower. Nev-
ertheless, there is a significant – around eight per-
centage points – unexplained difference between 
the mean wage of men and women. Looking at dif-
ferent points of pay distribution, it emerges that 
the disadvantage of women is greater at the high-
er end of the distribution, suggesting a glass ceil-
ing effect (Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2007); 
Table B2.1.2: Unexplained pay differentials between the two sectors, percentiles
Percentiles
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Women –0.041 (0.001) –0.078 (0.001) –0.126 (0.001) –0.185 (0.002) –0.236 (0.002)
Public sector 0.246 (0.003) 0.153 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004) –0.148 (0.006) –0.255 (0.008)
Public sector × women 0.019 (0.003) 0.040 (0.003) 0.057 (0.004) 0.084 (0.005) 0.121 (0.007)
N 1,401,418
Notes: Columns contain the coefficients of individual 
wage equations estimated by quantiles (standard 
error in brackets). The coefficients of Women dum-
my variable indicate the disadvantage of women 
compared to men in the private sector. The coeffi-
cients of Public sector dummy variable measure the 
advantage or disadvantage of the public sector in 
comparison to the private sector, for both genders. 
Interaction coefficients of the two variables meas-
ure the disadvantage of women in the public sector 
compared to the private sector. For a description of 
the dependent and other control variables – such 
as experience – the definition of public sector and 
weighting see the note for Table 1 in Lovász (2013). 
N is the number of individual observations.
Source: Wage Tariff Survey, 2002–2008.
Figure B2.1.1: Difference in unexplained gender pay 
differential between sectors, 2002–2008
Note: The figure represents the estimated interaction 
coefficient of the public sector and women dummy 
variables based on wage equations for each year be-
tween 2002 and 2008. The control variables are: em-
ployee characteristics (education, potential work ex-
perience and its square), institutional characteristics 
(size and region), and job characteristics (lunch break, 
type of work contract, difference between actual and 
official working time). For the estimations individual 
and institutional weightings were used. Occupation 
control variables are dummies generated from the 
first digit of HSCO codes.
Source: Wage Tariff Survey.
however the increase of the difference is smaller in 
the public sector.
Another form of discrimination can be mani-
fested in hiring and promotions – if employers are 
* It should be emphasised that the unexplained pay 
gap should be considered the upper range limit of 
discrimination because there are other, unobserved 
differences in employee characteristics that might 
skew upwards the estimated extent of discrimina-
tion. When comparing wage differentials between 
sectors, selection bias between sectors is an issue. 
This is not corrected here due to the lack of data 
but it might be argued that it can potentially lead to 
underestimating the relative advantage of the public 
sector (Tansel, 2004, Greene and Hoffnar, 1996).
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less likely to hire women than men or promote them 
to higher positions (the “glass ceiling” effect). To 
grasp this phenomenon we will compare the likeli-
hood of women and men with similar characteris-
tics to get to management positions in the two sec-
tors. The ratio of women in management positions 
is considerably higher in the public sector; how-
ever this might be due to their higher ratio with-
in the public sector workforce. Therefore their ra-
tio within occupations is also included among the 
control variables. The results of probit estimations 
(Table B2.1.3) suggest that the odds of women are 
no smaller in the public sector, while in the pri-
vate sector they have an approximately two-per-
cent disadvantage compared to men with similar 
characteristics.
These results suggest similar trends to wage dif-
ferentials: the estimated extent of discrimination 
against women is smaller in the public sector than 
in the private sector. Although there are significant 
unexplained gender pay differences in the public 
sector, overall it seems that regulation limiting the 
employer’s scope for individual discretion can be 
successful in improving the opportunities of wom-
en in the labour market. It is unlikely that there 
have been major changes in unequal gender treat-
ment since 2008 in the absence of substantial gen-
der-related changes that would affect the regulation 
of the public sector. It is likely that data in 2013 
would still show that limiting the possibilities of 
employers for individual discrimination improves 
the labour market opportunities of women in the 
public sector in comparison to the private sector, 
although the difference is not too big.
Table B2.1.3: Odds of management occupations, 
probit estimations, 2002–2008
Private sector Public sector
Estimated coefficient
Women –0.438 (0.011) –0.080 (0.018)
Vocational school 0.426 (0.032) 0.447 (0.077)
Secondary education 1.295 (0.030) 0.960 (0.067)
Degree 2.143 (0.031) 1.929 (0.065)
Experience 0.025 (0.000) 0.028 (0.001)
Marginal effect
Women –0.021 (0.000) –0.003 (0.001)
Vocational school 0.020 (0.001) 0.016 (0.003)
Secondary education 0.061 (0.001) 0.035 (0.003)
Degree 0.100 (0.001) 0.071 (0.002)
Experience 0.001 (0.000) 0.003 (0.000)
Observations 1,098,965 370,002
Pseudo R2 0.3006 0.1984
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Probit estimations, 
the dependent variable is probability of getting to 
a management position. The control variables are: 
employee characteristics (education, work experience 
and its square), institutional characteristics (size and 
region), and the ratio of female employees in the or-
ganisation. Experience is potential work experience; 
it is obtained by subtracting the sum of years spent 
in education and the compulsory school age from the 
employee’s age. Public sector refers to public service 
employees. For the estimations individual and insti-
tutional weightings were used.
Source: Wage Tariff Survey.
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2.2 Wage spillovers between the public  
and corporate sectors
Álmos Telegdy
The aim of this section is to analyse the effect of public sector wages on corpo-
rate compensation. This indirect effect of the State’s activity on labor markets 
has largely been neglected from research on wage spillovers over recent dec-
ades although the interaction of public and corporate wages is an important 
ingredient to wage setting policies.1 If public and corporate workers compete 
on the same labor market, corporate employees may consider the public sec-
tor as an alternative to their current employment. If total compensation, in-
cluding the net value of amenities and disamenities derived from various job 
attributes, is high in the public sector, private employers may face difficulties 
in the hiring process or have to cope with large quit rates among incumbent 
employees. To prevent such mechanisms taking place, they have to increase 
wages to keep a high-quality workforce and to prevent their current employ-
ees moving to the public sector.
May spillovers between public and corporate wages exist, their estimation 
is not straightforward, to say the least. Public and corporate labor markets 
are distinctly different in all countries. Public sector employees work fewer 
hours, enjoy longer paid vacations, have more secure jobs and the required 
effort, worker motivation and job satisfaction may also differ across the two 
sectors (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008; Heywood et al., 2002). Workers therefore 
self-select themselves into one or the other sector based not only on observ-
able, but also on unobservable characteristics such as their innate ability, risk 
aversion, willingness to work hard in exchange for higher wages and faster 
promotions and so on (Roy, 1951). Another problem contaminating the meas-
urement of wage differentials of private and public sector employees is that 
public sector workers typically cluster in a few industries – predominantly 
in state administration, health care and education – where the share of cor-
porations is small or non-existent. This makes it impossible to control for in-
dustry wage effects, which may be sizable (Krueger and Summers, 1988). Any 
of the factors discussed above may create co-movements of the wage levels in 
the two sectors; to identify a causal relationship, an exogenous variation of 
public sector wages is necessary.
The Hungarian institutional context is particularly useful in analysing pub-
lic wage spillovers as it provides the exogenous variation of public wages which 
permits overcoming many of the identification problems discussed above and 
the interaction of public and corporate wages can be measured more accu-
rately than is usually possible. The Hungarian government executed a large 
wage increase in 2001 and 2002 and thus created the conditions to establish 
1 A thorough search of the lit-
erature resulted in only a few 
papers analysing public wage 
spillovers: for example, Jacobsen 
(1992) studies this question in 
the United States and Lacroix 
and Dussault (1984) in Canada.
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the effect of public wages on corporate compensation. The large and rapid in-
crease of public sector wages provides a unique opportunity to identify wage 
spillovers as the exogenous wage increase breaks co-movements between pub-
lic and private sector wages. The sector-specific differences discussed above, 
which may bias the estimation, do not present a problem here as it is unlikely 
that the composition of workers, job attributes or industrial wage differen-
tials changed considerably in such a short period of time.2
Data description
The dataset used in this study is the Hungarian Wage Tariff Survey Data, 
hosted by the National Employment Office. It provides yearly information on 
workers’ year of birth, gender, highest level of education, occupation, earnings, 
tenure and type of contract (corporate and two types of public sector labor 
relation, as discussed below). These data are recorded for May of a given year. 
I use the years between 1998 and 2006 in this chapter as the public wage in-
crease took place in the middle of this period.
I keep in the sample only full time employees between 18 and 60 years. The 
police, military, firemen and border guards are not included in the public sec-
tor data, and I excluded the legal professions as their employment relation is 
regulated by a special law and they were not subject to the wage increase. The 
final sample includes 379–487 thousand public sector employees and 106–153 
thousand corporate workers. The comparison of the sample and the popula-
tion data reveals that the sample of corporate and public sector employees is 
about 7–8 and 70 per cent, respectively.
Composition of employment and the evolution of wages in the 
public and corporate sectors
Composition of the public and corporate employment. Public and corporate 
employment differs in a wide variety of dimensions. The public sector is pre-
sent in health care, education and public administration while the share of 
corporations in these economic sectors is minuscule. As presented in Table 
2.2.1, the demographic attributes of employees are very different in the two 
sectors. Three-quarters of public sector workers are female which is almost 
twice as large a share as in corporations. Corporate employees’ potential la-
bor market experience is shorter by two years.3
Given the peculiar industrial structure of the public sector, it is not sur-
prising that the occupational structure of employees is very divergent across 
the two sectors. Professionals and associate professionals are the most typi-
cal occupations in the public sector and 60 per cent of all employees belong 
to these categories. This is in sharp contrast with such occupations’ share of 
20 per cent in corporations. As expected, skilled workers are the most typi-
cal workers in the corporate sector as 46 per cent of all occupations are in 
2 Employers may raise wages 
even if actual mobility does not 
take place between the two sec-
tors due to threat effects. See 
Borjas et al. (1997) on threat 
effects in the context of inter-
national trade and Farber (2005) 
on wage effects resulting from 
the threat of unionization.
3 Potential experience is com-
puted as age – years of educa-
tion – 6.
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this category while such occupations’ share is only 6 per cent in the public 
sphere. Managers are more prevalent in the corporate sector: their share is 
9.5 per cent, 1.5 percentage points higher than this occupation in the public 
sector. Elementary occupations have a share of 14 per cent in the public sec-
tor, almost twice as high as in corporations.
Table 2.2.1: Composition of the workforce in the public and private sectors
Public Corporate
Gender (Female) 73.5 39.8
Labor market experience
23.8 22.0
(10.6) (10.1)
Occupation
Manager 8.0 9.5
Professional 30.6 4.9
Technician, associate professional 28.4 14.9
Clerk 6.4 6.7
Service 6.7 10.3
Skilled agricultural, craft industrial 6.0 45.7
Elementary 13.9 8.1
N 3,969,046 1,185,909
Notes: Pooled data. All variables are dummy variables, except average experience (in 
years, standard deviation in parentheses).
Public sector wage policies. The period between 1997 and 2006 is character-
ized by a steady growth of the Hungarian economy. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) grew each year between 3 and 5 per cent (Hungarian Statistical Of-
fice), and private wages followed this pattern, as we document below. Public 
sector wages, however, presented a more volatile behaviour which was prob-
ably rooted partly in the need to increase these relative to corporate wages 
and partly through political considerations.
Wages in the public sector are determined by a wage grid, which consists 
of a base wage and multipliers. Compensation may change either by raising 
the base wage (in this case the relative wages in the public sector are not af-
fected) or the multipliers can be changed (which implies that relative wages 
within the public sector will vary).
During the period studied the multipliers concerning public servants’ wages 
did not change so their relative wages were also stable, but the base wage was 
raised considerably. Most importantly, a large and universal wage increase 
raised each public servant’s base wage (but it did not affect civil servants). 
While the base was increased steadily between 1998 and 2002 such that rel-
ative wages between the public and corporate sectors were stable, in 2002 it 
was suddenly increased by 50 per cent. The following year it did not change 
but in 2005 it was raised again by 14 per cent. This was, however, accompa-
nied by a decrease in multipliers which further reduced the wage differentials 
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Private Public
200620052004200320022001200019991998
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within the public sector. The last year in these data was election year and the 
base wage was raised again by 10 per cent.
Civil servants’ wages were increased in 2001 (15 per cent of the sample are 
made up of these employees, who are typically highly skilled and work in 
public administration). Wage policy in their case was used to motivate civil 
servants to work in the public sector for their whole career. The base wage 
was almost constant, but the multipliers were changed such that it increased 
the relative wages of university graduates and those with long experience.
It is important to note that the wage grid serves only to set the minimum 
compensation for various categories of workers (defined by the level of edu-
cation and experience). Total compensation may be larger due to allowances 
(such as a managerial allowance) and public sector organizations also have the 
right to pay higher wages if they have the funds for it. Public sector employees 
also received a 13th month’s salary during the period studied.
During the first several years of the analysis public sector employees had in-
deed very low wages.4 Despite the fact that the share of university graduates 
is much larger in the public sector than in corporations, average wages are 
about 11 per cent lower in this sector before 2002. Figure 2.2.1 shows that 
public and corporate wages had experienced widely different growth patterns.
Figure 2.2.1: Wage growth in the public and corporate sectors  
(1998 = 100, N = 1,184,604)
While corporate real wages steadily increased by 3–6 per cent each year (ex-
cept in 2004 when they did not change), wages in the public sector follow a 
distinctly different pattern. In the first three years of the analysis the overall 
growth rate is quite similar in the two sectors, but between 2001 and 2002 
– the year when civil servants experienced a wage growth – public sector wag-
es grew by 15 per cent. This is followed by an increase of 22 per cent in 2002, 
which is more than a 5 times larger wage growth than in corporations.5 Our 
data therefore show that over a two-year time period, real wages in the pub-
lic sector increased by 40 per cent while those in corporations by only 12 per 
cent. In the last years of the analysis the overall growth rates are quite simi-
lar (but the timing varies). During the whole period studied, therefore, cor-
4 The wage measure used in this 
chapter is the monthly wage 
paid in May, and it includes the 
base wage, overtime pay, regular 
payments other than the base 
wage (such as language and 
managerial allowances), and 
1/12th of the previous year’s ir-
regular payments (e.g., end-of-
year bonuses and the 13th salary 
in the public sector).
5 The policy was labeled as a 
50 per cent increase, but it was 
not applied to civil servants and 
referred to the base nominal 
wages. We computed the growth 
of nominal base wages for public 
employees between 2002 and 
2003 which is indeed very close 
to 50 per cent.
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porate wages increased by 38 per cent while public sector wages increased by 
72 per cent – the large difference between the two growth rates was built up 
in only two years.
Identification strategy, results
The starting point in the measurement of the degree of interrelatedness of 
public and corporate wages is the classification of corporate workers by their 
“closeness” to the public sector: how similar they are to public employees. This 
is important to identify those workers who are likely to be affected by the 
wage increase. If, for example, a corporate worker has an occupation which 
does not exist in the public sector and his or her abilities are also very differ-
ent from what is demanded, a switch to the public sector is almost impossible 
due to a lack of demand or is very costly for the worker as most of his human 
capital will be lost. Therefore, the employer of such workers does not need to 
take into account their earnings potential in the public sector, which can be 
seen as an outside option in wage bargaining.
The variable measuring public sector proximity of a corporate employee is 
the proportion of public sector workers in labor market segments defined by 
gender, occupation and work experience. More precisely, I segment the labor 
market by gender, potential labor market experience (5-year intervals making 
up 8 groups) and 7 occupational dummies (manager, professional, associate 
professional, clerk, service worker, skilled worker and elementary occupation). 
I call this variable PSHARE.6
I regress the log of corporate sector wages on PSHARE, which is interacted 
with two periods of time which represent the periods before and after the 
public wage increase (1998–2001 and 2002–2006, respectively). To control 
for average wages by worker type, I include fixed effects of the variables used 
in the construction of PSHARE (Zijt) as well as year effects, 21 regional (coun-
ty) effects and a full set of 2-digit industries to partial out any differences 
between local labor markets, consumer prices, and industrial wage differen-
tials. As the level of public sector wages may also affect the strength of the 
spillover, I also control for the average public sector wage within labor market 
cells (WPijt). The unemployment rate (UEijt) at the cell level is included as well, 
as it can also affect spillovers: if there are many unemployed, the bargaining 
power of workers declines and they cannot ask for higher wages, regardless 
of the proximity of the public sector (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990).7 The 
estimation equation is the following (i indexes workers, j the labor market 
segment and t indexes time):
log(wijt)= α0 + γbefore PSHAREjt BEFOREt + γafter PSHAREjt AFTERt +
+ αwplog(WPjt) + αuelog(UEjt) + αxZijt + ΣαindINDUSTRYk +
+ ΣαregREGIONr + ΣαtYEARt +εijt
6 The average value of PSHARE 
is between 22 and 27 per cent 
during the period studied, its 
median is 13–14 per cent. The 
standard deviation of the vari-
able is large relative to the mean 
showing that the variable covers 
most of the interval on which it 
is defined.
7 The unemployment rate is 
computed for each labor mar-
ket segment defined by gender, 
experience and education, us-
ing the Hungarian Labor Force 
Survey.
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The estimated spillover effect is the difference between γafter and γbefore: this 
measures the change in the effect of the presence of the public sector on cor-
porate wages.
The results suggest that private wages do not vary by the exposure of work-
ers to the public sector before the public sector wage increase as the coefficient 
on the interaction of PSHARE and the period before the wage increase is only 
0.001. In the period subsequent to the public sector wage increase, however, 
the level of corporate compensation increases in the sectors exposed to the 
public sector: the estimated coefficient of PSHARE after 2001 is equal to 0.143 
(and is highly significant in statistical terms). Taking the difference between 
the coefficients associated with PSHARE before and after the wage increase 
as a measure of the wage spillover, this analysis finds that during a period of 
a 40-per cent increase in the public wage, a 10-per cent difference in public 
sector exposure induced a larger wage growth of 1.4 percentage points. Com-
pared to the wage increase of about 12 per cent during this period, this result 
translates to a faster wage growth of over 10 per cent, which is quite sizable.
To gauge how the spillover effect evolves in time, we present the same regres-
sions as before, but with a full set of interactions between years and PSHARE. 
These results are shown in Table 2.2.2. In the first three years of the analysis 
the coefficients of PSHARE are between –0.027 and –0.017 with no conceiv-
able trend. In 2001, in the year of the civil servant wage increase, the effect of 
public sector exposure on corporate wages is 3.3 per cent and one year later it 
grows to 7.1 per cent (both coefficients are statistically significant). In 2003, 
after the large public employee wage increase affecting almost all public sector 
workers, the coefficient becomes 0.176 further increasing to 0.2 the following 
year. The difference between the coefficient in 2001 and 2004 is 0.167 which 
we take as the estimate of the wage spillover. As the public wage premium 
starts to stagnate, the coefficients decrease somewhat.8
Table 2.2.2: The yearly effect of public sector size on corporate wages
pshare × 1998 –0.027 (0.018) pshare × 2003 0.176*** (0.014)
pshare × 1999 0.017 (0.017) pshare × 2004 0.200*** (0.014)
pshare × 2000 –0.019 (0.017) pshare × 2005 0.158*** (0.015)
pshare × 2001 0.033** (0.015) pshare × 2006 0.112*** (0.017)
pshare × 2002 0.071*** (0.013)
R2 0.445
N 1,184,604
Notes: Each regression includes controls for gender, experience, education, year, in-
dustry, and region. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1-per cent level; ** significant at the 5-per cent level.
Wage spillovers may also vary along the occupational structure of the corpo-
rate sector. Workers with occupations which are abundant in the public sec-
tor are likely to have a higher wage increase, as they can find a job more easily 
8 The last year of the analysis 
was election year which resulted 
in an increase of public sector 
wages. As the budget deficit was 
10 per cent of the GDP, it was 
expected that the new govern-
ment would cut back spending. 
As such interventions make the 
public sector less attractive to 
employees, this may be the 
reason for a declining spillo-
ver effect.
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and will not lose their occupation-specific human capital if they move (e.g., 
Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009). To test this, I construct a dummy vari-
able which categorizes each 3-digit occupation by its public sector share: the 
dummy equals 1 if this is larger than 40 per cent.9 This variable enters the 
estimation equation in a three-way interaction between the time periods be-
fore-after the wage increase and PSHARE (and I also control for its level). The 
estimated coefficients, presented in Table 2.2.3, indeed demonstrate that the 
spillover effect is larger for such workers. The interactions term just described 
is associated with a coefficient of –0.18 before the wage increase which shrinks 
to –0.115 in the period subsequent to it. Therefore the wages of such workers 
increase faster if the worker is exposed to the public sector.
Table 2.2.3: The effect of occupation on wage spillovers
pshare – before 0.057*** (0.013) pshare – occpreV – before –0.179*** (0.016)
pshare – after 0.173*** (0.012) pshare – occpreV – after –0.115** (0.017)
R2 0.446
N 1,184,604
Notes: Before = 1998–2001, After = 2002–2006. Occprev = 1 if occupation prevalent 
in public sector. Each regression includes controls for gender, experience, occupa-
tion, year, industry, region, and the Occprev interacted with “Before” and “After.” 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1-per cent level; ** significant at the 5-per cent level.
Another feature of the labor market which may alter wage spillovers is the 
proportion of new hires in the public sector. If there are no employment op-
portunities, corporate workers cannot switch sector. We compute the rate of 
new hires in the public sector relative to the number of workers in corpora-
tions within each labor market segment, and we add this variable to the regres-
sion.10 The results (presented in Table 2.2.4) show that public sector hiring 
does not have an effect on corporate wages before the wage increase (the esti-
mated coefficient is essentially zero), but after the public sector wage increase 
this coefficient becomes 0.12. Although the coefficient is not significant, its 
large magnitude provides partial evidence that more public vacancies induce 
a significantly faster wage increase in the corporate sector.
Table 2.2.4: The effect of public sector vacancies on wage spillovers
pshare – before 0.017 (0.017) proportion hired – before –0.007 (0.125)
pshare – after 0.152** (0.014) proportion hired – after 0.120 (0.078)
R2 0.444
N 951,303
Notes: Before = 1998 to 2001; After = 2002 to 2006. Each regression includes con-
trols for gender, experience, occupation, year, industry, region, and proportion 
hired. Proportion hired is measured relative to the size of the corporate sector. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1-per cent level; ** significant at the 5-per cent level.
9 Out of 136 occupations, there 
are 42 which satisfy this condi-
tion, and they cover 10 per cent 
of corporate workers.
10 This variable is not interacted 
with PSHARE because it is pro-
portional to it by construction. 
The average public sector hiring 
rate (standard deviation) rela-
tive to private sector employ-
ment is 0.024 (0.065).
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Conclusions
This chapter analysed public wage spillovers, using for identification a fast and 
large wage rise which increased public sector wages by 40 per cent over a two 
year time period while corporate wages increased by only 12 per cent. Meas-
uring public sector proximity by the share of public workers in labor market 
cells defined by gender, labor market experience and occupation, it finds that 
a 10 per cent higher share of public sector employment in the labor market 
cell caused a faster corporate wage increase by about 10 per cent.
The above analysis therefore suggests that public wages do have an effect on 
the wage policies of corporations: not only may average wages increase induc-
ing therefore larger personnel costs, but wage differentials may also change 
as those workers, who are typical in the public sector, will be affected by 
spillovers to a larger extent than those who are not. It is also likely that such 
spillovers not only existed in Hungary in the early 2000s, but they occurred 
everywhere. This study used the periods before and after the public sector 
wage increase only to have a credible identification strategy – in the lack of 
an exogenous movement of public wages it is difficult to obtain an unbiased 
estimate of wage spillovers.
Using the results of the chapter, we can drive insights about the public sec-
tor wage spillovers in contemporary Hungary. Looking at the evolution of 
wages over the last decade or so, it is likely that their effect on corporate wages 
declined. As the information of the Hungarian Statistical Office suggests, be-
tween 2006 and 2013 public sector wages declined both in real and nominal 
terms and also relative to corporate wages. While the unconditional relative 
wage between the two sectors was 14–16 per cent in 2007 and 2008 (show-
ing that public sector workers obtained a premium on average), during the 
following four years this was continuously falling resulting in a public wage 
penalty of 15 per cent in 2012 (despite the fact that the proportion of highly 
skilled workers is much larger in the public sector than in corporations). The 
current policy which increased the wages of several occupations in the pub-
lic sector is not shown yet in the data, but it is likely that in the absence of a 
large wage increase, public sector wages will lag behind the compensation in 
corporations which decreases wage spillovers. This tendency, however, can be 
attenuated by longer job search in the corporate sector and less job security, 
which can make public sector jobs look more attractive to employees.
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2.3 Pay level and selection to the public sector
János Köllő
This chapter is based on a study by Köllő (2013) that examines changes in 
the number and quality – as measured by their residual earnings in the pri-
vate sector – of graduates moving from private sector to public sector jobs 
as a result of the large pay increases implemented before and after the 2002 
general elections.1
The analysis is based on a large administrative panel dataset covering a rel-
atively long period (1998–2008) but limited in terms of the number of vari-
ables. It explores the development of mobility between the two sectors and 
then draws conclusions on the quality of inflows from the private to the pub-
lic sector based on the mean residual wages of those shifting from the private 
to the public sector. (Residual wage is the difference between the actual wage 
and the expected wage on the basis of gender, age and education). The analy-
sis concludes with a panel estimation that directly quantifies the relationship 
between the sectoral wage gap and private sector residual wages of workers 
moving to the public sector.
Earlier literature and methodological considerations
Surprisingly few studies examined inter-sector mobility and the selection ef-
fects of public sector wages over recent decades. Some studies draw conclu-
sions about selection effects from the between-sector earnings differentials – 
without actual data on mobility [see e.g. Foguel et al. (2012) on Brazil, Tansel 
(2005) on Turkey or Assad (1997) on Egypt]. Other studies (Bellante and 
Link, 1981, Blank, 1985) analyse selection directly, without data on wages. 
Obviously, even “lopsided” studies like these can have valid conclusions on 
the relationship between wages and selection if they can reliably estimate how 
much public sector employees would be earning in the private sector and vice 
versa. For example Stelcner, van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1989), Heitmueller 
(2006) or Gimpelson and Lukiyanova (2009) use this approach (switching re-
gression) to address this problem.
Nickell and Quintini (2002) draw conclusions from comparing time series 
of the wage gap and various quality indicators. Quality is measured as test 
results in early teenage years and they show the deterioration of these results 
alongside the weakening in the wage position of the public sector in Britain. 
Katz and Krueger (1993) find a strong positive relationship between relative 
wages in the public sector and changes in educational attainment within pub-
lic service occupations in the United States.
Borjas (2002) captures the quality of people moving to the public sector us-
ing the residual wage they achieved in the private sector, assuming that to some 
1 In the absence of data on edu-
cation, “graduate professionals” 
are defined as employees who 
worked in occupations that 
require higher education or in 
a managerial position for any 
length of time in the observed 
period between 1997 and 2008.
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extent this reflects their productivity. In this study Borjas basically provides an 
adaptation of the Roy-model (Roy, 1951, Borjas, 1987) to the issue of selection 
between the private and public sector. Thus, its main focus is the relationship 
between the quality of entrants and wage dispersion within sectors. If both 
sectors value more or less the same skills and the dispersion of wages is much 
smaller in the public sector, more productive workers will select themselves 
to the private sector, even if mean wages in the two sectors are equal – this 
is one of the key conclusions of Borjas’ version of the Roy-model. The study 
presented here also follows this approach in measuring quality, however it 
does not aim to adopt Borjas’s (2002) model mechanically because disper-
sions within sectors did not change at all in Hungary in the period observed; 
however mean wage differentials between the two sectors fluctuated within 
a very wide range. Therefore, it is worth concentrating on the effects of the 
latter and keeping the measurement method of the Borjas study.
The use of residual wage as an indicator of quality needs a qualifying note 
here. The actual wage of people moving from one sector to the other can dif-
fer from the wage that would be expected on the basis of their gender, age 
and educational attainment due to a variety of unobserved factors. Residual 
wages that are controlled for only these factors might reflect characteristics 
associated with quality, such as management position, diligence or talent, 
but they will also contain items that compensate for non-wage advantages or 
disadvantages, industry rents, trade union premiums, bonding schemes and 
other factors that divert the actual wage from actual marginal productivity. 
Of course, it cannot be posited that in the comparison of two individuals 
higher residual wage indicates higher productivity.
However changes over time in mean residual wages of people who move be-
tween sectors – especially if these changes are not trend-like – can indicate 
increases or decreases in mean productivity, particularly if there are no chang-
es or no trend-like changes in the composition of the private sector in terms 
of sub-sectors, company size, ownership or trade union membership. A large 
sudden increase or decrease in residual wages among those who move between 
sectors, in otherwise stable circumstances, is likely to indicate a positive or 
negative selection effect, which is the focus of this analysis.
Further questions can be raised. First, are there any factors, in addition to 
the pay gap, that might cause sudden changes in the composition of people 
considering a sector change? Moving to a job in the public sector can be mo-
tivated by a variety of considerations. These can include changes in risk toler-
ance or preferences to do with age and family status. (On the role of risk tol-
erance in selection between sectors see for example Bellante and Link 1981, 
Pfeifer, 2008, Buurman et al., 2009.) It is also possible that some people who 
are made redundant accept a job in the private sector, but later, when the op-
portunity arises they reconsider this decision and move to a more preferred 
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job in the public sector. And vice versa: somebody who is at risk of unemploy-
ment in the private sector, might decide to accept a job in the public sector 
immediately rather than risk unemployment, even if their preferred option 
would be a private sector job at the given wage. However, the influence of 
these factors is unlikely to fluctuate if the age distribution of the work force 
is stable (or changing steadily) and the labour market is near equilibrium. On 
the contrary, an abrupt increase in the relative pay position of the public sec-
tor makes it suddenly profitable for higher paid, more productive workers to 
move to a public sector job as well.
Secondly, it is arguable whether changes in intentions to move to another 
sector can be captured through time series on actual mobility. The supply ef-
fect can only be demonstrated from data on actual moves if public institu-
tions are intending to select the best applicants at the given pay level. This 
seems like a reasonable assumption for most jobs; apart from those positions 
that are filled according to explicitly political criteria.
Based on these considerations this study uses the following methods: we 
observe, over a long period of time (1997–2007), all cases when a graduate 
employed in the private sector in year t moves to the public sector in year 
t + 1 without any unemployment or other interruptions in between. After 
this, changes in the residual wage of people who changed sectors are exam-
ined. Finally, we estimate how the between-sector pay differential affects the 
residual wage of switchers. The procedure is presented in Annexe 2.3.
Data and variables
The Central Administration of National Pension Insurance (CANPI) has a 
centralised electronic register that holds records of contribution payments 
(“Kelen”) starting from 1997. This chapter uses a 20-per cent random sam-
ple of individuals who were registered in Kelen between 1997 and 2008; it 
includes a total of 15,464,904 annual records for 1,288,742 individuals. In 
the database there were 738 thousand individuals employed in “graduate oc-
cupations” in 1997 and 852 thousand in 2008.2 For further information on 
the sample and the key concepts see the original paper (Köllő, 2013). Here we 
only summarise how coding in the “Kelen” data base affects the definition of 
public and private sector employees and switchers.
Private sector employees are defined as employees whose income came ex-
clusively from one or several private sector jobs in a given year. Switchers are 
those who worked as public service employees or civil servants for any length 
of time in the following year, without any time spent in unemployment, on 
parental leave, or as self-employed or independent contractors.
For public sector employees the only certainty is that they worked in the 
public sector for any length of time in the given year, thus their income might 
also include earnings from the private sector. Furthermore, direct mobility 
2 The CSO Labour Force Survey 
found 773 thousand and 900 
thousand college or university 
graduates in these years. Ob-
viously some of those who are 
considered “graduates” on the 
basis of their work history do 
not have a degree, while some 
graduates would probably not 
meet the above criteria based 
on their work history. Neverthe-
less the figures are reassuringly 
similar.
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from the public to the private sector is only observed if the individual was 
employed in the private sector for the whole of the following year and had no 
other earnings. Also, particularly at the beginning of the period, it was com-
mon that public sector workers moved to the private sector without a change 
of jobs through outsourcing or privatisation. On the extent of this and job 
moves from the public to the private sector see Chapter 2.4 of this In Focus 
and for more detail Elek and Szabó’s paper (2013). Thus, shifts from the pub-
lic to the private sector are not examined in this chapter. We focus on direct 
moves from the private to the public sector.
The earnings data relate to total annual earnings subject to social insurance 
contributions while the number of qualifying days is also known. The wage 
level is measured as earnings per day and is expressed as a percentage of the 
total sample’s mean.3
Development of wages in the private and public sector
Figure 2.3.1 shows the development of the wage differential between the two 
sectors, controlled for gender, age and educational attainment, based on data 
from the Wage Tariff Survey and Kelen. In the latter case, the wages of those 
who worked for the whole year were taken into account. Based on admin-
istrative data the wage level of the public sector seems higher, but this is not 
unexpected as, unlike the Wage Tariff Survey, the Kelen data base includes 
the low-paid workers of companies with fewer than five employees. However, 
the development of the wage gap over time is similar, apart from 2004. This 
might be explained by the differences in recording earnings data: the Wage 
Tariff Survey of May 2004 recorded regular earnings in May plus 1/12 of the 
bonuses and premiums received in 2003, while Kelen records earnings in the 
year they are actually paid.4
Mobility
Public institutions can use their increased resources in a variety of ways that 
has implications for our expectations about the development of job mobil-
ity. Pay rises can – even without any additional action – slow down the exo-
dus of high-quality workforce and thus reduce entry mobility. At the same 
time public institutions could also take advantage of higher wages and recruit 
more and better workers from the private sector. (They could have done this 
all the more as the number of public sector workers – including employees in 
graduate occupations – was rising until 2005.) This latter strategy increases 
the rate of entry to the public sector and may also increase the exit rate if the 
number of jobs is held constant.
The data clearly show that wage rises during the Medgyessy and Orbán gov-
ernments increased the number of direct moves from private to public sec-
tor jobs only in 2003 (Table 2.3.1). (Note that the rows indicate the last year 
3 Information on wages for 1997 
had considerable amounts of 
missing data and seemed unreli-
able – the mean and dispersion 
are much smaller than in sub-
sequent years – therefore wage 
data for only 1998–2008 was 
used. The time-scale of employ-
ment statistics is 1997–2008, for 
mobility it is 1997–2007, and 
the analysis of the relationship 
between wages and mobility 
is for the period between 1998 
and 2007.
4 The Wage Survey records regu-
lar earnings for the month of 
May minus irregular bonuses in 
May plus the monthly average 
of irregular bonuses from the 
previous year.
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spent in the private sector, therefore moves that happened in 2003 are shown 
in the row of 2002!) The block on the left side of the table displays the unad-
justed transfer rates for everyone and also separately for people aged under 
and over 40 years. The block on the right shows year fixed effects from probit 
models that estimate the probability of transition between sectors controlled 
for gender and single years of age. Both the raw data and the estimates suggest 
that the transfer rate was slowly declining in 1998–2002, slightly increased 
in 2003, and then dropped sharply to well below any previous levels and re-
mained there, fluctuating within narrow ranges.5
It might be argued that the transfer rate could have decreased without a de-
cline in the absolute number of job movers as a result of the steady increase in 
Figure 2.3.1: The earnings advantage/disadvantage of public sector employees, 
1998–2008 (percentage points, private sector employees  
with similar observable characteristics = 0)
Note: The curve represents eβ values calculated from β parameters. For public sector 
employees some of the qualifying days might be from the private sector.
Wage Tariff Survey. Wage: Gross wage in May excluding irregular bonuses but in-
cluding 1/12 part of the total bonuses in the previous year. Sample: employees of 
companies with five or more (in 1998–1999 10 or more) employees, and public ser-
vice employees and civil servants in the public sector. Dependent variable: the loga-
rithm of wage. Control variables: gender, age, age square, educational attainment, 
number of paid working hours.
Kelen. Wage: monthly breakdown of annual earnings from employment or public 
service/civil service status. Sample: everyone who paid contributions on labour 
income for the whole year. Dependent variable: the logarithm of wage. Control 
variables: gender, dummies for single years of age, proxy for educational attainment 
(see main text).
5 The statistical tests also con-
firm that the transfer rate fell 
significantly both in the older 
and younger group in 2003. In 
earlier or later periods fluctua-
tions were not statistically sig-
nificant.
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the number of graduates employed in the private rather than the public sector. 
The data disprove this: the fall in the transfer rate was sudden and much greater 
than would have been justified by a steady decline in the relative weight of the 
public sector (that was even interrupted by a slight increase in 2002–2003). 
The question might also be raised of whether the remarkable decline in flows 
from the private sector was caused by an (implicit) hiring freeze introduced 
alongside the wage increases. This is clearly not the case because the number 
of graduates working in the public sector steadily increased from 290 thou-
sand in 2001 to 306 thousand in 2004 and only started to decrease as a result 
of austerity measures taken in 2006.
Table 2.3.1: Job moves from the private to the public sector – transfer rates  
and year fixed effects, 1997–2007 (probability that a private sector worker  
moves to a public sector job in the subsequent year)
Last year in 
the private 
sector
Unadjusted transfer ratesa Year fixed effects controlled  for gender and age
All 25–40 years 41–61 years All 25–40 years 41–61 years
1997 1.95 2.14 1.68 2.24 2.13 2.13
1998 2.08 2.21 1.89 2.40 2.19 2.45
1999 1.69 1.92 1.35 1.75 1.73 1.58
2000 1.83 2.07 1.48 1.95 1.90 1.80
2001 1.79 2.12 1.28 1.85 2.00 1.48
2002 1.97 2.35 1.41 2.13 2.34 1.69
2003 1.43 1.72 0.99 1.30 1.46 0.99
2004 1.48 1.72 1.10 1.39 1.50 1.19
2005 1.41 1.69 0.96 1.28 1.47 0.94
2006 1.34 1.57 0.97 1.18 1.32 0.96
2007 1.25 1.45 0.93 reference
a Transfers to public sector as a percentage of private sector workers.
b Probit marginal effects at the sample mean, percentage.
Dependent variable: worked in the public sector for any length of time in the subse-
quent year.
Independent variables: gender, age, age square, dummies for single years of age. All 
year effects are significant at 0.01 level.
Table 2.3.2 presents time series data on mobility from the public to the pri-
vate sector in a similar structure to Table 2.3.1; however it must be empha-
sised that these data differ from data on moves in the opposite direction. The 
slump in 2002 is clearly noticeable in the total sample as well as in the older 
and younger groups. Job moves from the public to the private sector – and 
any vacancies as a result – decreased considerably: in the four years when 
the public sector paid high wages, moves to the private sector were over 30 
per cent lower than either before or after. The increase later, in 2006–2007 
could already be related to the redundancies that had begun to commence 
in the public sector.
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Table 2.3.2: Job mobility from the public to the private sector, 1997–2007  
(the probability that somebody who [also] worked in the public sector  
in year t would have earnings only from the private sector in year t + 1)
Last year in 
the public 
sector
Unadjusted transfer rates (percentage) Year fixed effects controlling  for gender and agea
All 25–40 years 41–61 years All 25–40 years 41–61 years
1997 4.63 5.90 3.05 3.29 4.34 2.31
1998 3.92 5.38 2.19 2.45 3.62 1.32
1999 3.96 5.35 2.42 2.59 3.57 1.64
2000 4.17 5.81 2.41 2.90 4.18 1.68
2001 3.59 5.05 2.10 2.24 3.20 1.33
2002 2.64 3.83 1.46 1.04 1.57 0.51
2003 3.00 4.40 1.62 1.54 2.36 0.80
2004 3.03 4.32 1.79 1.64 2.30 1.06
2005 2.90 4.21 1.66 1.50 2.22 0.88
2006 3.55 5.12 2.08 2.41 3.52 1.46
2007 3.39 4.85 2.05 benchmark year
a Probit marginal effects at the sample mean, percentage.
Dependent variable: only has earnings from the private sector in the subsequent year.
Independent variables: gender, age, age squared, dummies for single year of age. All 
year effects are significant at the level of 0.01.
Wages of job movers in the public sector
The wages of job movers are first examined using repeated cross-sectional re-
gressions. Table 2.3.3 indicates that the daily wage of graduate job movers 
controlled for gender, age and working time (“residual” hereafter) was 2.5–8 
per cent lower, than the daily wage of stayers in 1998–2001, and the differ-
ence was significant at 0.05 in three out of the four years.6
The number of observations increased at a steady rate over time: ranging 
from 91,439 to 116,682 in the full sample, from 49,480 to 69,944 in the 
younger group and between 44,756 and 50,139 in the older group.
In the years of large pay rises (2002–2004) the wage of movers – as expected – 
exceeded the wage of stayers by 4.4–5.6 per cent. However, alongside the decline 
in the relative wage level of the public sector this advantage first disappeared 
and then in 2007 turned into a significant and rather large 6.6 per cent disad-
vantage. It would be difficult to attribute the sudden changes to anything else 
than the temporarily high public sector pay, which made it profitable for high 
earner private sector employees to move to the public sector. Public institutions 
used positive selection and chose applicants that appeared to be more productive.
The development of residual wages over time in the younger and the older 
age groups was similar, however according to estimations by age group the 
selection patterns were different. Earnings of young movers (aged 25–40) 
were below the earnings of stayers in each year. Their disadvantage was sta-
tistically significant and substantial (10–16 per cent) in 1998–2001. During 
6 The coefficients show the wage 
advantage or disadvantage of 
employees moving between sec-
tors in logarithm points. For ex-
ample, the value in the upper left 
corner indicates that the wage 
of people moving between sec-
tors is 0.0512 logarithm points 
– or approximately 5.1 per cent 
– higher than the wage of stay-
ers all other things being equal.
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the pay rises of the Orbán and Medgyessy governments, this gap disappeared 
and the group of movers was comprised of average earners. However, the gap 
re-appeared with the decline in public sector pay in 2005–2007 and movers 
– increasingly – came from the lower tail of the wage distribution.
Table 2.3.3: Wage premium/disadvantage of graduate job movers from the private 
to the public sector compared to stayers in the private sector, controlled for gender, 
age and number of years worked (logarithmic point, linear regression coefficients 
estimated with the method of ordinary least squares)
Last year in the 
private sector Full sample
Younger people  
(25–40 years)
Older people  
(41 years and over)
1998 –0.0512** (2.33) –0.1082*** (3.65) 0.0233 (0.74)
1999 –0.0824*** (3.36) –0.1609*** (5.10) 0.0478 (1.28)
2000 –0.0239 (1.04) –0.1095*** (3.70) 0.1149*** (3.22)
2001 –0.0696*** (3.30) –0.1427*** (5.65) 0.0811** (2.31)
2002 0.0448** (2.35) –0.0360 (1.55) 0.2066*** (6.48)
2003 0.0442* (1.94) –0.0119 (0.43) 0.1685*** (4.32)
2004 0.0550*** (2.49) –0.0159 (0.59) 0.2016*** (5.35)
2005 –0.0104 (0.46) –0.0782*** (2.93) 0.1580*** (3.93)
2006 –0.0285 (1.27) –0.1058*** (3.90) 0.1427*** (3.74)
2007 –0.0655*** (2.95) –0.1334*** (4.93) 0.0757* (1.99)
Note: t-values in parentheses.
Dependent variable: the logarithm of daily earnings.
Independent variables: male, dummies for single year of age variables, days in work 
during the year, dummy for movers set to 1 if the individual worked in the public 
sector in the subsequent year and 0 otherwise).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
In the older group, movers’ earnings exceeded that of stayers in each year, al-
though the difference was not yet significant in 1998–1999. During the time 
of large pay rises the average residual wage of older switchers jumped to 20 per 
cent. It then started to fall and drop below 8 per cent in 2007.
So far the argument that fluctuations in the residual wage of movers were 
related to variations in the sectoral pay gap was based on the similarity in their 
time series. The following sections will attempt to show – using the panel 
equation presented in Annexe 2.3 (A2.3.1) – that there is a direct relation-
ship between them. First, we form K = 640 groups of private sector work-
ers on the basis of their gender, single year of age and calendar years. Second, 
we regress the wages of private sector workers on a set of controls, a MOVER 
dummy and its interaction with the deviation of the kth group’s annual aver-
age public sector pay (wkt) from its intertemporal average (wk). The coefficient 
of the MOVER dummy measures the average difference between movers and 
stayers. The coefficient for the interaction term [MOVER ´  (wkt – wk)] measures 
how fluctuations in the public sector pay of a given group affect the residual 
wages of movers (relative to stayers) in that group.
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The estimated wage equation is controlled for gender, age, age square, the 
number of days in work during the year and calendar year fixed effects – the 
coefficients of these variables are not presented here. Younger and older age 
groups are distinguished on the basis of their year of birth rather than their 
age – to make sure that categories are stable. The two age groups are: people 
younger than 40 years in 2003 and anyone older than this.7
As for the results presented in Table 2.3.4: according to estimations for 
the full sample, the difference between the wages of movers and stayers en-
tirely depended on variations in earnings potential in the public sector. The 
wage of stayers is only 0.85 per cent higher if the level of public sector pay is 
at its intertemporal mean. By contrast, if the public sector wage is 10 per cent 
higher in a group than its intertemporal mean, the residual wage of movers is 
increased by approximately 6 per cent compared to stayers.
Table 2.3.4: The effect of public sector pay level on the wages of people moving from 
the private to the public sector, 1998–2007 (panel estimation assuming individual 
random effects and using the method of least squares)
Full sample Younger peoplea Older peopleb
β1: MOVER 0.0085** (2.00) –0.0213*** (3.76) 0.0364*** (5.86)
β2: MOVER × (ln wKkt – ln w¯Kk)c 0.5780*** (8.14) 0.6280*** (7.55) 0.3975*** (2.71)
Internal R2 0.0422 0.0613 0.0052
External R2 0.0727 0.0611 0.0452
Total R2 0.0622 0.0663 0.0292
Mean number of years observed 6.7 6.5 7.0
Number of observations 1,313,629 783,390 530,239
Number of individuals 207,597 126,222 81,375
Dependent variable: logarithm of relative wage.
Sample: private sector employees.
a Born before 1963.
b Born after 1963.
c : (wKkt – w¯Kk) deviation of the mean wage in group k (based on gender and age) in year t 
from the intertemporal (between 1998 and 2007) mean wage in the public sector.
Z values in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The effect of public sector wages is much stronger in the group of younger 
people born after 1963 than in the older group: elasticity is above 0.6 in the 
first group while it is below 0.4 in the second. This is most probably related to 
the fact that people who move to a public sector job at an older age are more 
likely to be at a senior level. Some of the moves might be part of politically 
motivated reshuffles of senior government officials or people might move to 
the public sector as elected officials.
7 The estimation was carried 
out using GLS panel regression 
assuming random effects for the 
reasons presented in the discus-
sion of equation (A2.3.1). Due to 
the presence of predicted vari-
ables in the equation, standard 
errors were estimated with a 
500-step bootstrap method also 
taking into account that there 
are multiple, possibly correlated 
observations for each individual. 
Therefore we adjust the standard 
errors for “clustering by indi-
viduals”.
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Conclusions
The substantial increase of public sector pay – first for civil servants, then for 
public service workers – in 2002–2003 made the sector more attractive even 
for higher paid private sector workers. At the same time thanks to the large 
pay rises, which were not accompanied by redundancies, the number of em-
ployees leaving the public sector for a job in the private sector fell and so did 
the number of vacancies. Public institutions could hire fewer people from a 
pool of better quality applicants and this lead to an improvement in the qual-
ity – as measured by the residual wage – of new entrants.
With the erosion of the wage advantage from 2002 and the “slimming 
down” of the public sector that started in 2006, the number of people com-
ing from the private sector continued to decline as well as their overall qual-
ity. The large pay rise temporarily – for three years strongly and for a further 
two years moderately – improved the composition of workers moving to the 
public sector, however any positive effect on the public sector workforce was 
limited by a large fall in the entry rate – to two thirds of its previous level. The 
public sector could have benefited more from the higher wage level if at the 
same time it would have “sifted through” its existing workforce.
Measures introduced during the economic crisis – especially the abolition 
of the additional 13th month salary and an unofficial but effective pay freeze 
– pushed the relative pay level of the public sector into a low not seen since 
the early 1990s. Considering Hungary’s current growth and fiscal prospects 
it is unlikely that this will change in the foreseeable future. At the time of 
writing this chapter, in 2013, the wage level of the public sector was 20 per 
cent below the private sector for people of the same gender, age and educa-
tional attainment – this has been unprecedented since 1996, the second year 
of the Bokros package.
Based on the estimations presented in this study it is expected that the 
public sector will become even less attractive for workers, and it is likely that 
much of this deterioration has already happened. (Of course there is no way 
to verify this prediction until micro data covering 2013 is available.) At the 
same time it is unclear whether a general pay rise similar to 2002 would 
lead to the desired outcome: improvement in the quality of the public sec-
tor workforce. In addition to pay rises, this also requires selection based on 
performance and skills.
Annexe 2.3
The effect of the fluctuation of public sector wage on the residual wage of mov-
ers was estimated with the following panel regression:
 ln w Mikt = αXikt + β1moverikt + β2moverikt × (A2.3.1) 
 × (lnw¯ Kkt – lnw¯ Kk ) + γt + uikt 
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The left side of the equation represents the annual income from year t for ith 
private sector worker in group k, Xikt includes the indicators of gender, age 
and working time, and t is a set of dummy variables for calendar years. The up-
per case K (public sector) and M (private sector) indicate the two sectors. We 
distinguish those who are known to have worked in the public sector in year 
t + 1 (MOVER). The expression wkt – wk measures to what extent the mean pub-
lic sector wage of a given group differs from its own intertemporal mean. For 
the estimation we calculate mean public sector pay for 640 age years × gen-
der × year interactions. Separate estimations are carried out for younger and 
older workers.
The estimation was carried out using the method of generalised least squares 
(GLS), assuming random effects. A fixed effects model would not answer the 
question that we are interested in – are higher paid people selected if public 
sector wages are temporarily high – but would answer the question of whether 
the wage of movers increases in the year of move compared to their own per-
sonal average if the pay advantage (disadvantage) of the public sector is grow-
ing (falling) compared to its mean advantage (disadvantage). In other words: 
our aim is not to filter out but to measure the selection bias arising from the 
non-random selection of movers.
The reason why the wage component in the interactive term is defined in 
the way it has been is that we only want to capture the variance of group-level 
average wages over time. (In an equation that uses the public sector pay vari-
able without removing the mean, parameter β2 would simply measure that 
the wage of movers is likely to be higher in groups where wages are high in 
both sectors. In the equation (A2.3.1) β1 measures the mean residual wage of 
movers, while β2 measures the effect of fluctuations in public sector pay on 
the selection of movers.
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2.4 Labour outflow from the public sector in Hungary
Péter Elek & Péter András Szabó
This chapter concentrates on the outflow from the public sector in Hungary 
in the period between 1998 and 2010; a more detailed analysis can be found 
in Elek and Szabó’s (2013) paper. First, the rate of job mobility and outflow 
into unemployment or inactivity from the public sector will be compared to 
the same rates from the private sector and we will consider whether the pub-
lic sector is more stable in any of these aspects. It will be shown that the like-
lihood of moving into unemployment or another job from the public sector 
was approximately half of that from the private sector between 1998 and 2010.
Secondly – as a possible implication of the public sector’s higher stability 
– it will be examined whether people who leave the public sector end up in a 
significantly worse position than similar workers leaving the private sector. 
This will be assessed by examining the re-employment probabilities of those 
made redundant and overqualification rates of those who left to move to an-
other job. The results will show that – with the exception of the low-skilled 
– workers coming from the public sector are not at a disadvantage in terms of 
finding a new job and they are not at increased risk of ending up in a “worse” 
job position compared to people from the private sector.
An important contribution of this study is that it uses two large micro-lev-
el panel data sets [the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (CSO) and the 200,000-strong sample from the register of 
the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance (CANPI)] to ex-
amine these questions.
Data and definitions
CSO Labour Force Survey. The CSO’s Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a quar-
terly survey on a representative sample of 70,000 individuals. It provides infor-
mation on self-reported labour market status and other characteristics. From 
the perspective of the present study, an important feature of the survey is that 
it asks about the reason for terminating previous employment (dismissal, re-
dundancy, leaving the job etc.) and thus it is possible to distinguish between 
people who left the public sector voluntarily and people who were forced to 
leave. The survey follows participants for six quarters and thus consecutive 
quarters can be linked to create a panel dataset.
This study adopts a relatively narrow definition of the public sector when 
using CSO Labour Force Survey data: an employee is part of the public sec-
tor if they work in, public administration and defence, education, health and 
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social care or research and development branches1 and their employer is not 
fully privately owned. Thus, the definition excludes people who work in pri-
vately owned hospitals or schools, as well as people who work in state-owned 
businesses in manufacturing or services (for example the Hungarian Na-
tional Rail). We also exclude people who are employed in public works pro-
grammes because they are significantly different from the rest of public sec-
tor employees.2
CANPI pension insurance database. The other data set comes from the 
Central Administration of National Pension Insurance, and contains an an-
onymised administrative panel data of 200,000 people between 2000 and 
2006. It records social security insurance status (for example work contract, 
public service employee or civil servant status, self-employed etc.) and corre-
sponding income as well as transfers (sick leave, family benefits, pensions) re-
ceived by the individuals in the sample for each month. In addition the data 
set includes some demographic and personal information (age, gender, post 
code), and the occupation (SCO) code for most social security statuses (ex-
cept for self-employed statuses and alike). Thus the CANPI database makes 
it possible to follow the (official) labour market and transfer status of indi-
viduals on a large sample over a longer period than the LFS.3
Since the CANPI administrative database has no direct information on 
branch, public sector was identified jointly on the basis of social security status 
and the SCO code. An employee is considered to be part of the public sector 
if they are employed in public service, public administration, judiciary, law 
enforcement, armed forces or “premium years” status (the latter is designed 
for the employment of public employees just before the pension age limit), or 
if their SCO code indicates an occupation that is highly likely to be in the 
public sector (doctor, nurse, teacher etc.). Thus, the CANPI dataset (unlike 
the CSO Labour Force Survey) includes doctors and teachers in private hos-
pitals, schools etc. among the public sector workers.4 In the analysis private 
sector means employees outside the public sector; the self-employed and en-
trepreneurs are excluded. The CANPI database does not have information 
on educational attainment, but this is approximated on the basis of occupa-
tion by assigning the typical (median) educational attainment of employees 
with the same SCO code in the Labour Force Survey to the SCO code of the 
individual in the administrative data.
The characteristics of people leaving the public sector
According to Figure 2.4.1 the public sector comprised approximately 800,000 
people between 1998 and 2002. Then, this number started to increase rapidly 
and reached its peak at around 850,000 by 2003–2004. By 2008, it dropped 
to 790,000, which was again followed by a rapid rise but only due to the ris-
ing number of participants in public works programmes.
1 This includes Hungarian 
NACE–2003 codes 73, 75, 80 
and 85, that correspond to codes 
72, 75, 84–88 in NACE–2008 
(the latter has been used in the 
definition since 2009).
2 For details of the narrower 
definition of the public sector 
see Elek and Szabó (2013).
3 For a detailed description 
of the database see Elek et al. 
(2009a).
4 The exact definitions can be 
found in Table F2 in the An-
nex of the more detailed version 
of this study (Elek and Szabó, 
2013).
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Figure 2.4.1: Number of public sector workers and the estimated  
annual in- and outflow to/from the public sector
Note: The number of people entering or leaving the public sector are presented after 
iterative proportional fitting and (symmetrical) moving average smoothing over 
four quarters.
Source: Own calculations based on CSO Labour Force Survey data between 1998–
2010, public sector without public works participants.
Figure 2.4.1. shows the estimated outflow from, and inflow to, the public 
sector (without public works participants) in this period.5 The probability of 
entry to, or exit from, the public sector was around nine per cent on average 
annually, and changes in the number of people entering or leaving the pub-
lic sector all had a clear role both in the rapid rise between 2002 and 2004 
and the decline later. In the following the first component, the outflow, will 
be examined. (On inflow see Chapter 2.3 by János Köllő in this In Focus.)
Figure 2.4.2. and Figure 2.4.3. show quarterly outflow rates from the public 
sector – without public workers – into inactivity, unemployment or other jobs 
in another sector compared to the corresponding rates from the private sector 
between 1998 and 2010.6 A large part of the outflow from the public sector 
was comprised of people who become inactive (retire, claim child care benefits 
or enter another inactive status). The quarterly probability of outflow to inac-
tivity was on average 1.1 per cent and showed an increasing trend, although 
it was not substantially different from the same rate in the private sector. The 
probability of becoming unemployed and of job mobility were considerably 
lower in the public sector, on average around 0.3–0.4 per cent each, well be-
low the same transition probabilities of private sector workers. It is noticeable 
that while the risk of unemployment increased considerably in the private sec-
tor after the 2009 crisis, it did not grow at all in the public sector until 2010. 
Hungary was still characterised – as shown by Boeri and Flinn (1997) in their 
earlier study on three transition countries (Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) – 
by lower mobility in the public sector compared to the private sector.
5 In the calculations we did 
not use unadjusted transition 
probabilities that were com-
puted directly from Labour 
Force Survey panel data, but 
we adjusted these using iterative 
proportional fitting to ensure the 
consistency between stock and 
flow figures.
6 In addition to the above transi-
tions, outflow from the public 
sector formally includes out-
sourcing as well. See the more 
detailed version of this study 
(Elek and Szabó, 2013) on the 
number of people affected by 
this.
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Figure 2.4.2: Quarterly transition probabilities from the public  
and the private sector into unemployment and inactivity
Note: The figure depicts the quarterly probabilities of outflow into inactiv-
ity and unemployment from the public sector (without public workers) and 
from the private sector.
Source: Own calculations based on CSO Labour Force Survey data between 
1998–2010
Figure 2.4.3: Quarterly probabilities of job mobility from  
the public and private sector
Note: The figure depicts the quarterly probabilities of job mobility into other 
occupation and industry from the public sector (without public workers) 
and from the private sector.
Source: Own calculations based on CSO Labour Force Survey data between 
1998–2010
In the following we will focus on two out of the three important transitions: 
outflow into unemployment and another job. As has been shown the prob-
ability of the third type of transition (into inactivity) is not substantially dif-
ferent in the two sectors, thus the mechanisms at work are likely to be broadly 
similar as well, and the general patterns of retirement have already been ex-
amined by various studies.7
7 On outflow into retirement 
see for example Cseres-Gergely 
(2008), on family benefits see 
Scharle (2008). On the “crowd-
ing-out” dynamics between 
younger and older employees 
in the public sector see Cseres-
Gergely (2013).
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Transitions into unemployment from the public sector
The raw data in Figure 2.4.2 hide large variations in outflow in terms of 
educational attainment and other factors. A more detailed analysis of the 
risk of becoming unemployed shows that its probability in the public sec-
tor is approximately half of that in the private sector at each educational 
level.8 If a logit regression model is used to control for factors known to in-
fluence the probability of unemployment (for example gender, age, type of 
settlement), then the results show that people with higher educational at-
tainment (at least general secondary education) in the public sector are in 
an even better position than those with lower education; the relative risk 
of unemployment (compared to the private sector) among the highly edu-
cated is 20–30 per cent better than the corresponding relative risk among 
low-skilled workers.9
Probability of re-employment. Using LFS and CANPI data the widespread 
belief that public sector workers who are made redundant remain unem-
ployed for longer (i.e. are less likely to be re-employed) than similar work-
ers in the private sector can be examined. The labour market status of re-
dundant workers was observed quarterly for up to four quarters in the LFS; 
and monthly even for years – depending on the date of redundancy – in the 
CANPI data. We use Prentice and Gloeckler’s (1978) proportional hazards 
discrete-time duration model that is often referred to as the Jenkins model 
in the literature based on Jenkins (1995). Similarly to continuous-time du-
ration models, this expresses the hazard function λ(t) of unemployment’s 
duration T (or the “intensity” of re-employment) as the product of base-
line re-employment intensity λ0(t),10 and a factor depending on individual 
characteristics:
λ(t) = λ0(t) × exp(Xβ),
where β is the parameter vector to be estimated and X indicates the individual 
variables. Thus, individual characteristics have the same multiplicative effect 
on re-employment intensity in each period. If, for instance, β = 0.1, then the 
given variable increases the intensity of re-employment by about 10 per cent 
at each time point. (So if the probability of re-employment is five per cent in 
the sixth month of unemployment, then the given variable increases this to 
1.1 × 5 per cent = 5.5 per cent.)
For the analysis of re-employment probabilities two approaches are used 
on both LFS and CANPI data to define people who flow out of employment. 
The first, narrower definition includes people who probably were made re-
dundant.11 The other definition is broader and includes all employees who 
become inactive or unemployed (the “total” columns on Figure 2.4.4).12 The 
sample has been constrained to include only people aged between 25 and 54 
years and not in a public works programme.
8 Obviously people with at least 
a general secondary education 
are a lot – by about a third – less 
likely, in both sectors, to become 
unemployed than those with 
at most a vocational education.
9 For the estimation results see 
the more detailed study (Elek 
and Szabó, 2013).
10 This is specified as non-par-
ametric on LFS data and as a 
modified Weibull-distribution 
for the CANPI data (see the 
more detailed Elek and Szabó, 
2013 study).
11 In the LFS-based analysis 
these are people who were in 
employment at observation 
–1 and were out of work at ob-
servation 0 and reported that 
they had lost their job (or their 
temporary contract had come 
to an end). In the CANPI da-
tabase people are considered 
“displaced” (“made redundant”) 
if they received unemployment 
benefit for any length of time 
within two months from the 
termination of their employee 
status. Thus, this is an even 
smaller group than the LFS 
definition because not all dis-
placed workers are entitled to 
unemployment benefits.
12 In the LFS this includes peo-
ple who became unemployed 
or inactive in a given quarter, 
while in the CANPI it includes 
people who are out of work due 
to the termination of a previous 
employment status or to long-
term leave (because of illness or 
parental leave etc.).
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Note: Re-employment intensity of employees aged 25–54 years after leaving a job, 
excluding public workers.
Source: Own calculations based on quarterly CSO LFS 1998–2010 and monthly 
CANPI 2000–2006 data.
Figure 2.4.4 shows that raw re-employment probabilities are consistently 
smaller for people who leave the public sector compared to employees from 
the private sector; however the difference is smaller among those who “lost” 
their job than among the broader groups. The results of the discrete-time 
duration models, presented in Table 2.4.1, also support this. (The detailed 
model specifications can be found in Elek and Szabó’s 2013 paper.) Results 
for people who are made redundant (groups of columns 1 and 3) indicate that 
the raw re-employment intensity after public sector work history was 25 per 
cent (LFS) or five per cent (CANPI) lower in each period compared to pri-
vate sector work history. (However, only the LFS-based difference in re-em-
ployment rates is significant.) The difference essentially remains the same even 
after controlling for demographic (educational attainment, gender) and other 
variables (job tenure, transfer status): in the LFS model it is highly significant 
(at around 25 per cent) and in the CANPI model it is still not significant.
It is worth considering whether there is any difference in the re-employment 
probabilities of employees made redundant in the public and the private sec-
tor by educational attainment. In the bottom section of Table 2.4.1 the in-
teraction variable of public sector and educational attainment is also shown 
in addition to the control variables of the previous model. The results reveal 
that former public-sector employees with low educational attainment (pri-
mary education or vocational training school) are 20–40 per cent less likely 
to be re-employed according to LFS data and 10–20 per cent less likely ac-
cording to CANPI than similar workers made redundant in the private sector. 
There is no such difference between graduates and in the CANPI specifica-
tion between people with general secondary education. Overall the moder-
Figure 2.4.4: Re-employment probabilities of people leaving the public  
and the private sector by length of time out of work, based on LFS and CANPI data (percentage)
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ately lower re-employment probabilities (25 per cent lower according to LFS 
and no significant difference according to CANPI)13 are entirely caused by 
the worse prospects of lower skilled employees, and this conclusion seems ro-
bust regardless the available datasets (LFS and CANPI).
Table 2.4.1: Re-employment intensity of the non-employed leaving the public sector 
(compared to the private sector) based on LFS and CANPI data
LFS
CANPI
(re-employment within 12 months)
“Redundant” “Total” “Redundant” “Total”
Baseline models (raw difference between the two sectors)
Public vs. private sector 0.762*** (0.056) 0.510*** (0.023) 0.945 (0.032) 0.635*** (0.012)
Models with control variables
Public vs. private sector 0.766*** (0.061) 0.581*** (0.029) 0.962 (0.035) 0.794*** (0.019)
Models with interactions and control variables, benchmark = public sector × primary education)
Public sector 0.606*** (0.091) 0.634*** (0.073) 0.790*** (0.059) 0.811*** (0.043)
Public sector × vocational training school 1.260 (0.266) 1.003 (0.154) 1.109 (0.118) 0.838** (0.063)
Public sector × general secondary education 1.195 (0.276) 0.844 (0.123) 1.381*** (0.133) 1.023 (0.067)
Public sector × higher education 2.141*** (0.521) 0.887 (0.132) 1.552*** (0.194) 1.018 (0.074)
Note: Calculations are presented for the age group 25–54 years (former employees 
only, excluding public works participants). The pension variable in the CANPI data 
was available for 2000–2004 only, therefore models including the transfer status 
were estimated for this period. In the CANPI models education is approximated as 
the median educational attainment for a given occupation (SCO code).
Discrete-time hazard models, where the table displays relative risks [exp(β)], and 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Hence there is no effect if the param-
eter estimate equals one.
Models with control variables: education, gender, age and other factors that affect 
re-employment are included. The full list of control variables and their estimated 
parameters are reported in Elek and Szabó (2013).
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on CSO LFS 1998–2010 and CANPI 2000–2006 
data.
Finally, groups of columns 2 and 4 in Table 2.4.1 show the difference be-
tween the re-employment rates of people who leave their job for whatever 
reason by their sector of origin (public/private).Results based on both LFS 
and CANPI suggest that the raw intensity of re-employment is about 35–50 
per cent lower for people leaving the public sector, which drops to 20–40 
per cent in models with control variables. This means that although there is 
no significant difference between the re-employment probabilities of those 
who become redundant, inactivity is more likely to be a permanent exit from 
the labour market in the case of public sector workers compared to private 
sector employees. The main reason is that people who retire from the public 
sector or leave it due to “other reasons” (according to the LFS) are a lot less 
likely to return to work than those who leave the private sector for the same 
13 The difference between the 
LFS and CANPI results is due 
to differences in the databases 
and the definition of the public 
sector.
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reasons. In contrast to those who are made redundant, in these models there 
is no significant difference in the relative re-employment rate of public sector 
workers by educational attainment.
Job mobility from the public sector
As has been shown above, the public sector was not only more stable in terms 
of outflow into unemployment but also in terms of job mobility compared to 
the private sector between 1998 and 2010: in both cases the appropriate tran-
sition probabilities were around half of those observed in the private sector 
(Figures 2.4.2 and 2.4.3). However, raw data in Figure 2.4.3 conceal which 
public sector groups – in terms of education, age or branch – are more likely 
to move to the private sector. Using a logit regression model, it emerges that 
people who are disadvantaged on the labour market (low skilled, living in ru-
ral areas) moved to the private sector with a greater probability in the last 12 
years. There are also substantial differences in the raw probabilities of exit to 
other jobs from the three main branches of the public sector. However, these 
get much smaller after the inclusion of control variables, when only health 
care appears to still have a lower exit rate by about 25–30 per cent compared 
to the other two branches, public administration and education. (For details 
see Elek and Szabó’s (2013 paper).]
Overqualification in the new job
It is a widespread belief that people who leave the public sector are likely to 
accept jobs for which they are overqualified (for example a teacher becomes 
an administrator). Transition from the public to the private sector provides an 
opportunity to examine this: if it can be shown that people who move from 
the public sector are more likely to be overqualified for their new job, then 
this might indicate the lower quality of the public sector workforce – com-
pared to the private sector.
To address this question on the LFS database we assign to each occu-
pation group (four-digit SCO code) the median educational attainment 
(MEA) of workers within that occupation group. Overqualification occurs 
when an employee has a higher educational attainment than the MEA cor-
responding to their occupation. Therefore being overqualified is not only 
an individual characteristic but also a characteristic of the occupation 
group. For example – at the level of detail of the current SCO classifica-
tion – overqualification is much less common among people with general 
secondary education in the public sector than in the private sector. Over-
all, 14 per cent of public sector workers and 25 per cent of private sector 
workers are “overqualified”.
Therefore, it is not surprising that people who leave the public sector for 
another occupation in the private sector have a higher probability – around 
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37–39 per cent – of being overqualified in their new job than the 14 per 
cent average in the public sector. This raw ratio is also significantly higher 
than the ratio observed among movers to a different occupation and branch 
within the private sector (30 per cent). However, after controlling for other 
factors that are important for overqualification (especially education) the 
difference basically disappears. The logit regression models of Table 2.4.2 
show this.
Table 2.4.2: Probability of overqualification among people moving to a new job  
in the private sector by the sector of origin (public or private) (logit models)
Odds ratio
Raw odds ratio
Public vs. private sector 1.664*** (0.147)
Model with control variables
Public vs. private sector 1.040 (0.108)
Educational attainment (benchmark = vocational training school)
General secondary education 7.313*** (0.349)
Higher education 13.627*** (0.987)
Sample size 14,063
LR χ2 2237.1
Pseudo R2 0.1726
Dependent variable: Is the individual overqualified? Unweighted logit estimation.
Sample: people moving to another occupation and branch (in the private sector), 
without public workers.
Note: The table shows the odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Raw odds 
ratio: odds ratio of being overqualified for people moving from the public sector 
versus people changing jobs within the private sector.
In the model with control variables: education, gender, age, age squared, and the 
dummy of at least two years’ tenure in previous job are included. For the estimated 
parameters of control variables see Elek and Szabó’s (2013) study. Control variables 
do not include primary education because people with primary education cannot 
be overqualified by definition.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on LFS 1998–2010 data.
The raw odds ratio of being overqualified for people leaving the public sector 
compared to people moving within the private sector is 1.66 (highly signifi-
cant). After controlling for education and other parameters this drops to 1.05 
and is no longer significant. So if people with similar educational attainment 
are compared then the widespread belief that people who come from the pub-
lic sector are more likely to end up in “worse” jobs than those moving within 
the private sector can be refuted. This view might have developed because 
graduates are overrepresented in the public sector and they – naturally – are 
more likely to be overqualified in a new job compared to people with lower 
educational attainment.
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Conclusions
This chapter has concluded that the public sector was considerably more sta-
ble both in terms of outflow into unemployment and into other jobs than 
the private sector between 1998 and 2010. The question of whether greater 
stability was related to adverse selection – “poorer” quality of public sector 
workers – was examined by looking at the re-employment rates of people 
who became unemployed and at the flow of workers from the public to the 
private sector.
The results have shown that the re-employment probability of workers made 
redundant in the public sector is moderately (by 5–25 per cent) lower than the 
same rate in the private sector; however the difference disappears in groups 
with higher educational attainment. Similarly the overqualification rate of 
movers to another job is no greater than in the private sector after control-
ling for educational attainment and other factors. Thus, these estimates do 
not support the widespread belief that people who leave the public sector face 
greater difficulties in finding a job and are more likely to accept jobs below 
their qualification level. The findings are especially interesting given the fact 
that our estimation strategy is more likely to overestimate rather than under-
estimate the quality differences due to a possible selection bias – people are 
much less likely to be made redundant in the public sector. However, related 
to its greater stability, people who leave the public sector for whatever reason 
are significantly less likely to be re-employed (the intensity of re-employment 
is 20–40 per cent lower even after controlling for other factors), mainly be-
cause pensioners who have retired from the public sector are significantly less 
likely to return to work.
The number of public sector workers increased between 2010 and 2013, 
although a large share of this increase was due to the expansion of pub-
lic works programmes. It will be interesting to examine in the future how 
the re-employment prospects of people made redundant in the public sec-
tor have changed since 2010, when the Hungarian economy started to ex-
pand following the period of stagnation and recession after 2007. To an-
swer this question the panel database of the Labour Force Survey as well 
as the database on individual social security contributions will have to be 
extended until 2013.
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2.5 Why do people choose to work in the public sector?  
The role of subjective factors
György Molnár & Zsuzsa Kapitány
Selection between public and private sector jobs is influenced by a variety of 
factors in addition to potential pay. An important objective factor is the rela-
tively higher demand for highly educated employees in the public sector. The 
main subjective factor is greater security in the public sector in a number of 
ways: greater job security, more regulated working conditions, and more pre-
dictable promotion opportunities. Those who value these are more likely to 
choose to work in the public sector even if it means lower pay. Another impor-
tant subjective difference is that people are often motivated by a stronger sense 
of mission or social responsibility when choosing to work in the public sector.
The decision can also be influenced by family circumstances. This study 
will identify a number of life scenarios that support this hypothesis. The ef-
fect of motivations related to social responsibility will be examined through 
participation in voluntary work and attitudes towards income redistribution.
The study will address three related questions: 1) What are the family factors 
which influence public sector employment? 2) Are public sector employees 
more likely to be involved in voluntary work? 3) Are there any special char-
acteristics of public sector workers in terms of their attitude to centralised 
income redistribution?1
Background
It was Bellante and Link (1981) who first suggested that risk averse people are 
more likely to choose to work in the public sector than in the private sector. 
Their study was mainly based on Bloch and Smith’s (1977) finding that public 
sector employees – ceteris paribus – are less likely to become unemployed than 
private sector workers. Gregory and Borland (1999) highlighted a potential 
issue with the interpretation of results: Bellante and Link’s (1981) findings 
only show that public sector employees are more likely to be risk averse than 
those in the private sectors. It is possible, however, that the effect mechanism 
works in the opposite direction and that the public sector prefers risk averse 
employees. Furthermore, there is a possible third explanation: public sector 
employees become risk averse as a result of the job requirements. Hartog at 
al. (2002) examined factors associated with risk aversion: public sector em-
ployees are more, while entrepreneurs are less, risk averse, private sector em-
ployees are in the middle.
In addition to security, the feeling of social usefulness can also play a role in 
choosing to work in the public sector. Various studies showed that the motive 
of doing socially useful work is stronger among public sector employees (see 
1 This chapter is a shorter and 
simplified version of the paper 
by Molnár–Kapitány (2013), 
which includes a more in-depth 
literature review and descriptive 
statistics.
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for example Dixit, 2002). Dixit concludes that this motive is much stronger in 
the early stages of the establishment of institutions than later on, and is more 
characteristic of employees who work directly with people than managers.
Most studies examined the relationship between social responsibility and 
public or private sector employment using questions about social responsi-
bility. However there is a risk of social desirability bias here; the responses of 
public sector employees might be influenced by social expectations towards 
them. In a behavioural experiment Buurman at al. (2009) showed that the 
motivation to help others is stronger than average among people in the early 
stages of their public sector career.
Perception of the extent and dynamics of income inequalities can strongly 
influence preferences for income redistribution (see for example Meltzer and 
Richard, 1981), and that might be an indicator of social responsibility. This is 
often assessed using the following question: “Do you agree that the Govern-
ment should reduce income differences?” The answer to this question is influ-
enced by a number of additional factors: absolute and relative financial and 
wealth situation, mobility, expectations towards the future, personal history, 
education, family structure, and so on. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) provide 
an in-depth review of the literature on preferences for redistribution, while 
Molnár and Kapitány (2006) analyse the issue on Hungarian data. Differ-
ent factors might be important in different countries, nevertheless support 
for redistribution generally decreases with the increase of income and more 
positive expectations towards the future.
There are few studies that look at working in the public sector in the context 
of attitudes towards redistribution. Jaime-Castillo (2008) found a positive but 
not significant relationship between working in the public sector and prefer-
ence for income redistribution in Spain. Finseraas and Ringdal (2012) using 
data from 23 European countries including Hungary found a very strong 
relationship. According to their analysis, employees who work in the public 
sector – ceteris paribus – are more likely to support the welfare state than oth-
ers. In international comparison the Hungarian data suggests a paradox situ-
ation. Hungary is among the countries with a strong preference for a range of 
welfare state activities. However, when asked to indicate the desirable extent 
of taxes and welfare provisions on a scale between 0 and 10, Hungary pro-
duces the lowest value. One of the possible reasons for this contradiction is 
the low level of tax awareness in Hungary and undervaluing the tax cost of 
public services (see Csontos at al. 1998, Gábos et al., 2007 and Tóth, 2009). 
Very low trust in public institutions in international comparison might also 
contribute to this phenomenon (Tóth, 2009). Therefore people think that it 
would be possible to provide more welfare services from the taxes they pay.
Linder (2010) examined the situation of civil servants in Hungary. In her 
dissertation she used the findings of a 2003 survey that asked public service 
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employees about the most attractive aspects of their job as a civil servant. 
Most respondents (75%) mentioned benefits for the community and security 
(70%), and any financial aspects only came after these. However, the author 
also raised the question of whether the frequent mentioning of community 
aspects might reflect social desirability (Linder, 2010, pp. 203–204.). At the 
same time, frequent reorganisations, large scale redundancies, and the weak-
ening of the principle of irremovability raise the question of whether greater 
public sector job security is still the case in Hungary.
About the data
The analysis uses Hungarian data for the two-year EU–SILC (European Un-
ion Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) household panel survey col-
lected by the Central Statistical Office in 2005–2006. The sample includes 
around 5,000 households and 13,300 individuals, out of which 12,800 people 
took part in both years. The selection of these years is justified by the inclu-
sion of questions on life satisfaction and attitude towards income redistribu-
tion in the 2006 survey. The 2006 questionnaire also includes a question on 
voluntary work and there is information on the ownership of the workplace 
for both years. In the analysis the public sector includes civil servants, public 
service employees and employees of state or local government owned busi-
nesses. Household income was computed using the “OECD1” equivalence 
scale because this is the most appropriate within the Hungarian context (see 
also Cseres-Gergely and Molnár, 2008).
Why do people choose to work in the public sector? The role  
of family factors
In life situations when job security and predictability of working conditions 
is very important, the decision to work in the public sector might be an ad-
vantage. Such life situations might include raising children, the health status 
or long term condition – not work-related – of the individual or other fam-
ily members, and factors related to other family circumstances. In terms of 
health status, people with a long-term condition – who are able to work – are 
more likely to work in the public sector. In addition to their own illness, the 
presence of long term conditions in the family and any caring commitments 
might also influence decisions about jobs.
The rate of people who had been unemployed previously is considerably low-
er in the public sector than in the private sector (28 and 42 per cent respec-
tively). In addition to different education levels, this might be due to higher 
job security in the public sector or the fact that the public sector is less likely 
to recruit unemployed people for jobs. A two-year panel survey is very short 
for making any general conclusions, however it is indicative that only 2.6 per 
cent of public sector employees had been unemployed in the previous year 
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compared to 5.9 per cent of employees in the private sector. Therefore, in 
terms of the preference for job security, earlier unemployment in the family 
might be a relevant factor.
The sample has been limited to employees, excluding entrepreneurs and 
casual workers in the private sector. In the data set approximately 35 per cent 
of employees worked in the public sector. A logistic model was used to esti-
mate what factors influenced the likelihood of working in the public or pri-
vate sector and to what extent. The results of the estimation are summarised 
in Table 2.5.1; this presents not the coefficients but the estimated marginal 
effects. (For continuous variables the marginal effect shows the average ef-
fect of a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable. Categorical variables 
with multiple values were compared to reference groups, so for example a 
difference of 46.5 percentage points shows the difference in the probability 
– expressed as a percentage – of a female university graduate to work in the 
public sector compared to a male with a vocational school education. For di-
chotomous variables the marginal effect shows how much their occurrence 
increases or decreases probability.)
Each life year – taking all other explanatory factors as constant – increas-
es the likelihood of working in the public sector on average by 0.5 per cent. 
Women with a vocational school or vocational secondary education or lower 
are 8–9 percentage points more likely to work in the public sector than men 
with the same level of education. Men whose highest education is general sec-
ondary education are as likely as women with the same education to work in 
the public sector and there is no significant difference between the two val-
ues. This means that the public sector provides better opportunities for men 
with a general secondary education and no vocational qualification than the 
private sector. There is no difference between men with a general secondary 
education and men with a college degree in this respect.
In terms of gender differences, it is greatest among graduates, particular-
ly college graduates. Women with a college degree are 15 percentage points 
more likely to work in the public sector than men with a similar education, 
while among university graduates the gap is somewhat smaller: 12 percentage 
points. The likelihood of working in the public sector increases with education.
There are no differences in terms of the number of children; however there 
are two types of households that stand out. Single parents are more likely to 
work in the public sector than people in other types of households. This ef-
fect no longer prevails if there is another adult (for example a lineal relative) 
in the household. The result suggests that the public sector provides better op-
portunities for single parents to manage their child care responsibilities and 
therefore they are more likely to work here rather than in the private sector.
In cohabiting households the likelihood of working in the public sector 
is smaller than in other households. A possible explanation is that people 
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who value formalised security less are also less likely to get married or have 
a more secure job.
Table 2.5.1: Factors influencing selection between the public and private sector 
among employees, 2006 (logit estimate,  
dependent variable: selection of public sector job, N = 4,200)
Variable Marginal effect (percentage)
Age 0.5***
Vocational training school or lower, male reference group
Vocational training school or lower, female 8.3***
Vocational secondary school, post-secondary vocational qual., male 8.9***
Vocational secondary school, post-secondary vocational qual., female 17.6***
General secondary education, male 21.2***
General secondary education, female 24.1***
College, male 24.2***
College, female 40.9***
University or higher, male 34.2***
University or higher, female 46.5***
Single –0.1
Married couple without children –3.3
Married couple with child(ren) 1.5
Single parent with child(ren) 7.7**
Single parent with child(ren) + another adult 0.9
Cohabiting partners –6.3**
Other type of household reference group
Spouse or partner worked in the public sector in the previous year 11.5***
Long-term condition 6.4***
Spouse/partner or child in the household has long-term condition 7.3***
Husband had been unemployed before 40th birthday of wife 7.3**
Wife had been unemployed before 40th birthday of husband 3.7
Logarithm of regional unemployment rate 10.9***
Pseudo R2 0.127
Note: We used robust estimation clustered for households. The estimated odds ratios 
and standard errors are available in Table 1, Molnár and Kapitány (2013).
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level.
People who have a self-reported long term condition are significantly more 
likely to work in the public sector than those who do not have a long-term 
condition. One of the possible reasons is that the public sector provides bet-
ter employment opportunities for people with long term conditions, or the 
public sector makes more of an effort to employ people who are disadvantaged 
due to a long term condition. This effect does not only prevail for their own 
illness; people whose spouse/partner or child has a long term condition are 
also more likely to work in the public sector.
Women whose husband had been unemployed before they (wife) turned 
40 (or any time in the case of those aged under 40) are more likely to work 
in the public sector than others. There is no similar significant effect in the 
case of cohabiting couples or men (whether their wife had been unemployed).
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Finally, in terms of regional effects, contrary to international experience, 
in Hungary people who live in the capital are less likely to work in the public 
sector than others. (More precisely this is only true for public sector employ-
ees, not for civil servants.) The phenomenon is related to the regional distribu-
tion of unemployment. The higher the unemployment in a region, the more 
likely it is that people in employment are working in the public sector. There 
are numerous small regions in the country where only the public sector pro-
vides any employment opportunities.
In summary, it might be concluded that attributing the decision to work in 
the public sector to individual risk aversion is overly simplistic; it is often the 
result of family rather than individual strategies. Nevertheless, these strate-
gies will only remain valid in the long run if the public sector does provide 
greater security in these life situations. There have been some opposite trends 
in recent years: the economic and financial crisis might have increased the 
advantage of the public sector in terms of job security over the private sector; 
however frequent reorganisations and the further weakening of the principle 
of irremovability might have worked in the opposite direction.
Voluntary work
Voluntary work is considered a possible proxy variable for social responsibility. 
The number of people involved in voluntary work is rather low and less than 
half of them undertake it at least once a month. The frequency of voluntary 
work in the total adult population is just under 15 per cent, and 18 per cent 
among the economically active.
Estimates for factors associated with participation in voluntary work are 
presented in Table 2.5.2. The model was estimated for the total adult popu-
lation rather than employees only. It is assumed that involvement in volun-
tary activities is cumulative within the family. To examine this, a variable was 
created that indicates the ratio of adults involved in voluntary work in the 
household. The augmented model that includes this variable is shown in the 
second column of the table.
People employed in public education, research and culture are around 10 
percentage points more likely to be involved in voluntary work than people 
who are private sector workers. For people who work in health care or social 
care the difference is approximately six percentage points. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, there is no significant difference between public administration and 
private sector workers in terms of involvement in voluntary work; there is 
no evidence of a greater than average social responsibility among people who 
work in public administration. This finding supports Linder’s (2010) argu-
ment above that civil servants tend to respond according to social expecta-
tions in surveys. The indirect measurement, based on voluntary work most 
probably provides a more realistic picture.
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Table 2.5.2: Factors influencing voluntary work in the adult population (logit 
estimation, dependent variable: does any voluntary work, N = 10,664)
Dependent variable: does any voluntary work
Marginal effect (percentage)
Model 1 Model 2
Employed in the private sector reference group
Employed in public administration 1.3 0.7
Public education, R & D, culture 10.7*** 9.5***
Health and social care 6.3*** 5.9***
Other public sector 1.4 2.0
Entrepreneur 1.9 0.6
Casual worker, public worker 6.8** 6.8***
Retired 0.6 0.6
Student 14.8*** 11.0***
Other unemployed and inactivea –1.4 –1.0
Logarithm of household income 1.7 0.7
19–29 years, not in educationb reference group
30–39 years 6.6*** 5.7***
40–49 years 8.2*** 5.2***
50–59 years 9.3*** 7.8***
60–69 years 8.9*** 7.7***
70 years or older 6.8*** 6.4***
Poor health –6.2*** –5.3***
Female –0.9 –0.7
Primary education or lower reference group
Vocational training school 6.0*** 4.6***
Vocational secondary school 11.0*** 8.8***
General secondary education 9.9*** 7.8***
College 18.3*** 14.7***
University 17.8*** 13.3***
No children under 15 in the household reference group
1 child 5.1*** 2.5***
2 children 6.7*** 3.2***
3 children 10.2*** 5.6***
4 or more children 8.1 4.5
Rate of adults involved in voluntary work within the same householdc – 21.0***
Budapest reference group
City with county rights 4.3*** 3.4***
Town 2.6* 2.3**
Village 9.1*** 6.8***
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.189
Note: See comments for Table 2.5.1.
a Includes: unemployed not in public works, full-time parents, homemakers, other 
non-working.
b 99% of students age over 18 are between 19–29 years, therefore – as students are 
in a different variable – the reference group is comprised of 19–29 year olds not in 
education.
c The indicator was obtained by dividing the number of adults who do voluntary 
work by the total number of adults in the household. The observed individual was 
not included in the numerator nor in the denominator. If there were no other adults 
in the household the value of the variable is zero.
*** Significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level.
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For public service employees another question is whether voluntary work is 
truly altruistic and genuine or if it is forced upon the individual by the em-
ployer. This was examined by comparing old and new public service employ-
ees in the paper by Molnár and Kapitány (2013) mentioned earlier. The de-
tailed findings of this study are not presented here, nevertheless they seem to 
suggest that even if there are expectations from employers, the people who 
work in human services have a higher level of social commitment than others.
It is worth considering what other factors influence involvement in volun-
tary work based on Table 2.5.2. Among students (mainly students in higher 
education) participation in voluntary work is very high, then it declines and 
again it slightly increases with age. As the level of education goes up involve-
ment in voluntary work also goes up, and this is especially true for graduates. 
Voluntary work is partly related to children. The probability of voluntary 
work is higher in villages than in towns and especially Budapest. The finan-
cial situation does not play a role but family factors have a very strong effect.
More recent developments, radical re-organisations and increasing central-
isation weaken the sense of mission. To test this hypothesis it would be im-
portant to include questions on voluntary work and other factors suitable for 
measuring social commitment in household surveys on a more regular basis.
Attitudes towards income redistribution and the public sector
In relation to income redistribution respondents answered two questions: “Do 
you agree that the Government should limit the income of the rich?” and “Do 
you agree that the Government should provide higher income to the poor?” 
There was a similar survey in 2002 as well, see Molnár and Kapitány (2006b). 
In the four-year period between 2002 and 2006 the rate of respondents who 
strongly agreed increased considerably by about 10 percentage points against 
those who somewhat agreed in both categories (Table 2.5.3). The share of 
those who strongly or somewhat agreed reached 91 and 80 per cent respec-
tively in 2006.
Table 2.5.3: Attitudes towards income redistribution, 2002 and 2006 (percentage)
Higher income for the poor Limiting the income of the rich
2002 2006 2002 2006
Strongly disagree 4 3 6 9
Somewhat disagree 7 6 14 11
Somewhat agree 29 21 30 21
Strongly agree 60 70 50 59
Total 100 100 100 100
The starting hypothesis was that public sector employees are more likely to 
support income redistribution than others. There might be various reasons 
for this: the desire to reduce inequalities related to social responsibility; soli-
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darity with the poor; funding of the public sector, including their own job 
comes from income redistribution; envy of the rich.
Attitudes towards the two directions of income redistribution were first ex-
amined using an ordered logit model; detailed calculations are presented in 
Molnár and Kapitány (2013). A simpler analysis was also carried out by merging 
the three categories other than strongly agree. There are no fundamental differ-
ences between the two results; however the second version – presented in Ta-
ble 2.5.4 – allows an easier presentation and interpretation of marginal effects.
Table 2.5.4: Factors influencing attitude towards income redistribution in the adult 
population (logit estimation, dependent variable: dichotomous variable of attitude 
towards income redistribution, N = 10,219)
Variable
Marginal effect (percentage)
Higher income for the poor Limiting the income of the rich
Employed in the private sector reference group
Employed in public administration 1.1 –1.7
Public education, R & D, culture –0.4 2.3
Health and social care 5.6* 8.4**
Other public sector 3.7 3.0
Entrepreneur –3.5 –8.0***
Casual worker, public worker 0.0 1.4
Retired 0.9 2.6
Student –8.4*** –8.1***
Other unemployed and inactive 1.6 5.5***
Logarithm of household income –7.8*** –10.2***
Age –0.1 0.1
Poor health 4.9*** 5.1***
Female 1.4* 1.0
Primary school education or lower reference group
Vocational training school –1.4 2.8*
Vocational secondary school –6.4*** –5.1***
General secondary education –7.9*** –3.5*
College –13.0*** –14.7***
University –13.5*** –21.5***
No children under 15 in the household reference group
1 child 0.5 –3.9*
2 children –9.0*** –9.7***
3 children 0.2 –7.6*
4 or more children –13.8 –3.3
Budapest reference group
City with county rights 7.0*** 8.6***
Town 9.0*** 11.3***
Village 9.0*** 13.7***
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.069
Notes: See comments for Table 2.5.1. The categories of the dichotomous variable for at-
titudes to income redistribution are “strongly agree” and all other categories combined.
*** Significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level.
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Contrary to our initial assumption, in the public sector only people who 
work in health care or social care support are more likely to support income 
redistribution than workers in the private sector. They are also more likely to 
agree with limiting the income of the rich. The question as to why there is a 
difference between health and social care, and education, science and culture 
in this issue might be raised. The review of literature has highlighted that at-
titude towards income redistribution can be related to the perception and at-
titudes to inequalities. The results suggest that these are different in the two 
areas of human services.
Entrepreneurs are less supportive of limiting the income of the rich than 
others. However, students are the least likely to agree with income redistribu-
tion in both categories. This is probably associated with their student status 
and positive expectations towards the future. Interestingly, “other inactives” 
(including the unemployed) are in favour of limiting the income of the rich, 
however there is no significant effect for supporting the poor.
As income increases, there is a noticeable decrease in the preference to in-
come redistribution in both areas. Poor health increases preference for income 
redistribution; here self-interest is probably a motivating factor as people with 
a long term condition benefit from income redistribution. There is a nega-
tive relationship between educational attainment and preference for income 
redistribution. People with children are more likely to support limiting the 
income of the rich. There is a negative relationship between the size of settle-
ment and preference for redistribution.
In conclusion, characteristics associated with preference for redistribution 
and voluntary work often work in the opposite direction, although not always. 
The correlation between the two factors is near zero, they are independent of 
each other. Therefore, attitude towards redistribution is not always a suitable 
indicator to measure social responsibility.
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2.5.1 The satisfaction of public sector workers
György Molnár & Zsuzsa Kapitány
Luechinger at al. (2007, 2010) examined selection 
between public and private sector alongside satis-
faction. Their starting assumption is that people 
allocate themselves into the public or private sec-
tor based on their individual characteristics; they 
choose – if they have the possibility – between sec-
tors based on their life situation and preferences, 
and this results in additional satisfaction. They ar-
gue that the public sector is chosen primarily by 
people who are more risk averse or committed to 
social issues, while people who aspire to work in 
the private sector value more highly the opportu-
nity of a dynamic career. Thus, the sectors might 
offer different sources of additional job satisfaction 
to different workers. By comparing actual alloca-
tion and satisfaction with a hypothetical random 
allocation and related satisfaction they show that 
self-selection produces a non-trivial amount of ad-
ditional satisfaction.
When looking at job selection, the question 
might be raised of whether there are hidden ad-
vantages in the public sector that are not possible 
to measure directly due to their nature. The anal-
ysis of life satisfaction (in a different terminology 
– subjective well-being) might provide answers 
to such questions. Luechinger at al. (2008) exam-
ined whether there was a difference between the 
subjective well-being of public and private sector 
workers based on data from the European Social 
Survey and the Latinobarometer. If public sec-
tor workers are more satisfied with their life than 
workers in the private sector that indicates the 
existence of hidden rents other than higher wag-
es, and it also suggests that entry into the pub-
lic sector does not depend only on education and 
skills but also connections. In their internation-
al comparison they found a greater than five per 
cent difference in satisfaction between the public 
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and private sector in four countries (Czech Repub-
lic, Greece, Poland and Paraguay). Unfortunate-
ly Hungary was not included in the international 
comparison because there were no questions on 
the ownership status of the employer in the pe-
riod they looked at.
Therefore subjective well-being in Hungary 
was examined. In an earlier paper (Molnár and 
Kapitány, 2006) we concluded that the sharp in-
crease in household real income between 2000 and 
2002 increased subjective well-being less than ex-
pected, especially among private sector employees. 
The reason was that people were uncertain about 
the sustainability of growth and prospects for the 
future. At the same time there was no significant 
difference in the subjective well-being of public and 
private sector workers.
Using the database from 2005–2006 the question 
was examined again using the same methods. We 
found no significant difference between the subjec-
tive well being of public sector employees, and also 
more closely civil servants, compared to those who 
are employed in the private sector. This suggests 
that working in the public sector does not have sys-
tematic hidden benefits in Hungary. The 2013 wave 
of EU-SILC again had questions on subjective well-
being. As soon as the dataset becomes available it 
will be possible to examine whether there have been 
any changes over the past few years.
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3. the InstItutIonal envIronment  
of the publIC seCtor labour market
3.1 Trends in labour law – the dismantling of job security  
in the public sector
Beáta Nacsa
This section offers an overview of the regulation process leading to the dis-
mantling of public sector job security, exploring the issue through the lens of 
broad-based labour law. First, we will look into the factors – that continue 
to be valid – that justify designing guarantees of job security and that argue 
in favour of sustaining legal protections. We will discuss the need for legal 
protections for a legally employed person and on the relationship between 
the guarantee of job security and the neutrality and professionalism of public 
service. Then, we will summarize the reasons behind the introduction of dis-
missal without stating cause and of the Constitutional Court and European 
Court of Human Rights overruling of that law. We will look at new regu-
lations that replaced the overturned laws, which formally comply with the 
court rulings but which continue to contradict them in substance. Finally, we 
will briefly explore other flows in Hungarian labour law regulation that have 
eroded job security. In the beginning, we will underline the legal concept of 
civil servant (a term which has been changed repeatedly over time), but will 
also look at the public servant, albeit to a lesser extent.
Reasons in support of establishing and maintaining guaranteed 
job security
Traditionally, the legal status of the civil servant as used in the current sense 
was not considered a private law contract between equal parties but a status-
based relationship regulated by public law derived from the principle of state 
sovereignty. The reasoning that sums up this approach is: “The state and the 
servant working for it cannot be set one against the other as contracting par-
ties of equal rank … The servant is not merely the executor of the will of the 
state but is also the implement by which the state fulfils its calling.” (Mártonffy 
unknown date, p. 667) The state bureaucracy assured the civil servant of life-
long protection and a stable legal status.
The principle of state sovereignty was significantly reduced over the course 
of the 20th century insofar as interpretation of the various legal relationships 
of the state was concerned. Distinctions between the “external” and “internal” 
legal relationships of the body exerting public power became increasingly ac-
cepted. In fact, it was recognized that in external legal relationships the state 
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might appear not only as the entity exercising public power but also as a pri-
vate entity, for instance when signing a lease or a purchase or sales contract.1 
By the start of the latter half of the 20th century it became clear that the 
principle of sovereignty did not cover the essence of the “internal” legal rela-
tionship between the state and the civil servant. Therefore, professional arti-
cles emanating from the west began exempting the civil servant from labour 
law arguments. Starting with the 1960s a new approach began taking over 
in which the body of public administration, as employer, was not exercising 
state power but was employing natural entities to meet specific functions, just 
like any other employer. State officials are no longer considered representa-
tives of the state in the legal relationship surrounding employment. Instead, 
they are employees who work for the state and who – in this capacity – are 
far more conscious of their employee status than their status as a representa-
tive of a sovereign power (Ozaki, 1990).
The legal conditions of employment in the private and public sectors are 
identical in that the employee is subordinate to the employer and that the 
employee performs the tasks assigned by the employer, following employer 
instructions on any and all components of the job, doing so regularly and 
continuously, in return for remuneration. It is clear from the content of this 
work relationship (in the broad sense of the term) that the civil servant is 
economically and personally dependent on their employer, which is the out-
come of the economic and organizational supremacy of power. At the same 
time, there are specifics to employment by the state that justify maintaining 
some unique features in the regulation of the legal relationship governing 
employment (Horváth, 2008). The lowest, fundamental feature of the civil 
servant fits within the broader concept of legal employment, and the second-
ary characteristics stemming from the civil service nature of the relationship 
form a superstructure.
The regulation of job security is essential to both layers, albeit the dogmatic 
arguments for them differ. It follows from the concept of legal employment 
in the broader sense that a tenet of principle to protect the weaker entity, as 
is typical of all legal employment, is needed here, too (Morris and Fredman, 
1993). The civil service character – as a secondary characteristic – also justifies 
the regulation of job security guarantees as has been pointed out by experts in 
labour law and public administration law alike, since this is how to provide 
professionalism, reliability, and an absence of prejudice in public administra-
tion. In this context it is worth exploring how Hungarian professional litera-
ture has described the guiding principles of public administration law. István 
György underlined the principles of political neutrality, lawfulness, subordi-
nation, career and professionalism, and heightened responsibility.
Political neutrality is the outcome of the separation of civil service and pol-
itics. “…the personnel involved in public service need to be separated from 
1 If the state (body) appears as a 
private law entity within a legal 
relationship, then the rules of 
private law – with possible but 
not necessary modifications – 
are the ones to be followed. Priv-
ity is based on contract and not 
on a unilateral act of the state.
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the venues of political infighting, and must be rendered independent of party 
politics.” (György, 2007. p. 47) The political neutrality requirement is the de-
fining principle of public administration from which numerous other princi-
ples of modern public administration are derived. The principle of political 
neutrality includes the requirement of loyalty between the civil servant and 
whichever authority is in power. The civil servant is mandated to accept the 
legitimately elected power and execute every lawful instruction coming from 
it (Gajduschek, 2006).
The requirement of loyalty gives rise to the promise that a change in govern-
ment will not result in large scale replacements among staff and that political 
neutrality is, in the final analysis, the ultimate factor securing the evolvement 
and operation of professional public servants.
In public administration the principle of lawfulness is slightly different from 
its primary definition in the private sector. In the private sector, everything 
is legal unless prohibited by law. In the public sector, the civil servant may 
only do what the law explicitly permits or prescribes. At the same time, the 
law places a more powerful responsibility on the civil servant than would be 
the case otherwise, since it requires not only that the civil servant obey the 
law, but also that they compel others to do so.
The principle of subsidiarity on the one hand set public administration as 
subordinate to the elected bodies and on the other, it establishes a strict hier-
archy within the official apparatus, which includes the ensuing right to give 
orders.2 Morris and Fredman (1993) added that the strict hierarchy of supe-
rior and subordinate in an office ensures a clear chain of command that goes 
up to the minister’s responsibility to parliament on the one hand, and on the 
other, makes sure that the official staff exercises its public function vis-à-vis 
the citizens in a transparent, fair and unbiased way. Lőrinc and Takács (2001) 
have summed up the basic principles of public administration as manifest in 
the democracy and effectiveness of public administration. In this context 
they view the principle of democracy as the restriction on public administra-
tion. All of these principles will directly or indirectly reinforce the require-
ment derived from the specifics of employment, that a civil servant may only 
lose their job if, for some reason, the purpose for which they were employed 
no longer exists.
Regarding the other basic form of public sector employment, the public 
servant, a unique approach in Hungarian laws has existed regarding this form 
of employment since it was established in 1992. The public servant fits in 
somewhere between the general employment condition and the civil service. 
In this case the employer performs a public service3 that does not require the 
exercise of some form of public power or state prerogative. The public serv-
ant employment status was established by Act XXXIII of 1992 on public 
service employment (hereinafter: Kjt.). The basic feature of this employment 
2 The right to give orders, which 
is generally typical of work as an 
employee, becomes reinforced 
because of the principle of sub-
sidiarity.
3 Therefore, the regulation of 
the public servant is exceedingly 
diverse, since any number of sec-
toral laws (on public education, 
higher education, health care, 
etc.) and ministerial decrees 
regulate the specifics of people 
employed under this title.
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status is that it was established to meet topical political and – even more so 
– budget circumstances. In other words, it is the product solely of pragmatic 
considerations and not legal dogma (Horváth, 2008).
The dismantling of job security in labour law in general and  
in the public sector (among civil servants and public servants)  
in particular
The labour law of 1992 regulated public sector employment separately, sepa-
rating it from private sector employment, and also separating the civil services, 
the public services, and the professional members of the armed services (the 
latter includes law enforcement and firefighting) within the public sector. 
The 1992 regulations introduced a set system of terminating employment in 
the public sector. The text of the law included an exhaustive list of the fac-
tors, which, should they occur, would allow or require the employer to uni-
laterally terminate employment. The guiding principle of Act XXIII of 1992 
on the legal stature of civil servants (hereinafter: Ktv.) regarding job security 
was that the people employed were career civil servants who did their work 
professionally, and in exchange the state would guarantee them job security 
and regular opportunities for advancement.4
In contrast, the private sector worked under the principle of the semi-re-
stricted job termination system as set down in sequential Labour Codes. In 
other words, it listed the specific types of causes for which dismissal became 
possible, which were concretized over a lengthy timeframe by day-to-day prac-
tices and court interpretations of the law (Act I of 2012, Paragraph 66, Section 
2). This regulation faithfully reflected public thinking in terms of labour law 
in the 1990s, which also coincided with the above reasoning. In other words, 
labour law accepted job security as the goal and requirement of the regulation.
In the meantime Hungarian labour law underwent significant changes. 
Labour law protections were reduced drastically and it seems reasonable to 
assume that current Hungarian regulations offer one of the lowest levels of 
work protection in all of Europe and North America.
Although arguments in favour of reducing job protections can be heard 
often by a wide range of analysts, convincing dogmatic arguments are sorely 
absent from this position. They cite the dismantling of labour protections as 
a way to expand employment and improve competitiveness without demon-
strating exactly how the reduction in protections will do this, or through what 
mechanisms, albeit their goals are valid and necessary. The literature cover-
ing labour law lacks systematic investigation into how the past two decades 
of labour law, which deregulated employment, has impacted job creation and 
competitiveness. Has it improved them and if not then why do we believe that 
future deregulation will do the job? To my knowledge related sciences have 
also failed to prove a cause/effect relationship. Actually, they seem to dem-
4 These regulations are the 
most important guarantees of 
the principle of closed public 
administration discussed above.
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onstrate the opposite. Labour economy research (domestic and internation-
al alike) have verified that the dismantling of labour law protections has not 
influenced employment levels. At most it has had a statistically insignificant 
impact on the composition of the workforce. (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 
2000, Cazes and Nesporova, 2007, p. 36–39) Among the goals thought to be 
attainable with deregulation is increasing employment (something which can 
be quantified and monitored) and the much less palpable goal of improving 
competiveness. However, generally such analyses fail to offer concrete infor-
mation on the content of competitiveness or the desired goal. This makes it 
harder to explore and monitor cause/effect relationships.
In the public sector, reducing job security was intended to, in part, meet 
other goals. Partly it was a move to cut budget outlay and partly – as of 2010 
– it was to adjust public sector staff to meet political preferences. The eroding 
of job security among public sector employees started in about 2000. After 
facing the legal consequences of unlawful dismissals – which the Constitu-
tional Court reversed in Decision 4/1998 (III. 1.), the job of eliminating the 
legal consequences of unlawful dismissal got underway by amending the law.
An amendment to Kjt. on 1 September 2007 essentially redrew the set of 
legal consequences for the unlawful dismissal of civil servants (Kjt. Para-
graph 34.) The amendment started by discarding the principle of restitutio 
in integrum, under which the violator of the law was mandated to return the 
unlawfully dismissed employee to their original job. Under the new rule the 
civil servant only could request being returned to their original job if the em-
ployer’s decision violated the principle of equal treatment, if the person was 
under special protection prohibiting or restricting dismissal, or if the move 
violated special workplace protections afforded to elected union officials (a 
member or chair of a civil service council or a public employee representa-
tive) or a labour safety official. (Kjt, Paragraph 34, Section 1., Subsections a 
and b). Among the factors requiring the return of someone to their original 
job, the changed legislation – effective 1 January 2010 (Subsection c) – cited 
dismissal without legal cause or disciplinary dismissal that was found to be 
a disproportionately severe sanction.
All other violations of the law – in fact every single violation usually com-
mitted – were cited among the violations regulated by Section 4., where the 
legal consequence was limited to a payment obligation on the part of the em-
ployer, the amount of which was determined by the court. Therefore, if the 
employer gave no cause for dismissal or if the cause was a falsehood (which 
occurs quite often), the civil servant could not request a return to their former 
job. In fact, under decrees that took effect in 2007 and are still in effect, al-
beit in changed form, these regulations, which were full of fault legally, were 
considered valid, and the job was classified as legally terminated at the time 
specified in the notice of termination. In other words, an employer could 
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deliberately flaunt the law and dismiss a civil servant without risking the 
consequence of having to return the civil servant to the job, since the risk of 
having to return the person to the job was non-existent except in the specific 
cases listed in the law.
The driving force of this 2007 amendment was an attempt to save central 
budget monies. Ending the need to return someone to a job also prevented a 
returned employee from demanding back pay and, should the employee again 
be dismissed, severance pay. Limiting the amount of back pay a person was 
owed saved the budget from having to pay out multiple years’ worth of salary 
that the civil servant had not worked for when court proceedings were lengthy. 
While the regulation did save money it was dogmatically inconsistent, since 
limiting the chance to return to the job to a very limited circle broke with 
the fundamental legal principle which declared that an action which seriously 
violated the law was null and void and could have no legal consequence.5 At 
the same time, the lengthy court proceedings and consequentially, the em-
ployer’s growing payment obligation occurred for circumstances unrelated to 
the civil servant since the lengthy proceedings generally could not be blamed 
on the malevolent efforts of the civil servant trying to drag out the proceed-
ings.6 In fact, the drawing out of the court proceedings was disadvantageous 
to the plaintiff civil servant since the outcome remained in limbo, requiring 
them to secure a living through other means while remaining uncertain of 
receiving any compensation (sometimes for years on end) even if there were 
solid grounds for the lawsuit. It would have been in the interests of both sides 
for the government to have taken measures to get the courts to move faster 
in labour disputes and had this been done legislative amendments running 
counter to labour law dogmatics could have been averted.
Another amendment to the detriment of civil servants limited their right 
to back pay. A provision declaring that an income covered through another 
source did not have to be paid out by the employer who had violated the law 
was already in effect. In other words, if the civil servant had found another 
job in the interim and received a salary, or had been receiving unemployment 
benefits, the amounts received were to be subtracted from the amount the 
employer had to pay. The 2007 amendment added the twist that a civil serv-
ant who did not display proper diligence in seeking another source of income 
was not entitled to back pay either. Failure to display proper diligence partic-
ularly meant that the person did not cooperate with state employment agen-
cies in looking for a job, did not conclude a job-seeking agreement with them, 
or that the employee had rejected what the employment agency qualified as a 
satisfactory job offer – in keeping with the conditions in the law on job seek-
ing – and was not actively seeking employment otherwise (Kjt. Paragraph 34, 
Section 5.) If the court found an absence of proper diligence it could inves-
tigate all circumstances surrounding the case before setting back pay, if any.
5 Act I of 2012 on the new labour 
code cited this logic expressis 
verbis as an exception to the 
principle of said action being 
null and void.
6 Cases got dragged out far 
more often by unrealistically 
long (sometimes six-month) in-
terruptions between two court 
proceedings, delayed evidence 
submitted by the employer (the 
employer did have some obliga-
tions) and lengthy expert evi-
dentiary proceedings.
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Shortly after the new labour code was adopted the legal consequences of 
unlawful dismissal underwent further erosion in the sphere of public service. 
As of 1 July 2012, the abovementioned regulations on the legal consequenc-
es of unlawfully dismissing a civil servant as specified in Kjt. were declared 
null and void and replaced by regulations in the new labour code containing 
even weaker sanctions.
As regards public service employment regulations, public service itself was 
essentially redesigned between 2010 and 2012. Parliament adopted Act LVIII 
of 2010 (Hereinafter: Ktjt.) on the legal status of government officials.7 The 
new legal status of government officials brought two essentially new approach-
es into the regulation of public sector employment conditions. 1) It introduced 
dismissal without cause, drastically reduced notice time, and separated the 
duration of notice time from the length of time the person had spent on the 
job. (Ktjt. Paragraphs 8 and 9).8 2) Instead of overtime pay for overtime work 
government officials became entitled only to time off, on an hour-for-hour 
basis (Ktjt. Paragraph 15). These regulations were later incorporated into the 
rules governing civil servants.9 The reasoning in the law on the legal status of 
government officials stated that the amendment was necessary to establish 
balance among the subjects covered by the law, i.e. employer and employee. 
Therefore, the obligation to provide cause in the unilateral termination of 
employment had to be identical for both as did the period of notice.10 This 
regulation was extended to civil servants as of 1 January 2011. Under the new 
regulation there was no need to offer cause for dismissal – much the same as 
when termination was initiated by the employee – and notice time, previously 
adjusted to years on the job, was reduced to two months for termination by 
either employer or employee.
The reasoning behind this law contradicted the basic principle governing 
labour law. The argument, which set a body of public power on the same foot-
ing as a private individual not only broke with the principle of sovereignty but 
also rejected the existence of the difference in economic and organizational 
power as it exists in employment situations, and treated the legal status of 
the government official and the civil servant as equals under civil law. Conse-
quently, it rejected the protective function of labour law based on the princi-
ple of proportionate interest, which is the principle that labour law regulation 
had to protect the weaker party, the one performing the work, at the points 
where they were vulnerable, and to offer sufficient protection through legal 
regulation to counterbalance that vulnerability (Hepple, 1996–1997). Un-
der the generally accepted principle of labour law dogmatics, in all regulated 
systems (including the labour law of the United States which is considered 
the most liberal) the employer is more restricted in job termination than the 
employee. The economic justification for the regulation significantly favour-
ing the employee is the excessive economic power of the employer, while the 
7 This new legal status of gov-
ernment officials replaced the 
old one as part of the legal sta-
tus of employment in bodies of 
public administration.
8 For an early albeit well-de-
veloped critique of the law see: 
Kocsis (2011).
9 Ktv. Paragraph 18, Ktv. Para-
graph 71, Section 2, Subsection 
a) stated that the regulations in 
the labour code calling for cause 
to be given for dismissal was 
no longer to be applied to civil 
servants as of 1 January 2011.
10 This is the portion of the 
reasoning quoted by the Con-
stitutional Court in its decision 
to overturn the law discussed 
below.
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legal justification is the right to work (Collins, 1991). The demand for pro-
tection of the employee when employed by the state is even stronger, since 
the state is an employer whose excessive power is vastly heightened. In addi-
tion, the requirement for job security is derived from the guiding principles 
of public administration (particularly those of neutrality and efficiency), as 
was discussed in greater detail earlier in this analysis.
In 2011 both of these laws were struck down by the Constitutional Court 
as unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court struck down the decree on the 
status of the government official in Decision 1068/B/2010. It began its justi-
fication with the general characteristics of public service regulation and the 
specifics of a closed public administration system. Then it focused on the is-
sue on the basis of the right to work and the constitutional regulations on the 
right to bear public office, and on past Constitutional Court interpretations 
of these rights. Finally, it drew the conclusion that Ktjt. Paragraph 8, Section 
1, Subsection b) allowing the termination of government official employment 
without cause was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of the 
rule of law regulated in Paragraph 2, Section 1 of the Constitution, the right 
to work regulated in Paragraph 70/B, Section 1, the right to bear public of-
fice regulated in Paragraph 70, Section 6, the right to seek redress from the 
courts in Paragraph 57, Section 1, and the right to human dignity in Para-
graph 54, Section 1. The date given for overturning the law on government 
officials was – surprisingly – 31 May 2011, which allowed nearly another six 
months to continue the dismissals without cause although it was based on 
regulations declared unconstitutional for multiple reasons. The Constitu-
tional Court gave its reason for the nullification date as the fact that parlia-
ment had to enact a new law for which it needed several months to prepare.
In a separate decision the Constitutional Court overturned the same provi-
sion allowing dismissal without cause in Ktv. § 17., offering a reasoning that es-
sentially coincided with the above, based on constitutional principles.11 The ter-
mination of the regulations governing public official legal status was retroactive 
although, since the effect of the earlier regulations was restored with the over-
turning of the new ones the given decree was overturned with ex nunc validity.
The legislation that followed the Constitutional Court decision was CX-
CIX of 2011 on public service. While less obvious, it retained the right to 
terminate employment without legally relevant cause despite a 2011 govern-
ment document called the Magyary Program that declared itself to be estab-
lishing the basics of “good governance” and “good public administration.” On 
the surface the dismissal system returned to the former one but the reasons 
the employer was required to give were as abstract as “becoming unworthy 
of the position” and even “loss of confidence in the person by the manager.”12
One can cite objective considerations within the rubric of becoming unwor-
thy of a position. Therefore at least in principle it is possible to offer a concrete 
11 Constitutional Court Deci-
sion 29/2011 (IV. 7.)
12 Act CXCIX of 2011 on public 
service officials, Paragraph 63, 
Section 2, Subsections a) and e)
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reason, and which limits challenges in the courts. While it is possible that los-
ing the confidence of the manager can be the result of objective circumstances, 
in cases when rational and consistent reasoning could describe how confidence 
was lost, the wording itself suggests that subjective considerations could play 
a much bigger role than objective ones when coming forward with that ar-
gument. In other words, the dismissal could be the outcome of a completely 
subjective factor, such as that the manager personally disliked the civil serv-
ant and did not want to work with them. This extreme interpretation makes 
possible not only politically motivated discrimination but discrimination by 
gender, age, family status, or disability, which conflicts with European Un-
ion acquis and international legal norms.13 The concepts of “unworthy” and 
“loss of manager confidence”, though the former is the less serious of the two, 
are hardly different from the legislation thrown out by the Constitutional 
Court, unless judicial practice can restrict their use.14
Summary
The new labour law has almost completely eliminated job security with la-
bour regulations covering civil servant employment conditions. The first 
moves towards this end were in the mid-2000s, when regulations govern-
ing job termination that no longer rested in dogmatic principle were first 
introduced, exclusively to reduce budget expenditure. The regulations that 
diminished basic labour laws tended to “go around and come around.” In 
other words, if a regulation withstood Constitutional Court scrutiny it was 
included into additional laws and thus reduced labour law protections for 
all categories of public sector workers. The process peaked in 2010 when dis-
missal without cause was introduced. At this time political factors appeared 
to have been more important than budget considerations, given that a new 
political party moved into office. The excuse, however, was to establish true 
equality among partners (i.e. employer and employee). The inconsistency of 
the argument and the absence of a foundation of principle were underlined 
by the fact that in addition to the reference to the equality (non-existent) 
of state and civil servant, – the law also argued for state sovereignty, i.e. its 
overwhelming authority – while calling for the termination of other rights. 
Taken separately, neither argument holds water. Applying them together is 
self-contradictory and spotlights the absolute superficiality of the reason-
ing given for the laws.
The regulation allowing dismissal without cause was overturned by both 
the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights,15 in 
part for overlapping reasons. In its decision the Constitutional Court under-
lined the right to work and the right to bear public office while the European 
Court of Human Rights found the right to fair procedure to have been vio-
lated by the de facto impossibility of court control.
13 Lawsuits continue to remain 
possible despite the new regula-
tion, but given that the highest 
level of this strange regulation 
is that of employer subjectivity, 
it is possible that anti-discrimi-
nation regulations would also be 
violated in Hungarian practice. 
Balancing out the two norms 
will require very circumspect 
interpretation of the laws.
14 For more on the uncertainties 
related to the new regulations, 
see Mrs. Nagy (2012) and Fer-
encz (2012).
15 European Court of Human 
Rights, Section Two. K.M.C 
vs. Hungary, case (submission 
19554/11) Strasbourg. 10 July 
2012. Final. 19 November 2012.
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The new legal regulation formally complied with court conditions but the 
new reasons which allowed termination of employment, in particular, the loss 
of confidence on the part of the manager, retained the opportunity to termi-
nate employment for purely subjective reasons. This has opened the door to 
all manner of discriminative and unlawful employer practices.
In addition to rewriting the causes for which an employer or the employee 
could give notice, sanctions for unlawful dismissal were reduced. Reducing 
sanctions to a minimum along the entire spectrum of labour law leads to a 
situation in which employees will not protest even flagrant violations of the 
law in workplace practices. Formally, this will lead to an improvement in 
statistics on labour-related lawsuits but in practice will lead to deteriorating 
working and living conditions.
At the same time the regulations are dysfunctional from the aspects of or-
ganization development and human resource management because they re-
inforce servility and stifle opportunities for independent thinking and ac-
tion. Thus, they could lead to the deteriorating performance of businesses, 
government administration, and the institutions that service them, possibly 
within the very near future.
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3.2 The specifics of setting salaries and interest 
reconciliation in the public sector
Erzsébet Berki
The portions of the Hungarian legal system covering public sector employ-
ees that evolved between 1992 and 1996 divided up the public servant sector 
which until then had been nearly a single entity. The divisions were partly 
along the lines of branches of service and were partly linked to the role of 
their employers. Three major public servant groups were established within 
the government power structure: armed services (including law enforcement 
and the military), public servants, and public service employees. Without of-
fering details on the specifics of these legal relationships, we do need to say 
that the first two are related to public administration and power functions 
while the employers of public service employees provide residential services. 
Therefore, employment specifics related to armed forces and public servants 
tended to make up “closed systems”, while the regulation of the public ser-
vice employees was less restricted and more like that of the business sector.
Wage systems for public sector employees
The differences appear in the pay scales even though all three operated with 
set remuneration systems based on education level and years of service that 
determined both rank and wages. There was one significant difference regard-
ing public service employees, in that while the minimum was set, anything 
higher could be negotiated. The regulation of labour relations was set in ac-
cordance with that difference. Among public service employees wage agree-
ments and collective agreements were possible, while both were out of the 
question for the other two categories.
The pay scale for the armed service and for public servants had little room for 
employer decisions and there was no such thing as collective bargaining, albeit 
the system did contain a smidgeon of flexibility. The law governing public serv-
ants allowed local governments to set their own “base salary”1 for pay scales. As 
far as civil servant salaries were concerned, over time the law allowed deviation 
from the pay scale, initially by ±20 per cent and then over a range of from mi-
nus 20 per cent to plus 30 per cent. In addition, it introduced a configuration 
called “personal remuneration” which was completely divorced from the pay 
scales. As of 1996 there were two separate pay scales for armed forces person-
nel. One was a remuneration scale linked to position and the other linked to 
rank. Remuneration under the first system differed from the pay scale in that it 
operated along a 100–120 per cent scale. Promotion dates were set into zones, 
which meant that when time for a mandatory promotion arrived (this was the 
lowermost section of the waiting time zone) the remuneration also increased.
1 The “base salary” (illetmény-
alap) is a basic point of the pay 
scales, regularly set by the law. 
Mandatory basic salaries in all 
brackets of the pay scale are 
defined by tariff multipliers 
combined with the “base sal-
ary”. While salary increase can 
be given for everyone by estab-
lishing a higher “base salary”, 
the wage proportions across 
different brackets remain un-
changed. (Editor’s note: there 
is a similar technique in the 
French public sector pay scale, 
the common English translation 
for the French counterpart of 
“base salary” is “index point”.)
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For all three categories, a broad range of bonuses topped on the basic salary. 
For public servants the remuneration was made up of the salary set by the pay 
scale plus a remuneration supplement, while for armed forces remuneration 
for rank was added to this.
Although all three remuneration systems were based on nearly identical 
principles and centrally set wages were the rule, actually salaries were quite 
different from one another. This was because of differences in the pay scale 
(more specifically, the structure of the pay scale and the various multipliers) 
as well as the fact that the “base salary” for public servants and civil servants 
(the latters’ “base salary” has to be applied for armed forces) was quite differ-
ent. We have summarized mandatory pay for the three categories under the 
rules valid for 1994 in Table 3.2.1.
Table 3.2.1: Extreme values of mandatory pay for employees with the same 
education level in 1994 (HUF, minimum wage at the time: HUF 10,500)
Soldiera Civil Servant Public Service Employee
“Base salary” 18,000 18,000 8,000
Minimum 30,096 9,900 8,000
Maximum 122,760 63,360 44,000
Maximum/minimum 4.08 6.40 5.50
By education level, with 10 years of service
Eight grades primary school – 21,780 10,500
Secondary school completed 32,640 31,680 16,800
College/university 75,240 46,530 27,200
a Given that Act XVIII that regulated armed services was only adopted in 1996, the 
calculations here are based on Defence Minister 50/1987 and 8/1994 Ministry of 
Defence Commands, which are limited to soldiers.
Source: Berki (1994a) p. 16.
In 1994 – after the civil servant pay scale was introduced but before the public 
service one came out2 – the average monthly income of civil servants accord-
ing to a survey in May was HUF 43,342 while the average for public service 
employees was HUF 41,052.3 In other words, there was hardly any difference 
at this time, but by the end of the decade they were quite different. Accord-
ing to a report published annually by the ministry responsible for labour, in 
1998 comparative earnings4 took the shape seen in Table 3.2.2.
Table 3.2.2: Comparative earnings in the public sector, 1998
Sector/sub-sector
Comparative earnings ratio  
compared to the private sector 
(per cent)
Actual amount, 
monthly
As compared to the average 
for the public sector  
(per cent)
Public sector total 64.2 64,158 100.0
Civil servantsa 90.3 98,519 153.6
Public service employees 59.3 54,934 85.6
a No data available for armed forces.
Source: KSH Informative database – Gross average earnings of civil servants and 
public service employees in public institutions.
2 It took effect on 1 January 
1995.
3 See: Briefing on the income 
evolvement over the first half of 
1994 and valid collective agree-
ments. Ministry of Labour, Sep-
tember 1994 (quoted by Berki, 
1994b, p. 12).
4 When comparing earnings, 
standardized data for educa-
tion level and length of service 
were used.
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In other words, some of the differences in income were built into the pay scale 
and others were the outcome of the lower “basic salary” of public service em-
ployees, when legislators built a huge gap into the pay system even though the 
difference in the social status of the three groups at the time of the regime 
change did not justify it.
The forums for interest reconciliation and the main issues
When the interest reconciliation system took shape (Table 3.2.3) there were 
regular negotiations between the government and the public sector unions, 
which reached and signed onto agreements. Until the 2000s, the most im-
portant venue for bargaining was the Interest Reconciliation Council for 
State-financed Institutions (KIÉT),5 and later the salary issue became the 
central theme of the National Labour Council for Public Service Employees 
(KOMT).6 Dialogue was essentially between the government and the unions 
with the positions of local government associations determined by central gov-
ernment budget resources. The complete set of vertical and horizontal forums 
for public service interest coordination was ready by 2002. Every trade union 
federation and confederation organizing public servants within the govern-
ment’s power structure participated in the coordination on nationwide, sec-
toral, sub-sectoral, settlement and workplace level alike.
Table 3.2.3: Peak interest reconciliation forums in the public services
Time of operation Forum
September 1991 to October 2001 Interest Reconciliation Council for State-financed Institutions (KIÉT)
July 1993 to July 2001 Interest Reconciliation Forum for Civil Servants (KÉF).
October 2001 onward Labour Council for Public Service Employees (KOMT)
July 2001 to March 2012 Interest Reconciliation Council of Civil Servants (KÉT), National Local Government Civil Servants’ Interest Reconciliation Council (OÖKÉT)
November 2002 to October 2006 Intergovernmental Interest Reconciliation Forum of Law Enforcement Bodies (RSZTÉF)
December 2002 onward National Public Service Interest Reconciliation Council (OKÉT)
October 2006 to July 2012 Interest Reconciliation Forum of Armed Forces Members (SZÉF)
March 2012 onwards Interest Reconciliation Council of Public Servants (KÉT)
Given the significant differences in systems of remuneration and in earnings 
levels, the unions involved in the various interest reconciliation forums were 
focused on reducing the income gap that, as already mentioned, had been built 
into the system. The players in the system were also pushed towards bargain-
ing upon the “base salary” by the knowledge that if the “base salary” were 
increased pay for the entire circle of employees under their authority would 
increase quasi automatically. As following the central bargaining the “base 
salary” is legally set finally, its value determines what the outcome of bargain-
ing will be during the sectoral or local phases.
5 This was a four-party forum 
operating from 1991 to 2001. 
The members were the govern-
ment, the federations of public 
sector unions, the federations of 
local governments and several 
organizations of institutional 
employers, the latter without 
voting rights.
6 The governments were gener-
ally careful to keep salary levels 
satisfactory in central govern-
ment public administration, 
while regulations also made it 
possible for local governments 
to do the same.
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In the late 1990s and primarily on trade union initiative a spontaneous ef-
fort was made to decentralize wage bargaining,7 which resulted in separate 
wage multiplier systems used for the various public service employee groups. 
The profession/sectoral wage multiplier was intended to provide a measure 
of extra earnings, in addition to the public service employees’ pay scale, to 
the employees in the various sectors. The rationale was 1) to be able to raise 
pay in selected sectors without changing the pay scale but while keeping in 
step with the differentiation in it, and 2) to deny the increase to other sectors 
employing public service employees. The size of the multiplier was strongly 
differentiated, depending primarily on which sector had a stronger influence 
on government decisions.
The outcome was a higher education and R + D pay scale that is still in effect, 
that adjusted the mandatory (guaranteed) salaries8 of teachers and research-
ers to the system of professional promotions. At this time KIÉT still existed 
formally but was no longer in operation. Given the decentralized bargaining 
mechanism it might have appeared to no longer be necessary.9
However, it soon became clear that decentralized bargaining had numer-
ous disadvantages. The government conceded to the demands of some groups 
of public service employees while other groups (sectors and professions) fell 
behind wage-wise while no one was really controlling labour market impacts. 
Another argument against decentralized bargaining was that the unions – for 
the most part, the ones in the Trade Unions’ Cooperation Forum (SZEF) – 
soon realized that they were unable to influence the distribution of central 
budget resources between ministries or sectors, which could easily be played 
one against the other. So, to prevent internal conflict, they tried once again 
to negotiate within the KIÉT framework. This saved the ministries supervis-
ing the sectors and acting as executors from tough wage negotiations, by ena-
bling them to turn the talks over to the one minister responsible for labour 
affairs and the finance minister.10
The government that took office in 2002 opted for a consistent interest rec-
onciliation system and a reduction in the wage gap discriminating against 
public service employees. The result was two important measures, the es-
tablishment of the National Public Service Interest Reconciliation Council 
(OKÉT), and a “50 per cent” wage hike for public service employees. The re-
sult of the latter was a substantial decline in the wage gap. In 2003 the pub-
lic service employees got 92.97 per cent of the average earnings for the pub-
lic sector while civil servants got 133.93 per cent. In 2002 the difference was 
nearly double that amount.11
From 2002 to 2006 there was comparative calm in interest reconciliation 
forum operations and in public sector wage flows. Interest reconciliation be-
came centred on the mass layoffs that began in 2003 and the human resource 
policy measures announced by the government to update public service. As 
7 The agreements reached 
through interest reconciliation 
lacked the power of the collec-
tive agreements. The only way 
adherence could be guaranteed 
was through legislation that in-
cluded the content of the agree-
ments or by an administrative 
entity involved in the process 
issuing a decree to that effect. 
Therefore, most authors refer 
to bargaining negotiations oc-
curring here as quasi (wage) 
bargaining.
8 For instance, as of September 
2001 the professional multiplier 
was 1.43 in public education. 
As of January the multiplier in 
health and social care was 1.2. 
As of September the multiplier 
for college/university graduates 
in social care was 1.26, while as 
of September the multiplier was 
1.2 for institutes of general cul-
ture and public collections. For 
more details see Berki (2000).
9 Seven plenary meetings were 
convened in 1998 and none in 
1999. In 2000 there were three 
plenary meetings – but from 
1998 on, not a single agreement 
was reached (Berki and Dura, 
2012)
10 Though momentary interests 
appeared to coincide, the real 
underlying problem was that 
no one dared to touch the issue 
of establishing a direct ranking 
of public service employees by 
salary since there was no foun-
dation of principle to establish 
that the work of a doctor was 
more valuable – and therefore 
should be paid more – than a 
teacher, or vice versa.
11 Own calculations based on 
KSH data.
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far as public servants were concerned it introduced a performance-evaluation-
based system – something it was said to be considering for the other sectors, 
too. It transformed the target-based bonus system and reshaped the rules un-
der which public service employees could bargain collectively, and so on. But, 
these efforts bore very little result. In the autumn of 2006, the Gyurcsány ad-
ministration announced – as an austerity measure – that it wanted to discon-
tinue payment of certain income components, which is why no wage agree-
ment had been reached for 2007 within OKÉT. Negotiations with the united 
public service strike committee established in the wake of the announcement 
did end with an agreement but in the autumn of 2008 the government de-
clared that it did not have the means to honour that agreement (Berki, 2008). 
The strike committee, suspended earlier, was reactivated and negotiations 
continued until 15 October 2009. The agreement signed then however left 
the pay scale unchanged, discontinued the 13th month salary, introduced 
the super-gross income, allowing the portion of incomes deducted ab ovo for 
social insurance to also be taxed, and introduced a single compensatory fac-
tor, an earnings supplement of HUF 98,000 gross, for incomes lower than 
HUF 340,000 (SZMM, 2009). The series of negotiations in themselves dem-
onstrated that as long as negotiations remained balanced they had a place in 
the interest reconciliation system, but when a collective dispute occurred the 
interest reconciliation system did not have the ability to handle it.
Interest coordination after 2010
“The interest reconciliation system was fundamentally changed after the new 
government took office in 2010, since the position of the new government was 
to govern employers and employees as though they were one and the same and 
to focus on the interests of both when governing.” (Berki and Dura, 2012, p. 
89.) The National Interest Reconciliation Council ceased to function after a 
few meetings, and after a bit of a delay, it was taken over by a tripartite forum 
operating far from the public eye and devoid of legal authorities.12 As far as 
the reconciliation of public sector interests was concerned, the government 
believed that persons affected by changes in public service had to be notified 
of said changes so it retained that mode of communication while otherwise 
changing part of the system.
The National Public Service Interest Reconciliation Council is still in opera-
tion. The employee side was significantly changed twice since 2010. Current-
ly there are five trade union confederations in it, but FRDÉSZ13 (the Armed 
Services and Law Enforcement Interest Protection Federation) is not among 
them. OKÉT held talks on altering the legal profile of public service on more 
than one occasion. It also negotiated regarding public sector wages but no 
agreement was reached on substantive issues. In the autumn of 2013 OKÉT’s 
union side called for 20 per cent salary increases. The National Labour Coun-
12 The Private Sector and the 
Government Standing Consul-
tative Forum (VKF) was estab-
lished by a tripartite agreement 
in February 2012, which includ-
ed three employer organization 
and three trade union confed-
erations that had been members 
of the defunct National Interest 
Reconciliation Council.
13 The Armed Services and Law 
Enforcement Interest Protec-
tion Federation, which quit the 
Liga Trade Union Confedera-
tion and lost some of its member 
organizations in disputes among 
trade union associations.
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cil of Civil Servants (KOMT) is also in operation but limits itself to periph-
eral issues. It has not discussed the transformations undergone in the various 
branches or the changes in the remuneration system of civil service employees 
(health care, education) to any substantive extent.14 At the same time legisla-
tive regulation has altered the area for which KOMT was responsible. Under 
Subsection a) of Section 1, Paragraph 6 of the Act on Public Sector Employ-
ees on labour relation issues and matters impacting the legal status within the 
entire public service employee sector, the minister in charge of the sector may 
negotiate with the union representative of the branch within KOMT or with 
the sectoral interest reconciliation forum, but must include the national lo-
cal government interest advocates, too. This rule has overwritten the old one, 
namely, while issues affecting all public sector employees should be negotiat-
ed at KOMT, sectoral issues should be on the agenda of sectoral forums only.
KÉT and OÖKÉT were replaced by a revived Public Service Interest Recon-
ciliation Forum while the law divided the civil servants into government civil 
servants and other civil servants. In 2011 Act CXCIX on public servants put 
them in the same service employment relationship, although it was a civilian 
service relationship. The forum raised every single issue affecting the public 
services under the law, so when the government civil servant legal category was 
introduced, the issues of job termination without specifying a reason and the 
98 per cent excise tax on severance pay were debated at the forum but the un-
ions failed to get their points across. For that reason they chose a variety of pos-
sible remedies which they proposed to their members. The situation is similar 
today with restrictions on voicing opinions, the legal issues surrounding loss 
of confidence (see sub-chapter 3.1 in this volume), and other legal questions.
The Interest Reconciliation Forum of Armed Forces Members (SZÉF) was 
terminated. It was replaced in part by the Internal Affairs Interest Reconcilia-
tion Council since in the meantime, all law enforcement bodies excepting the 
tax and customs tariff services, were placed under the authority of the Minis-
try of the Interior. The Hungarian Law Enforcement Faculty/Body (MRK),15 
established in 2011, was granted an interest protection function under the law 
so it took over the role of the trade unions in sectoral interest reconciliation, 
which were otherwise significantly weakened by amendments to Hszt.16 and 
the Labour Code (hereinafter Mt.).17 The Armed Services Interest Recon-
ciliation Council, which in recent years has faced problems similar to those 
of the unions and law enforcement workers, continues to operate. However, 
these forums were unable to substantively influence the transformation of 
the armed service pension system (see in sub-chapter 4.4) or to prevent the 
deterioration of their own operation conditions.
There have also been problems with sectoral interest reconciliation, which 
used to be ministerial level issues. These forums – particularly the ones cov-
ering public education, higher education, culture, and health care – had once 
14 Today nearly half of the 
brackets in the pay scale is “un-
marked” since the guaranteed 
salary included in it is higher 
than the minimum wage and 
the guaranteed minimum wage 
for skilled workers – more about 
this later.
15 The Hungarian Public Ad-
ministration Faculty/Body, 
whose members are government 
officials, did not receive such 
clear-cut union rights.
16 Act XLIII of 1993 on the 
service conditions of armed 
forces professionals (hereinaf-
ter: Hszt.)
17 Hszt. amended the provi-
sion on deducting trade union 
dues and actually terminated 
the mandatory dues deduc-
tion – without giving the unions 
time to prepare. The outcome 
was that that the unions lost 
a significant portion of their 
members. The position of the 
unions was also weakened by the 
establishment of the MRK – the 
Hungarian Law Enforcement 
Body/Faculty, which fostered 
the illusion among many mem-
bers of the armed forces that it 
was an interest advocacy group 
that didn’t charge dues.
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operated in part as information disseminating and consultative channels that 
substituted for sector-level collective bargaining. Today, the structure of the 
bodies serving to maintain these areas is being transformed (the public schools 
and some health care facilities are being shifted out of local government con-
trol and placed directly into the hands of the central government), and this 
– in accordance with the government’s human resource policy outlook – has 
led to the introduction of lifelong career models and the transformation of 
civil servant remuneration. The second of the sectoral interest reconciliation 
forums has been the public education,18 health care and armed services sector 
interest reconciliation forum, and an agreement on the renewal of the forum 
in the social care sector was reached in September 2013.
The failure of the transformation of public education and of the lifelong 
career model of teachers led to the establishment of a strike committee in 
which every single union organized in public education originally participated. 
Despite the fact that the government reached agreement with the members 
of the strike committee – with the exception of one union, the Democratic 
Teachers’ Union – innumerable disputed issues remained. The circle of par-
ticipants in health care reconciliation talks has been haphazard, with profes-
sional and interest advocacy organizations participating jointly. The main 
issue here has been the sector’s human resource strategy, which is seeking a 
resolution to the problem of people leaving the professions and the labour 
shortage. The forum is an opportunity for the invited participants to directly 
notify the state secretariat of the issues where quick intervention would be 
desired (such as the home paediatric practitioners employed by local govern-
ments whose salaries had fallen well behind), but there were no institutional 
guarantees that there actually would be any government decisions to remedy 
the problems raised here.
Effective wage systems for public services
At this point, we would like to explore the main components of the remunera-
tion system, including starting salaries and highest attainable salaries under 
the various legal formations. In the professions where introduction of lifelong 
career models is currently under negotiation (health care, public education) 
separate pay scales have been devised. Therefore, a number of ranking systems 
will be established (although the original public service employee and the 
higher education pay scales will be retained) and the uniform remuneration 
system for public service employees will be terminated. Introduction of the 
lifelong career model will trigger a significant rise in earnings,19 albeit over a 
lengthy timeframe, so people for whom the old public service employee pay 
scale remains in effect can expect their incomes to drop back (as happened 
with the social care sector, for which the unions set up demonstration com-
mittees in August 2013).20 In parallel, under the rules, collective agreements21 
18 Act CXXIX of 2013 amend-
ing several laws regulating edu-
cation did establish a National 
Teachers’ Body/Faculty. Its 
functions, however, were not 
enumerated in the law so we 
cannot say anything about its 
connection to interest advocacy.
19 For instance, teachers in 
public education are to be cat-
egorized in accordance with the 
new system by 2017.
20 The main demand of the un-
ions is increasing salaries but 
updating the interest reconcilia-
tion system and even concluding 
a new sectoral collective agree-
ment were also included among 
their demands.
21 For business entities that be-
came budget-sponsored institu-
tions, Act CIII of 2013 amended 
the National Budget Act. “Col-
lective agreements in effect in 
these entities lose their valid-
ity at the time the government 
takes over the responsibilities of 
these entities” (Paragraph 11/F, 
Section 12). “Any works coun-
cil in operation at the company 
shall be terminated at the time 
the government takes over the 
responsibilities of these entities” 
(Paragraph 11/F, Section 13).
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are being terminated in business entities that the government has taken over, 
which will lead to employees here losing the benefits listed in those agreements.
In public education the future of the collective bargaining agreements is 
unclear. The benefits that local governments had funded were not provided 
by the central government in 2013. In the other variations, according to the 
regulations governing wages that have been made known22 the “base salary” 
for remuneration is not uniform. For people with a secondary education it is 
120 per cent of the minimum wage, for people with a higher education at bach-
elor level it is 180 per cent of the minimum wage, and for people with Mas-
ters degrees, it is 200 per cent. In 2013 the minimum wage was HUF 98,000, 
and civil servants starting their careers were entitled to 100 per cent of that 
amount. The pay scale contains five remuneration classifications, with 15 lev-
els of payment. The highest multiplier is 265 per cent, which means that HUF 
519,400 could be paid as a basic salary. For people employed in non-teach-
ing jobs, the old public sector employees’ promotion system is to be applied.
In health care, two pay scales,23 introduced in 2012 and operative since 1 
January 2013, have been in effect. Under them, attempts were made to cover 
any salary increases due but left unpaid through differentiated lump sums in 
compensation. For doctors the pay scale set up three pay grades (H, I, and J) 
and 15 levels within that (for years of service from zero to 45). The base re-
muneration is HUF 108,000 and the lowest multiplier is 1.809. The highest 
is 3.415. For professional health care workers the pay scale retained the 11 
classifications of public service employees and also includes 15 levels. Salaries 
range from HUF 103,000 to HUF 330,725. The starting level of Category 
D is HUF 118,000, higher than the 2013 guaranteed mandatory wage mini-
mum for skilled staff.
The higher education remuneration system was retained (with, however, the 
chance to differentiate to a greater degree than the original system made pos-
sible), in which the university professor occupation is the “base salary” on the 
pay scale, and 40 to 106 per cent is a guaranteed salary. The guaranteed re-
muneration for university professor No. 1, was HUF 437,300 as of 1 January 
2013. Forty per cent of that is HUF 174,920 and 106 per cent is HUF 463,538.
The public service employees not cited here separately continue to be paid 
according to the public service employee pay scale. Since the minimum wage 
is regularly increased and the “base salary” has not been changed, about half 
of the pay scale is now “empty” (61 of the 140 cells appearing in Table 3.2.4 
are in gray) since the minimum wage or the mandatory guaranteed mini-
mum for skilled workers is now higher than the guaranteed pay in the pay 
scale. (Every group of public service employees has the right to conclude a lo-
cal collective agreement but the wage agreements within it can only regulate 
the amount of the add-ons and salary extras that the law explicitly assigns to 
collective bargaining to regulate. This latter only may be paid out at the ex-
22 See the version of the Pub-
lic Education Act valid as of 1 
September 2013.
23 See the appendices to Act 
LXXXIV of 2003 on certain 
issues within the realm of health 
care activity.
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pense of the institution’s own (market) income, which means that additions 
of the type controlled by collective agreements are very rare.
24 The institutions subordinat-
ed to the county public admin-
istration bureaus established 
in the reorganization of public 
administration of 2010–2011 
were dropped down a level in 
the public administration hi-
erarchy. The outcome was that 
salary supplements were also 
dropped down by one level, 
which meant a loss of earnings 
for the government officials. 
[According to the tariff chart 
the salary supplement is to be 
determined as a percentage of 
the (job category) salary, for 
instance, if the worker has a 
college or university degree 
and works in a parliamentary 
office the multiplier is 80 per 
cent, if in a ministry it is 50 per 
cent, if in a public administra-
tion body it is 30 per cent and 
if in a body subordinated to it, 
it is 10 per cent].
Table 3.2.4: Remuneration set as mandatory under the public service employee pay scale  
for the different wage categories and payment levels
A B C D E F G H I J
1 69,000.0 77,000.0 78,000 79,000.0 89,000.0 122,000 127,000.0 129,500.0 142,000 154,500.00
2 70,207.5 783,47.5 79,560 80,975.0 91,447.5 126,270 131,445.0 135,975.0 148,390 163,770.00
3 71,415.0 79,695.0 81,120 82,950.0 93,895.0 130,845 136,207.5 142,450.0 156,555 175,357.50
4 72,622.5 81,042.5 83,070 84,925.0 97,010.0 135,420 140,970.0 148,925.0 165,785 186,945.00
5 73,830.0 82,390.0 85,020 86,900.0 100,125.0 139,995 145,732.5 155,400.0 176,435 198,532.50
6 75,037.5 83,737.5 86,775 88,875.0 103,240.0 144,570 150,495.0 163,170.0 187,085 210,120.00
7 76,417.5 85,277.5 88,725 91,047.5 106,577.5 149,145 155,257.5 172,882.5 197,735 219,390.00
8 77,797.5 87,780.0 90,675 93,812.5 109,915.0 154,330 161,607.5 182,595.0 208,385 229,046.25
9 79,350.0 90,282.5 93,210 96,775.0 113,252.5 159,515 169,227.5 192,307.5 216,905 238,702.50
10 80,902.5 92,977.5 95,940 99,737.5 116,590.0 166,835 177,165.0 202,020.0 225,425 248,358.75
11 82,455.0 95,672.5 98,865 102,700.0 119,927.5 174,155 185,102.5 210,437.5 233,945 258,015.00
12 84,007.5 98,367.5 101,790 105,662.5 122,597.5 181,475 193,040.0 218,855.0 242,465 267,671.25
13 85,560.0 101,062.5 104,715 108,625.0 125,267.5 188,795 200,977.5 227,272.5 252,405 278,486.25
14 87,112.5 103,950.0 107,640 111,587.5 128,382.5 196,115 208,915.0 235,690.0 262,345 289,301.25
Act LVIII on the legal status of government civil servants, no longer in ef-
fect, was adopted in 2010. It did nothing to change the essence of govern-
ment civil servant salaries but certain incomes were significantly reduced 
because of it.24 Act CXCIX of 2011 on public servants regulates the legal 
status of civil servants and government civil servants. The law retained the 
basic features of the earlier pay scale. For government civil servants the 
remuneration range ran from –20 per cent to +50 on a performance ba-
sis (in the ministries and the prime minister’s office, the maximum is +30 
per cent. The salaries of office workers with lower qualifications are set by 
the office chief and must be as high as the guaranteed wage minimum for 
skilled staff but may not exceed six times the “base salary”. The other con-
siderations for setting the basic salary must be set down in the public service 
regulations of the given administrative unit. The wage of a public service 
employee can be set between the minimum wage and ten times the aver-
age national economy-wide gross monthly wage for the previous year. For 
priority government bodies salary supplements for people with a university 
or college education is 50 per cent and for people with secondary educa-
tion it is 15 per cent. For bodies on the lower level of the hierarchy it is 10 
per cent for people with a university or a college education. The salaries of 
the top managers can be set by their superior body without fitting it into 
a category, in which case the manager is not entitled to any salary supple-
ment. Depending on the organization, remuneration may range from 28 
times to 17 times the “base salary” level. For offices not part of the central 
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government, and those in local government, there are two important dif-
ferences in the remuneration systems. Add-ons to remuneration and leader 
remunerations differ. The law does not limit the civil servant salary insofar 
as how much it can deviate from the remuneration set for a person’s given 
rank, and a personal remuneration can be set without limits.
Under currently valid regulations, employers and the representative bod-
ies of local governments have far greater scope in setting salaries than earlier.
For persons in the armed services the “base salary” is the same as in pub-
lic administration, but the pay scale is unique. Despite amendments to Act 
XLIII of 1996 on the service relations of professional members of the armed 
forces the basic remuneration system was retained. The remuneration sys-
tem was made up of a position salary, rank salary, salary supplement, service 
time supplement and other supplements. The position salary and rank sal-
ary combined made up the basic salary. The system contains two pay scales 
(categories), for officers, high ranking officers and generals (requires college 
or university degree) in Category I, non-commissioned officers and second 
lieutenant equivalent (with a secondary education), in Category II. Both pay 
scales are projected onto the public servant “base salary”. The service time bo-
nus functions as a partial salary booster with the starting amount at 12.5 per 
cent and the highest amount at 25 per cent. (The wages of defence employees 
working under the Labour Code (Mt.) cannot be higher than 10 times the 
national economy-wide average income.)
The remuneration for soldiers is governed by Act CCV of 2012 on the legal 
status of armed forces personnel and is of a similar structure (except that it 
uses a “defence” multiplier instead of a rank-based salary.) The salary is made 
up of a position salary, a defence bonus, a salary supplement, a service time 
supplement, a salary add-on, and at times, an additional salary component. 
The position salary and the defence bonus together make up the basic salary. 
Officers must be in Category I while rank-and-file personnel and non-commis-
sioned officers are in Category II25 with each category made up of a ten-point 
scale. The defence bonus is equal to the multiple of the “base salary” and the 
defence multiplier.26 A minister’s decree can allow the commander exercising 
the rights of employer to raise the salaries of subordinates by 30 per cent for 
a timeframe extending to 31 December of the given year. For persons with a 
university or college education the salary supplement is to be 20–50 per cent 
of the position salary depending on the place where the service is performed. 
For persons without college or university degrees it is 10–15 per cent of the 
position salary. The service time bonus ranges from 5 to 35 years and is 10–
22.5 per cent of the “base salary”.
The public sector salaries (if we ignore possibilities to deviate because of 
performance or qualifications and calculate maximums with the highest sal-
ary supplements) are summed up in Table 3.2.5.27
25 Since there is a shortage of 
soldiers who contract for a num-
ber of years, non-commissioned 
soldiers and service personnel 
with lower commissions are 
also granted other benefits not 
detailed here.
26 Please note that in the De-
fence Forces the tables of service 
personnel state that positions 
and ranks are subordinated to 
one another as specified by law, 
and therefore specific ranks are 
required to hold the various po-
sitions. If someone is mandated 
to advance to a higher rank for 
which the given position is no 
longer suitable, the position 
must also be re-shuff led to a 
higher level. Considering that 
there are not a sufficient number 
of higher positions to cover the 
people with higher ranks, the 
law contains an interim solu-
tion that acts as an incentive 
for people to remain in their 
previous positions.
27 Please note that the law for 
teachers was amended at the end 
of August 2013, and on the one 
hand it extended the scope of 
regulation to teachers working 
outside of the public education, 
while on the other, it reduced 
the starting salary. The system 
called for a 3.5 year interim to 
transit to the new pay scale, so 
for the moment the sections of 
the law referring to them are 
fiction.
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Table 3.2.5: Internal differentiation of the public service pay scales  
and the extreme values compared to the 2013 minimum wage
Categories of public sector  
employees
Mandatory maximum 
salary at the end of a 
career compared to 
starting minimum
Starting mandatory 
minimum compared to 
minimum wage
Mandatory maximum 
at the end of a career 
compared to the  
minimum wage
Salary set by the Act on Public 
Service Employee 4.19 0.70
* 2.95
Teachers (with college/university 
degrees) 2.94 1.80 5.30
Health care
Doctors 1.89 1.99 3.76
Skilled health care workers 3.21 1.05 3.37
Higher education, researchers 2.65 1.78 4.73
Public servants
University/college graduates 2.90 1.22 3.55
Secondary school graduates 2.83 0.71* 2.00
Office workers 2.03 1.16 2.37
Law enforcement
University/college graduates 3.34 1.22 4.08
Secondary school graduates 3.73 0.63* 2.36
Defence
University/college graduates 5.00 1.18 5.92
Secondary school graduates 2.81 0.79* 2.22
* The minimum wage must be paid in the public sector too, so in practice the multi-
plier = 1.
The calculation does not include the special bonuses available in some occu-
pations that are not available to all, or non-wage benefits that can be chosen 
from among alternatives, which amounted to HUF 200,000 among civil-
ians whose salaries are paid by the central budget. When discussing these 
pay scale configurations we particularly wanted to show the internal ratios, 
so when conducting our calculations we also sidestepped the items that go 
below the HUF 98,000 minimum wage and HUF 114,000 guaranteed wage 
minimum of 2013.
Summary
Table 3.2.5 and the history of interest reconciliation over past years allow us 
to draw the following conclusions.
• The salaries of people working in the public sector are far from uniform. 
Today there are even significant differences among public service employ-
ees. There are a total of 14 different pay scales in the public sector if we ig-
nore the public institutions’ employees operating under the labour code.
• The differentiation of pay scales was not the outcome of different interests 
and negotiations at public sector interest reconciliation forums – it was 
primarily the result of government intentions influenced by pressures from 
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some professions, but the latter was random and the bargaining was decen-
tralized to professions rather than sectors.
• Chances of advancing in the various careers are quite different. Within the 
services, the best chances of income growth were among military officers 
while the new system of advancement for doctors does not even see to it 
that their incomes will double during their careers. The only ones whose 
initial earnings can go up by threefold are law enforcement personnel and 
skilled health care workers.
• For persons with a secondary education and no specific profession, the wage 
scale is below the minimum wage everywhere except in public education. 
For government office workers it is equal to the guaranteed wage minimum 
– which is quite low.
• The difference between maximum earnings and the minimum wage is much 
smaller than the difference in the private sector. People with a secondary 
education will barely earn more than double the minimum wage even at 
the end of their careers.
• The new pay scales replacing the old ones create new disparities which can-
not be justified or explained on a theoretical basis.
While the Act on Public Service Employees formally allows collective wage 
bargaining there is no scope for them in practice, and in the other sectors even 
the formal possibility of collective agreements has been denied. The multi-
tude of pay scales prevents any centralized wage agreements based on higher 
level interest reconciliation from taking place. There is little likelihood that 
bargaining, should it occur within sectors or even professions if allowed by 
law would lead to proportionate outcomes keeping the labour market bal-
anced. The failure of the decentralized bargaining taking place in the late 
1990s should serve as a warning to today’s negotiators.
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3.2.1 Collective bargaining in businesses owned by central and local governments
Erzsébet Berki
In 2011 there were 13,991 businesses in Hungary 
employing over 20 people each.* These are business-
es in which it was realistic to establish collective 
agreements. Trade unions can conclude collective 
agreements, and unions are more likely to exist in 
public sector companies than elsewhere.**
The Information System of Labour Relations 
(MKIR), which rests on the mandatory require-
ment to report collective bargaining agreements, 
has a registry of 964 valid collective agreements at 
employers in the business sector (of which labour 
relations are regulated by the Labour Code.) (Ta-
ble B3.2.1) This amounts to 6.9 per cent of the busi-
nesses employing more than 20 people.*** look at all 
collective agreements in existence shows us that 
355 of them (26.4 per cent) are in the public sector 
(owned by central or local government).
In September 2013 there were a total of 65 multi-
employer collective agreements, and the scope of 
two of them included public sector employers. Of 
the 18 sector-level collective agreements (conclud-
ed by employers’ associations), the scope of three 
included public sector employers and one was an 
extended agreement (valid for all employers in the 
given sub-sector) which covered public ones as well.
Table B3.2.1: Number of valid single-employer 
collective agreements in the business sector  
and breakdown by the owner of the businessa
Majority owner
Number of  
collective agreements
Breakdown 
 (%)
Central government 135 14,0
Local governments 120 12,4
Private 709 73,5
Total 964 100,0
a As of 8 September 2013.
Source: Labour Relations Information System 
(Munkaügyi Kapcsolatok Információs Rendszere).
This tells us that collective agreements are far more 
common in the public enterprises (central or local 
government owned ones) than in the business sec-
tor as a whole. However, the Labour Code (Act I., 
of 2012) that came into effect on 1 July 2012 limit-
ed opportunities to conclude collective bargaining 
agreements with public sector employers. The new 
law contains two sections with restrictions (Para-
graphs 205 and 206), stating that collective bar-
gaining agreements cannot deviate from the law 
with regard to
•	 the duration of notice period,
•	 the regulations governing the conditions for 
granting severance pay and the amount of said 
pay,
•	 the regulation of time that does not qualify as 
working hours, and in this regard daily working 
time amounting to less than a full working day 
(eight hours) cannot generally be accepted as a 
full working day,
•	 the regulations governing the works council, or
•	 the regulations governing trade unions.
These restrictions lead to a weakening in the po-
sitions of the traditionally strong workplace unions 
in the state/local government owned businesses. 
Additionally, the unions stand to lose a portion of 
their incomes and may not come up with any other 
form of support, and thus their financial opportu-
nities (for instance for training courses or to con-
* Source: KSH.
** According to research conducted within the TÁMOP 
2.5.2 programme there are trade unions operating at 
about 15 per cent of employer premises, and within 
that, at 58 per cent of facilities owned by the govern-
ment. Similarly, the public sector businesses stand 
out regarding the union density level, with average 
unionization at 22 per cent and public sector unioni-
zation at 43 per cent (see: Neumann and Simonovits, 
2010, p. 53–55).
*** Please note that the real number of collective agree-
ments is likely to be less than this, on the one hand 
because as of 1 January 2013 the agreements con-
cluded with unions at lower unionization levels than 
10 per cent were declared invalid, while on the other, 
the parties involved do not always comply with the 
obligation to register that their agreements had been 
terminated.
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sult with experts) are reduced. This leads to the de-
terioration in the quality of collective bargaining.
The above bans remove issues that are typical-
ly regulated in collective agreements. Thus, they 
expressly damage the positions of the employees, 
who, for instance, lose the extra notice time, the 
higher severance pay and the shorter working hours 
set under the former collective agreement (Nacsa 
and Neumann, 2013). One consequence of the de-
terioration in worker positions could be a further 
decline in trade union density.
Prohibitions on the organization of working time 
can also create significant problems for employers, 
too, primarily because in many places a break in the 
midst of working hours was a part of the working 
day, as well as because they are no longer allowed 
to operate with special reduced-hour working days. 
Several major state-owned firms were forced to re-
design their working time schedules to more or less 
comply with the law.
In the longer term, the prohibitions, stating that 
collective bargaining agreements cannot deviate 
from the law on labour relations, works councils, 
and trade unions, can damage the quality of labour 
relations. With this move the public sector employ-
ers as well as their unions and works councils are 
deprived of the possibility to jointly conclude in-
novative solutions. According to some interpreta-
tions of the law the collective bargaining agreement 
may not even regulate an issue on these matters not 
covered by the law because that too would be a de-
viation from the law.
When the collective bargaining agreements cov-
er only one employer it is easy to formally adhere to 
these prohibitions since any agreement conflicting 
with the law is automatically void and therefore, 
does not have to be applied. However, when the 
collective bargaining agreements are sectoral and 
when the employer organisation involves a com-
bination of central government, local government, 
and private sector businesses the parties involved 
have no idea regarding when they are in compli-
ance with the law, since the same provision that is 
unlawful for the government employer can be law-
ful for the private sector employer. Another ques-
tion concerns whether the collective bargaining 
agreement under which the ruling was agreed can 
discriminate against some of the employees un-
der its auspices, depending on the form of owner-
ship of their employers. On the whole, these pro-
hibitions on public sector labour relations lead to 
the deterioration of the quality of labour relations, 
a decline in the number of collective bargaining 
agreements, a reduction in their regulatory pow-
er and, in the final analysis, they could result in 
a competitive disadvantage that could hurt em-
ployers.
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3.3 Crises and waves – changes in the system of public 
employment in Europe
László Váradi
The recent decades of public employment have passed in a continuous wave 
between the maintenance of the Weberian “bureaucratic ideal” (Weber, 1978, 
pp. 220–221) and the new trend of the seventies, the 3Es (economy, effective-
ness, efficiency) The essence of the “fight” can be summarised in the way how, 
and by how much, individual countries deviate from the ideal of the public 
servant independent of the daily fluctuations of politics towards the direc-
tion of a public employment that operates cheaply, effectively and efficiently 
(OECD, 1999, pp. 8–14).
Different countries have built up distinct public employment systems de-
pending on their actual economic situation, social conditions and traditions 
and, even today, they also react differently to the challenges. As far as the sys-
tems of public employment are concerned literature applies numerous types 
or categories (Linder, 2010, Gajduschek, 2005), but the substance of them 
is the same in an employment aspect, where the individual public employ-
ment systems are situated at some point on an imaginary Weberian – open 
employment scale.
New Public Management
The conditions of public employment that used to operate in a Weberian 
framework had changed at the end of the seventies: the pressure of the so-
cialist world order disappeared, taxes were reduced in order to increase com-
petitiveness, the middle class extended, and the new toolkit of management 
became available (summarized by Hajnal, 2004. p. 34, and about the reasons: 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, pp. 25–27). And the answer is: the New Public 
Management (NPM), which intends to integrate the system of public man-
agement into the economy as a whole.
As Christopher Pollitt summarizes:
“… I will here assume that the NPM is a two level phenomenon: at the higher 
level it is a general theory or doctrine that the public sector can be improved 
by the importation of business concepts, techniques and values, while at the 
more mundane level it is a bundle of specific concepts and practices, including:
– Greater emphasis on ‘performance’, especially through the measurement 
of outputs.
– A preference for lean, flat, small, specialized (disaggregated) organizational 
forms over large, multi-functional forms.
– A widespread substitution of contracts for hierarchical relations as the 
principal coordinating device.
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– A widespread injection of market-type mechanisms (MTMs) including 
competitive tendering, public sector league tables and performance-re-
lated pay.
– An emphasis on treating service users as ‘customers’ and on the applica-
tion of generic quality improvement techniques such as TQM.” (Pollitt, 
2007, p. 1.)
New Public Management has completely changed principles in employment 
that were believed previously untouchable. The system of “jobs until retire-
ment”, life-long employment that used to be considered as a basic condition 
has been suppressed, although not radically.
“This suggests that the principle of life-long employment seems to belong 
– as opposed to promotion criteria or pay systems – to those traditional ele-
ments of the civil service that have been subject to the least modification dur-
ing the reform processes in the EU Member States and particularly in career 
systems. While the principles of recruitment and pay are increasingly being 
influenced by current practices in the private sector, this does not seem to be 
the case for life tenure.” (Bossaert, 2005, p. 18.)
Nevertheless, significant changes have occurred in its content. Dismissal of 
public servants has become easier. As the most important element of change is 
that performance is taken into consideration, though we cannot speak about 
its widespread expansion.1 Even so public servants remained safe from “ra-
tionalisation” type dismissals in most countries. If it has occurred then the 
conditions of the dismissal for them are more favourable than in the market.
Although measures to increase flexibility had poor results in this area, fi-
nancial difficulties and the constraints and spread of the New Public Man-
agement also brought another solution: the fixed term contract. Of course, it 
has nothing to do with lifelong employment, i. e. it is far from the principles 
of Weberian public management. At the same time, in systems where employ-
ees are hired for concrete tasks this also fits logically. Many countries have in-
creased the rate of fixed term contracts in order to bridge the headcount and 
generate cost reductions due to the economic changes (as in Germany where 
the volume of public servants is definite).
Occasionally, these measures created situations where employees of differ-
ent status may be used in the same workplace or even in the same job. How-
ever the basic question for these clerks having a differing status but working 
at the same time or even together is the following: if a non public servant 
can perform the task why do we need clerks with a specific status? Although, 
from many aspects we would expect the expansion of this more flexible em-
ployment in Europe – whilst the picture is very colourful – this tendency 
cannot be clearly observed.
Probably, the largest impact on the traditional employment was effected 
by the performance measurement systems. Earlier, individual public servants 
1 We should note that the new 
EU member states mostly chose 
less stringent solutions just in 
this field (Bossaert, 2005, p. 23).
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were remunerated according to the competences demanded by their jobs or 
the time spent in service. When the remuneration of the personnel is bound 
to performance, numerous problems have to be faced and the predictability of 
a public servants’ existence, the unidirectional nature of the path are generally 
questioned. In order to let the whole system completely “come into play” in 
the public servant’s life, not only does the traditional order of remuneration 
have to be broken but the model of promotion, the strict order of hierarchy 
changed, traditional values questioned, and public servants easily fired. De-
pending on an individual countries’ determination to break with tradition, 
varying systems were introduced. This is true as to the system itself (its size, 
elements, etc.) as well as the way of the introduction, the methods used, the 
range of stakeholders, the person of the appraiser, etc. The experiences of the 
EU member states concerning the introduction are listed by Cardona (2006) 
based on a report from May 2002:
– Performance-related pay systems are costly and time-consuming to im-
plement.
– In many cases such systems are only applicable at senior levels.
– Discretion of managers is confined to issues such as measurement of per-
formance and distribution of the small pool of money available for per-
formance-related pay.
– Some systems have been introduced as pilot projects with a view to wider 
application at a later date, but in absence of rigorous analyses of the ef-
fects of the pilot projects it is not clear how wider application could be 
introduced.
– Almost none of the current schemes addresses the issue of underper-
formance (no punishment for failure to deliver).
– Measurement of performance, particularly in areas where there are no ob-
vious quantifiable outputs, is a very difficult issue.
– No evidence has been found that performance-related pay schemes have 
contributed to an improvement in performance, in human resource man-
agement or in the quality of the service delivered.
– Additional remuneration was not a significant motivator for the employ-
ees concerned.
– The regular, annual or more frequent, formalised discussions between 
managers and employees on performance, targets and progress achieved 
have positive effects on motivation (recognition of the contribution of an 
individual to the organisational performance) (Cardona, 2006, pp. 3–4).
The author of the report draws our attention to two aspects. One of them is 
the complexity of the system. “Performance management needs to be based on 
strategic management according to which goals and results are established in 
a consistent way during the political, policy-making and managerial processes.” 
(Cardona, 2006. pp. 4–5) That is, while the higher level political and institu-
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tional objectives and consequences are not yet unambiguous, and are not ob-
viously defined, it is also very difficult to establish a consequent performance 
management system at a managerial – even more at an individual – level.
The key of the other aspect is that objectives and results are different for the 
political institutions and for the individual institutions and their managers. 
It is a very rare “state of grace” in the development of public institutions when 
subsequent governments are able to modify the operation of the public man-
agement along similar lines with similar aims, although the introduction of 
such large systems concerns more than only the government actually in power.
It does, however, seem evident that the system of performance manage-
ment can contribute not only to the introduction of the performance based 
remuneration. The system can be specifically useful – even economical and 
efficient – if the other, hidden opportunities of the performance management 
system receive more emphasis, such as having goals focused on development 
and improvement, to enforce the relationship between leader and follower, 
and the development of human resource management. The aspect not really 
favoured by many people is also important, that performance appraisal sup-
ports measurability of the differences between the public sector and the mar-
ket, increases permeability, and thus makes the internal and external assess-
ment of the public management more realistic.
The aim of the reforms as mentioned earlier is to make employees of the 
public sector work more economically, efficiently and effectively. To this end, 
the next step would be to motivate employees by giving them some tools to 
do this. It has already been widely determined that the most important mo-
tivation tool is money, a higher income, and this supports experiments con-
nected to performance based remuneration.
Of course, contemporary motivation theory doesn’t support this one-sided 
approach to a great extent. As different research works proved public employ-
ees’ wages significantly surpassed market wages on average in pre-crisis Europe 
– this is partly explained by the higher average age, and the higher rate of those 
with higher education and in managerial positions (concerning these see the 
2.5 sub-chapter of this actual In Focus) –, while the working hours of public 
employees are less everywhere (at least according to the legal regulation) than 
of those employed in similar jobs in the private sector. These considerations 
would imply that the conditions of public employees do not justify their mo-
tivation through higher salaries. Numerous research papers concerning the 
motivators of public work testify (see e.g. Steen, 2006, Cerase and Farinella, 
2006, Forest, 2006), that higher income doesn’t appear as the primary fac-
tor among the motivators for public employees. Well regulated work, activ-
ity for the public good, or political neutrality are much more important for 
them (ILM, 2010. p. 6). (Although, only very few analytic works have been 
prepared in this field based on facts, we can probably state that in the poorer 
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European countries where the public servants’ incomes are more moderate 
the wages play a significantly more important role. Here, public opinion is 
fairly steadfast that salaries are good tools to reach long term performance 
improvement. About this topic see also the 2.5 sub-chapter of this In Focus.)
Analysing the impacts of the New Public Management we can establish 
in general that it has generated significant but not radical changes in public 
administration. In countries more open to change – in Scandinavia, in the 
United Kingdom, etc. – not only has the structure of public administration 
essentially altered but also its model of operation. Numerous activities have 
been outsourced thus radically reducing the number of public employees and 
management of the institutions has been decentralised, both of which has ba-
sically modified the operation of these institutions. Less open countries also 
took steps in this direction – Germany, France, etc. – but we cannot speak 
about a real breakthrough in this respect in their cases. Between the two ex-
tremes we can find several countries (Mediterranean countries, etc.) which 
are radical in the transformation of the public administration only in their 
political slogans.
“What was an option ten years ago is not an option anymore today. I would 
say that in PA [public administration – ed.]
– in 1995, it was still possible to believe in NPM, although there were the 
first strong and substantial critiques
– in 2000, NPM was on the defensive, as empirical findings spoke clearly 
against it as well
– in 2005, NPM is not a viable concept anymore.
Yet, in many areas, both of scholarship and of the world, as well as in pol-
icy, NPM is very alive and very much kicking. It is, therefore, necessary to 
look both at the concept itself and at the reasons for its success.” (Drechsler, 
2005, p. 17)
Search for equilibrium – Neo-Weberian approach
In the light of experience both theoretical and practical approaches tended 
towards some mixture of the Weberian and the market elements. The essence 
of the thus born Neo-Weberian concept is that the principals of public service 
with a distinct status, culture and conditions should remain in employment 
associated with “A professionalization of the public service, so that the ‘bu-
reaucrat’ becomes not simply an expert in the law relevant to his or her sphere 
of activity, but also a professional manager, oriented to meeting the needs of 
his or her citizens/users.”(Lynn, 2008, p. 11)
Lesser or greater changes have taken place in the public administration of 
each country, and practically in all the countries which have had to face the 
fact that – as quoted – the traditional instruments are already not necessarily 
effective, while the new market oriented tools also haven’t brought about the 
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impact demanded. It has meant a specific difficulty for the decision makers of 
the EU because, in the enlarging organisation, diversity – not only in general 
but very concretely in public administration and in public employment – has 
further increased. In addition, one of the main objections against the New 
Public Management was that it couldn’t operate as a generally accepted best 
practice, as it didn’t take into consideration the traditions, the situation and 
the specifics of the individual countries. Therefore, the EU could only sug-
gest an initiation that is sufficiently flexible, and, at the same time, presents 
a certain direction for the member states.
In reaction to the above mentioned problems the European Union created 
and announced the principle of flexible security (flexicurity) in 2006–2007 
(EC, 2007). The concept was intended to provide a solution framework es-
sentially to the market problems, however, the same two directions also had 
to be harmonised in the case of public employment. Through the announce-
ment, as we said, they wanted to combine the flexibility created by the incor-
poration of the market models with the elements of traditional employment 
security. This comprehensive approach was also embraced by the public ad-
ministrations themselves. Multiple trends are outlined again in the imple-
mentation 1) countries with systems based on a secure public service (career-
based) (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Romania, Spain, 
etc.); 2) more flexible but secure systems based on given tasks (position-based) 
(Denmark, Finland, Netherland, Sweden and the United States) and 3) nei-
ther flexible, nor secure systems (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, etc.) (Kuperus and Rode, 2010, p. 21).
Decomposition – effects of the crisis
However, the crisis in 2008 interfered in the debate concerning how to pro-
ceed. The majority of countries introduced austerity measures in the employ-
ment of public employees either sooner or later. They made a choice from the 
possible methods or we might say the different options of escape, basically 
according to their budget situation (Glassner, 2010, p. 32).
As Christopher Pollitt states, the solution of the situation of the European 
public administration can be centralised around three key areas: 1) reduc-
tion, liquidation of waste, 2) renovation of processes, innovation, and 3) co-
operation of the different social actors to find the common solutions. In an 
optimal case, measures in all the three areas, should work in synergy together 
strengthening each other in the long run, or in a better scenario even in the 
short one (Pollitt, 2011).
Although, these intentions sound good, there is only a vague chance for their 
implementation in reality. Most countries introduced radical constraints in 
the field of employment: froze or rather decreased wages, cut allowances, ben-
efits, ordered a recruitment shut down, or even fired large numbers, and en-
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gaged in short term, occasionally “special” employment contracts.2 The results 
of these measures were growing workloads, deteriorating quality and conse-
quently evaluation, risk evasion due to fear, decisions being pushed to higher 
levels, centralisation, and thus overwhelming bureaucracy, as well as growing 
costs. Under these circumstances, fear of the employees in public administra-
tion from privatisation is increasing, as well as their resistance towards coop-
eration with the private sphere. Accordingly, the chance to renovate the sys-
tems, to find the multilaterally useful and successful solutions is very limited.
Of course, in the countries where they were not forced to introduce wide-
spread and long run constraints we can observe excellent examples of sys-
tematic reform measures. In many countries the number of public employ-
ees remained stable, and the tool of dismissing people was not used or only 
used to a limited extent. The numbers of personnel in industries that they 
considered strategic (education, health care) were increased, or women’s share 
in the numbers of employees was improved thus implementing a highly anti-
cyclical economic model.
Nevertheless, measures have had their impacts along the same lines in most 
countries.
• Fairness of the system deteriorates, ad hoc measures smash the hierarchy, 
disrupt responsibility relationships.
• Different employment or contract relations tilt the balance within the pub-
lic administration (between sectors, age groups, social cohorts, etc.).
• Decreasing financing, growing workload, increasing internal and external 
expectations, remuneration changes and deteriorating workplace atmos-
phere – as we mentioned above – degrade working conditions.
• Social dialogue transforms. The weight of the trade unions that are gener-
ally very strong in the public administration declines, employees’ vulner-
ability increases.
• Development in general is suppressed due to the austerity measures, conse-
quently there is less process development and thus less training and other 
personal development. The quality of public administration worsens and 
therefore, its authority and attraction reduce.
• Promotion of the employees slows down and may even be blocked for a 
period. Career programs are often frozen, most talented young people can 
only with difficulty be kept in public administration.
• If there is an option, migration reaches a high level from public employment 
(policemen, firemen, doctors, teachers, IT professionals, etc.), and interna-
tional migration can also increase in some jobs.
• Earlier reforms may become partially or totally meaningless. The perfor-
mance based remuneration becomes a nonsense by the freezing of wages, just 
like fixed term contracts by the constraints on benefits, and the appraisal 
system by the blockage of promotions.
2 Here we don’t speak about 
the public works programme 
just designed to eliminate the 
effects of the crisis. Professional 
literature assesses its impacts 
as doubtfully positive even for 
the individuals in the long run, 
and evidently negative for the 
market (EC, 2010, p. 86).
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Certainly, there could be procedures to improve the situation, even though 
they could hardly significantly change the essence of it. Nevertheless, it would 
be important that governments a) fix the timely and the economic limits 
of the constraints, b) negotiate with the stakeholders (even if they fail to 
agree), c) choose solutions that cause less damage in the long run, d) sup-
port strengthening social solidarity with their decisions, endeavour to draft 
a widely acceptable public employee career path. With these measures they 
can improve the chances for the acceptance of the crisis measures and also of 
their implementation.
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3.4 Crisis driven changes in wage setting systems in the EU
Márk Edelényi & László Neumann
Data from 2010 shows that slightly more than 50 million employees worked 
in the public sectors of the EU member states which accounts for a quarter of 
all persons employed in Europe (EC, 2012).1 Naturally, the share of the pub-
lic sector varied greatly among member states, exhibiting more than an 18% 
difference between the higher Scandinavian data (between 2008 and 2011 
in Denmark and Sweden it was 32% on average) and a lower share in South 
Eastern Europe (during the same time period the public sector employed 18% 
in Bulgaria and only 14% in Romania) (EC, 2013, p. 94). Though it goes be-
yond the scope of this sub-chapter we must draw attention to the fact that 
one of the main obstacles in comparing European public sectors is the lack 
of adequate statistical information.2
Data from 2010 is important given that this was exactly the time when 
the mortgage and credit crises that hit the United States in 2008, and which 
reached Europe, at least in the sense of the labour market as a production and 
economic crisis, transformed into a fiscal one. This was mainly the result of 
three factors: the state founded bail-outs of the troubled bank sector, falling 
tax revenues and the extra pressure on social and welfare benefits due to the 
shrinking labour market. As a consequence of this process the retraction of 
the labour market, felt thus far only in the private sector spilled over to the 
public sector (Anxo et al., 2013). Our aim in the present sub-chapter is to 
show the impact of the crisis on the public sector of European Union member 
states paying special attention to its effects on the wage setting mechanisms.
The first part of the sub-chapter maps the legal statutes of employment 
which govern the public sectors of EU member states with a special empha-
sis on the wage determination systems. The second part reviews European 
wage setting mechanisms including the state’s role in that process. The third 
shows the direct impact of the crisis on the situational positions of the pub-
lic sector employees of EU member states highlighting wage cuts and work-
force reductions. Finally, the fourth part analyses the indirect effects of the 
crisis concerning mainly the changes in the structure and the role of collec-
tive bargaining. Our inquiry here is primarily directed towards that part of 
the public sector at central government level including those institutions di-
rectly dependent on the central government. A deeper analysis of the local 
government sector can be found in sub-chapter 3.5. Notwithstanding, this 
distinction often proves to be extremely cumbersome especially in times when 
the responsibility of many service provisions are shifting between governance 
levels as a part of the reforms and of crisis responses.
1 This data was elaborated using 
NACE codes so it contains data 
on private employees working in 
health and in education.
2 On related methodological 
problems please refer to the 
study of János Köllő, the first 
chapter of this present volume; 
and also EC (2013) p. 26 and 36. 
The demand for better quality 
statistical data was clearly for-
mulated by the President of the 
European Commission Herman 
Van Rompuy n in a conference 
dedicated exclusively to address 
this issue (Rompuy, 2013)
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Traditional public sector models in Europe
The historical development of the modern state’s administration gave birth 
to two traditional types of legal models of employment relationship in Eu-
rope: the Prussian-Napoleonic model and the Anglo-Saxon model based on 
the civil law tradition.
The main features of the Prussian-Napoleonic model are the following: young 
employees enter into the system following completion of appropriate studies 
and remain a part of it throughout their careers until retirement. Entry re-
quirements may also include the successful completion of a competitive pub-
lic exam. Expulsion from the system may only occur in the event of serious 
legal wrongdoing. The legal regulations that govern employment relations in 
the public sector are separated from those governing the rest of the labour 
market and expressly emphasize seniority based promotion. (For this reason 
the literature refers to it on numerous occasions as a career-based or “closed” 
public sector model). Wages are usually set according to the pay-scales codi-
fied by law and mostly dependent on service period and education level. These 
pay-scales may be indexed for instance by the level of inflation. Contrary to 
this, in the public sector model based on the Anglo-Saxon civil law tradition, 
employees are subject to the same legal regime as those in the private sector. 
Accordingly, employees in the public sector do not enjoy a “preferential sta-
tus” and additionally restrictions on entry and leaving (including being dis-
missed) are relaxed. All vacancies (including senior positions) are offered in 
public announcements and filled through public competition open to all so 
consequently, neither the concept of the career nor the notion of seniority play 
a major role within the system. Wages are mainly dependent on the position 
occupied and its development is regulated by individual and collective agree-
ments instead of mandatory pay-scales. (This model is also known as position 
based or “open” public sector model). (EC, 2013, p. 104)
Two classical examples of the Prussian-Napoleonic model are worth men-
tioning as an illustration. For the German Beamter (civil servant) the state 
guarantees the means for an adequate lifestyle through a suitable economic 
recompense, based on a legally established pay scale (Bosch et al., 2012). Civil 
servants employed by the French fonction publique are in a similar situation 
as far as their income is concerned. According to the text of the legislation 
instead of a salary (salaire) they receive a stipend (traitement) dependent on 
various factors, such as the corps they belong to, the education level, the post 
and the seniority (ancienneté) of the employee. This “stipend” depends on the 
pay scale of the public sector (grille), which establishes a multiplier (between 
308 and 1501 in 2012) that can be applied to the “index point” (EUR 55.56 
since 2010) to arrive at the annual income of any given employee (Audier et 
al., 2012, p. 8). The reform of 1982 cancelled the previous inflation based 
automatic indexation of the “index point” (Audier et al., 2012, p. 11). Even 
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though the German and the French public sector model are different in many 
ways, neither the Beamter nor the fonction publique status is restricted to pub-
lic administration officials, so the majority of those who would be considered 
in Hungary a public service employee, (i.e. the majority of teachers and phy-
sicians) belong to their ranks.
It is interesting to note that while the European Union through its politics 
indirectly yet efficiently, encourages the reform of its member states’ public 
sectors its own bureaucracy corresponds to the Prussian-Napoleonic model. 
Applicants to the “EU bureaucrat” positions can gain entrance through pub-
lic contest to its two bodies – administrators and assistants. While the for-
mer group is made up of 12 rank levels (AD05-AD16) the latter has only 11 
(AST01-AST11). Thus wage categories are divided into 16 levels and each level 
has 5 seniority steps (with the exception of the 16th level which has only 3). 
Monthly base wages (from 1st of July 2010) are between EUR 2,654.17 (first 
level, first seniority step) and EUR 18,370.84 (16th level, third seniority step).
Three examples are worth reviewing to illustrate the Anglo-Saxon civil law 
based model. The UK is the first example given that its public sector is unique 
in many ways. First of all, only 9% of those employed in the public sector are 
civil servants, working mainly for the ministries and for state agencies and 
employed directly by the Crown. The remaining 91% are public services em-
ployees and their employment contracts are regulated by the “regular” private 
sector labour legislation (Administration, 2008). Also, until recently the legal 
standing of civil servants was governed by custom and not by law.
The second characteristic example is Sweden. Here labour regulations are 
the same for both public and private sector employees. Even though those 
who work for the state have no separately legislated labour status they do en-
joy advantages of some particular legal conditions only applicable to them. 
The previous, seniority based system was reformed and replaced by the new 
position based “open” public sector model in the 1990’s. However, employees 
of the diplomatic corps, of the army and of the police are subject of specific 
norms and regulations (Public…, 2010).
The last example is Estonia, which established a position based public sector 
in 1995 while the vast majority of the new Eastern European Member States 
have a public sector that could be described as a Prussian-Napoleonic one. Dis-
similar from the other countries that use a position based public sector, in Es-
tonia a separate legislation regulates the sector and further special legislation 
applies in those positions with the highest relevance for the state (diplomatic 
corps, police, army and judges). At the same time those employed in health 
care and education are under the private sectors’ labour law (Public…, 2010).
These examples clearly indicate that there are no pure and model-like cases. 
Although member states could be classified by their dominant public sector 
model, this would only blur the characteristic differences of how each of them 
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mixes the two models to be able to take advantage of both. A pure position 
based model is difficult to implement in certain areas, such as the army or 
police, where special emphasis is put on hierarchical subordination and on a 
predictable promotion system. And inversely, more and more member states 
exclude from the secure public sector positions not only auxiliary jobs (such as 
cleaning and catering) but also complete areas of health and education, reor-
ganizing them as contracted services either from market based actors or from 
state/municipality owned enterprises. (Outsourcing and in-sourcing is an is-
sue treated in detail in sub-chapter 3.5). In summary, it can be indicated that 
member states blend the two pure (ideal-type) models into a country specific 
mixture, that, generally speaking, are similar in their internal segmentation 
despite the palpable differences.
Wage setting mechanisms
In wage determination there are also two opposite poles, corresponding to 
the two ideal types of legal models of employment.
Unilateral wage setting can be directly related to the Prussian Rechstaat 
model. According to this the employer of the public sector (for the sake of 
simplicity: the state) unilaterally, within its own limits of power, decides on 
the public employee’s income thus ensuring their independence both eco-
nomically and politically (EC, 2013, p. 104). Given that idealistically “wage” 
is not subject of an agreement, an incidental wage dispute may require liti-
gation. Thus the court is to decide on whether a “salary reduction” impedes 
the adequate way of life guaranteed by law for the German public servant.
Collective bargaining as a wage setting mechanism is mainly used in the 
case of those employees who have a (fixed-term or open-ended) work con-
tract regulated by labour law. The two sides participating in the collective 
bargaining are the representatives of the employees and the state or munici-
pality (and their agencies and enterprises). A particularity of the situation is 
that the state is as much a negotiator as the actor laying down the rules for 
the same negotiation. This obviously results in an advantageous negotiating 
position. In Sweden to counterbalance the possibility of direct state inter-
ference a specialized state agency is accredited to carry out the negotiations 
(Berki et al., 2007). Also, in the UK during the 1970s, Pay Preview Bodies 
were established in the 6 areas of the public sector to address the same prob-
lem, replacing collective bargaining with annual proposals for wage develop-
ment based on hearings with the participation of three groups – employees’ 
representatives, those representing the employers and also independent sci-
entific experts (Grimshaw, Rubery and Mariano, 2012a).
Besides these two main systems some EU member states use a hybrid struc-
ture to determine wages in the public sectors (or in some if its areas). This 
means that wage setting is de facto carried out through negotiations between 
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the state and the trade unions; however the deals forged in these negotiations 
de jure are enacted through legislation or promulgated through the declara-
tion of the pertinent executive body. This form of wage setting is relatively 
common in Eastern European member states and a similar system is used in 
both Italy and Spain (Glassner, 2010). Naturally, in this system the negotiat-
ing position of the state is stronger without even taking into consideration the 
fact that agreements forged in these negotiations may fail to enter into force.3
The review of the European wage determination systems also shows that 
there are member states that use more than one system simultaneously to set 
wages in the public sector. First and foremost, it is possible that those work-
ing in the central state administration and those working in offices of the mu-
nicipalities are subject to unilateral wage setting, while the rest of the sector 
is governed by collective agreements or by a hybrid wage setting mechanism. 
The situation can, however, be even more complex: in some member states, for 
instance in Italy and in Spain, “salaries” of central administration employees 
also depend on the type of contract used and also on the level of administra-
tion at which the employee is employed (Glassner, 2010). This may lead to 
the situation where two persons, employed in the same position, are subject 
to different wage setting mechanisms.
The two wage determination models in the public sector correspond to two 
types of state role: the state (or the municipality) can be a sovereign employer 
(which makes unilateral decisions) or it can be role-model employer. In this lat-
ter case, characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon civil law based model, the state, by 
those agreements forged in the public sector, sets a model for the private sec-
tor. In these agreements the state guarantees employees job security, income 
security (sick money, pensions, etc.), equal opportunities, fair processes and 
that the employees’ representations are taken into account through adequate 
channels. Last but not least the state guarantees a “fair payment” based on 
just comparisons (Grimshaw, Mariano and Rubery, 2012b, p. 32). Naturally, 
these are not rigid and mutually exclusive roles given that the state as a sov-
ereign employer can set models for the private sector while, though this is a 
paradox, the role of the state as a model employer is not exempt from elements 
of guarantee, particular within the career based systems. Furthermore, even 
in those EU members where the state acts as a model employer there are sub-
sectors and areas (the army could be a suitable example here) where the state 
can only act as a sovereign employer.
The impact of the crisis on the public sectors of EU member states.
Prior to the crisis employment in the public sector had been increasing mod-
estly. For instance, the headcount of public administration grew by 2% be-
tween 2004 and 2008, though the speed of growth was on the decline. Em-
ployment of the sector remained more or less intact by the first phase of the 
3 This can occur for formal 
reasons: the entity with due 
authority – e.g. the Parliament 
– refuses to accept the negoti-
ated results and thus declines 
to promulgate it, or – especially 
in times of crisis – the wage in-
crease can become mired down 
in the governmental hierarchy 
due to the lack of funding.
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crisis (that is to say between 2008 and 2010). During this period dismissals 
took place predominantly in the private sector, and as a consequence, the share 
of the public sector in the total employment figures even rose in a number of 
member states, at least statistically (Anxo et al., 2013). Since 2010, however, 
packages of fiscal restraints impacted on the public sector directly.
Due to the external pressure exercised by foreign investors, various Euro-
pean member states applied for help to the “troika” (made up of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Com-
mission).4 In exchange for the financial bail-outs governments offered severe 
austerity packages in order to curb the expenses of the central budget. Given 
that a really important part of this derives from the public sector’s employ-
ment costs (salary and other), it was not surprising that the primary and im-
mediate effects of these measures were wage freezes, wage cuts and layoffs in 
the sector. Additionally, these fiscal restriction packages in some cases con-
tained dispositions designed exclusively to limit the scope and influence of 
the social dialogue (Ghellab and Papadakis, 2011, p. 85).
At the same time, this “wave of restrictions” had a negative impact on the 
public sector (as far as its employment, salaries and the role in the social dia-
logue are concerned) even in those member states such as Poland where the 
effects of the crisis had less of an impact compared to other member states 
which required external help. The spread of austerity measures was stimulat-
ed by two factors: on the one hand, in recent years low state spending on the 
public sector became the main benchmark of the “fitness and healthiness” of 
the state (Anxo et al., 2013). On the other hand, in 2011 the stability and 
growth pact was replaced by the Euro Plus Pact that contains much stricter 
regulations. Only four member states opted out of the new agreement: Swe-
den, the UK, Hungary and the Czech Republic (Bach and Stroleny, 2013).5
Before turning our attention to the crisis reactions it is worth highlighting 
the fact that traditionally trade unions are stronger in the public sector than 
in other sectors of the economy though union density has fallen remarkably 
since the beginning of the crisis. While Glassner (2010) using data from 2003 
found that trade union density was not higher in the public sector than in 
other sectors only in 2 member states, a more recent report of the European 
Commission (using different data sets from between 2009 and 2012) indi-
cated 6 member states where union density is equal in the public sector and 
in other sectors of the economy and 3 where it was actually lower (EC, 2013, 
p. 44, chart 1.11).6
The easiest way to reduce wage expenses of the public sector is by reducing 
its workforce. Naturally, there are many different ways to complete this task. 
One of the most widespread procedures is by not filling vacancies. This was 
used for instance in France where only one vacancy was made available for 
each two persons leaving the public sector. A much more drastic “exchange 
4 In 2008 Hungary, Romania 
and Latvia, in 2009 Greece, Por-
tugal and Ireland, in 2010 Spain 
and finally in 2011 Cyprus.
5 It might be mentioned that 
the wave of austerity reached 
the administration of the EU 
with a surprising delay only in 
2012. Also this happened only 
thanks to the sustained personal 
pressure of the English Prime 
Minister David Cameron. As a 
result a 10% restriction on the 
EU bureaucracy was agreed to 
be implemented during the fis-
cal period of 2014–2020. Natu-
rally, employees contested with 
strikes.
6 The countries of the Glass-
ner study are Belgium and the 
Czech Republic. And those of 
the EC report are: Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Hungary, the Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia and Belgium 
in the former category and the 
Czech Republic, Poland and 
Estonia in the latter.
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rate” was offered in Greece where first a 1 to 5 rate was agreed, later modified 
to 1 to 10. Incidentally this latter exchange rate also applies to many areas of 
the Spanish public sector (EC, 2013, p. 142).
Another way is to allocate “surplus” labour into a “reserve force” as a first 
action. Besides being a direct income reduction for the employee concerned, 
this also means that if a new workplace cannot be found for the individual 
within a limited time period their eventual dismissal becomes possible. Such 
a solution was planned in Greece affecting some 15,000 employees, though 
in the end the measure was never implemented (EC, 2013, p. 142).
Thirdly, headcount reduction can be completed through outsourcing and 
privatization. “Internal externalization” is a special instance of this. Such a 
process happens when a public sector employee, holding a protected employ-
ment status (which implies a higher degree of job security and correspondingly 
a more advantageous position), is replaced by an employee having a private 
sector contract (for instance, instead of a public servant an employee is hired 
according to private sector labour regulations). In the French public service, 
even before the crisis, it had become common to hire employees using vari-
ous contracts under the private sector law rather than employing them in ac-
cordance with status based legal dispositions of the fonction publique. In other 
words the private sector’s labour conditions had been “smuggled” through this 
process behind the safety barriers of the public sector (Audier et al., 2012). 
Instead of a replacement it is also possible that the legal position of the given 
employee is transformed though this has much higher transactional costs.
Finally, work force reduction could also mean effective dismissals that, no 
doubt, also entail high expenses, whether we speak about severance payments 
accompanying dismissals or early retirement (Public…, 2010).7 It must be em-
phasized that layoffs in the public sector affected mainly those working in 
administration and in management. Also in various countries the most af-
fected were those with a fixed-term contract due to the possibility of refus-
ing renewal (EC, 2013).
Freezing wages has a great potential in political communication: it sends 
the message to voters that the otherwise privileged public sector employees 
also share the burdens of the crisis. A wage freeze, however, does not necessar-
ily mean a real worsening of the public sector employees’ wage position. This 
may be the result of the fact that only freezing the pay scales does not exclude 
the effective wage increase of a given employee. Firstly, because the employee 
can advance on the job ladder, and secondly, because seniority related wage 
development can also take place. So it is not so surprising that many member 
states opted to implement this measure.
A more drastic expense cutting measure is to cut wages. This generally trig-
gers wide-scale refusal by trade unions who usually argue that public employ-
ees are not to be blamed for either the unfolding of the crisis or for its delayed 
7 This can impact heavily on 
the pensions systems. In 2010 
in Portugal so many people re-
quested pre-retirement that the 
government had to suspend the 
whole pre-retirement program.
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effects (EC, 2013 p. 150). These wage cuts mainly targeted those extra ben-
efits that are unusual in the private sector (such as the 13th and 14th month 
salary and other social and fringe benefits). At the same time, in some mem-
ber states the lowest earners were excluded from the negative effects of a wage 
decrease (EC, 2013). Such positive discrimination was implemented in Ire-
land, Italy and in the UK. It is interesting that on many occasions decisions 
on dismissals and wage freezes/cuts entered into force with considerable delay, 
there was even a case where an austerity package was implemented according 
to the original plan only following the national elections.
Reforms of the wage setting systems
Prior to the crisis, in various member states the ongoing reforms were driving 
the given state’s wage determination systems closer to the model dominated 
by collective bargaining. This process originally started in the 1970s when 
Finland changed its unilateral wage setting system and established one based 
on collective agreements (EC, 2013, p. 39). A move in the same direction can 
be observed in the Spanish reforms of 1984, in the reforms of 1993 in Italy, 
and also in the one in 1998 in Portugal (Anxo et al., 2013). The appreciation 
of negotiations could also be observed in the expansion of the European lev-
el sectoral social dialogue with the inclusion of 4 areas of the public sector: 
local and regional public administration (in 2004) hospitals and healthcare 
(in 2006), education (in 2010) and central public administration (also in 
2010). These committees, formed after lengthy negotiations between 2004 
and 2011, permit trade unions and employer representation organizations of 
the different sectors to engage in direct negotiations. Additionally, immedi-
ately before the crisis these forums were looking for ways to extend and thus 
upgrade even further the traditionally bilateral relation in this sector via the 
inclusion of other stakeholders, such as users for instance (EC, 2013, p. 144).
The majority of EU member states’ governments acted in a prompt and de-
termined manner to counterbalance the impacts of the crisis. One of the side 
effects of the immediate reactions was that governments ignored the tradi-
tional channels of social dialogue (Anxo et al., 2013). Therefore, the role of 
the government in wage setting and thus unilateralism has increased, while 
social dialogue began to decline. Glassner (2010) already lists 10 member states 
where crisis reactions made governments take unilateral decisions on salaries 
in the public sector. Also, this approach to set wages unilaterally as a response 
to the crisis reached beyond the original group of countries that had used hy-
brid wage setting systems, for instance and now also includes the UK, which 
had previously used, almost exclusively, collective agreements to set wages.
Despite this in some of those countries hardest hit by the crisis agreements 
were forged within the framework of social dialogue. However at least in the 
Lithuanian and Hungarian cases analysts cast doubts on how meaningful and 
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real these negotiations were (Glassner, 2010). Only Ireland was an exception 
to this tendency. There, within the framework of a nationwide accord called 
the Cork Park Agreement parties agreed on a 4 year framework for action. 
Thanks to the agreement actual dismissals were avoided through a strict “no 
replacement” measure that ruled out the possibility of opening new vacan-
cies, while wages were frozen too (EC, 2013, p. 145). It must be highlight-
ed though that the above mentioned is only a pale imitation of those social 
pacts that were characteristic of Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s – the scope 
of the Cork Park Agreement was obviously limited to the public sector. The 
strength of the agreement was also put into question by the Irish Federation 
of University Teachers when it refused to sign it. Another warning sign was 
seen when, in 2009, the biggest employer association, IBEC (Irish Business and 
Employer Confederation), left the national wage negotiations and suggested 
its members carry on with consultations at local level. By the middle of 2013 
even its last supporter, the government, backed out of the Cork Park Agree-
ment and started to sign bilateral agreements with a series of trade unions 
of the public sector within the new framework of the public sector stability 
agreement (2013–2016) better known as the Haddington Road Agreement. 
The government opted for this solution once negotiations of a Croke Park II 
Agreement became stranded thus making it impossible to come up with sec-
tor wide accord. Nonetheless only three trade unions, working in the area of 
education, declined to sign one of these bilateral agreements (Sheehan, 2013).
Unfortunately, European level social dialogue in the public sector failed to 
play any prominent role in managing crisis driven conflicts of interests. From 
the four sectoral social dialogue committees, only two: the one on municipali-
ties and the other on central government were able to come up with something 
and this was only a joint statement on the crisis (EC, 2013, pp. 109–110).
Three main crisis related tendencies can be observed in the field of social 
dialogue (Bach and Stroleny, 2013). Firstly, many governments responded 
with restriction, primarily in member states where social dialogue had no deep 
historical roots. In some EU member states this restriction included the sus-
pension of nationwide social dialogue. This led in some cases to protests and 
demonstrations and also to the decentralisation of social dialogue from the 
blocked governmental level to local and sectoral levels. This process can be 
observed clearly in the case of the Netherlands and also in Italy, though in 
these cases government interference was less drastic than in others.
The second tendency was a move in the direction of flexibility. This process 
produced some positive outcomes predominantly in member states where legal 
dispositions require joint consultation. It was this requirement that opened 
the channel that social partners could use to debate issues that traditionally 
were addressed at the central (higher) negotiation level. Although this was 
a positive consequence it must be mentioned that the results mostly served 
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the interests of the employers, as issues like outsourcing, flexibility and rising 
service quality, were overrepresented in the final outcome.
Finally, governments could also try to reform the system of the social dia-
logue as such. One of these reforms was implemented successfully in Den-
mark. Here the municipality level of the social dialogue was reinforced with 
a permanent forum that works with the participation of the elected chief ne-
gotiators even between the collective negotiation rounds. Another example 
is the Bercy agreement in France (which entered into force in 2011 with the 
exception of local governments where it applies only from 2014). The agree-
ment, which imported solutions from the private sector’s labour relations, 
tied representativeness of the trade unions directly to workplace level elec-
tions and extended the scope of the collective negotiations (to include issues 
of working conditions, career and training among other new topics). At the 
same time however, collective agreements in the public sector did not became 
legally enforceable so those parts of the unilateral system that benefited the 
state remained intact (Tissandier, 2010).
In Italy the Brunetta-reforms (2009–2011) must be mentioned, which 
had the specific aim of raising the efficiency of the Italian state bureaucracy. 
Named after the Minister of Public Service and Innovation, Mr Brunetta, the 
reform package changed the system of the wages (from one which was sen-
iority based to one production based) and made it possible to dismiss work-
ers from the public sector. The implementation of the reform was completely 
unilateral; the opinion of the trade unions was ignored as much during the 
preparatory phase as during the implementation of the reform itself. As a 
consequence of the changes it became possible to make wage decisions relat-
ed to the state bureaucracy without any involvement of the trade unions. In 
addition the agency (Agenzia per la Rappresenttanza Negoziale delle Pubbli-
che Amministrazioni, ARAN) representing the state as the employer in wage 
negotiations was reorganized. All these actions resulted in strong resistance 
from the trade unions. In the end, mainly as a result of the impossibility of 
creating a unified workplace level trade union structure (which the reform 
also aimed at) and also because of the political changes at national level, it 
became inevitable to initiate negotiations with the trade unions (Rinolfi and 
Paparella, 2008, DellaTorre, 2008). In May 2012, the agreement, signed with 
the participation of the municipalities, modified in various aspects the original 
Brunetta-reforms, which was a clear success for the trade unions (Sanz, 2011).
Along with differences in member state specific responses to the crisis, there 
were clearly observable topic related differences too. Strict restrictions were 
common in “hard” questions (such as wages and salaries) while on “softer” is-
sues a posture closer to flexibility was permitted to govern. As a conclusion, 
however, it must be stated that in numerous member states changes were 
contrary to the dynamics that had prevailed in the labour relations of their 
in focus
156
public sectors before the crisis. (Furthermore, as the Italian example shows, 
the opposite of the contrary to the previous direction might even material-
ise as the winning resolution.) As far as the transformation of the social dia-
logue is concerned both decentralization and centralization can be observed 
as growing in importance. As indicated above the “negotiation avoiding” be-
haviour of the central government greatly helped the decentralization, up-
grading the regional and municipality level social dialogue. Notwithstand-
ing, it is a fact too that public sector dismissals first affected those employed 
in a flexible contractual way, and as a result the share of the workforce with 
a better job security has risen. This of course, permits a higher centralization 
in wage negotiations.
Conclusions
The public sectors of EU member states can be located in between the two 
fundamental end points of some dimensions of a continuum. The oppos-
ing poles are usually described in Prussian-Napoleonic vs. Anglo-Saxon civil 
law tradition terms as far as the legal model of employment relationship is 
concerned; unilateral vs. collective bargaining in terms of wage setting and 
finally in dimension of the role the state playes as the employer: sovereign vs. 
role-model employer. At the same time each member state’s public sector is 
a particular. It is a country specific mixture of these approaches whereas em-
ployees employed according to different models work together, sometimes 
directly in the same workplace. Yet, these country specific resolutions of the 
member states are really similar in many ways.
This duality, similarity and divergence, was characteristic of the crisis driven 
transformations in all segments of the public sector. There was a great simi-
larity among the various state’s responses, moreover the harder the economic 
pressure on a country resulted in a higher similarity in the austerity measures 
implemented. Meanwhile the possibility and viability to execute the proposed 
measures, again, varied greatly among the member states. There were member 
states where a unilateral state position was possible and others where it pro-
duced such resistance (in the form of strikes and protests) that it could not be 
implemented successfully. Furthermore there were examples (as in the case of 
Germany and Austria) where, even though unilateralism is the legally codi-
fied way of procedure, it did not became necessary to ignore and exclude the 
opinion of the social partners in addressing the crisis. Moreover, the domi-
nance of the unilateral state approach was independent of the established le-
gal model of employment, of the traditional form of wage setting and also of 
the role the state usually plays as an employer. Apparently, an early statement 
of Marsden (1994, p. 17, cited by Grimshaw et  al., 2012b) still applies. Ac-
cording to this, unilateral wage setting may help states to reach the desired 
fiscal objectives effectively. However a process of the wage setting mechanism 
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involving employers and trade unions is a “much more flexible tool for legiti-
mating changes”. In other words the risk of immediate fiscal control is the 
conflict between employers and employees. Also, the sustainability of wage 
reforms presupposes employees’ approval too.
In any event, it is thought-provoking to consider how the European Un-
ion and also the majority of its member states, so proud of their institutes of 
social dialogue, could ignore in a such a uniform manner all those resources 
which have been invested in the building up of the institutional structure of 
the social dialogue. Furthermore, they did so, just at the moment when these 
institutions could have demonstrated their efficiency in these critical times.
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3.5 Privatisation of municipal services, outsourcing  
and in-sourcing efforts and their employment impacts  
in the European Union countries and Hungary*
László Neumann & Márk Edelényi
In December 2012 some unusual news appeared in daily newspapers regard-
ing a “strike” at the public transportation company of a Hungarian town. 
At dawn on a Monday morning one third of the bus drivers refused to start 
work, therefore many bus lines were not operating during the morning peak 
hours. The director of the company alluded to a coup attempt, suggesting 
that although bus drivers were citing the technical condition of buses, their 
refusing to work was in fact due to their wage claims. The trade union leader’s 
statement, of course, immediately rebutted this assumption. By the end of 
January 2013, the news reported that the trade union leader, who had long 
been protesting because of the condition of the buses, was laid off, the com-
pany justifying it through a loss of trust. The trade union took legal action 
against the unlawful dismissal. A report in mid-February 2013 revealed that 
a police investigation was underway for “disturbing the operation of works 
of public interest “. In his statement the town’s mayor promised full support 
to the company director who had gone to the police, calling it unacceptable 
that the town’s life should be paralyzed by a wildcat strike that no one could 
prepare for.1
The case gained nationwide publicity and exposes, to some extent, a field 
of industrial relations which has so far received little attention in studies: the 
specificities of the municipality-owned enterprises sector. Coincidentally, half 
a year before the above-mentioned case we had actually conducted interviews 
at the company in question in the framework of an international research pro-
ject2 and could not detect any signs of the coming conflict. Therefore we will 
return to the case at the end of the present sub-chapter and attempt to give 
an explanation as to the developments that ensued in the meantime.
The original field research, conducted in the framework of an international 
research project, took place in two country towns that provide a wide range 
of public services, involving the private sector and church institutions in dif-
ferent ways (Berki et al, 2012). The two towns, differing in size, were indebt-
ed to different degrees and party politics appeared differently in their lives. 
In both towns we conducted interviews with the heads of the municipality 
and its institutions/companies, as well as interest representation organisa-
tions – wherever they existed. In both places we focused on five service ar-
eas: public transportation, geriatric care, provision of school meals, cleaning 
and waste management. Hereby we would like to thank our interviewees for 
their cooperation.
* The authors would like to thank 
Erika Steiner (National Fed-
eration of Local Governments, 
TÖOSZ) for her help with the 
research.
1 The news reports appeared in 
the local media, national news-
papers and at the Hungarian 
News Agency. Unfortunately 
we have to omit the exact refer-
ences and verbatim quotations 
for the sake of anonymity which 
we must ensure for every inter-
viewee who participated in the 
research.
2 The research project “Public 
sector pay and social dialogue 
during the fiscal crisis” covered 
five countries (France, Germany, 
Hungary, Sweden and the Unit-
ed Kingdom) and was funded 
by the European Commission 
(VS/2011/0141), Research co-
ordinator: Damian Grimshaw, 
Manchester Business School 
(Grimshaw, Rubery and Mari-
ano, 2012). This chapter builds 
greatly on the results of the re-
search gained both in Hungary 
and internationally.
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In line with the practice of New Public Management (NPM), described 
in Chapter 3.3 of the current volume, an increasing part of municipal public 
services are provided – in various structures – by private or non-profit organi-
sations, and the disintegration of sharp divisions between sectors can be seen. 
The first part of the sub-chapter provides a brief overview of the motives be-
hind outsourcing and in-sourcing, (public) procurement, its prevalence and 
regulation, as well as its impact on the labour market in some of the EU mem-
ber states. The second part attempts to map the relevant Hungarian experi-
ence – the starting point being the specificities of management, service provi-
sion and interest reconciliation in the Hungarian municipal system –, giving 
a description of interests and counter-interests that are behind organisational 
changes. Finally, we will take two case studies to illustrate the employment 
impact of outsourcing and re-municipalisation, as well as the involvement of 
the church in service provision. Our article focuses mainly on labour market 
segmentation and the transition between various employment statuses, so 
many other parts of the topic will have to be covered in outline only.
Municipalities’ crisis reactions and outsourcing in some EU 
member states
a) The impact of austerity measures at the level of municipalities. An ILO study 
(Vaughan-Whitehead, 2012) exploring European crisis reactions, and more 
closely the adjustment of the public sector, between 2008–2010, distinguishes 
between quantitative measures (redundancies, wage freeze and wage cuts) and 
structural reforms. Differences among countries in this respect are significant: 
while in Greece or Portugal it was necessary to significantly reduce the size 
of the public sector, other countries – such as the UK or the Netherlands – 
chose a combination of two adjustment approaches: in the case of some pub-
lic services the responsibility of provision was decentralized and delegated to 
the municipalities. In many countries the direction of structural changes was 
privatisation, outsourcing, purchasing services from the private sector – that 
is processes that began with the New Public Management (NPM) (see sub-
chapter 3.3) have been bolstered. According to OECD data, calculated on 
the basis of the national accounts, the total volume of buying services from 
the private sector between 2007 and 2010 increased on average from 12% of 
the GDP to 13%. In Holland, Finland and Canada particularly significant 
increases were registered. Hungarian figures are close to the average but show 
an approximately 1% decrease (OECD, 2013).
Research on the reactions to the crisis focused initially on national respons-
es (see sub-chapter 3.4) and only the most recent studies have come to study 
the level of municipalities. This is despite the fact that a considerable element 
of public services are provided in the framework of municipalities, therefore 
budgetary constraints introduced after the onset of the crisis appeared most-
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ly at this level. Our topic requires that we address the economic autonomy 
of municipalities and local systems of wage agreements and interest recon-
ciliation channels (Leisink et al., 2013). While the wide range of municipal 
services is very similar in different countries, there are significant differenc-
es as to the division of labour among governmental levels and the financial 
approaches applied; therefore there are considerable differences with respect 
to the financial autonomy of local governments. OECD data show that the 
proportion of transfers from the central budget (subsidies, shared taxes, etc.) 
is high in the United Kingdom (70%) and in Hungary (59%); it is smaller in 
France (29%), in Germany (18% in the constituent states and 35% at the level 
of municipalities) and Sweden (24%).3 The order of course is reversed when 
looking at the proportion of local taxes and other revenues.
Depending on their fiscal autonomy, local governments can decide about 
how to react to the austerity measures introduced by the central government. 
They may choose to reform the local tax system, shrink the range of services 
they provide, or – under some circumstances – it can be the opposite: they 
may be prompted to experiment with a “countercyclical policy”, to amelio-
rate the impacts of the economic crisis by increasing wages or concluding out-
sourcing contracts on better terms, etc. – thus endangering the implementa-
tion of the central government’s budgetary goals. In the absence of autonomy, 
however, municipalities may be instructed or impelled – by changing politi-
cal and economic conditions – to curb their services, investments, employ-
ment level and, if possible, increase taxes. Such reforms may be followed by 
what is called the vision of the “Big Society” (UK), which encourages citi-
zens’ self-reliance, volunteer activities and the involvement of not-for-profit 
organisations (Bach, 2012). In welfare states settlements with a greater pro-
portion of low-paid or unemployed inhabitants are more affected by subsidy 
cuts, as they are more dependent on targeted subsidies for the disadvantaged 
sections of the population. In the United Kingdom these include a large part 
of centrally provided subsidies, which the current administration decreased 
by 25% on average, while in the poorest locations central support dropped 
by 72% (Grimshaw, Rubery and Mariano, 2012). If the central government 
cuts support for local governments, while also delegating to them the respon-
sibility for service provision, there will be strong pressure at the local level to 
organise services more efficiently.
All this must have an impact on the employment of those providing public 
services locally. In their paper Leisink et al. (2013) sum up the conclusions of 
another international research project, where case studies were conducted in 
three countries (Italy, the Netherlands, United Kingdom), describing two mu-
nicipalities in each country, exploring industrial relations at municipal level in 
the wake of the crisis and examining if they are similar or different in the case 
of the municipalities studied. When austerity measures reach the level of mu-
3 2011 data, source: OECD Fis-
cal Decentralization Database, 
Table 17. 
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nicipalities then interest reconciliation channels prove to be an important fac-
tor: whether there is a sectoral or local forum of social dialogue, whether trade 
unions are strong or not, and the level of institutionalization, all play a role.
From this point of view institutions in Italy and the Netherlands are strong, 
whereas in the UK they do not really have a place in the liberal economic mod-
el. Despite the traditional dual-level collective bargaining, municipalities in 
Italy, for instance overrode the central government’s unilateral decision on 
a wage freeze, while in the Netherlands interest representation bodies of lo-
cal governments drew on a 1994 law to retain their entitlement to conclude 
collective agreements in the face of pressure from the central government to 
implement a wage freeze. In the United Kingdom, however, municipalities 
were able to exempt themselves from the scope of national wage bargaining – 
in the few areas, that is, where they had such a role. Thus in the Netherlands 
and the UK municipalities and trade unions had a legitimate scope of action 
against the central will, while in Italy the unilateral government decision on 
wages allowed no such opportunity. In the latter case, however, municipalities’ 
financial potentials were decisive and the fairly wealthy local governments ne-
gotiated employment terms without formal authorization as well. So despite 
the fact that fiscal constraints in the three countries prompted municipalities 
to act, the implementation of restrictions at the local level was determined by 
national intermediary institutions and the structure of the local government 
– thanks in main to their autonomy vis-à-vis the central government and the 
institutions of social dialogue. Thus local governments and employee repre-
sentation bodies had some freedom in deciding how to react to the central 
austerity measures. There were, however, significant differences within the 
countries, and therefore the differences despite a similar institutional set-up 
suggest that the strategies and decisions of local actors also had an impact.
b) Decisions on outsourcing, labour market regulation and the role of inter-
est representation. The extensive body of literature on privatisation and out-
sourcing decisions generally emphasizes two main labour market factors: the 
public sector’s wage advantage over the private sector and the different in-
fluence in interest representation (works council entitlements or the trade 
unions’ bargaining power). The latter is usually weaker in the private sector, 
which is evidenced by the rough indicator of trade union density. The wage 
advantage of the public sector is typically considerable in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, therefore in these countries there is a possibility to decrease costs 
by restraining wages; no wonder this approach was mostly emphasized in the 
Anglo-Saxon studies. Large wage gaps provide a strong impetus for outsourc-
ing low-wage jobs, especially in times of austerity. Obviously, wherever wage 
differences are smaller or of the opposite direction, then it can hardly be the 
main motivating factor.
Public-private gaps
(eg. pay, collective bargaining coverage,
trade union representation)
Employment status
& organisational form
(eg. ownership structure; legal employment
status; public sector control, share of revenues)
Employment protection
& minimum wage rules
(eg. TUPE, social clause [prevailing wage], minimum
wage, consultation rights, unfair dismissal rights)
Procurement
policy
&
practice
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Grimshaw, Rubery and Mariano (2012) suggest that beside wage differ-
ences and the strength of interest representation, a third factor also plays an 
important role the different levels of legal protection of employees in the two 
sectors, whether it concerns the status of civil servants or other public sec-
tor employment statuses (non-civil servant). The difference in employees’ le-
gal protection within the public sector manifests itself in labour market seg-
mentation as well: in differences concerning employees’ remuneration, access 
to promotions and job security. These three factors of course carry different 
weight from country to country when it comes to decisions about outsourc-
ing (see: Figure 3.5.1).
Figure 3.5.1: Procurement policy and the labour market
Source: Grimshaw, Rubery and Mariano (2012).
Decision-making is further complicated by two additional factors. On the one 
hand service provision often does not take place in pure community or private 
frameworks but in a varied combination of ownership structures: there may 
be countless variations for this from 100% privately owned, profit-oriented 
companies to 100% publicly owned, not-for-profit enterprises.4
On the other hand, beside the consequential external and internal labour 
market segregations, other aspects are taken into account when consider-
ing outsourcing. These may include regulations about the transition, most 
prominently the regulations concerning transfer of undertakings and wag-
es following the outsourcing (for more details see later). These regulations 
differ from country to country and if they prove effective, then they make 
the transition to outsourcing a smoother process and alleviate the impact of 
the consequential labour market segmentation. Decisions about outsourc-
ing seek to be sensitive to the specificities of the service concerned, while re-
acting sensitively to financial constraints and the legal regulations related to 
(public) procurement. The choice of organisational form is influenced by the 
4 In an extreme case, for in-
stance, the municipality con-
tracts the self-employed, keep-
ing its de facto control over 
service providers. It is a typical 
decision in many countries to 
use an enterprise with the mu-
nicipality having majority own-
ership, thus retaining control 
over the operation, which may 
also be a source of income and 
may provide the opportunity to 
circumvent the headcount limi-
tation in the public sector, while 
applying employment regula-
tions valid for the private sector.
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VAT regulations as well. In Germany, for example, VAT is applicable where 
the local government is participating in service provision, which is a way to 
encourage decisions towards favouring the private sector. At the same time 
acquiring investment sources is another important incentive for outsourcing, 
while the establishment of municipal enterprises is justified by the revenues 
generated by the sale of shares, which is a way to decrease debts.
In France there is some pressure to in-source, which is, in all likelihood, due 
to the disappointment at the obscure, uncontrollably complicated organisa-
tional structure and the great costs and low quality of previously outsourced 
services. The decision to outsource/contract a private provider thus – accord-
ing to the literature – is the result of decisions made on the basis of various 
viewpoints, and not only a reaction to price signals.
Outsourcing decisions are by no means exempt from ideological aspects – 
political motives play a role too. In the United Kingdom it is essentially up 
to the municipalities to decide how they cope with the cuts in subsidies from 
the central budget, while they have to retain the responsibility of service pro-
vision. In connection with geriatric care, for instance, they often had to cut 
the fees of outsourced services, laid down in the contracts, meaning they had 
no choice but to economize at the cost of service quality. On top of that, the 
current government is encouraging outsourcing by financial means as well, 
as local governments may apply for funding if they involve the private sector. 
Therefore every new school is built in such a setting without any real super-
vision of municipalities. Joint financial structures of the public and private 
sectors are encouraged in the entire municipal sector, not least for the pur-
pose of decreasing the amount of recorded debts within local governments 
and the employment level in the public sector.
c) Interaction between regulation and outsourcing practices. The appearance of 
private sector actors in the provision of public services raises the question of 
interaction between different labour market regimes, including the nature of 
labour market segmentation and the possibility of a regulation to prevent the 
emergence of considerable differences between the two sectors. A general pre-
sumption is that employees working in jobs outsourced to the private sector 
receive lower wages, their promotions lack predictability, and they are more 
exposed to changes in market demand, therefore additionally making their 
jobs more at risk. This logically follows from the fact that the goal of outsourc-
ing is to ensure more efficient work for lower pay and/or more flexible working 
conditions. Experience shows, however, that this is not always the case. Our 
first counter-example is not about outsourcing to the private sector, it is only 
about organisational decentralization. During the reforms of the 2000’s in 
France, as many as 128,000 employees (mainly primary school teachers) were 
transferred to the municipalities. Most of them accepted this move voluntar-
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ily in the hope of better payment conditions, as the municipalities’ scope for 
action was greater despite the fact that salaries – as determined by the civil 
servants’ pay scale – were lower than those set in the central pay scales.
It is also an experience in France that in-sourced employees usually lose their 
benefits in-kind that they are entitled to in the private sector, such as the sup-
plementary health insurance, and those other benefits that the works council 
at the private enterprise have achieved. Having returned to the public sector, 
they constantly suffer disadvantages compared to those employees with long-
term employment in public service. Although their salaries are unchanged 
following their transfer later on they are excluded from seniority-based pay 
rises because their years spent in the private sectors are only partially taken 
into consideration. All this explain why employees and their trade unions are 
reluctant to support in-sourcing. An in-depth study revealed that interest rep-
resentation bodies always consider the conditions of the concrete transition 
and its expected outcome when deciding whether to support or oppose the 
proposed changes (Audier et al., 2012).
The study conducted by Grimshaw et al. found that of the four Western 
European countries there are only two where the outsourced private sector 
offers lower wages: Germany and the United Kingdom. In Germany, how-
ever, this difference is decreasing following the introduction of a new lower 
tariff category (see later) in the public sector and the minimum wage in cer-
tain services, while in the UK the collective agreement concluded with the 
local governments may improve the situation. In France the situation is simi-
lar, although the private sector allows longer working hours and greater work 
intensity, while in Sweden the collective agreement is applicable in each sec-
tor. Trade union reactions to outsourcing correspond to wage considerations. 
There is no resistance in France and Sweden, but there is general opposition 
from the trade unions in Germany (because of worse working conditions and 
because there are no guarantees warranting the application of the collective 
agreement) and in the United Kingdom (due to less favourable working con-
ditions and the loss of pension entitlement).
The transition is tempered by the regulation of the relevant public service 
act, insofar as it may maintain status change over time, for instance by apply-
ing the more flexible conditions of the private sector to the new employees 
only. This is what happened in Germany, where in the 1990s the transfer of 
employees with a civil servant status led to complicated legal problems because 
they sought to both keep their special legal position and also facilitate the ap-
plication of the wage setting mechanisms and working conditions of the pri-
vate sector. Similarly, in France, when state-owned companies were privatized 
– e.g. in telecommunications and the electricity industry – employees who had 
already been employed were able to keep their status based on a separate law 
and the conditions pertaining to the private sector only applied to newcomers.
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Transition between the two sectors, and competition among labour regimes 
may be moderated by more general regulations as well: a relatively high min-
imum wage, the rules concerning the transfer of undertakings, the law on 
the prevailing wage, the extension of collective agreements and social claus-
es added to the outsourcing contract – the practices differ from country to 
country (Schulten and Brandt, 2012). A high national minimum wage may 
imply a lower limit in the wage competition (especially in those countries 
and sectors, where the proportion of low-paid employees is relatively high). 
The connection between the minimum wage and the wage regulations in the 
public sector is also interesting, especially when the minimum wage catches 
up with the lower wage categories of the public sector pay scale as a result of 
the faster rise of the former.
Of course the reforms of the public sector may result in a decreasing differ-
ence between the two sectors if pay and employment are made more flexible. 
There are reforms with the opposite intentions as well, such as the overhaul-
ing of the tariff agreements in the public sector in Germany in 2005, when 
a new, lower wage category was introduced for “extremely simple activities” 
(einfachste Tätigkeiten) that in Hungary would be called unskilled labour re-
quiring no qualifications. The new tariff was introduced explicitly to ensure 
that wage differences do not necessarily lead to outsourcing. Its reception was 
quite controversial even in trade union circles (as the goal of job protection 
clashed with the principle of fair wages) and there is no convincing evidence 
that it successfully prevented outsourcing (Bosch et al., 2012). Examples of 
more successful interest representation are connected mainly to consulta-
tions preceding concrete decisions of outsourcing or in-sourcing. In France 
it was trade unions, while in Germany the works council, that were able to 
intervene proactively, partly using formal channels (e.g. at local governments’ 
committee meetings preparing economic decisions, where they are regularly 
heard) or through informal ones (that is, through their political channels) 
(Grimshaw, Rubery and Mariano, 2012).
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) – “a change in the 
person of the employer”, as the new Hungarian Labour Code terms it – have 
been regulated by EU’s TUPE directives since 1977; however, there are great 
differences between countries as to their interpretation and the protection 
they ensure. For instance some countries allow employees to “refuse” “auto-
matic” continuation of the employment relationship at the new company, in 
which case the rules that apply are those related to the termination by the 
employer. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the application of the direc-
tive ensures only a relatively small degree of protection. Although the gov-
ernment has included in the regulation the right “to refuse” it did so in a way 
that there would be practically no legal consequences if those rights were 
to be infringed (Hartzen et al., 2008, citation by Grimshaw, Rubery and 
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Mariano, 2012, p. 70). Refusal practically entails resignation but it does not 
entitle employees to any kind of compensation, there is no protection against 
an unlawful procedure. (The Hungarian regulations in the market sector are 
basically on these lines.) In these countries there is no guarantee for the long-
term maintenance of employment, while elsewhere the successor (transferee) 
employer is obliged to maintain employment for a certain period of time: for 
15 months in France and 12 months in Germany and Sweden.
The application of social (employment) clauses stipulating equal treatment 
in the context of outsourcing contracts was introduced by a 1949 ILO con-
vention.5 The ruling of the European Court of Justice on the Rüffert case in 
2008 concluded that the employment clauses in contracts with private en-
terprises restrict competition, which practically determines the European 
Commission’s stand as well.
The practice of the extension of collective agreements including wage tar-
iffs also differs from country to country. Nowadays they are widely applied 
in the German constituent states. In North Rhine-Westphalia – where case 
studies for the research were conducted – the first law regulating wages in 
the course of outsourcing was passed in 2002 (Schulten et al., 2012).6 They 
were later abolished after the governmental change in 2006 – when the red-
green alliance was replaced by the CDU/FDP. The new government argued 
that they did not fulfil their goals effectively enough. In 2008, a law in Lower 
Saxony, similar to the above-mentioned Rüffert decision, led to the reappraisal 
of contractual clauses on wages. However, in 2010–2011 a new wave of leg-
islation on “prevailing” wages (Tariftreuegesetz) swept through the constitu-
ent states, which complied with the requirements of the European Court of 
Justice. Their essence is that during outsourcing entrepreneurs in the private 
sector should comply with wage tariffs included in collective agreements, pro-
vided the agreement has been extended to the entire sector.
In the United Kingdom, however, there are examples of the voluntarily ap-
plication of the standards common in the public sector, when – at the initiative 
of local governments and trade unions – certain employers apply the wages 
common in the public sector without any legal or contractual pressure. An 
example for such an initiative is the so-called living wage in London, which 
tracks living costs that are far above the average, its main supporter being the 
city’s mayor (Grimshaw, Rubery and Mariano, 2012).
Outsourcing and in-sourcing of municipal services in Hungary
a) Local governments’ system and economic management. In the West Euro-
pean countries rather different local government systems have been evolved, 
depending on the size of the country, the local traditions and the level of 
economic development. Despite recent convergence in the level of econom-
ic development and of cohesion efforts of the EU, there have remained sub-
5 Convention No. 94 – Hungary 
did not ratify this convention.
6 At this point about half of 
the German constituent states 
applied similar laws, mainly 
for construction works and in 
public transportation, but their 
scope was extended to other ser-
vices as well.
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stantial differences in terms of the number of local governments, autonomy 
of municipalities and the division of tasks between various governance levels. 
We cannot enter into a detailed discussion due to limited space, and the fol-
lowing presentation of features of the Hungarian local government system 
will also necessarily remain sketchy. The principle “one settlement–one lo-
cal administration” became established in Hungary in the 1990s. The Local 
Government Act assigns the responsibility of provision of a wide spectrum of 
mandatory services (public education, health care and social welfare servic-
es, maintenance of the local infrastructure, environmental protection, social 
housing, fire services, public safety, etc.) to local governments – regardless of 
their largely varying size in terms of population and economic power. At the 
same time they are given a free hand to determine the organizational frame-
work of service provision and how to spend their own revenue. The “Hungar-
ian model” resembles the Mediterranean one with respect to its fragmented 
nature, and is similar to the Scandinavian system in terms of the wide range 
of local government functions (Vigvári, 2011).
Despite the existing legal framework providing for strong decentralization, 
centralization occurred from the early 1990s, mainly as a result of fiscal in-
centives. Local administrations’ own revenues are generally modest, primar-
ily based on revenues from property sales, local business tax and top-down 
income tax distributions, a system which has generated considerable finan-
cial disparity among local administrations. This has led to the state periodi-
cally intervening to provide uniform per capita support for mandatory ser-
vices, development subsidies and by reorganizing the tax system. In order to 
guarantee their continuing functioning, local administrations that are “in a 
disadvantaged situation through no fault of their own” – are entitled to sup-
plementary state support. According to OECD statistics, government trans-
fers accounted for a relatively high share, 59 per cent, of local government 
expenditure in Hungary in 2011. Due to the decrease in state subsidies, EU 
tenders emerged as the sole source of funds to finance development works.7
State subventions for local government functions have been continuously 
decreasing since 1995. On joining the EU, the state undertook the obliga-
tion of observing budgetary discipline, based on the Maastricht criteria. Thus 
the 2006 convergence programme brought about a new phase in budget cuts 
in the local government system. The brunt of stabilization costs was borne 
by local government. Direct cutbacks in the municipal subventions are esti-
mated to have improved the balance by 0.7% of the GDP (Vigvári, 2011). In 
addition, cutbacks in the healthcare and other sectors affected local govern-
ments’ ability to maintain their institutions, from hospitals to fire brigades. 
(Then local government expenses made up 11% of the GDP.) Cuts in subsidies 
provided from the central budget for mandatory functions did not necessar-
ily take the form of limiting the wage bill paid to local government employ-
7 The importance of EU grants 
is indicated by the fact that their 
winning prompts an opportun-
istic approach; as one interview-
ee, a mayor, put it, before they 
sought grant opportunities for 
what the community needed, 
today they would apply to any 
open call for proposals, like for 
building a football pitch, as is 
the case now: “ if the prime 
minister is mad about football, 
… then we will build a football 
pitch next to the pool, we will 
join the crowd. What we build 
stays here and adds to the town’s 
assets.”
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ees. Unfortunately, no statistics are available concerning the extent of budget 
cuts for an unchanged, comparable set of mandatory services. According to 
a study conducted by the State Audit Office, between 2007–2010 in the cit-
ies of county status, cuts varied in different services (1% in child welfare, 6% 
in primary schools, 16% in school dormitories). In this period the lack of re-
sources which emerged was compensated for by institutions’ own revenues 
and increasing local government support (ÁSZ, 2011).
Municipalities reacted to government austerity measures by raising con-
siderable external funds, predominantly by issuing bonds denominated in 
foreign currencies. Even the credit limit stipulated in the Local Government 
Act was not enough to close the loopholes that used various “financial inno-
vations”. The financial crisis triggered a major increase in interest payments, 
accompanied by dwindling local tax income and increasing claims for so-
cial assistance due to the economic crises. There were substantial differences 
among municipalities as to the level of their indebtedness, and in some towns 
bankruptcy was an everyday threat by 2012. With the decrease in revenues, 
local governments had to adopt a new approach towards private enterprises 
– in some settlements this meant a withdrawal of benefits (for instance, tax-
exempt status) provided for them earlier. Others opted for a strategy of not 
only maintaining the level of levies imposed on enterprises but also made 
efforts to retain their presence by easing their situation, hoping that they 
would expand their operation after the crisis and that tolerance on the part 
of the local government would pay off later in employment creation and the 
increase in local business tax.)
With the majority of mayors affiliated to the governing party, local govern-
ment indebtedness became a political issue. In October 2012 the Prime Min-
ister announced a fiscal consolidation programme for municipalities, under 
which the state budget would take over the debts of small municipalities (un-
der 5000 inhabitants, i.e. a total of 1700 villages), and on average 40 per cent 
of the debts of larger ones. However, in practice the government negotiated 
conditions town by town in 2013, with the process lacking in transparency 
and strongly influenced by party politics.
Although the law defines the minimum standards of services, the govern-
ment itself sought to narrow the extent of certain service provisions in re-
sponse to the crisis, The Law on Social Care assigns the duty of providing 
care for the elderly to local government. Paradoxically, however, municipali-
ties can freely decide as to the scope of beneficiaries, as well as on the quality 
of services provided and also regarding the extent of co-payment. In 2009, 
however, a ministerial decree ordered that entry to residential care facilities, 
run by the state (local government), ought to be subject to a doctor verifying 
the need for care of a minimum of four hours per day in the case of each per-
son. Although the number of beneficiaries did not decrease in residential care 
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facilities (KSH, 2011). According to our case studies however, it resulted in a 
dramatic increase in the proportion of in-patients with dementia, whose care 
implies a far greater workload and is subject to specific standards.
The government in power has taken a number of steps promoting the cen-
tralization of public administration and institutions providing public ser-
vices. As of 2013, local governments’ public administration functions have 
been transferred to government agencies, either at central government level 
or at district (micro-regional) level. This process began in the health care 
sector, affecting hospitals belonging to small municipalities. From January 
2013 a large share of public education was transferred to state management, 
meaning that all teachers are now employed by a single government agency. 
School facility management has however mostly remained with the local ad-
ministrations. Parallel to centralization the current government is facilitat-
ing the transfer of certain services (education, health care and social care) to 
church-based institutions by providing these with higher per capita subsidies 
compared to those run by municipalities. The current wave of public service 
centralization and their transfer to church-based institutions is motivated 
more by ideological and political considerations than based on evidence or 
on negotiations with key stakeholders.
b) Interest reconciliation and employment policy in local government. Either 
directly or indirectly (through their institutions and business companies) the 
municipalities employ about half of the public sector employees in Hunga-
ry. Despite local governments’ budgetary autonomy, the base salary of pub-
lic sector employees and civil servants is defined according to the pay scales 
specified in the relevant laws. As we have shown in sub-chapter 3.2, in na-
tional level interest reconciliation related to legislation and government poli-
cies local government alliances also take part, in their capacity as employers, 
besides trade union confederations. (Pluralism prevails here as well, as there 
are three such organisations.)
Employees of municipal companies are subject to the Labour Code (which 
applies to the genuine private sector, too) and the mandatory minimum wage 
that implies there is no tariff system to apply to their wages. Sectoral level 
interest reconciliation takes place at the Subsectoral Social Dialogue Com-
mittee on Communal Services. The Committee has no direct influence over 
wages; its members did not conclude a sectoral collective agreement. As to the 
typical remuneration practice of local government organisations, a recently 
conducted survey found that although a large proportion, 84%, of local gov-
ernment organisations carry out performance evaluation, only at 17% of them 
did the results influence annual pay (Bordás, 2012).
In the local government sector collective agreements are concluded only 
at company level. On the employer side, the agreement is signed by the com-
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pany’s management. Although the lack of management autonomy is a com-
mon barrier to collective wage bargaining in the entire public sector, this is 
particularly the case in certain municipal companies. According to the head 
of the sectoral trade union, local governments, as owners, are not represented 
at the bargaining table, and the management does not have the necessary au-
thorization. Moreover, the management is often unable to meet its legal ob-
ligation to provide information because the local government as owner disal-
lows it. As a consequence, there is no consultation on important or strategic 
decisions of the owner. The competence of the local company’s management 
to enter into negotiation is further curbed by the practice that larger towns 
set up a holding-organisation over their municipal companies, which deter-
mines company managers’ scope for action and centralizes resources.
As a result, trade unions in the municipalities do their best to negotiate di-
rectly with the owner, i.e. the local administration. In larger towns there is 
an interest reconciliation forum where trade unions can have direct negotia-
tions with the local administration’s chief officials. For instance, the Budapest 
Public Service Consultative Forum has been in existence since 1993, with 
the vice-mayor consulting with trade unions on such topics as restructuring. 
Although, legally speaking, this is not collective bargaining, each year they 
develop guidelines acting as recommendations for local wage agreements. It 
seems that a prerequisite to operating such a forum is to have a large number 
of institutions and companies, as well as well-organized trade unions. One of 
our case studies also shows that in a small town, however, there was no evi-
dence of any collective bargaining, and wages in the public service companies 
were low, corresponding to conditions on the local labour market. According 
to our interview data, everyone is paid “on the minimum wage”. This means 
that employees receive the lowest level of remuneration allowed by the law. 
Two organisations had previously had collective agreements (in a vocation-
al secondary school and at the local hospital). However, subsequently, both 
organisations were integrated with a third that is non-union and as a result 
their collective agreements will become void 12 months after the merger. In 
any event, the collective agreement at the hospital included no provisions on 
wages and benefits. Because employees of local government organisations and 
local government-owned companies practically have no interest representation 
whatsoever, there is an absence of collective wage bargaining that could influ-
ence employment conditions and remuneration practices. (Berki et al., 2012.) 
All in all, municipal-level social dialogue remains immature in Hungary.
c) Local government policies of outsourcing and re-municipalisation. The Local 
Government Act and other sectoral laws specify the services that local govern-
ments, depending on the settlement’s population size, are obliged to provide. 
Additionally, the municipalities may undertake other services on a voluntary 
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basis. As we have seen, local governments are free to decide how service pro-
vision will be organised. A traditional arrangement is for local governments 
to maintain institutions with public service employees providing services. In 
such institutions the administration of finances is carried out in line with the 
– rather rigid – protocol, customary in budgetary institutions. According to 
this arrangement, the maintainer (i.e. the local government) may determine, 
beyond the institutions’ budget, the number of employees and also the wage 
costs. The other arrangement implies that the local government outsources 
some public services, which might take the following forms:
• The municipality establishes and operates a business company. It does not 
necessarily need to maintain 100 per cent ownership, and may sell some of 
its shares or involve an external investor. This was the most common form 
of the privatization of public utilities in the 1990s.
• The municipality runs a public procurement procedure to select an enter-
prise for providing the service or offering it a concession.
• The municipality concludes an agreement, generally with civil organiza-
tions or churches, for providing the mandatory tasks.
• It forms a consortium with other local administrations to provide the pub-
lic service using any of the above three approaches.
In each of the above-mentioned outsourcing forms, the municipality signs 
an agreement with the selected enterprise/non-profit organisation. Neverthe-
less, the local government bears a secondary liability for ensuring the unin-
terrupted delivery of public services; if the contracted enterprise is unable to 
provide an adequate level of service, then the municipality has to take back 
the responsibility of provision. Depending on the contract and the legal pro-
visions, for services the local government continues to have the competence 
to determine service fees (e.g. water bill, public transportation fees) (Dicső, 
2010, Horváth et al, 2002).
According to a survey conducted in 2011, 55% of local governments have 
shares in business associations and in 28% of such associations local govern-
ments have controlling stakes (Bordás, 2012). Privatisation of local govern-
ment operated corporations, and involving external investors, became a major 
trend in the mid-1990s. The reasons behind privatisation of local government 
businesses were the same as that of state enterprises: intention to modernize 
financially weak corporations that had partially lost their markets, with the 
involvement of foreign technology and expertise in marketing and manage-
ment. On the other hand, the budget revenue generated by privatisation was 
equally important for an indebted municipality. However, municipality lev-
el privatisation was even less transparent than that of state corporations; in-
stead of the central State Property Agency, decisions were made by the elected 
general assemblies. A great deal of publicity was given to contracts that had 
been scandalous in being greatly disadvantageous for the local community.8
8 A study, prepared on the basis 
of a research by the State Audit 
Office on corruption, also uses 
the conditional tenses when 
discussing this issue: “Owner-
ship in a business association is, 
among others, a risk factor from 
the point of view corruption 
because the motivation behind 
owners’ decisions is not neces-
sarily to serve public interest, 
and there are no legislative or 
other kind of controls. In the 
case of privatisation, it would 
require an extensive study on 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
to decide whether an enterprise, 
selected to run a public utility 
service, is any better at it – or put 
otherwise, if privatisation serves 
the public interest or not –, and 
to answer the question whether 
they were undersold.” (Bordás, 
2011.)
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Outsourcing certain auxiliary activities (cleaning, security and mainte-
nance services, etc.) has for decades been a common practice at state and lo-
cal government institutions. As of 2004, however, service providers, or the 
beneficiary of a concession, have to be selected through a procurement pro-
cess. The motives behind local governments’ outsourcing decisions are not 
sufficiently well known, however, and public statements rely on the same 
rhetoric as in the privatisation (increasing efficiency, bringing in special tools 
and knowledge, etc.). It is probable that the attempt to evade regulations on 
headcount may have been a more important factor here than in the private 
sector, although this is more likely to hold true for centrally managed institu-
tions than for local governments which have more flexible financial admin-
istration. According to the above-referred survey from 2011, 31.7% of local 
governments outsource services; 25.1% of the outsourced services pertain to 
mandatory services of municipalities, 9.6% to specialized tasks, while 65% 
are linked to voluntarily undertaken functions of municipalities. As much 
as 37.9% of local governments have long-term cooperation agreements with 
civil organisations, although it is unknown what proportion of these covers 
the outsourcing of public services (Bordás, 2011).
The present government – referring in part to some well-known examples 
of privatization debacles – has been pursuing a policy of re-nationalization. 
Local politicians are also keen to regain full control over service providers 
and follow a re-municipalisation policy. Service-providing enterprises and 
beneficiaries of concessions constitute a different story: the government’s ap-
proach in these cases is to renegotiate the contracts, i.e. not necessarily to na-
tionalize them but instead starting a new procurement process and possibly 
replacing former providers. The emphasis here is on providing opportunities 
for Hungarian rather than foreign companies. Such attempts have however 
engendered scandals, such as when the new beneficiary turned out to be an 
entrepreneur from the clientele of the party in power, or a family member or 
friend of a well-known politician of the ruling party. Our case studies con-
firmed that such “political advantages” are prevalent among the motives of lo-
cal decision-makers and similarly influence outsourcing or the redistribution 
of profitable businesses in line with a partisan-clientele rationale.
d) Impact of outsourcing and in-sourcing on employment and wages. Probably 
our most interesting research question was connected to transitions (privati-
sation, outsourcing, in-sourcing) between various service providers. We tried 
to reveal the motives of related decision making as well as the consequences, 
namely their influences on employment and wages.
Whether it is a private company, a church or other non-profit organisation 
that takes over service provision from the local government, employees’ legal 
status will change regardless of the new provider: instead of the Act on the 
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Legal Status of Public Service Employees, they will be subject to the Labour 
Code following the transfer.9 In the event that public sector employees refuse 
to accept a position offered to them, they receive a lower amount of severance 
pay than they would otherwise be entitled to.10 Given that Hungarian law is 
in compliance with the TUPE Directive, dismissals cannot be effected at the 
moment of transition. However, as in many other EU member states there 
is a possibility to do that before and after. In our case studies we have come 
across restructuring, implying lay-offs of moderate scale, and the narrowing 
of the scope of services. In the case of institutional transferrals to church in-
stitutions, looking to the higher per capita subsidy for which they are eligible, 
there is no point in narrowing the scope of service, at least as long as the rel-
evant law is in effect, although the issue of rationalizing operations is raised 
because of efforts at cutting costs. In the same manner, management is more 
rationalized in the case of services provided by the private sector than by state 
institutions. All in all, however, our case-study data suggest that the stabil-
ity of employment has been retained despite the transfer. Moreover, in some 
cases some improvement in employment security has been noted, compared 
to the precarious situation which existed before.
In general – and particularly after the relevant changes in legislation effect-
ed in 2012 – the Labour Code implies far less constraints for the employer 
than the Act regulating the employment of public service employees, espe-
cially when it comes to pay: instead of applying mandatory wage tariffs, only 
the two-level statutory national minimum wage system must be observed.
With respect to wage levels and wage bargaining after outsourcing, the case 
studies allow only limited conclusions. Outsourcing and the subsequent re-
municipalisation of public utility services in the bigger town in our scrutiny, 
where trade unions have a strong bargaining position, had practically no im-
pact on the advantageous position of employees. Interestingly enough, in this 
town the geriatric care organization acquired by the church made no changes 
to pay conditions. As the new provider, the church was in a position to do so 
without any risk in the short term, since the majority of employees were paid 
the minimum wage anyhow and a large state subsidy covered additional costs. 
It is telling, however, that the new collective agreement for this particular or-
ganization does not set base wages or benefits. Therefore it is possible that in 
the longer run it will be easier to deviate from the wage scale. Moreover it also 
indicates that the employer does not foresee any wage bargaining taking place.
In the other small town investigated, wages in the local government sec-
tor are low, irrespective of whether the service is run by the municipality or a 
private company. Although drivers working at the bus company, operated by 
a private entrepreneur, earn somewhat more than the minimum wage their 
salaries are precisely half of that which bus drivers in the other bigger town 
receive, not to mention the difference in fringe benefits. (a strikingly higher 
9 Both laws refer to the ques-
tion of transition, more or less 
in compliance with the Trans-
fer of Enterprises Protection of 
Employees (TUPE) Directive.
10 This is an exceptional ruling 
in Hungarian labour law, as in 
other cases employees do not 
have the right to refuse a trans-
fer and are automatically taken 
over by the new employer.
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difference than the usual 20–30 per cent disparity between regional averages). 
Wage differentials between different local labour markets are thus boosted in 
the case of services outsourced by the local administration, while the public 
service employees’ pay scale – though very depressed – has had a levelling effect.
The law prescribes the obligation to provide information when public service 
employees become subject to the Labour Code, which may ideally facilitate 
collective bargaining. The case studies of the two towns indicate that such 
bargaining takes place only if the trade union has engaged in robust interest 
representation beforehand. Similarly, even in the towns where municipal-level 
information and consultation forums formally exist they hardly ever allow 
employee representatives to have a say in restructuring, outsourcing and re-
municipalisation decision-making.
*
However, as the excerpts cited in the introduction suggest, the industrial 
relations climate has radically changed at the bus company since the field-
work in 2012. As was promised at the beginning of the sub-chapter, we now 
return to the case highlighted in the introduction – and presented in Box 
3.5.1 – in order to shed light on the background to the events which have 
unfolded at the public transport company since December 2012. Though 
related labour court cases are still pending at the time of writing, one can 
pose the question as to what has changed over a half year period. What are 
the new circumstances which strengthened the employer position so much 
that it has become able to challenge the union’s long-established bargaining 
power? It is very likely that the position of the city’s right-wing dominated 
leadership has been consolidated since the general election of 2010. In addi-
tion to direct political support – and by no means independent thereof – the 
town’s economic situation has been improving. The timing is noteworthy: 
negotiations with the government had just ended in a 70 per cent bailout – 
much higher than could have been expected from the initial announcement 
of the prime minister – and now the city is considering purchasing buses. 
If the city were able to upgrade its run-down fleet, this would mean less de-
mand for experienced drivers and there would be no grounds for the driv-
ers’ work-to-rule actions.
In addition, legislation also contributed to the strengthened management 
position. The sectoral law on essential services established a level of service 
provision so high that it practically ruled out any lawful strike at the compa-
ny. The new Labour Code erodes the position of local unions, especially that 
of maintaining the position of full-time president. The law also imposes spe-
cific limits on the scope of collective bargaining in the state and municipali-
ty-owned company. Sanctioning of unfair dismissal has also been weakened 
drastically. Moreover, a new ground for dismissal is an employee’s inappropri-
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ate behaviour. This includes violating the obligation to “behave in accordance 
with the necessary trust relationship related to the given job”.11 It worth noting 
that the CEO went further in terms of legal tools by criminalising workers 
engaging in a wildcat strike. In his report to the police the employer accused 
the trade union leader with “disturbing the operation of works of public in-
terest” (Közérdekű üzem működésének megzavarása), a statutory definition in 
the Hungarian Penal (Criminal) Code, which threatens the perpetrator of 
the offense with a two to eight year period of imprisonment.
Final thoughts
While studying the local governments’ response to the crisis, trends of priva-
tisation and outsourcing, the researcher may find a lot of similarities between 
Hungary and Western European countries. Nonetheless, it is difficult to draw 
far-reaching conclusions owing to the striking differences in local govern-
ment systems, traditions of local autonomy and division of labour between 
various levels of governance. Constraining the conclusions to the core issue 
of our investigation, the privatisation and outsourcing efforts, one can wit-
ness diverging trends in Western countries. While in a part of the countries 
the ongoing process of building New Public Management (NPM) was rein-
forced (most characteristically in the UK), elsewhere numerous examples of 
in-sourcing or “re-municipalisation” emerged, partly as a result of the autono-
mous deeds of local actors, partly due to the regulatory efforts of the central 
governments or Lands in federal states. In the long run, however, in western 
countries these changes seem to occur in an ad hoc manner. Recent changes 
in Hungary, however look very strange by international comparison, and nei-
ther follow the model of UK moving to NPM, nor that of the other countries 
which pursue parallel outsourcing and in-sourcing policies. The Hungarian 
processes, namely the systematic re-nationalisation, “re-municipalisation” or 
centralisation of control over public services, as well as government incentives 
to reverse secularisation cannot be matched to any Western mainstream cri-
sis responses and seem to be rather unique developments.
Relatively few foreign research projects have dealt with the impact of ad-
verse economic conditions on social dialogue at the local level. In their theory 
focused on developed market economies, Marchington and Kynighou (2012) 
sketched various alternative scenarios concerning changes in employee in-
volvement and participation. One of the extreme poles is the expected mar-
ginalisation of participative institutions, for employers/decision makers are 
becoming less interested in the meaningful operation of employee participa-
tion. At the other pole, a more intense operation of institutions can be imag-
ined, for employers/decision makers are well aware that they can utilize the 
institutions with a view to legitimizing their measures and thus they can rely 
on employees’ participative support. According to the authors, the actual fate 
11 Article 52(5) of the Labour 
Code contains this obligation 
of employees. Legislators ba-
sically incorporated previous 
court jurisprudence into the 
new Code. (For the latter ex-
planation, special thanks to 
István Horváth.) On the other 
hand, such justification of the 
dismissal may be attributable 
to the similar option recently 
introduced in the public serv-
ants’ employment relationship 
(see sub-chapter 3.1).
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of employee involvement and participation depends both on the actors’ strate-
gic choice and on the institutional context. Stated differently the first means 
whether the representatives of the employers/decision makers and those of 
the employees are willing to cooperate in order to promote changes or not. 
The well-known theory of “Varieties of Capitalism” (Hall and Soskice, 2001) 
embraces one set of important factors of institutional context – whether the 
given country can be classified as a liberal or as a coordinated market econ-
omy. Another important factor is the established trust relationship between 
employers and employees. Although Hungary can hardly be classified as one 
of the main models of “Varieties of Capitalism”, an evaluation of the above 
mentioned preconditions would be highly topical.
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3.5.1 Case studies on municipalities’ service provision
László Neumann & Márk Edelényi
Reorganisation of geriatric care in a big town
In the past two years, the indebted town has trans-
ferred the provision of the majority of social servic-
es as well as three public educational institutions 
to churches. In both areas, outsourcing was justi-
fied by financial gains: churches being immediate-
ly entitled to higher per capita funding than local 
governments. The difference between per capita 
amounts is calculated every year on the basis of 
the financial resources provided by the municipali-
ties to supplement state funds for service provision.
Prior to the transfer, the system of social service 
provision had been reorganized twice for cost rea-
sons. In the 2007 reorganization, services were cen-
tralized and bringing back in-house the delivery 
of cleaning services previously outsourced. From 
2009, in the second reorganization further stream-
lining occurred, with just three organizations re-
tained in-house: day care services, care for people 
with disabilities and geriatric care. In the latter 
case, the number of residents decreased, with resi-
dential geriatric care being transferred to a church 
organization in 2011. Four workplaces and 343 em-
ployees were taken over by the Hungarian Baptist 
Aid. Two of the remaining three sites were closed, 
with the third taken over by the Jewish Commu-
nity.
Having outsourced these activities, the town 
is no longer obliged to subsidize elderly care, and 
saved 0.5 billion HUF (EUR 1.8 million) per year 
(1.25% of the entire town budget); moreover, it 
proved to be advantageous despite the fact that the 
municipality undertook the responsibility of reno-
vating some of the buildings after the transfer. The 
outsourcing contracts include a clause stipulating 
that the municipality is obliged to “re-municipal-
ize” geriatric care homes should there be any chang-
es in financing. This would be relatively easy to put 
into practice, as the outsourcing is restricted to the 
operation of the organization and does not cover its 
assets and property. At the same time, the contract 
contains no guarantees as to the quality and price 
of services beyond that laid down in the relevant 
law. In 2012 the new provider was thus allowed to 
increase fees significantly. Not only did the local 
administration not interfere with this action but 
it also appreciated the advantages of not having to 
take such an unpopular measure itself.
In the residential care home taken over by the 
Hungarian Baptist Aid, a church organization, the 
largest employee group is made up of nurses and 
mental health professionals. As services are not out-
sourced, cleaners, laundry and kitchen personnel 
and drivers are also employed. Given the nature of 
the work, the majority of the workforce are women. 
Prior to the takeover, employees experienced a great 
deal of uncertainty, not only because of the previ-
ous lay-offs, but also because – aware of the mu-
nicipality’s serious financial problems – they were 
very much concerned that their wages would not 
be paid. Such concerns were not unfounded, giv-
en that the local administration had previously re-
voked certain fringe benefits (the so-called cafete-
ria package and other benefits). On the other hand, 
they were afraid that the new provider would bring 
in its own people to replace existing personnel.
The local trade union has a 60–65 per cent un-
ionization rate, although this has been in decline. 
Before the transfer, two trade unions had local or-
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ganizations operating here as well, but they have 
since merged. In the spirit of union renewal, young 
people were taken on as shop stewards. Since the 
new provider was not going to take over more em-
ployees than the minimum prescribed in the Law 
on Social Services, the transfer was preceded by a 
collective redundancy of 49 people. Those who were 
laid off in this way included mainly two groups of 
employees: those who were eligible for retirement, 
since they did not have to be paid severance pay; 
and those whose work the new provider was plan-
ning to dispense with. Contrary to the general prac-
tice in Hungary, the consultations with the trade 
union and the works council also included the se-
lection of the jobs to be eliminated and persons to 
be dismissed. Among those selected for transfer 
to the church employer, an estimated 20–30 peo-
ple refused to accept the particular job they were 
offered. Some were planning to find employment 
abroad, others had hoped to get, in addition to the 
severance pay, a notice period together with the 
respective salary. The local government, however, 
refused to pay the latter, referring to the transfer 
of undertaking regulations according to which it 
was not due.
In the negotiations preceding the transfer, the 
church’s representative promised to take over em-
ployees under the same terms and to retain the sys-
tem of base salaries, defined according to the public 
sector employees’ pay scale, and additionally bo-
nuses as set out in the collective agreement. Follow-
ing the takeover, the collective agreement was rene-
gotiated but only minor changes were made, with 
the scale of bonuses and other benefits retained. 
The weakness of the new agreement, however, is 
that it is completely lacking a pay scale. This could 
also be explained by continuity, given that its pre-
decessor also omitted it. However there is a crucial 
difference in the conditions: previously, under the 
scope of the public sector law, it was not necessary 
given the mandatory pay scale. In 2012 there were 
works council elections at the organisation, in com-
pliance with the legislation for employees covered 
by the Labour Code.
With regard to pay, the new employer maintained 
salaries in line with the public sector pay scale, al-
though the national minimum wage for skilled 
workers applied to the majority of employees. In 
addition, the employer re-launched the cafeteria 
package and resumed paying premiums that had 
been abolished by the local government. In essence, 
HR management practices remained the same. The 
only novel element concerns employees with a high-
er education degree, being given the possibility to 
attend a theology college free of charge.
*
Since the case study was completed a dispute has 
unfolded between the management and the trade 
union because the employer intended to termi-
nate the collective agreement without providing 
the trade union with any justification. In the mean-
time many employees have quit voluntarily, partly 
because of an announced collective dismissal, part-
ly due to the weakening protection of employees. It 
is likely that the 2012-3 measures to increase wages 
in the health care sector (see sub-chapter 4.3) also 
motivated quitting and moving to the public health 
care, as it did not apply to nurses in the social care 
sector. Given these worsening working conditions, 
the local trade union asked the local government to 
consider the possibilities of “re-municipalisation”.
Outsourcing and in-sourcing of a big town’s 
public transport
The local administration has been the sole owner 
of the former state-owned public transport com-
pany since 2002. In the hope of replacing old ve-
hicles with modern ones, partial privatization took 
place in 2008. A private investor acquired a minori-
ty shareholding (32 per cent) and received exclusive 
management rights. According to the original strat-
agem the new investor, together with the town’s 
transport company, started off by establishing a 
new company with only minimum initial capital. 
This was followed by a business transaction, in the 
course of which the municipal transport company 
sold the old buses to the newly established entity 
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for HUF 2bn (EUR 7.2m), only for the former to 
lease back the vehicles at a high fee for the follow-
ing 10 years. In exchange for this the new company 
agreed to upgrade vehicles.
A couple of months later the opposition party, 
FIDESZ, came to power in the municipal elections, 
and decided that the contract concluded by the pre-
vious town administration was disadvantageous 
for the community. At this point the story becomes 
extremely complicated, tainted by contract abro-
gation, pressing charges, tax authority investiga-
tions and court cases. A bitter dispute ensued, at 
the end of which the municipality decided to take 
public transportation into its own hands. The lo-
cal administration set up a new 100 per cent-owned 
company and signed a contract with it for provid-
ing public transportation. Buses were returned to 
the original transportation company and now the 
latest company is leasing buses from the old one.
There seem to be two fundamental reasons be-
hind “re-municipalisation”. On the one hand, the 
local administration was unable to fulfil the long-
term leasing contract for purchasing new vehicles 
due to its financial difficulties. On the other hand, 
it may well be that the politicians leading the new 
city administration had no intention to do so, giv-
en the perception that the private investor’s profit 
was too high.
Although change in the ownership implied 
changes in the company management, it did not 
affect employment relations, as it still remained 
subject to the Labour Code. Similarly, there was 
no change with respect to payment conditions or 
other acquired rights of employees neither as a re-
sult of the company’s partial privatisation, nor their 
return to the new company fully-owned by the mu-
nicipality. Trade unions had no role whatsoever in 
the transformations, although information provi-
sion always took place as required by law.
As a result of the unsuccessful privatization, the 
number of buses suitable for transportation has de-
creased since 2008, having a major impact on the 
number of employees. In addition, the municipal-
ity’s budgetary problems prompted a 7 per cent cut 
in the number of services. The new municipal en-
terprise employs 460 people, while four years ago 
the number was over 500.
A trade union with considerable bargaining pow-
er exists at the company. It has a 100 per cent organ-
ization rate among drivers, and 87 per cent overall. 
Although there has not been a strike there since a 
two-hour warning strike in 1995, the trade union 
is adept at using other forms of pressure (which 
they are forced to do, given the tightening of strike 
laws). Their most common action is a work-to-rule. 
For instance, when the municipality attempted to 
cancel fringe benefits (i.e. the so-called cafeteria 
package), as it was able to do in the case of public 
service employees, the bus drivers’ trade union or-
ganized action ostensibly related to road safety. Bus 
drivers refused to drive buses other than those in 
perfect working order.
There is a collective agreement at the compa-
ny which is renewed every year. The agreement 
includes a seniority-based pay system for driv-
ers (which the trade union considers its greatest 
achievement), proportional (per cent) benefit rates, 
the extent of overtime and details of working time 
arrangements. As a rule, annual wage increases 
rarely exceed the forecast inflation rate but the 
trade union is sometimes able to achieve higher 
wage increases for certain groups. More recently, 
the company started introducing performance-
based pay. In addition to their base wage, drivers 
receive shift bonuses, commission dependent on 
the number of tickets sold, an annual bonus and a 
cafeteria package (amounting to HUF 200,000 per 
year (EUR 722). An important source of income 
is the overtime bonus, especially as the company 
makes full use of the 300-hour quota allotted to 
each employee. Nevertheless, salaries are high only 
by local standards. At present the average month-
ly income of blue-collar workers is HUF 211,000 
(EUR 762).
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4. oCCupatIonal labour markets
4.1 Teacher salaries, teachers’ selection and turnover
Júlia Varga
Becoming a teacher is not a result of a single decision, but of a series of sub-
sequent ones. Prospective teachers first have to choose teacher training as a 
field specialization in their higher education studies, and then, after gradu-
ating (or later) they have to decide on entering the teaching profession and 
continuing therein. The composition of teachers is the result of this series of 
self-selection processes.
How do wages affect a teacher’s decision to enter and remain in the teach-
ing role? Can teacher attrition be reduced by means of wage increases? How 
does an overall wage increase affects teacher attrition for different groups of 
teachers? The answer to these questions is of central policy importance. As 
teachers constitute a large proportion of public servants and as the salary costs 
of teachers, and other school employees make up around 80 per cent of cur-
rent educational expenditures a wage increase for teachers also has importance 
from a budgetary respect. This chapter investigates how teachers’ salaries af-
fect the composition of teachers, more specifically, how the 2002 year public 
servants’ wage increase effected attrition of the different groups of teachers.
Earlier research has found that teacher salaries have an effect on who choos-
es the teaching profession (Dolton, 1990, Chevalier et al., 2002, Wolter and 
Denzler, 2003). For Hungary Varga (2007) found that the decisive factor in 
the choice of the teaching profession is the difference of attainable earnings 
between non-teaching and teaching jobs. The same study also found that 
there are self-selection processes at every point in the process of becoming 
a teacher – applying for teacher training, finding employment as a teacher 
after finishing higher education, and continuing teaching in the fifth and 
sixth years after qualifying. Those who apply for college-level teacher train-
ing have less advanced abilities than those who apply for other specialisa-
tions. The less talented graduates are more likely to take teaching jobs, and 
they are more likely to be found among those in their fifth or sixth year of 
a teaching career.
Nevertheless concerning the role of the attractiveness of higher-paying al-
ternative occupations in teacher attrition research findings are mixed. A part 
of the studies found that there is a connection between teacher attrition and 
teachers’ relative wages. Murnane and Olsen (1989) show that higher wages 
have an important influence on how long teachers stay in teaching. Simi-
lar results were presented by Podgursky et al. (2004); Imazeki (2005); Krieg 
(2006); Ondrich et al. (2008); Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995), (1999); and 
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Chevalier et al. (2002). Other studies found that very few teachers who leave 
teaching take jobs that pay more than their prior salaries as teachers. Scafidi 
et al. (2006); Frijters et al, (2004); and Vandenberghe (2000) found that a 
large share of teachers who leave teaching relinquish employment entirely 
or earn less pay in other occupations within the public sector. Other studies 
show that working conditions are as important in teachers’ leaving decisions 
as relative salaries (Hanushek et al. (2001). Stinebrickner (1998) found that 
the role of family circumstances, such as maternity and marriage is decisive 
in teachers’ leaving decisions. Gilpin (2011) found that the wage differential 
between a teaching and a non-teaching occupation matters only for inexpe-
rienced teachers – teachers with less than six years of teaching experience – 
while the work environment affects the leaving decisions of both experienced 
and inexperienced teachers.
This chapter is based on a study which investigated the role of wages in 
teacher attrition in Hungary; the differences in the effect of wages between 
differently aged teachers and the effect of the 2002 year salary increase on 
teacher attrition (Varga, 2013).
Data
The base data-set used in the study was a merged dataset collecting infor-
mation from the Pension Directorate (ONYF), the Health Insurance Fund 
(OEP), the Treasury (MÁK) and the Public Employment Service (ÁFSZ). 
The sample was created by a fifty per cent random draw from the Hungar-
ian population aged 5–74 in January 2002. Each individual in the sample 
is followed from January 2002 until December 2008 or exit from the social 
security system (for reasons of death or permanent emigration). Out of the 
base dataset a “teacher” subsample was created. All individuals who were in 
a teaching job for at least one month between January 2002 and December 
2008 were included in the teacher subsample. We have data for 57,546 indi-
viduals. The unit of observation is the monthly status of individuals and the 
maximum number of observations for an individual is 84 months.
Our data contains information on demographics (age, gender), education-
al attainment (for those with at least one unemployment spell), employment 
status, occupation code, wages for the occupation codes, and transfer receipt.
Methods
For analysing, the effect of the 2002 wage increase on teacher decision to 
leave the profession duration models were used. Duration models estimate 
the conditional probability that a teacher leaves the profession given that she/
he has not left it prior to the month of investigation.
First, we used binary choice Cox proportional hazard models (leaving the 
teaching profession or not), then competing risk models1 that distinguish exits 
1 In the Cox model the base 
hazard is non-parametric, no 
form is pre-specified for the 
baseline hazard, the hazards 
are proportional to each other, 
and do not depend on time, 
but time-dependent covari-
ates also can be incorporated 
to the analysis. Censored data 
are handled in the Cox model: 
both left truncated data, that 
for those who work as teachers 
in the first observation there is 
no information as to how long 
have they worked as a teacher 
and the model also handles the 
right censored data, that we only 
know that the event of interest 
had not happened for an indi-
vidual during the time that was 
the subject of the study, but we 
do not have information if it 
happened later.
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to another occupation and exits to a non-working state. In the Cox-model, the 
risk given covariates are the product of the baseline hazard and a relative risk:
λ[t, x(t)] = λ0(t)ex(t)’В(t),
Where λ0 stands for the base hazard; t for time; x for the observable charac-
teristics of the individual. The Cox-model can allow for time-varying covari-
ates x(t). The model also handles time-dependent effects, where the coeffi-
cients are a parametric function of time β(t), so the effects of covariates are 
not proportional.
A number of those who leave teaching do not go on to another job, but in-
tentionally or non-intentionally arrive at a non-employment state: become 
inactive, go on to child-care pension, retire, become unemployed, etc. As the 
determinants of these decisions might be different from the determinants of 
going to a non-teaching job teacher attrition was also analysed with the help 
of a competing risk model (Fine and Gray, 1999) which distinguishes exits 
to a non-teaching job (NT), and exits out of active status (NF). Competing 
risks are present when those who are working as teachers are at risk of more 
than one mutually exclusive event, and the occurrence of one of these will 
prevent any other event from happening. In our case the individual either 
goes on to a non-teaching job or becomes inactive or unemployed. Compet-
ing risk models define a separate hazard function for each event: going to a 
non-teaching job λNT(t) and becoming inactive or unemployed λNF(t). The total 
hazard of leaving teaching is the sum of the sub-hazards.
The effect of the single, high level wage increase of public servants was an-
alysed with the help of models where the independent variables contained 
dummy variables which indicated the year of the observation using 2002, on 
the one hand, as the reference category. On the other hand as the Cox-model 
makes it possible to split the data by episodes and check whether the effect 
of the covariates differs by episodes this method was used as well. The effect 
of the wage increase was also investigated using episode splitting. The public 
servants’ wage increase came into force in September 2002. The data from 
January to August 2002 describe the state before the wage increase and the 
data from September 2002 the state after the wage increase. Thus, the data 
were split into two episodes and checked to determine if the effect of given 
covariates differed before and after September 2002
Independent variables in the analysis were: gender, age-group dummies in 
the models that used the whole sample, and region of residence. Regional effect 
may reflect different effects: the differences in local labour markets, differences 
in the work environment, and differences in the quality of education caused 
by, for instance, differences in pupils’ composition or other factors. Further 
independent variables in the models were if the individual had worked as a 
teacher in primary or secondary education. The effect of wages was measured 
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by the (log) wages of the individual at January 2002 constant prices.2 In ad-
dition, the monthly unemployment rate of the region of the individual’s res-
idence was also included. Finally, a dummy variable indicated if the month 
was September. School years begin in September and prior to that there is a 
long summer holiday, so it might be worthwhile to delay an exit from teach-
ing until September and use the full the summer holiday.
Teacher attrition
Figure 4.1.1 shows the empirical Kaplan and Meier survival functions by gen-
der and age-group.3 The figure shows in the months observed the proportion 
of teachers who are still working as teachers. The figure for the whole sample 
shows that for those teachers who began teaching between January 2002 and 
December 2008 the unconditional exit rate was quite steady between 2002 
and 2008. Exit rates of men and women were similar between January 2002 
and September 2002, but thereafter the exit rates of men were higher than 
the exit rates of women.
Figure 4.1.1: Kaplan–Meier empirical survival (remaining in the teaching profession) functions  
by gender and age-groups
There are marked differences after September 2002. Only half of the teach-
ers who were younger than 30 years of age and older than 51–60 remained in 
teaching by December 2008. Survival was the greatest among teachers who 
were 41–51 years of age. Exit rates of the younger and older teachers were 
slightly higher by January 2008 than for middle-aged teachers, but thereafter 
2 We estimated also three fur-
ther specifications using dif-
ferent measures for teachers’ 
relative wages. The detailed 
estimations results are reported 
in Varga (2013).
3 Censored cases are not re-
garded as exits.
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exit rates of the younger and older teachers accelerated. The smallest survival 
can be observed among young teachers.
How much do teachers earn after leaving the profession?
Table 4.1.1 shows average monthly earnings of current and former teachers 
one month after former teachers had left teaching at constant prices. Aver-
age earnings of former teachers are smaller one month after leaving teaching 
than the average earnings of those who remain in teaching posts because a 
large proportion of former teachers become inactive, go on to childcare pen-
sion or retire. Average earnings of former teachers who remain active and are 
working in a non-teaching job is higher than earnings of current teachers
Table 4.1.1: Average monthly earnings of current and former teachers  
(in constant prices – 2002 January, HUF)
All –30  years old
31–40 
years old
41–50 
years old
51–60 
years old
61–  
years old
Current teachers 149,818 106,531 130,229 169,783 192,820 159,807
All former teachers 123,480 84,294 104,286 151,043 172,909 107,529
Former teachers who remain 
working 152,031 113,220 138,516 170,804 181,320 104,384
Former teachers who are on 
child-care pension 47,348 47,030 46,858 37,013 – –
Former teachers who are non-
employed for other reasons 48,977 49,931 46,900 39.003 39,4712 43,890
There are differences by age groups. Inexperienced, young, former teachers, 
those who are younger than 30 and those who are 31–40 years of age earn 
more on average than those who remain in teaching. Average earning gain of 
former teachers is not too high at 6–7 per cent. Older teachers do not achieve 
any earnings gain from attrition. There is no difference between the earnings 
of former and current teachers for those who are 41–50 years of age. Earnings 
of former teachers who are older than 50 are even lower than the earnings of 
their counterparts who remain in teaching.
The effect of salaries and the effect of the public servants’ wage 
increase
In September 2002 the base salary of public servants was increased uniformly 
by 50 per cent and, as a consequence, average real salaries of teachers increased 
by 20.5 per cent. Nevertheless in the subsequent years the wage increase of 
teachers slowed down, and then stopped, and the relative earnings of teachers 
began to deteriorate. (See “Teacher salaries in the public sector”; in Box 4.1.1).
Table 4.1.2 reports the results of the binary choice Cox-model split for two 
episodes. The table shows the sub-hazard rates. The first part of the table re-
ports the results of the base model. The second part of the table shows the 
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results of the estimations where the variables in the equation were split into 
two episodes (months 0–9 and months 10–84), to check if there was a differ-
ence in the probability of attrition before and after the public servants’ wage 
increase. That is, it was checked to see if the probability of attrition differed 
during the first eight months of the observations and during the subsequent 
months for teachers with certain characteristics (belonging to different age-
groups; teachers teaching in secondary education as compared to teachers 
teaching in primary schools; male teachers as compared to female teachers). 
A hazard ratio greater than one implies an increased probability of attrition 
while a ratio less than one implies a decreased probability.4
Table 4.1.2: Binary choice Cox proportional hazard models  
(leaving teaching profession or not) split to episodes
4 For instance in the base model 
the hazard ratio of men is 1.142 
indicating that the probability 
of leaving for men is 14.2 per 
cent higher than for women. 
Similarly a one percentage 
point increase in the regional 
unemployment rate wil l de-
crease attrition by 7.4 per cent 
(the hazard rate is 0.926).
Hazard rate
Base model
Gender (Male) 1.142***
Teaching in secondary school 1.043*
Monthly unemployment rate in the region 0.926***
(log) real salary 0.693***
September 0.096***
–30 years old 2.282***
31–40 years old 1.599***
51–60 years old 3.373***
Older than 60 years 12.438***
tvc (variables in tvc equation interacted with t < 9)
Gender (Male) 1.219**
Teaching in secondary school 1.219**
–30 years old 1.255***
31–40 years old n. s.
51–60 years old 0.433***
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level. ** Significant at the 5 per cent level. * Sig-
nificant at the 10 per cent level. n.s. not significant.
Other controls: Regions Reference category: Female, teaching in primary or 
lower secondary education, region Southern Transdanubia, another month 
than September, 41–50 years old.
Results of the base model show that the lower the salary of the teacher the 
higher the probability of attrition. Teachers who are younger than 30 leave 
the profession with more than twice the probability as that of teachers who 
are 41–50 years of age. Teachers who are 41–50 years of age remain in teach-
ing with the highest probability compared to the other age groups. The high 
probability of attrition for the 51–60 years of age group and teachers who are 
older than 60 is due to retirement.
The results of the interactions with duration show that the effect of gender 
is different in months 0–9 and 10–84. The estimate shows a 21.9 per cent 
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larger effect in the second, post wage increase period for men and a 21.9 per 
cent larger effect for teachers teaching in secondary schools. There is no evi-
dence that the effect is different for the 31–40 year old teachers in the two 
periods. Young, inexperienced teachers left teaching with 25.5 per cent larger 
probability after September 2002 than before compared to teachers belong-
ing to the reference group – those in the 41–50 years of age group. The prob-
ability of attrition of older, 51–60 years of age teachers decreased by 56 per 
cent after the wage increase.
Table 4.1.3 summarizes the results of the separate competing risk models 
for age-groups that analysed the effect of the 2002 year wage increase with 
the help of dummy variables which indicated in which year was the month 
under observation. The reference year was 2002. The competing risk models 
which consider the effect of wages on multiple causes of attrition were going 
to a non-teaching job and becoming inactive or unemployed.
Table 4.1.3: The effect of wage increase – Competing risk models (subhazard rates).  
Risks: Working in a non-teaching job/ Inactive or unemployed
–30 years old 31–40 years old 41–50 years old 51–60 years old
Working in 
non-teaching 
job
Inactive or 
unemployed
Working in 
non-teaching 
job
Inactive or 
unemployed
Working in 
non-teaching 
job
Inactive or 
unemployed
Working in 
non-teaching 
job
Inactive or 
unemployed
Gender (Male) 1.511*** 0.700*** 2.031*** 0.397*** 1.707*** n. s. 1.241*** 0.734***
Log real salaries 0.745*** 0.670*** 0.847*** 0.660*** 0.597*** 0.464*** 0.773*** 0.788***
2003 0.777** n. s. 0.760** n. s. 0.561*** 1.674*** 0.920 0.864
2004 n. s. 2.355*** n. s. n. s. 0.594*** 1.769*** 0.711*** 0.682***
2005 n. s. 3.739*** n. s. 1.736*** 0.591*** 2.171*** 0.676*** 0.595***
2006 n. s. 3.581*** n. s. 1.884*** 0.728** 2.256*** 0.681*** 0.234***
2007 1.667*** 7.157*** 1.518*** 6.791*** n. s. 5.271*** n. s. 0.182***
2008 1.392*** 8.258*** 10.060*** n. s. 4.532*** n. s. 0.229***
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level. ** Significant at the 5 per cent level. * Significant 
at the 10 per cent level. n.s. Not significant.
Other control variables in the model: teaching in secondary school, monthly unem-
ployment rate in the region, September.
Reference category: female, teaching in primary school, region Southern Transdanu-
bia, another month than September, year 2002.
Low salaries increase the probability of moving to another job or becom-
ing inactive. As for the effect of the public servants’ wage increase: in 2003 
young teachers (younger than 30), and those teachers in the 31–40 years of 
age group left teaching for a non-teaching job with a lower probability than 
in 2002. The results show no difference in the probability of attrition after 
2004, compared to 2002. After 2007 young teachers left teaching with a great-
er probability than in 2002. The probability of becoming inactive increased 
after 2004 both for teachers under 30 and teachers between 31–40 years of 
age. Teachers who are younger than 30 became, with twice as much prob-
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ability, inactive or unemployed in 2004 than in 2002, and with an eightfold 
larger probability in 2008. For the 31–40-year-old teachers, the probability 
of becoming unemployed is tenfold greater in 2008 than in 2002.
The effect of the wage increase lasted longer for older teachers and was 
stronger than for the young. The probability of going to a non-teaching job 
decreased for older teachers after the wage increase. Both the 41–50 year old 
teachers and the 51–60 year old teachers exited teaching for another job with 
lower probability from 2003 to 2006 than in 2002. The effect was the strong-
est for the 41–50 year old teachers. They exited teaching with a 40–45 per 
cent smaller probability than in 2002. The probability of becoming inactive 
had been decreasing for the 41–50 year old teachers from 2003. The older, 
51–60 year old teachers had become inactive with a much lower probability 
after 2002 than in 2002.
The public sector wage increase had reduced the probability of going to a 
non-teaching job for young teachers only for one year. The effect lasted long-
er for older teachers. After the wage increase young teachers for some years 
went to another job and became inactive with larger probability than before 
the wage increase. On the contrary, older, 51–60 year old teachers had not 
only gone to another job with smaller probability, but they had also become 
inactive with a smaller probability after the wage increase. Older teachers 
were the group of teachers that were retained in teaching by the wage increase.
Where do teachers work after having left the profession?
To get a fuller picture of the determinants of teachers attrition it is worth-
while to summarize where teachers work after having left teaching. Accord-
ing to the results of earlier research (Gilpin, 2011) a large part of the teach-
ers who leave teaching stay in the education sector in an administrative or 
non-teaching job. Our data contains information on the occupation codes 
of former teachers, and it is also possible from the data to identify the sector 
of employment of former teachers. Table 4.1.4 shows by age-group if former 
teachers are working in the education sector or outside the education sector. 
Table 4.1.5 shows the distribution of former teachers who are working out-
side the education sector by occupation group.
The majority of teachers who leave teaching remain in the education sector 
in Hungary too, but there are large differences between age-groups. More than 
70 per cent of former teachers who are younger than 30 years of age leave the 
education sector and more than half of the 31–40 year old group who exit 
teaching go to work outside the education sector. On the contrary more than 
60 per cent of older teachers remain in the education sector in non-teaching 
jobs. That is older teachers leave teaching for other possibilities within the 
education sector – administrative or management jobs. Only one-third of 
former teachers who are older than 41 find a job outside the education sector.
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Table 4.1.4: Distribution of former teachers  
by sector of employment after attrition (per cent)
Whole  
sample
–30  
years old
31–40  
years old
41–50  
years old
51–60  
years old
Working outside the education sector 
in non-teaching job 51.77 70.57 51.24 37.52 39.89
Working in the education sector in 
non-teaching job 48.23 29.43 48.76 62.48 60.11
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 4.1.5: Distribution of former teachers who left education sector  
by occupation group (per cent)
Whole 
sample
–30  
years old
31–40  
years old
41–50  
years old
51–60  
years old
Managers 33.1 11.6 32.0 50.6 47.9
Other professionals 29.7 31.9 32.3 25.5 28.6
Clerical support workers 29.9 43.9 25.4 15.8 17.1
Service and sales workers 3.9 7.9 5.5 3.7 1.1
Elementary occupations 3.4 4.7 4.8 4.4 5.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
The table indicates that inexperienced former teachers who exited the educa-
tion sector work not only in other professional jobs, but they also go to oth-
er employment for higher earnings. 44 per cent of former teachers who are 
younger than 30 years of age work as office or administrative support and 
about 8 per cent as service and sales workers. The majority of 31–40 year old 
former teachers work as managers or professionals, a quarter of them become 
clerical support workers, and 5 per cent of them go to service and sales jobs. 
More than half of the former teachers who are older than 41 become man-
agers, a quarter of them go to other professional jobs, and 16–17 per cent 
of them obtain employment as clerical support. About 5 per cent of former 
teachers work in elementary occupations in all age groups of former teachers.
Conclusions
This chapter investigated the effect of salaries on teachers attrition. Results 
show that earnings matter. The lower the salary of a teacher the larger is the 
probability that the teacher will go to another job or becomes inactive in all 
age-groups of teachers, but the effect is stronger for young teachers. The ma-
jority of exiting young teachers leave the education sector and find a job out-
side the education sector. Teachers aged 41–50 remain in teaching with the 
highest probability, all other age groups find another job or become inactive 
with a larger probability. The public sector wage increase in 2002 did reduce 
attrition rates of young teachers’ temporarily, but the effect disappeared as 
the relative earnings of young teachers began to deteriorate again thereafter. 
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Attrition rates of young teachers who are younger than 30 or the 31–40 year 
old group returned to the level where it had been before the salary increase 
or even worsened. Attrition rates of older teachers decreased after Septem-
ber 2002. In 2013, the so-called “teacher career model” was introduced in 
Hungary, and the base salary of teachers was increased in certain parts of the 
pay scale. At the same time, a number of earlier bonuses and supplements 
were abolished. So, we do not know yet if the total salary of teachers or cer-
tain groups of teachers has increased or decreased and how relative salaries 
of teachers have changed. Further analysis will be needed, when micro-level 
data on teacher salaries for 2013 and for the subsequent years will be availa-
ble, to evaluate how the new conditioning of teacher salaries has affected the 
relative wages of teachers and the attractiveness of the teaching profession.
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Before the transition teachers earned about 70 per 
cent of other graduate salaries. After 1989, there 
was a dramatic decrease in the relative wages of 
teachers that was temporarily tempered by wage 
increases in some years: in 1992 and 1995. At the 
lowest point, in 1999–2000, the relative wages of 
teachers slightly exceeded 40 per cent of average 
graduate salaries. After the 2001 and 2002 year 
wage increase for public servants the wage lag of 
teachers ameliorated to a 1989 year level, but fol-
lowing that point the lag worsened once again from 
year to year. The increase in salary levels had lost its 
value within a few years. In 2012 the average teach-
er earned 49 per cent of average graduate salaries 
and, in 2013, 51 per cent (Figure B4.1.1).
Figure B4.1.1: Average teacher salaries as a 
percentage of other graduate salaries, 1986–2013
Source: Based on data of Wage Tariff Surveys of the 
National Employment Service.
There are marked differences in the relative posi-
tion of teachers by educational level, years of expe-
rience and gender (Figure B4.1.2). The lag is larger 
for men than for women, larger for those teach-
ers who have a master’s degree than for those who 
have a bachelor degree. By years of experience, the 
relative wage profile of teachers takes a U-shaped 
line. The relative wage lag for the youngest and old-
est teachers is much smaller than for those who 
have 10–15 years of experience. In the first 10–15 
years of experience, there are widening differen-
tials. The reason for this is that the salary schedule 
of teachers is quite different from the structure of 
4.1.1 Teacher salaries in the public sector (1986–2013)
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compensation in the non-teaching labour market 
– the teachers’ pay scale rewards only degree level 
and experience.
Figure B4.1.2: Teachers’ relative salaries by years  
of experience and level of educational attainment 
2001, 2003, 2011
Source: Based on data of Wage Tariff Surveys of the 
National Employment Service.
The wage increase was uniform for all teachers. The 
base salary was increased by 50 per cent. The sal-
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ary increase only lessened the widening lag behind 
other graduates’ salaries during the first ten years 
of experience but did not correct it. (See the study 
of János Köllő János, in In Focus). In 2013 the rela-
tive wage lag was increasing by years of experience 
to a smaller extent than it was in 2003, but it still 
holds true that young teachers during the first 10–
15 years of their career find themselves in a worse 
and worse relative position from year to year com-
pared to other graduates.
Hungarian teachers’ relative salaries compared to 
other graduates earnings are low by international 
comparison. Teachers’ statutory salaries for those 
with 15 years of experience were much lower in 
2011 at all educational levels compared to earnings 
for tertiary educated workers as the EU or OECD 
average shows (Figure B4.1.3).
International comparable statistics on teacher 
salaries relative to earnings for tertiary educated 
workers are available only for recent years so long-
run changes cannot be tracked in this respect. Data 
are available for longer periods on teacher salaries 
relative to per capita GDP (Figure B4.1.4). Between 
1996 and 2010 teacher salaries relative to per capita 
GDP were lower at all educational levels than the 
OECD average. In consequence of the public serv-
ants wage increase in 2002 the difference had de-
creased between Hungarian teacher salaries rela-
tive to per capita GDP and the OECD average, but 
thereafter the difference began to increase again. 
Between 2008 and 2010 the increase in the differ-
ence was due to the fact that between 2008 and 
2010 in a part of the OECD countries teacher sal-
aries increased relative to per capita GDP, in spite 
of the economic crises, while in Hungary teacher 
salaries decreased during the same period.
Figure B4.1.3: Teacher salaries relative to earnings for tertiary educated workers aged 25–64 (2011)*
* Teachers with 15 years of experience. ■ Source: Based on data of OECD Education at a Glance 2013. Table D.3.2.
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Figure B4.1.4: Statutory salaries of teachers* compared to per capita GDP, 1996–2010
* Teachers with 15 years of experience. ■ Source: Based on data of OECD Education at a Glance 2013. D.3.4.
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4.2. Labour mobility and employee bargaining power in 
healthcare – Regional overview
Imre Gergely Szabó
In Hungary, the wages of government workers were frozen and in some cases 
reduced between 2008 and 2012. Within this very diverse set of employees, 
resident physicians were the only group capable of taking successful collective 
action and achieving wage increases that were extended to the entire health-
care sector. However, the 2011 mass resignation campaign organized by the 
Hungarian Association of Resident Physicians was not unique in the Visegrád 
region.1 Similar protest events took place in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. Most importantly, in all these cases (including Hungary) the protest 
organizers took advantage of the issue of medical emigration and the resulting 
labour shortages. After the 2004 EU-enlargement, the westward migration 
of healthcare professionals from these countries intensified, causing further 
deterioration in health service coverage and quality. On the other hand, large-
scale emigration increased the bargaining power of employees who remained 
in their home countries. Trade unions and professional associations used the 
issue of emigration to justify their wage demands and claimed that the only 
way to stop the exodus of professionals was to raise salaries at home. Further-
more, knowing how easy it is to find a job abroad, trade unions and profes-
sional associations of doctors launched mass resignation campaigns to back 
up their claims. Results were similar across the region: in all four countries, 
significant wage increases were achieved for all healthcare workers, but above 
all for doctors. Besides, in all cases, contentious action – most importantly 
in the form of resignation campaigns-proved to be more effective than col-
lective bargaining. Protesters addressed their claims not to employer associa-
tions but directly to the central government. Similarly, in most instances the 
results were underwritten by statutory laws or government orders rather than 
by collective agreements. This was the case even in Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic where industry-level collective bargaining is stronger than in Hun-
gary. Nevertheless, there were serious cross-country differences with regard 
to the timing of the events, the main actors involved and their relationship. 
The most pronounced conflicts between the government and trade unions 
and amongst trade unions could be observed in Slovakia, while disputes in 
Hungary were resolved in a relatively peaceful manner.
Within the region, Poland experienced the first major wave of emigration-
related healthcare protest in 2007. The bargaining dispute lasted for almost a 
year and revolved around doctors’ call for a starting monthly salary of 5000 
zlotys (approximately 1300 euros at 2007 ECB reference exchange rate) for 
resident physicians and 7500 zlotys (2000 euros) for specialists. Doctors also 
1 This overview relies on the fol-
lowing news sources: English-
language news sites Spectator on 
Slovakia and Prague Post on the 
Czech Republic, Hungarian-lan-
guage sites rezidens.hu, eduline.
hu and ujszo.com on Slovakia 
and Hungary.
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demanded that these sums should be included in an industry-level collective 
agreement. Similarly to Hungary, industry-level collective bargaining tradi-
tionally plays a minor role in Poland. After failed negotiations at the hospital 
level, the trade union of doctors turned directly to the Ministry of Healthcare. 
Having deemed the ministry’s offer unsatisfactory, the union launched a strike 
that affected almost 200 of the country’s 700 hospitals (Czarzasty, 2007). In 
some hospitals, doctors collectively handed in their notice, paralyzing entire 
departments. Eventually, the 2007 crisis was solved by local level agreements, 
but the government later on gradually increased wages at the industry level 
as well, which may have contributed to the slowing down of medical emigra-
tion from the country (Kautsch and Czabanowska, 2011).
While emigration is a less severe issue in the Czech Republic, the Czech 
doctors’ union was the first to organize a structured resignations campaign. 
While Polish doctors walked out spontaneously from hospitals, their Czech 
colleagues did this as part of a pre-planned action. The main trade union of 
physicians (Lékařský odborový klub, LOK) launched its “Thank you, we are 
leaving” campaign in March 2010, encouraging medical doctors employed in 
hospitals to resign prior to December 31 of the same year. Setting the wages 
of doctors between 1.5 and 3 times the national average featured prominent-
ly within the 13-point demands list issued by the union. As of 20 December 
2010, 3,513 out of the 18,000 physicians employed in Czech hospitals handed 
in their notice, taking effect from 1 March 2011 (Veverková, 2011).
This move triggered a crisis that lasted until February 2011 and ended with 
the government granting an immediate wage increase of between 5 and 8 
thousand korunas for doctors (the average wage in 2010 ranged between 45–
50 thousand korunas, equalling 1800–2000 euros at 2010 ECB reference ex-
change rate). The government also committed itself to a long-term settlement 
under which doctors’ salaries would reach 1.5 times the national average by 
2013. The rest of the hospital workforce was not covered by the agreement, 
but right after the doctors’ protest, the nurses’ pay scale was upgraded and 
they were also promised a 10 per cent wage increase from January 2012. Fur-
ther debates erupted on how to secure the resources for these undertakings. 
Doctors’ pay increase was supposed to be financed by cutting the number of 
acute care beds and by restructuring the hospital procurement system. Those 
hospitals that were not run by the health ministry – but typically by the re-
gions – did not receive any extra funds to cover the increases, neither from 
the central government nor from health insurance companies.
Emigration is not a new topic of bargaining disputes in Slovak healthcare, 
but until 2011 these debates were mostly contained within the existing in-
dustry-level bargaining forums (Kaminska and Kahancová, 2011, 199). This 
changed in autumn 2011, when following the Czech example, the Slovak 
Trade Union of Doctors (Lekárske Odborové Združenie, LOZ) called for 
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mass resignation. Responding to the call, around 2,500 doctors handed in 
their notice, mostly anaesthetists, whose work is crucial for most hospital de-
partments. LOZ addressed the Radicova government with three major de-
mands: doctors salaries should be raised to a level of between 1.5 and 3 times 
the national average, the hospital financing system should be restructured 
and hospital corporatization should be stopped.2
Compared to the other cases, Slovak protests caused the most serious dis-
ruption in the healthcare system. After their notice period ended on 1 De-
cember 2011, 1,200 doctors indeed refused to take up work. In response, the 
government declared a state of emergency extending to 15 hospitals and asked 
neighbouring countries (including Hungary) to provide substitute medical 
staff. The conflict was resolved by an agreement between the government and 
LOZ in late December 2011 that guaranteed the termination of corporatiza-
tion and a three-stage wage increase. The first two stages were executed prior 
to June 2012, increasing resident salaries to 1.2 times and specialist salaries 
to 1.9 times the national average wage. The final step is still to be completed, 
but it will result in 1.25 times the national average for resident doctors and 
2.3 times for specialists (Czíria, 2012a).
In the wake of the 2011 autumn doctors’ resignation campaign, internal 
conflicts ensued both on the employer and on the employee side of Slovak 
healthcare. Employers were divided on the issue of how to split up the costs 
among the central budget, the health insurance companies and the hospi-
tals. On the employee side open hostilities broke out between LOZ and the 
nurses’ unions. Shortly after the agreement was reached between the doctors 
and the government, the Slovak parliament also raised the statutory wages of 
nurses – to a range of 640 to 928 euros per month depending on qualifica-
tions and years in service. Nevertheless, the medical chamber – being closely 
associated with the doctors’ trade union – attacked the law at the constitu-
tional court, claiming that due to the lack of allocated fiscal resources, it en-
dangers the functioning of hospitals (Czíria, 2012b). It seems that this time, 
doctors overrepresented in hospital management acted as employers not as 
employees. In 2013, the court ruled in favour of the Medical Chamber and 
annulled the wage increase for nurses.
Despite the fact that on purchasing power parity, Hungarian physicians’ 
wages are the lowest in the Visegrád region, (Reginato and Grosso, 2011, p. 
4) Hungary was the last to be reached by the wave of protests. One of the 
reasons might have to do with the fact that medical emigration from the 
country accelerated only after 2007.3 Besides, the resignation campaign 
was not organized by traditional trade unions but by the Hungarian As-
sociation of Resident Physicians, a relatively new formation. Nevertheless, 
once protests started, the Medical Association (MOK) and its trade union 
branch (MOSZ) expressed support. Due to the nature of the main organ-
2 Corporatization denotes the 
process during which public 
sector institutions change legal 
status and become corporations. 
In Slovakia, between 2003 and 
2006, municipality-run hospi-
tals were turned into corpora-
tions while public ownership 
remained intact. The aim of the 
reform was to introduce stricter 
rules of financial management 
for hospitals. In 2011, the Radi-
cova government was going to 
extend corporatization to uni-
versity hospitals as well.
3 According to the Office of 
Health Authorisation and Ad-
ministrative Procedures, after 
a slight decrease between 2005 
and 2007, the number of phy-
sicians applying for overseas 
recognition of their medical 
qualification increased from 
695 to 1108 from 2007 to 2012.
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izer, demands focused on the improvement of wages and working condi-
tions for young doctors, but more general claims were also formulated, in-
cluding the long-term goal of increasing practising physicians’ wages three 
times above the national average. As of December 2011, the Association of 
Resident Physicians collected 2,500 resignation letters, which would have 
been handed in to employers in January 2012 and would have taken effect 
in March the same year. Direct confrontation was avoided however, as in 
the final days of 2011, the government offered a deal that the resident doc-
tors found suitable as a basis for negotiations. According to the agreement 
that was finalized in March 2012, doctors earning below a monthly gross 
of 350,000 Forints (1150 Euros, without on call duty), were entitled to an 
increase of 66,000 Forints. Above this level, the increase was gradually 
capped, deducting 5,000 Forints from the increase after every 10,000 For-
ints of higher original wages. Moreover, the government launched new, or 
expanded already existing, scholarships for resident physicians (Girasek and 
Szél, 2014). The wage increases extended to qualified nurses as well: 32% 
of them could expect a wage increase of 20,000 Forints per month while 
another 47% 15 thousand per month. A new round of wage increases fol-
lowed suit in 2013. It would be too early to assess how these recent wage 
increases affected emigration trends. In 2013, 955 physicians applied for a 
certificate of good standing necessary for taking up employment abroad, a 
drop in numbers compared to the years 2010–2012, but still higher than 
in the pre-crisis years (Girasek and Szél, 2014). Besides, the leaders of the 
Association of Resident Physicians gained countrywide recognition in the 
wake of the events, which they also want to exploit in a bid to influence poli-
cies of the Medical Chamber. It remains to be seen whether they succeed, 
but the “Residents” are getting involved in much broader issues of health 
politics. For instance in 2013 they launched an awareness campaign to fight 
against the widespread practice of informal payments.
The protest wave in the medical sector that spread through the region be-
tween 2007 and 2012 has several features that highlight the contradictions 
of collective bargaining within the public sector. First of all, despite decen-
tralization and public management reforms, the ultimate responsibility for 
public sector employment relations is still born by the central government. 
Even in countries where the autonomy of hospitals is stronger than in Hun-
gary, healthcare employees addressed their claims directly to the central gov-
ernment. Besides, it seems that within the public sector only healthcare em-
ployees have a generally favourable labour market position as a result of the 
migration opportunities they enjoy (Kaminska and Kahancová, 2011). Other 
public sector professions such as teachers or members of the armed forces have 
much less demand for their services and much less job opportunities abroad, 
which decreases their bargaining power.
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The weaker bargaining position of teachers became evident during recent 
events in Slovakia and Hungary. In autumn 2012, one year after the doctors’ 
resignation campaign, the Slovak teachers’ union OZPŠaV started collective 
action in a bid to achieve a 10% wage increase, which was modest compared 
to that which the doctors received (Czíria, 2013). Reacting to a short warn-
ing strike in October 2012, the government offered 5 per cent but ruled out 
a more generous offer, referring to the difficult fiscal situation. The union re-
jected this and launched an open-ended strike, affecting three quarters of the 
country’s schools. Demonstrating a willingness to yield, the government pro-
posed 7.5%, but a portion of this increase should have been covered by munici-
palities. The leadership of OZPŠaV accepted the offer despite several school-
level strike committees expressing dissatisfaction with it. Problems with the 
implementation of the deal and the government’s lack of commitment to a 
long-term solution triggered a renewed strike threat from OZPŠaV in 2013, 
but no actual steps were taken. In Hungary, starting from 2012, and after four 
years of a wage freeze, the government carried out a wage settlement in educa-
tion from above, in parallel with the re-centralization of schools and with the 
establishment of the National Board of Teachers, a corporative professional 
organization with compulsory membership. The two main trade unions in 
education (PSZ and PDSZ) fiercely criticized the centralization of the school 
system. They claimed that the new wage system was unfair and also that the 
new representative body was just a puppet of the government. Nevertheless, 
they were not able to influence government decisions to a significant degree.
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4.2.1 Doctors’ pay and gratuities
János Köllő
Official pay in the health sector is low by any stand-
ards and it even declined substantially during the 
crisis. As it is shown by Figure B4.2.1 graduate pro-
fessionals in the sector – predominantly doctors – 
were earning significantly less already in 2008, than 
graduates with similar education and age employed 
in the private sector. Similarly to other graduates in 
the public sector, the gap was widest at the age of 
35–40 years for doctors as well – on average 43%. 
As a result of the abolition of the 13th month pay 
and other measures, the gap increased to 51 per 
cent in this cohort by May 2010. At the same time 
the (official) relative pay of the most highly paid 
doctors – those aged over 55 – dropped even more 
drastically: from 90 per cent to 70 per cent.
Figure B4.2.1: Monthly gross pay of graduates  
in the health care sector expressed as a percentage 
of monthly gross pay of graduates in the private 
sector, May 2008, 2010 and 2013
Source: Wage Tariff Survey, 2008, 2010 and 2013. 
Moving means by three years.
Between May 2010 and 2013 the pay of doctors 
aged under 40 years increased by around seven or 
eight percentage points, however the pay of older 
doctors declined even further with the exception of 
those near retirement. The selection bias resulting 
from the increased exit of low-paid older employees 
might have also paid a role in this. Even now, doc-
tors aged 40 earn no more than half of what their 
counterparts in the private sector are paid.
A distinctive feature of the struggle of doctors 
and nurses for higher pay in Hungary has been its 
initial link to the fight against gratuities. Although 
patients across Eastern Europe and in some South-
ern European countries routinely pay gratuities for 
health care (see e.g. the paper by Chawla, Berman 
and Kawiorska, 1998 on Poland, Delcheva, Bala-
banova and McKee’s 1997 on Bulgaria, Sabiriano-
va and Zelenska’s 2011 study on Russia, Burak and 
Vian’s 2007 research on Albania and Liaropoulos et 
al. 2008 report on Greece), but as far as we know, 
only in the Hungarian “pay movement” the idea of 
replacing gratuities with higher pay was put for-
ward in the past years. The Hungarian Resident 
Association started the “green cross” movement at 
the end of 2010. Doctors supporting the movement 
would have given up gratuities for a 100 per cent 
pay rise (they would have expressed their support 
to the movement by wearing a green cross badge). 
However, the proposal was against the interest of 
older doctors benefitting from gratuities and there-
fore, with pressure from professional bodies (Hun-
garian Medical Council, Hungarian Medical As-
sociation, Association of Hospitals), it was rapidly 
taken off the agenda of pay negotiations.
There are various obstacles to tackling gratui-
ties. Firstly, the opposition of senior doctors should 
be expected because it is unlikely that official pay 
would be brought into line with actual pay that in-
cludes gratuities, which widely vary with age, rank 
and field of practice.
Secondly, replacing gratuities with pay would 
also have major budgetary implications: Bognár, 
Gál and Kornai (1999) estimated annual gratuity 
payments at 33 billion forints in the early 1990s, 
Szinapszis Ltd at 45 billion forints in 2008, and Pa-
tika Health Fund at 73 billion in 2009.*
* The last figure was considered exaggerated by experts 
of Szinapszis Ltd, see Kiss (2009).
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Last but not least, the reluctance of tax payers 
should also be considered: although they would 
happily get rid of the burden of gratuity payments 
and they overwhelmingly support a major pay rise 
for doctors,** at the same time over 80 per cent of 
voters rejected co-payment (a small fee for medi-
cal consultations and a daily fee for hospital stays) 
on top of social insurance contributions to create 
additional funding for health care – among oth-
ers, to combat gratuity payment – at a referendum 
in 2008. Since Fidesz – who initiated the referen-
dum – came to government, the introduction of any 
general co-payment scheme is very unlikely. In the 
current context, demand and supply of gratuities 
can be reduced by additional government spend-
ing and the introduction of new taxes (such as the 
“hamburger tax”), or by supplementary insurance 
and additional fee-paying services. Obviously, the 
last two can only provide a solution for the better-
off upper- and middle classes for whom the “obli-
gation” of gratuity payment is a lesser burden an-
yway (Szende and Culyer, 2006). Pay agreements 
that set out a gradual increase of wages signed in 
2012–2013 created a necessary but insufficient con-
dition to tackle the issue of gratuity: competitive 
and fair pay, and a health care sector free from gra-
tuity payment are no longer as interconnected as 
in the original programme of the Hungarian Resi-
dent Association.
** According to a survey by Szinapszis Ltd 88 per cent 
of the population would support the pay increase 
of health care workers. One third of the population 
would consider a 50 per cent rise fair, and 11 per cent 
would double pay (Nógrádi Tóth, 2010).
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4.3 Nurses and other health care professionals
Erzsébet Berki, Éva Czethoffer & Endre Szabó
The wage demands of health care professionals have been very much in the pub-
lic eye in recent years. The Association of Hungarian Residents has organized 
a number of actions, and regular media reports on the emigration of health 
care workers have spotlighted working conditions in the health care sector 
(for details see sub-chapter 4.2 of this issue of In Focus). This article explores 
the status and movement of health care professionals on the labour market.
Both the public (central and local governments) and the private sectors have 
been equally involved in health care for many years. The outcome has been a 
patchwork of conditions set by various employers. Some people work as pub-
lic service staff while others are straightforward employees, while overtime 
work and a variety of special contracts including ones that legally transform 
health care workers into private entrepreneurs try to fill in the gaps generat-
ed by a shortage of labour. The entanglement of the private as well as central 
and local government sectors in this area even muddles up the statistics, but 
overall trends can be unearthed by using a variety of databases (Figure 4.3.1)
Figure 4.3.1: Number of health care workers and average earnings
Source: Central Statistics Office Statistical Database (KSH STADAT) Annual time-
lines (labour market, Tables 2.1.33., 2.1.35, and 2.1.38 and 2.1.43) and own calcula-
tions.
KSH data covering employment from 2007 to 2012 very clearly shows that 
employment in the public (central government) health care sector has been 
declining steadily while in the private sector – which includes businesses in 
which the government is a minority or majority owner – it has been on the 
rise. Overall however, the numbers have gone neither up nor down since 2008. 
There was one break in this picture, in 2013, when what till then had been pri-
vate business entities were turned into central-budget-run institutions. That 
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year private sector employment went down by roughly 14,000 persons, while 
the number of people working in the public sector increased.
At this same time, mean earnings in the private sector were slightly below 
the average for the public sector (the biggest difference was in 2010, when it 
amounted to HUF 14,000/month). For all intents and purposes, earnings 
stood still between 2008 and 2011, and then began to rise in 2012–2013. 
Data for 2013 reflects a more significant rise in average earnings in the pub-
lic sector than in the private one (these numbers also reflect the earnings lev-
els of the staff that had been moved from the private to the public sector). By 
that time the earnings difference between the two sectors amounted to over 
HUF 11,000/month to the benefit of the public sector.
Public (central and local government) health care professionals 
and their career paths from 2002 to 2008
There are a number of factors within the overall trend cited above that sur-
face when exploring the career paths of health care professionals working in 
the public (central and local government) sector. We used data available in 
the databank of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Economic 
and Regional Studies (MTA KRTK) to investigate this. In 2002, the sam-
ple covered half of the population between ages 15 and 74, of whom 114,089 
people spent at least one month of the timeframe under investigation working 
in health care. This sample was made up of workers in the health care profes-
sions,1 who constituted 4 per cent of total employees, a number that was slow-
ly declining. During the period of the study (2002–2008) 32,809 members 
of the sample worked exclusively for private employers, and were therefore 
excluded from the sample on which the study focused. Some 81,283 people 
worked as public service employees or civil servants for at least a portion of 
the period, and were therefore included in this study. Together, they were em-
ployed for 88.5 per cent of the timeline under observation, were unemployed 
for 2 per cent, and were inactive for 0.65 per cent.2 Some 8.77 per cent of the 
sample was not in any of the above groups. They were recipients of some sort 
of social transfer for 70 per cent of the months observed. Thirty-four per cent 
received old-age pensions, 12 per cent disability pensions or disability pen-
sions following workplace accidents, and 16 per cent received benefits linked 
to small children (child-care aid/assistance/job substitution pay/support/ma-
ternity-confinement aid). The remaining 38 per cent received some other so-
cial transfer (e.g. a pension transferred through a different configuration, a 
family-member benefit, an allowance, or a fee for nursing a family member).
Our investigation revealed that 39,331 people or nearly half (48 per cent) of 
the 81,283 people in the sample quit the sector3 during the period under explo-
ration. A growing number of people left the public sector each year between 
2002 and 2006. In 2002 the number of people from the sample who quit was 
1 The selection was based on 
ISCO codes. 23 occupations 
listed with ISCO codes were 
included. Doctors obviously 
were not. Therefore, the data 
in the sample cannot be com-
pared with the sectoral data of 
the NACE employer codes. At 
the same time it is obvious that 
most health care occupations 
are in the health care sector. The 
number of components in the 
sample tells us that a far larger 
number of people enter and 
leave the health care sector than 
reflected in the annual average 
data given by KSH, something 
also supported by the high ratio 
of people quitting the profession. 
(See below).
2 We call a person inactive if 
based in OEP (National Health 
Insurance) data the person is 
not insured in his/her own right 
or was unable to appear on the 
labour market. People unable 
to appear are (a) below the age 
of 18, (b) have been placed in 
live-in welfare/social facilities, 
(c) are homeless, (d) are receiv-
ing sanatorium-type care (aged 
18–24), (e) pay an 11 per cent 
health care contribution, (f) are 
dependent family members or g) 
receive cash benefits following 
termination of their insurance.
3 Since a person has the option 
of quitting more than once, the 
number of quitters (40,213) is 
higher than the number of peo-
ple leaving the sector for good. 
(The quitters do not include 
people who terminated employ-
ment and then re-established it 
within one month. Quitting can 
also mean leaving a position for 
another job, or leaving it and be-
coming inactive/unemployed.)
in focus
202
3,349. By 2008 the number was up to 6,541 (it peaked in 2007 when 6,950 
left, meaning that the 2008 figure shows a slight decline compared to 2007).
We have reliable information on the status of roughly 75 per cent of indi-
viduals after they quit public (central or local government run) health care. 
Over the 2002–2008 timeframe there was a 6 per cent increase in the ratio of 
people who quit and found other jobs, and a 9 per cent rise in the proportion 
of people who remained jobless after leaving the sector (Table 4.3.1). About 
2 per cent became inactive, and the ratio of those receiving some other mis-
cellaneous social transfer dropped significantly (by 8 per cent). Of the group 
within the “other care” column 78 per cent received some sort of social trans-
fer. Some 62 per cent of these received old age pensions while 8.52 per cent 
were granted some child-related benefit.
Table 4.3.1: Breakdown of people quitting public health care service  
in the years of the survey by their ensuing labour market status (%)
Year Employed Unemployed Inactive Other care Total
2002 64.88 0.85 1.94 32.32 100.00
2003 66.99 0.74 2.31 29.96 100.00
2004 64.88 0.85 1.94 32.32 100.00
2005 55.47 13.14 2.19 29.20 100.00
2006 55.81 12.26 2.14 29.79 100.00
2007 68.43 12.14 2.17 17.25 100.00
2008 70.23 9.75 2.11 17.90 100.00
Total 63.02 10.03 2.06 24.89 100.00
Total, capita 25,342 4,032 830 10,009 40,213
We know the type of jobs to which 21,031 people switched. These were the 
people who were re-employed. Some 36 per cent remained in health care 
(most of them in the private sector – here we do not know how many were 
transferred due to the tendency of outsourcing from the public sector), 9 per 
cent went into social and labour market services, 14 per cent into some other 
service, and 5.8 per cent into a health care activity requiring a college degree. 
Three per cent of the latter remained public service employees or civil serv-
ants. The rest, which is about half of the people finding new jobs, chose from 
a wide variety of options ranging from catering to machine operation. Most 
of the people remaining in the health sector were general or specialist nurses 
and specialist assistants who found new jobs which statistically shifted them 
to a different economic sector, even though they actually continued working 
in the same occupation. A comparatively high ratio (6.7 per cent) of people 
who left the sector took jobs as social service nurses.
If we look at the above numbers in their entirety we have to conclude that 
half the people employed in public sector health care left the sector and one 
quarter have also quit the profession during the seven-year timeframe of the 
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study. Since the overall number of people working in the sector showed only 
a slight decline, the obvious conclusion is that the sector attracted almost the 
same numbers of new workers as the number that departed.
The people the statistics lost
As already mentioned, we know to where 75 per cent of the people in the study 
went and what their status was on the labour market after they left public 
sector health care. Exactly 10,009 people in the sample (24.8 per cent of the 
quitters) left the labour market altogether (see Table 4.3.1).
Table 4.3.2 shows us the kind of social transfers they received, and also 
shows that 2,204 people received no assistance of any kind (this is equivalent 
to 22 per cent of all the people leaving the labour market and 5.4 per cent of 
all the people leaving the public health care sector).
Table 4.3.2: Social transfers received by the people who left the labour market
Social transfer
Received by  
(number of persons)
Breakdown  
(%)
Gyes (child care aid) 321 3.21
Gyed (Salary replacement for child care 109 1.09
Gyet (Support for raising children) 360 3.60
Tgyás (Maternity/confinement assistance) 63 0.63
Old-age pension 4,847 48.43
Disability pension 1,320 13.2
Disability pension (for accident victim) 12 0.12
Other pension 31 0.31
Disability support 54 0.54
Welfare-type support 166 1.66
Nursing fee (for nursing family member) 113 1.13
Care for family member 408 4.08
Benefit/assistance received, total 7,804 456.00
No data 2,204 22.02
Grand total 10,009 100.00
This sample tells us that there are really about 4,000–5,000 people for whom 
we have no data following their departure from public health care, and 
who apparently have no job and receive no social transfer of any sort. We 
presume that they are among the people working on the health care black 
market or some other black market, or that they have left the country to 
work elsewhere without the knowledge of the domestic authorities. We be-
lieve that although the study period has ended, the number of people disap-
pearing from the statistical rolls has continued to rise since there were no 
measures prior to the salary increases of 2013 that would have reduced the 
number of people leaving the sector, while it became even more difficult to 
access social transfers.
in focus
204
Changes in the incomes of people leaving public sector health care
We have seen that the overall number of people in the sample leaving the 
sector was 39,331 (40,213 in all who quit), while the number of people who 
quit to do other work was 25,342. In other words, about 63 per cent of the 
quitters are still working (they are the ones who the health care sector could 
continue to employ if working conditions were satisfactory). When looking 
at the changes in incomes following the job changes we took the mean4 earn-
ings for a maximum of six months of the previous year to be the income be-
fore the job change (which led to the loss of some of the sample, because peo-
ple who began working later did not have an income that fit the criteria). The 
post-job-change income we used was the mean salary for a maximum of six 
months on the new job, which did not include the salary for the first month. 
We had sufficient data on 16,561 people and when calculating their earnings 
we discounted them to the 2008 level.
Incomes for most of the job-changers – 51 per cent – went down. For 40.7 
per cent incomes rose and for 8.3 per cent we were unable to make the com-
parison. The earnings of the individual people compared to their own spe-
cific earlier earnings yielded a 110.7 per cent combined average (standard 
deviation 1.35). The investigation based on income levels showed that when 
“before” earnings were below HUF 120,000/month the changes resulted in 
higher earnings, but when they had been higher, the “after” earnings declined. 
When earlier earnings were above HUF 160,000 the decline was over 10 per 
cent. The high ratio of people suffering earnings losses suggests that the ma-
jority of the people quitting public (central or local government-run) health 
care were unable to sustain their earnings. To be more precise, wherever they 
went they were faced with the same downward pressure on earning levels that 
were frozen somewhere in the vicinity of the minimum wage or guaranteed 
minimum wage for skilled workers. This was particularly true for people who 
abandoned health care and switched to a different skilled profession or to a 
job that did not require professional skills.
To double-check our calculations we also ran the numbers reflecting the 
earnings changes using current (non-discounted) data. Using current earnings 
data the earnings of 38.5 per cent of the sample went downward. However, 
on the whole, the average of post-job-change earnings was 20 per cent high-
er than pre-job-change earnings had been. This tells us that for those people 
whose incomes rose, they rose significantly. Losses in earnings are partially 
explained by movement between sectors (Table 4.3.3).
The number of people switching from public sector health care to the private 
sphere between 2002 and 2008 was 8,431 (about 1,200/year, rising slightly 
from one year to the next). Differences in average earnings – noting that av-
erage earnings were lower in private health care (see Figure 4.3.1) – were suf-
4 We used this option to prevent 
earnings from being distorted 
upwards by possible severance 
pay. (The severance pay is in-
cluded in the earnings data of 
the year of job-termination, di-
vided up into months.)
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ficient to explain a portion of the decline in earnings,5 underlining that a shift 
to the private sector did not automatically increase earnings.6 Overall 2,002 
people switched from jobs in public sector healthcare to social care employ-
ment. This came to nearly 300 people a year. Given that in the period under 
investigation, average earnings in the social care sector were lower than in 
health care, we feel safe in assuming that people only switched to jobs in so-
cial care if their earnings were higher or at least as high on the new job. This 
is why a higher percentage of people in this sub-category saw their earnings 
increase. People who switched from jobs in the social care to ones in health 
care had the best chance of increasing their earnings – true at the time of the 
study and just as true today. In the period under investigation 1,185 people 
or an average of 169/year made this switch, albeit the actual number in 2002 
was only 126, rising to 187 in 2008. (For information of flows in 2012–2013, 
see Erzsébet Berki in sub-chapter 3.2 of this volume.)
Table 4.3.3: Movement between sectors, per annum
Year
From publica health care  
to private health care
From publica health care  
to social care
2002 558 137
2003 764 291
2004 1,158 333
2005 999 282
2006 1,092 268
2007 1,903 311
2008 1,957 380
Total 8,431 2,002
Available income data 7,036 1,475
Proportion of people whose earnings increased (%) 42.08 57.08
Changes in earnings (%) 107.25 117.05
a Central and local government-run combined.
An investigation by age shows us that this is also a factor in the decline in 
earnings. By using the data in the Individual Wage Survey we demonstrat-
ed that earnings for 18–44-year-olds tended on average to rise, while above 
the age of 45 earnings went down. This is connected with the fact that earn-
ings in the higher income brackets tend to drop more drastically after a job 
change (for more on this, see János Köllő in Chapter 1.) It is also probable 
that earnings prior to a job change include a significant amount of overtime, 
shift bonuses, and other bonuses, which older people lose because they are 
no longer willing to make the effort. In other words, they halt their earlier 
“self-exploitation” strategy.
An investigation of post-job-change occupations shows that the people 
whose earnings went up the most found jobs in areas requiring a college/
university degree. For instance, 81 people became family doctors, and their 
5 In 20 07 the government 
pushed forward the 13th month 
salary that would have been due 
in January 2008, by paying half 
of it in monthly instalments 
starting on 1 July. Then, at the 
start of 2008 it paid the remain-
ing half of the 13th month sal-
ary for 2007, but given that the 
advance had been paid earlier, 
the move reduced everyone’s 
monthly earnings in the public 
sector. Over the course of the 
year, a uniform HUF 15,000 was 
paid out twice to every public 
sector worker. 2008 also marked 
the last wage tariff increase (an 
average of 5 per cent). For more 
details see Berki et al. (2012). 
Thus, the government only 
offered compensation for the 
loss of the 13th month salary to 
low-income people in the public 
sector but not in the private one, 
while outsourcings continued.
6 We do not know how many of 
the shifts were voluntary – in 
other words, how many were 
actual job changes – and how 
many were the outcome of out-
sourcing, when a health care 
facility changed its profile from 
public to private sector and the 
person remained in the same job 
despite the sectoral shift.
in focus
206
earnings went up 2.4-fold. The people whose incomes rose the most steeply 
were among the ones who quit health care altogether. People who went into 
sales (121 people) saw their earnings go up 2.5-fold, while others (65 people) 
who took jobs in miscellaneous office occupations received a 2.8-fold jump 
in earnings.
In contrast, the biggest losers were people who took unskilled service in-
dustry jobs (such as driving a car, cleaning, or other unskilled work). The 
earnings of people working in occupations not requiring the type of degree 
needed in health care were more or less unchanged (1.0–1.2-fold differences) 
in other words, if their earnings went up as a result of the job change, it was 
not by much.
On the whole, it seems safe to say that the people with the greatest chance 
of increasing their earnings were college or university graduates who switched 
from the public sector to the private one and moved out of health care, unless 
he or she became a doctor or a dentist in the interim.
This brief analysis was intended to demonstrate that deeper-reaching chang-
es within a segment of the labour market can be explored with the appro-
priate data, and that once the causes are exposed it becomes possible to seek 
new tools to remedy the labour market problems of a given professional area. 
Since quitting from health care appears to have remained at a high level over 
the timeframe following the conclusion of this study,7 and while government 
measures taken between 2009 and 2013 (primarily the wage increases and 
opportunities for women to retire after 40 years of employment) have gener-
ated new flows, long timelines of data are worth analysis using similar meth-
ods, to investigate subsequent changes.
Reference
Berki, E.–Neumann, L.–Edelényi, M. and Varadovics, K. (2012): Public 
Sector Pay and Procurement in Hungary. National Report.
7 “According to a briefing from 
the ministry to our paper, and 
to data from the Permit-Grant-
ing and Public Administration 
Bureau, by 30 June 2013 some 
454 people had submitted re-
quests for certificates enabling 
them to work abroad from the 
authorities as against 542 in 
2012. This year, 247 of them 
were doctors while last year, 342 
were doctors. As far as other 
health care personnel with pro-
fessional skills are concerned, in 
the first half of 2012, 300 had 
requested certificates enabling 
them to work abroad while this 
year the number of requests for 
certificates was 360. There was 
a significant drop in the migra-
tion of doctors and residents 
under the age of 35. This is 
probably the outcome of the 
Lajos Markusovszky Stipend 
Program offering extra money 
for professions in short supply, 
and of gradual wage increases,” 
Népszabadság online (nol.hu) 
wrote on 31 August 2013 in an 
article on health care called “I 
Have No Concept Regarding 
the Future.”
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4.4 Law enforcement workers, before and after retirement
Erzsébet Berki, Éva Czethoffer & Endre Szabó
Significant legislative changes
The retirement system in Hungary has been under debate for decades. One 
topic under fire concerned the people who became entitled to pensions when 
comparatively young, and how to regulate the extensive group that took ad-
vantage of this perk.1 One distinct group within the individuals affected by 
this legislation has been made up of retirees from armed public service-em-
ployment relationship, more specifically from law-enforcement occupations.2 
The issue of this group and of revamping retirement regulations for it came 
up repeatedly in the government administrations holding office from 2002 
to 2010, but trade union opposition, arguments from the group in question, 
and a spotlight on wage issues halted any real reforms.
However, the administration that took office in 2010 did introduce a num-
ber of important retirement-related measures that impacted on this group. 
On 28 November 2011 Parliament adopted Act CLXVII. on Termination 
of Early Retirement, on Social Transfers before Retirement Age, and on Pub-
lic Service Allowances. The law was promulgated on 9 December, 2011, just 
22 days before it actually went into effect. Given its retroactive validity, the 
people affected had no way of preparing for the significant change in their 
living conditions.
The most important components of the law and the related amendments 
to the public service act that affected public servants (including law enforce-
ment workers) and defence workers were as follows.
• As of 1 January 2012 armed service pensioners born in 1955 or earlier will 
now receive a service allowance instead of their armed service pension until 
they reach the retirement age for a standard old-age pension.
• The amount of the service allowance will be the same as the armed service 
pension, but is subject to a deduction equivalent to the legal personal in-
come tax deduction (currently 16 per cent). The amount received will not 
be less than 1.5 times the amount of the minimum wage valid on 31 De-
cember (or HUF 117,000).
• For people in public service (including armed service) the standard retire-
ment age will now apply.
• If a person has completed 30 years of armed service, then five years prior 
to the retirement age valid for their age, they may request a transfer to pre-
retirement service in the “reserve corps”. The salary received will be the 
same amount as they would receive as a full pension at that particular time.
• If a person has completed 25 years in armed service, they may request lighter 
duties. The service time with this option is 35 hours/week. The person may 
1 According to data from Jan-
uary 2011, there were 42,600 
armed service retirees and the 
combined number of early re-
tirees under various pension 
schemes was 238,400, mean-
ing that benef its to people 
who retired prior to standard 
retirement age amounted to 
HUF 657 billion (Scharle and 
Kocsis, 2011).
2 In this chapter we generally 
use the terms “armed service” 
and “armed service pension”, 
nevertheless the legal changes 
also affected people in other oc-
cupations not necessarily us-
ing weapons but whose service 
employment relationship was 
regulated by the same law until 
2012. (For instance, fire fighters, 
custom officers. See the list of 
occupations affected in detail 
in Table 4.4.2 – Editor’s note).
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only work between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. and may not be assigned overtime. 
The monthly salary in this case will be equal to the amount of absence pay 
the individual would receive for the last month spent in regular service.
• A recipient of the service allowance who is below the age of standard re-
tirement may request admission to a special services (senior services) unit. 
(In this case the person would be transferred to the police force.) In this 
event the service allowance would be replaced by a net salary that must be 
at least as high as the service allowance had been, and may not be less than 
1.5 times the minimum wage. This salary must be increased annually by 
the same amount as the old-age pension. Weekly working hours and limits 
on the work schedule are the same as lighter duty service. Members of this 
service may be ordered to assist civil services (such as local governments, to 
supervise public works programmes). These regulations resulted in a sig-
nificant decline in the number of people choosing to retire (Table 4.4.1).3
Table 4.4.1: Trends showing numbers of individuals leaving the National Police Force
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  (until May 31)
Total number of persons leaving the police 
force 3,872 2,732 2,298 2,974 n. a. 668
Professional officers leaving n.a. 1,428 1,512 1,279 308 73
Professional officers retiring 1,857 n. a. n. a. 774 55 2
n.a. = no data available.
Source: Csikász (2013).
The introduction of the above measures was preceded by an extensive media 
campaign that, in essence, called it a travesty that robust and able-bodied 
people clearly able to work should receive pensions. This argument shifted 
the problem to a moral plane. Countering this argument the unions – and 
other advocacy groups such as the Hungarian Solidarity Movement – pos-
sibly brought about precisely because of this type of legislation – argued that 
most of the people affected had completed 25 years of service, after which they 
were no longer fit either physically or psychologically for heavy-duty work of 
this kind. They cited a great many examples. They also objected to the gov-
ernment reneging on a “social contract”, which they termed a tacit agreement 
with these people to the effect that they would spend 25 years in low-wage, 
physically demanding or risky jobs after which they would receive a pension 
and be free to launch a second career.
Retirement – when?
First of all, we set out to determine whether the rumours of “young people” 
enjoying armed service pensions were true or not. We used data available in 
the databank of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Economic 
3 There is no data on the number 
of allowance recipients. The data 
is not consistent but since, ac-
cording to Csikász (2012), the 
average age of the police officers 
working actively on the force 
is 26, we do get some idea of 
proportions.
berki, czethoffer & szabó: laW enforcement…
209
and Regional Studies (MTA KRTK), which includes information on the 
various legal setups under which people in the law enforcement professions 
are employed. Fully 50 per cent of the people involved were included in the 
sample, including 27,411 people whose work history included service in an 
armed service or law enforcement body, in either a military (defence) or law 
enforcement occupation between January 2002 and December 2008. Nearly 
90 per cent of the sample, we found, was made up of people in four profes-
sions (Table 4.4.2)
Table 4.4.2: Employment categories listed in the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO), with the number of persons  
in the given occupation, as of the dates on which they were first reported
ISCO 08 Occupation Number of persons (%)
110 Commissioned armed forces officers 5.917 21.59
210 Non-commissioned armed forces officers 9.315 33.98
310 Armed forces occupations, other ranks 7.499 27.36
3351 Customs and border inspectors 748 2.73
* Civil defence employee 2 0.01
3355 Police inspectors and detectives 21 0.08
5412 Police officers 754 2.75
5411 Fire fighter 2,043 7.45
5413 Prison guards 765 2.79
5414 Security guards 6 0.02
5419 Protective services workers not elsewhere classified 341 1.24
Total 27,411 100.00
* Occupation defined by the Hungarian system (FEOR 97) with no equivalent in 
ISCO 08.
Exactly 4,949 (18 per cent) of the people who spent any time at all between 
2002 and 2008 in any law enforcement occupation, retired during that peri-
od. These people either retired from their law enforcement position or from 
some other employer and occupation. The first group (those retiring from a 
law enforcement role) consisted of 4,519 people, not a particularly large num-
ber, even if we set up ratios and round out numbers and say that ten thousand 
people took armed service retirement over the seven years. In fact the annual 
average number of retirees was less than 1,500. There were exactly 3,954 peo-
ple, or 87.5 per cent of all retirees, serving in a law enforcement body at the 
time of their retirement or in the three months prior to it. (The people not 
included in this category were last observed in law enforcement positions on 
the database 4 to 78 months prior to their retirement.)4
Figure 4.4.1 shows an overall age profile. We can see that there are three sig-
nificant age groups: 40–41 year olds, 49–50 year olds, and 56 year olds. The 
particularly high level of 40–41 year olds is clearly because of the law. This 
group has been building service time since the age of 15 when it entered voca-
4 In this connection please note 
that when determining whether 
a person has the necessary ser-
vice time, the years of service 
were added to the years of civil-
ian service using a multiplier, so 
the rules of the service pension 
also influence the possible date 
on which the person may retire 
as a civilian.
050
100
150
200
250
300
62605856545250484644424038363432302826242220
Age
Persons
in focus
210
tional secondary school and at age 40, obtained the 25 years of service required 
to retire. (Anyone retiring earlier does not receive a full pension, and anyone 
retiring later is not likely to have begun their career in law enforcement, and 
thus needs to put in more time to reach the 25 years. However, some people 
eligible for retirement may simply want to work longer. These latter factors 
are particularly true for officers with full secondary or college educations.)
Figure 4.4.1: Age profile of retirees from law enforcement bodies,  
by age at retirement (2002–2008)
The average 45-year-old armed service retiree with 25–30 years of service is 
clearly younger than a civilian retiree. However, this configuration made it 
possible for these people to begin a second career, particularly if they had a 
profession they could use in civilian life. From a social point of view they are 
therefore in a positive and not a negative position. It was this second career 
path that was partially stifled by the law on early retirement and by a decree 
introduced in 2013 which banned recipients of pensions and allowances from 
working for public (central government) bodies.5
We do need to point out that there was a very significant difference be-
tween the overall number of people in the sample and the ISCO breakdown 
of the retirees. According to Table 4.4.3, occupations requiring a college ed-
ucation accounted for 21.6 per cent of the sample entering the field and for 
48.2 per cent of those leaving to retire. The situation was exactly the reverse 
for occupations not requiring a secondary education, where 27.4 per cent of 
the sample entered the field in the period in question and only 1.1 per cent 
retired (the differences were not this great in the other categories). This sug-
gests that people with college educations tend to follow the career paths ex-
pected of them and obtain their entitlement to pensions within the organi-
zation, while a significant portion of the low-education group leaves after a 
time and does not retire from law enforcement.
5 To be precise: if the person 
receiving the benef it is em-
ployed by a non-public sector 
employer and their annual earn-
ings are less than 18 times the 
monthly minimum wage (which 
in 2013 was HUF 1,764,000) 
that person may receive their 
full retirement benefits along 
with the salary. For more details 
see: http://nyugdij.adohirek.
hu/ and Act CCVIII of 2012. 
Note that since benefits granted 
before retirement age do not 
qualify as pensions and that the 
16 per cent deduction does not 
qualify as personal income tax, 
this raises a number of problems. 
For instance, these incomes are 
not eligible for family tax deduc-
tions. The 16 per cent is not de-
ducted from the remuneration 
given to reserve soldiers.
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Table 4.4.3: Breakdown of occupations at the time the person first appeared in the 
database and at the time of retirement, and the age of retirement, 2002–2008
ISCO 08 Occupation
When first 
appearing When retiring Difference
Average age  
at retirement
110 Commissioned armed forc-es officers 21,59 48,15 26,56 48
210 Non-commissioned armed forces officers 33,98 37,66 3,68 42
310 Armed forces occupations, other ranks 27,36 1,11 –26,25 40
3351 Customs and border inspec-tors 2,73 0,35 –2,38 49
* Civil defence employee 0,01 0,03 0,02 –
3355 Police inspectors and de-tectives 0,08 0,03 –0,05 –
5412 Police officers 2,75 1,77 –0,98 42
5411 Fire fighter 7,45 9,96 2,51 45
5413 Prison guards 2,79 0,68 –2,11 43
5414 Security guards 0,02 0,03 0,01 –
5419 Protective services workers not elsewhere classified 1,24 0,23 –1,01 50
Total 100,00 100,00 0,00 45
* Occupation defined by the Hungarian system (FEOR 97) with no equivalent in 
ISCO 08.
There are differences in the mean retirement age depending on occupa-
tion. Customs and financial service workers were the last to retire (age 49), 
while police and people with a secondary education retired earliest in all 
areas. People with college degrees worked six years longer than their coun-
terparts with secondary education but four of those six years were likely 
to have been spent full-time in college and another four years would have 
been spent in secondary school, which cuts the actual number of years 
spent working to 26.
Re-entering the workforce
Post-retirement employment data was available for 1,448 of the overall num-
ber of law enforcement retirees (3,954), or 36 per cent of the sample. Within 
this, only 6 per cent continued working in the same occupation, while the 
others found new occupations. The sample included retirees working in 37 
different occupations6 (see Table 4.4.4).7
The largest number of retirees in any one category was in non-material ser-
vices (227), within which 182 people (80 per cent) again chose a law enforce-
ment type occupation.
6 Using the combined (two 
digit) ISCO group and the four-
digit ISCO code, there are 217 
different occupations.
7 Note that the first data on 
post-retirement employment 
for 82.5 per cent of people was 
from 2007–2008. The reason is 
that the requirement to pay a 
contribution on a pension when 
employed dates from this time, 
thus this is when pension + em-
ployment became visible in the 
database.
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Table 4.4.4: Occupations of retired law enforcement workers
Occupation
Number of 
peoplea
Breakdown  
(%)
Cumulative 
breakdown
Occupations in non-material services 227 15,7 15,7
Commissioned armed forces officers 125 8,6 24,3
Simple service occupations 91 6,3 30,6
Miscellaneous, highly qualified, administrators 79 5,5 36,1
Operators of moving machinery 75 5,2 41,2
Heads of businesses or budget-sponsored organizations 75 5,2 46,4
Non-commissioned armed forces officers 74 5,1 51,5
Administrators in business or financial institutions 69 4,8 56,3
Miscellaneous administrators 64 4,4 60,7
Technicians and similar technical occupations 51 3,5 64,2
Miscellaneous 414 28.5 92,9
No data available 104 7,2 100,0
Total 1,448 100,0
a Details provided for only those occupations in which over 50 people worked.
Earnings before and after retirement
Earnings data have been summarized in Table 4.4.5, discounted to the 2008 
level.8 We had wage data for 3,823 of the 3,834 people in law enforcement 
occupations. We also had other wage-type income data for 143 people.
Table 4.4.5: Monthly earnings of retirees from public servant status  
prior to retirement (HUF)
ISCO 08 Occupation
Average wages of law 
enforcement person-
nel exclusively from 
law enforcement job
Other income 
from wages
Wages of law 
enforcement 
personnel from 
all jobsa
110 Commissioned armed forces officers 525,167 99,250 528,986
210 Non-commissioned armed forces officers 313,382 85,047 316,618
310 Armed forces occupations, other ranks 244,747 34,800 247,357
3351 Customs and border inspectors 277,326 277,326
* Civil defence employee 274,500 274,500
3355 Police inspectors and detectives 530,372 530,372
5412 Police officers 407,031 38,194 407,180
5411 Fire fighter 345,857 79,186 347,528
5413 Prison guards 274,049 274,049
5414 Security guards 304,240 304,240
5419 Protective services workers not elsewhere classified 263,181 263,181
Overall mean 419,279 90,407 422,494
a The earnings data of the various occupational groups cannot be added up because 
of the differing numbers of people in each group.
* Occupation with no equivalent in ISCO 08.
8 Earnings data include all ex-
tras received before departure 
(including possible severance 
pay and/or disarmament assis-
tance, etc.) Given the practice of 
granting people extra benefits 
before retirement from public 
administration in order to jack 
up the pension, the earnings lev-
el prior to quitting is generally 
higher than the normal earnings 
level. The two, three, and four 
month average of wages prior 
to retirement are 4.5 per cent 
higher than the average of the 
seven, eight or nine months of 
wages prior to retirement.
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The first thing we see from the data is that the earnings of people with col-
lege degrees are significantly higher than the other groups – a conclusion we 
can also draw from the wages system (see this issue of In Focus sub-chapter 
3.2). We also can see that there are significant differences from one occupa-
tional group to the next. For instance, investigators/detectives and police of-
ficers earn significantly more than people working in non-police organiza-
tions. Average earnings were also relatively high for private security guards, 
a comparatively new profession only a few decades old. People with college 
degrees tended most often to augment their law enforcement earnings with 
some other work-related income. Overall earnings were highest for this group 
but other work-related income also significantly improved the earnings status 
of people with a secondary education.
Post-retirement wage data are available for the occupations qualifying as 
valid at the time of retirement. We have no data on the amount of pension 
money received so we were unable to compare overall incomes. But we did 
compare earnings. Our point of departure when making this comparison was 
the mean wage for all occupations (which differs just minimally from the in-
comes of law enforcement personnel within the sector, but is more precise in 
describing changes in the wages of the persons and groups we are observing.)
As we can see from Table 4.4.6, we were able to link up the pre and post 
retirement earnings of 1,333 people. We were only able to obtain post-retire-
ment wage data for 1,162 people, which is rather a small sample. When inter-
preting the data we need to be aware that the earnings data include inflow to 
a person employed in a public service configuration that did not come from 
the person’s full-time job, meaning the job from which the person actually 
retired. Thus, post-retirement earnings may be made up of wages from this 
secondary work or from a new occupation or a different job.
As we can see, retirement came with a 50–70 per cent loss of earnings. 
However, given the rules of pension calculation, if the person had been con-
tinuously employed their pension would not have been much less than their 
earnings from their full time job. Thus, we have estimated the overall income 
of retirees working in other jobs to come to 130–150 per cent of their pre-
retirement incomes. At the same time, we need to point out that this is not 
a particularly high income level although it is substantially higher than na-
tionwide average earnings.
This was the income status which was reduced by changes in the law in 2012 
and 2013, partly by slapping a 16 per cent deduction onto the incomes of peo-
ple below full retirement age and partly by requiring anyone continuing to 
work in the public sector to suspend their pension or allowance. The result is 
that the 130–150 per cent earning position could sink to one of 84–95 per 
cent in roughly a month. This is why the measures generated so high a level 
of dissatisfaction among armed service workers.
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Table 4.4.6: Mean wages before and after retirement
ISCO 08 Occupation
Before retirement After retirement Change from 
pre-retirement, 
wages in per 
cent
average 
earnings from 
all jobs, HUF
number 
of people
average 
earnings from 
all jobs, HUF
number 
of people
110 Commissioned armed forces officers 529,284 739 263,264 642 49,7
210 Non-commissioned armed forces officers 313,595 472 121,401 413 38,7
310 Armed forces occupations, other ranks 225,623 17 82,383 16 36,5
3351 Customs and border inspec-tors 269,680 4 82,107 3 30,4
* Civil defense employee 0 0
3355 Police inspectors and detec-tives 530,372 1 0
5412 Police officers 421,122 13 202,730 12 48,1
5411 Fire fighter 325,919 80 170,689 69 52,4
5413 Prison guards 231,667 5 72,187 5 31,2
5414 Security guards 0 0
5419 Protective services workers not elsewhere classified 201,779 2 147,681 2 73,2
Total/overall mean 433,402 1,333 203,514 1,162 47,0
* Occupation with no equivalent in ISCO 08.
The position and actions of interest advocacy groups
All the trade unions operating in the area sought to protect the pension sys-
tem and organized demonstrations and rallies to that effect starting in the 
spring of 2011. As opposed to outcomes prior to 2010, these interest-advocacy 
negotiations failed. They based their legal stance primarily on the portion of 
the law that transformed pensions to allowances for people who had already 
retired, in other words, on the retroactive nature of the law. The principle of 
legal security was also violated, they argued, when the people impacted by 
the change were not notified in sufficient time to have been able to prepare 
for the changes in their living conditions. Unions operating in the area, in 
particular the Trade Union of Interior Affairs, Law Enforcement, and Pub-
lic Service Workers, and the Independent Police Union – as well as other 
NGOs – began preparations in December 2011 to take the case to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, and eventually ended up with 
13,000 individual submissions. In the first half of 2013 the court resolved to 
call upon the Hungarian government to submit its position in writing regard-
ing the petition for legal remedy, giving the government four months to do so.
The Independent Police Trade Union also called on the Ministry of Human 
Resources, proposing that it amend the law given that the people whose enti-
tlement qualification was changed from entitlement to an armed service pen-
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sion to entitlement to a service allowance, could be hit by the reduced amount 
until the age of 65. The Ministry rejected the proposal on the grounds that 
the 16 per cent deduction was not a tax. As we have seen the deduction is nei-
ther a tax nor a contribution. According to the website of the Independent 
Police Trade Union “it is quite simply a deduction!” 
The unions also petitioned the Constitutional Court, which after five days 
of debate issued the decision that neither the termination of pensions for ear-
ly retirement nor the 16 per cent deduction on public service allowances was 
unconstitutional. At the same time, in 2011, the Hungarian Helsinki Com-
mittee (OSCE) stated its position, declaring that the withdrawal of the pen-
sions ran contrary to the legal practices of the European Court of Human 
Rights, and the issue could therefore be taken before the court in Strasbourg. 
The ombudsman was one of the entities taking the issue to the Constitution-
al Court (szakszervezetek.hu). The investigation conducted at the request of 
the trade unions found that the portion of the decree banning dual benefits 
for retirees working in the public sector ran counter to the right to property, 
to protection of rights equivalent to assets, and violated the requirement for 
proportionality if significant changes were introduced to the pension system 
within a short period of time (For more detail see szakszervezetek.hu).
Individuals submitted petitions to the European Parliament, but only a 
portion of these proceedings have progressed to a conclusion).9 According 
to a legally binding decision reached by the Strasbourg court in 2014, trans-
forming service pensions to allowances and taxing them for people who have 
not reached standard retirement age did not violate the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.
As to the extent to which the decisions of 2010–2013 altered the careers of 
law enforcement workers, as yet the timeline has not been sufficient to draw 
a chart, but the media has reported that in 2013, for instance, the average age 
of police officers on the force was 26. In the first five months of 2013 fully 688 
people quit the police force. Of these, 73 retired and only two continued work-
ing in public services as retirees (Csikász, 2013). The overwhelming presence 
of young people on the current police force is likely to cause human resource 
management problems later on. Therefore it is definitely worth monitoring 
labour turnover in an occupation-by-occupation breakdown.
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servICes1
1. Labour market policy services
A) Services of the National Employment Service
New tasks related to support and subsidies were assigned to labour centres. 
Labour centre branch offices have been in charge of the housing subsidy in-
troduced as of 1 October 2012. Since 1 April 2013 branch offices have regis-
tered requests for subsidies submitted by working age citizens.
A number of services have become accessible electronically: requests for un-
employment benefits, registration, reporting changes, meeting obligations for 
regular check-ins, or requests from employers for new labour demand. Appli-
cants must also turn up in person in the case of the first two services, with no 
effect whatsoever on the eligibility period which commences on the date of 
filing the request for subsidies or registering in the electronic system.
As part of the development of information services, a new web-application 
has been opened for unemployed people and employers (at: http://vmp.munka.
hu) to facilitate interaction between labour supply and demand. At the time 
of finalizing the present study 14,785 new job openings and 40,436 CVs are 
registered in the electronic system.
B) Further activities of the National Employment Service
The service-related tasks of labour centres have been extended to providing 
for labour market services and operating the institutional background there-
of. Labour centre branch offices are involved in this task in the geographical 
area where they operate.
Major regulations: Government Decree 323/2011. (XII. 28.) on the roles and 
responsibilities of the National Labour Office and the bodies directed and pro-
fessionally supervised by it; Ministerial Decree 30/2000. (IX. 15.) issued by 
the Minister for the Economy on labour market services and related subsidies.
New regulations: Government Decree 7/2013. (I. 18.) amending Government 
Decrees related to the Government decree stipulating the detailed rules of 
market supervision activities; Ministerial Decree 44/2012. (XII. 22.) issued 
by the Minister for the Economy on the roles and responsibilities of the la-
1 The present section was elaborated on the basis of the Eurostat Labour Market 
Policy (LMP) database and the LABREF database of the Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). Interventions are listed along the 
same ordinal numbers (see Busch, Cseres-Gergely and Neumann, 2013, p. 277).
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bour centre branch offices of the district-level (in Budapest: city district-level) 
branches of the Budapest and County Government Offices.
On-line source: http://munka.hu.
aCtIve labour market polICIes (almps)
2. Training
The reform of vocational education as of 1 January 2012 has been followed 
by the renewal of the legal background of adult training. The new law, which 
has been in force since 1 September 2013, aims at higher quality expectations 
by stipulating administrative rules for the official licensing of adult training 
activities, the general requirements for specific training programmes, as well 
as the support framework and the supervision of institutions. Tasks related 
to the licensing procedure and the supervision and registration of licensed 
training institutions are performed by the National Labour Office.
The financing system of vocational education has become more regulated. 
The decentralized funds available for training and the development of the 
training system have been divided into two equal parts. Half of the funds 
are used to finance the costs related to the development of the physical infra-
structure of school-based vocational education, while the other half is used 
for the operational costs of vocational educational institutions and the mod-
ernization of vocational education. The calls for applications for grants are 
implemented by the state vocational education and adult training body, fi-
nanced from the funds available, up to 1% of the total amount.
A specific percentage of the financing plans governing the Training Sub-
fund of the Labour Market Fund is allocated to finance further tasks. As of 1 
January 2013 the range of legal entities obliged by law to pay a financial con-
tribution to vocational training has been extended to companies established 
or owned in part by higher educational institutions. As of 1 September 2012 
companies can fulfil the obligation for a financial contribution to vocational 
training by organizing practical training in training locations outside institu-
tions and by signing student employment contracts with students taking part 
in basic training with a mandatory practical training element.
As of 1 January 2013 companies can allocate their vocational training con-
tribution to the professional training or language courses offered to their own 
employees provided that the company offers practical training places for at 
least 45 students having a student employment contract. The amount of voca-
tional training contribution can be accounted for up to the amount covered 
by student employment contracts, to a maximum of 16.5 per cent of the gross 
amount of the obligation. The training of the company’s own employees is 
New legal background 
in adult training
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considered as state aid to the company. The extent of state aid is 60 per cent 
of the eligible costs for general training and 25 per cent for special training. 
As regards general training the extent may be increased to 80 per cent if the 
employees participating in the training are disabled or disadvantaged people, 
or the aid is used by a micro, small or middle-sized enterprise.
The rules regulating requests for return on extra payments have also changed. 
Regulations differ on the basis of the share of student employment contracts as 
compared to the share of cooperation agreements within the overall amount 
of the obligation.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 (Section 14) on promoting employment 
and unemployment benefits; Act CLV of 2011 on contributions to vocation-
al education and promoting the development of training; Act CLXXXVII 
of 2011 on vocational education; Government Decree 280/2011. (XII. 20.) 
on the amounts of practical training normative support and the calculation 
of amounts subject to reductions which can be accounted for as the cost of 
practical training incurred as vocational education contribution; Government 
Decree 150/2012. (VII. 6.) on the National Register of Qualifications and 
the procedure of its amendment; Ministerial Decree 27/2012. (VII. 27.) is-
sued by the Minister for the Economy on the professional and exam require-
ments for qualifications in the responsibility of the Minister for the Economy.
Ministerial Decree 6/1996. (VII. 16.) issued by the Minister of Labour on 
financial support promoting employment and on tackling employment cri-
sis situations from the Labour Market Fund; Ministerial Decree 3/2011. (II. 
11.) issued by the Minister of Public Administration and Justice on the man-
agement and tasks of the regional training centres in charge of adult training 
and coordinating action tackling regional disparities.
New regulations: Act CLXXVIII of 2012 amending specific acts on taxa-
tion and related acts; Act LXXVII on adult training; Government Decree 
314/2013. (VIII. 28.) on vocational education agreements; Government De-
cree 393/2013. (XI. 12.) on the detailed regulations stipulating the licensing 
procedure and requirements to be met, the registration and the system of 
checks concerning adult training institutions Ministerial Decree 21/2013. 
(VI. 18.) issued by the Minister for the Economy for companies implement-
ing practical training on accounting for the cost of training the company’s 
own employees as vocational education contribution.
3. Job rotation and job sharing
The only tool referred to this category is still the reduced rates related to part-
time employment introduced as of January 2011. The social contribution tax 
introduced on 1 January 2012 is subject to the same conditions and works 
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in the same manner. Its extent is 7 per cent of either the gross salaries of the 
two employees added together, or, as a maximum, double the minimum wage.
Major regulations: Act CXXIII of 2004 on promoting the employment of 
career starters, unemployed people over the age of 50 and those seeking em-
ployment after parental leave or taking care of a family member, and employ-
ment with an internship (Section 8/B).
4. Employment incentives
Important changes have occurred in the field of employment incentives, main-
ly introduced as part of the Job Protection Act. These changes are meant to 
promote the employment of young people below the age of 25, people over 
the age of 55, the permanently unemployed, employees having small children 
and employees working in jobs requiring no vocational qualifications through 
reduced rates of the social contribution tax and the vocational education con-
tribution. Reduced rates can be effected for both those already employed and 
those just recruited.
Depending on the target group of employees, the rates of employers’ public 
dues can be reduced either fully or in part, to an extent of 14.5 per cent. Re-
ductions can be effected in any case only up to a HUF 100 thousand (approx. 
EUR 323) part of a gross salary.2
As part of the Job Protection Act the following rates can be effected for the 
specific target groups:
•	 Career starters below the age of 25 (where career starter means a person 
having been employed and having paid social security contributions for a 
maximum of 180 days): in the first two years of employment – up to the 
amount of a gross salary of HUF 100 thousand (approx. EUR 323) – the 
rate of social contribution tax is reduced by 27 percentage points and the 
vocational education contribution by 1.5 percentage points, which means 
no tax burden at all up to the amount of a gross salary of HUF 100 thou-
sand (approx. EUR 323).
•	 Employees below the age of 25 and over the age of 55: the rate of social contri-
bution tax to be paid by the employer is reduced by 14.5 percentage points 
of the gross salary up to a HUF 100 thousand (approx. EUR 323) part per 
month.
•	 Permanently unemployed people (i.e. those registered as unemployed people 
for at least 6 months in a period of 9 months prior to entering employment): 
in the first two years of employment – up to a HUF 100 thousand (approx. 
2 We use an exchange rate of 1 EUR = 310 HUF throughout the chapter.
Initiatives of the  
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EUR 323) part of a gross salary – the rate of social contribution tax is re-
duced by 27 percentage points and the vocational education contribution 
by 1.5 percentage points. In the third year of employment the rate of social 
contribution tax to be paid by the employer is reduced by 14.5 percentage 
points of the gross salary up to a HUF 100 thousand (approx. EUR 323) 
part per month.
•	 Persons receiving or having received child-care allowances, child-care benefits 
or child-care support: the rates are the same as those for permanently unem-
ployed people and can be effected for up to the 45th month after the termi-
nation of the unemployment benefit, for a maximum of 3 years. The action 
plan has been changed as of 1 January 2014 to allow for a longer tax credit 
period for employees returning from a parental leave and having three or 
more children. In the first three years of employment the employer will be 
fully exempt from paying the social contribution tax, and in the following 
two years the rate will be reduced by 14.5 percentage points.
•	 Employees working in jobs requiring no vocational qualifications (i.e. jobs 
listed in group no. 9 in the unified system of occupations called FEOR, is-
sued in 2008 by the Central Statistical Office): the rules to be applied for 
tax credits are identical with those applicable for employees below the age 
of 25 and over the age of 55.
The measures listed above have replaced the most important tools applied 
in this field over recent years in the framework of the so called Start pro-
grammes. The opportunity for applying for the so called Start cards has been 
terminated, while the tax credits can be effected for a while for already issued 
and still valid cards. Tax credits can be effected until 31 December 2014 for 
Start cards issued to young career-starters, and could be effected until 31 De-
cember 2013 for Start Extra, Start Plus and Start Bonus cards.
As of the 1 January 2013 the so called free enterprise zones have been op-
erational to promote the development of the most deprived regions. The la-
bel is valid for 5 years and can be prolonged. Employers installing investment 
worth at least HUF 100 million (approx. EUR 322,581) and increasing the 
statistical number of staff simultaneously are entitled to a tax credit. When 
employing new employees in the territory of the free enterprise zones the 
rate of social contribution tax payable after the HUF 100 thousand (approx. 
EUR 323) part of a gross salary per month is reduced by 27 percentage points 
in the first two years and by 14.5 percentage points in the third year of em-
ployment. As for the vocational education contribution the 1.5 percentage 
points tax credit can be effected for the first two years of employment up to 
the amount of HUF 100 thousand (approx. EUR 323) per month, which 
means full exemption for the first two years up to a HUF 100 thousand (ap-
prox. EUR 323) part of a gross salary. The tax credit can be effected for 5 years 
as of the date of instalment.
Start cards phasing out
Establishment of the free 
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The tax credits counter-balancing the changes regulating the personal in-
come tax levels and compensating for the expected level of pay-rise were in-
troduced in 2012. Despite the fact that the tax system did not change for the 
worse as regards net salaries, tax credits could be still effected to a lesser extent, 
regardless of whether employers made the pay-rise expected. Tax credits in 
the private sector have been terminated as of 2014, and can be effected only 
by employers in the public sector.
The new incentives presented above must not be effected simultaneously. 
Besides the still existing Start Extra, Start Plus and Start Bonus cards how-
ever, the support aimed at the preservation of the net value of salaries is still 
accessible.
The programme entitled “First workplace guarantee” started in 2012 and 
has continued ever since – throughout 2013 and 2014. The programme fi-
nances the whole salary and the related tax burden of permanently unem-
ployed people and those below the age of 25 with no qualifications up to 
150% of the mandatory minimum wage. As opposed to 2012 which had no 
such obligation, now the six-month subsidized period must be followed by 
a three-month period of further employment. During the period of further 
employment the tax credits payable in the framework of the Job Protection 
Act may be effected.
A further incentive for employing young career starters, unemployed peo-
ple over the age of 50 and those seeking employment after parental leave or 
taking care of a family member is subsidizing employment with an intern-
ship. The subsidy may be effected to the extent of 50% of the allowance dis-
bursed to those employed with a contract including an internship by central 
state administration bodies or their affiliated local bodies. The subsidy, how-
ever, may not exceed 80% of the smallest amount of basic salary disbursed to 
full-time employees. A pre-condition for applying for the subsidy is that the 
employer should employ employees with an internship to a number exceed-
ing 1.5% of the total staff. The subsidy was attainable in the first half of 2013.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 on promoting employment and unemploy-
ment benefits; Act CXXIII of 2004 on promoting the employment of career 
starters, unemployed people over the age of 50 and those seeking employment 
after parental leave or taking care of a family member, and employment with 
an internship; Government Decree 69/2012. (IV. 6.) amending the Govern-
ment Decree on the subsidies available for preserving the net value of salaries 
and on the amount of pay-rise expected in 2012 to preserve the net value of 
salaries and the amounts of fringe benefits to be considered; Ministerial De-
cree 6/1996. (VII. 16.) issued by the Minister of Labour on financial support 
promoting employment and on tackling employment crisis situations from 
the Labour Market Fund (Sections 11 and 18).
Wage compensation  
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New regulations: Act CXLVI of 2012 amending specific acts necessary to im-
plement the Job Protection Act; Act CLXXVIII of 2012 amending specific 
acts on taxation and related acts; Act CCXVI of 2012 amending specific acts 
on employment in relation to the Magyary Simplification Programme and 
other objectives; Act CCXXIV of 2013 amending specific acts in relation to 
the modification of child-care allowances and to the extension of tax credits 
concerning the social contribution tax; Government Decree 388/2012. (XII. 
19.) on the subsidies to be applied for by central state administration bodies or 
their affiliated local bodies as employers of employees with a contract includ-
ing an internship; Government Decree 27/2013. (II. 12.) on the establishment 
and operation of free enterprise zones and the rules stipulating tax credits.
5. Sheltered employment and vocational rehabilitation
The regulations stipulating the accreditation procedure and the system of 
central budget subsidies for sheltered employers employing disabled people 
(in Hungarian terminology: people with a changed working capacity) have 
changed. The rules must be applied for requests submitted as of 17 December 
2012 and the subsidies disbursed beyond 1 January 2013.
Instead of the former types of basic, rehabilitation, principal and conditional 
accreditation certificates, from now on only one type of certificate can be ob-
tained. The eligibility criteria unite the characteristic features of the former 
types, therefore the conditions for obtaining the certificate are in some cas-
es stricter. For accreditation the employer is required to employ a staff of 30 
disabled people, or employ a quarter of the total number of employees from 
this group. Further conditions are that the employer:
• should have a professional programme for vocational rehabilitation;
• undertakes to elaborate personal vocational rehabilitation plans;
• provides for the necessary assisting services;
• employs a vocational rehabilitation mentor, a counsellor and an assistant;
• facilitates employment in job openings where a qualification is required;
• provides for the training opportunities necessary for successful vocational 
rehabilitation.
The latter provision was formerly in effect only for obtaining a principal 
certificate necessary to qualify as a sheltered employer. What is made easi-
er, however, is the provision in the new regulation concerning the amount 
of time spent in operation, which may now be less than the 12 months ex-
pected formerly.
The tasks of the former rehabilitation trustee will be taken over by a voca-
tional rehabilitation mentor and a vocational rehabilitation counsellor. The 
provisions for assistants have also become stricter, depending on the number 
of employees with a changed working capacity. At the same time the obliga-
The system of rehabilita-
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tion of employers with a principal certificate to operate a three-member vo-
cational rehabilitation committee has been abolished.
Accreditation is performed by the National Office for Rehabilitation and 
Social Affairs, and the office has the license to involve an expert and perform 
on-the-spot checks during the accreditation procedure. A simplified accredita-
tion procedure may be applied if the employer was accredited within the year 
when the regulation entered into force and as a result of which the accredi-
tation certificate remained valid for one more year. The same rule applies to 
employers with a principal certificate and accredited as a sheltered employer 
after 1 January 2011. The fee of the accreditation procedure has also changed. 
The rehabilitation accreditation certificate has an open-ended validity period. 
The former validity period for the basic accreditation certificate was five years, 
for the rehabilitation certificate three years, for the principal certificate two 
years and for the conditional certificate it was one year, respectively.
The National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs is in charge of 
checking for compliance with the provisions of accreditation and whether 
subsidies are used appropriately. Evaluation scores are negative if the check 
reveals non compliance with the legal regulation, and the rehabilitation ac-
creditation certificate is withdrawn if negative scores amount to 12.
Following the introduction of the system of comprehensive qualification 
the employability and classification of disabled people changed. As a result, 
the definition of permanent employment means the sheltered employment 
of persons with health impairment below the level of 60% and whose voca-
tional rehabilitation is not recommended on the basis of external factors and 
not on the basis of their health status – regardless of the kind of assistance 
that their rehabilitation would necessitate, be it permanent or on-going as-
sistance. These people are employed for three years and their contract can be 
prolonged without limitations.
Transitional employment means the employment of disabled people whose 
health impairment is below the level of 60% and whose vocational rehabilita-
tion is recommended both on the basis of their health status and their exter-
nal circumstances (including those who might also need permanent rehabili-
tation). The aim of transitional employment is the preparation of individuals 
for employment in the open labour market. The vocational rehabilitation pro-
fessional programme must therefore comprise an action plan presenting the 
stages of transition and cooperation with employers in the open labour mar-
ket. The contract of employment is for three years. Transitional employment 
is considered successful if the employee is employed without interruption for 
a period of at least six months in the open labour market.
In line with the change of certificates and forms of employment the system 
of subsidies also changed. The old type cost compensation subsidies and re-
habilitation subsidies were disbursed until 31 December 2012.
The procedure  
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From this time on only salary costs (salaries and employers’ taxes) incurred 
by the employment of people with a changed working capacity and extra 
costs closely related to their changed working capacity are eligible for financ-
ing from the central state budget. Salary costs may be subsidized up to 75%. 
The amount of subsidy might reach 100% for NGOs and public benefit or-
ganizations such as associations, foundations or non-profit companies. Extra 
costs may be subsidized up to 100%. The individual amount of subsidy for 
the transitional employment of a person with a changed working capacity is 
decreased gradually, year by year: it is 100% of the individual subsidy in the 
first year, then 90% and finally 80%.
Only accredited employers are eligible – after submitting an application – 
for subsidies on salaries and extra costs. Subsidies are disbursed on the basis of 
three-year framework contracts signed by the National Office for Rehabilita-
tion and Social Affairs and the employer. The contract can be prolonged each 
year for the period of one year. Beyond that, individual employment agree-
ments must be signed for each employee.
From September to October 2013 accredited employers had the opportu-
nity for one month to submit an application for adapting the workplace en-
vironment for vocational rehabilitation purposes within a one-year period. 
The condition for being eligible for the job creation subsidy was to sustain 
the new or the adapted workplace for a period of two years commencing 
after the 90th day following the investment, and to recruit and employ a 
number of people with a changed working capacity, as specified in the con-
tract on job creation.
Further incentives for employing people with a changed working capacity 
are the tax credits deducted by using the so called rehabilitation card, ex-
emption from the rehabilitation contribution and a set of programmes fi-
nanced from EU-funds in the framework of the Social Renewal Operational 
Programme (SROP, called TÁMOP in Hungarian). The programmes aim-
ing at the promotion of the employment of people with a changed working 
capacity are entitled “Promoting the vocational rehabilitation and employ-
ment of people with a changed working capacity” (no. 1.1.1-12/1-2012-0001), 
“Transitional employment in the construction industry” (no. 1.4.6-13/1), 
“Supporting employers in providing motivational training and related ser-
vices to enhance the labour market opportunities of the most disadvantaged 
groups” (no. 5.3.8.A2-12/1).
Major regulations: Act CXCI of 2011 on the allowances of people with a 
changed working capacity and the amendment of specific acts; Government 
Decree 327/2011. (XII. 29.) on the procedural rules related to the allowanc-
es of people with a changed working capacity; Government Decree 95/2012. 
(V. 15.) on the National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs and on 
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the roles and responsibilities of the bodies under its professional supervision; 
Ministerial Decree 7/2012. (II. 14.) of the Ministry of National Resources 
on the detailed rules related to comprehensive qualification; Ministerial De-
cree 8/2012. (II. 21.) of the Ministry of National Resources on vocational 
rehabilitation experts.
New regulations: Government Decree 238/2012. (VIII. 30.) amending Gov-
ernment Decree 177/2005. (IX. 2.) on the central budget subsidies for the 
employment of people with a changed working capacity; Government Decree 
317/2012. (XI. 13.) amending specific Government Decrees on social affairs, 
child well-being and child protection services; Government Decree 327/2012. 
(XI. 16.) on the accreditation of employers of people with a changed working 
capacity and on the central budget subsidies for the employment of people 
with a changed working capacity; Government Decree 335/2013. (IX. 20.) 
amending Government Decree 112/2006. (V. 12.) on licensing social employ-
ment and Government Decree 327/2012. (XI. 16.) on the accreditation of 
employers of people with a changed working capacity and on the central budg-
et subsidies for the employment of people with a changed working capacity; 
Ministerial Decree 38/2012. (XI. 16.) of the Ministry of Human Resources 
on the rules governing the fees to be paid for the accreditation procedure by 
the employer of people with a changed working capacity.
6. Direct job creation
In Hungary public works programmes, listed among ALMPs, are still the 
most important measures.. In the period observed its operation is more or less 
the same as previously, and the aim of the most important changes has been 
the promotion and extension of the tool. Public works model programmes 
could be launched up to 1 July 2014 in seven areas in cases defined as model 
programmes by the Minister of the Interior. The costs of these programmes 
are reimbursed to the extent of 70 to 100% by the central state budget.
After the closure of the public works model programmes which are deemed 
successful, further programmes can be launched based on the same idea. In-
vestment and material costs of such programmes can be reimbursed to the 
extent of 50 to 100% by the central state budget, based on a decision by the 
Minister of the Interior. The condition for subsidies as of November 2013 has 
been that the public works employer must reinvest the income generated by 
the public works model programme into further financing the public works 
programmes or the operation of social cooperatives.
The extension of the implementation of public works programmes has been 
promoted by the National Fund of Land by a transfer of certain pieces of land 
for five years of free use to the local governments involved in public works 
programmes.
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The types of settlements where public works programmes may be launched 
has been extended. The definition of the small region which has a special im-
portance in public works programmes has been settled: small regions where 
half of the settlements have a special importance in public works programmes 
are considered especially important.
As of January 2013 public works require an expert’s opinion on employabil-
ity. Beyond 1 September 2013 unemployed people may be excluded from pub-
lic works programmes either if they are subject to a procedure investigating or 
proving a default of their school-age child, or if they fail to meet obligations 
concerning the tidiness of their living environment as specified by local gov-
ernment decrees. It is the responsibility of the labour centre’s branch office to 
issue a formal decision on the exclusion from the programme.
Between December 2013 and April 2014, both public works and training 
were available in the framework of the wintertime public works programmes. 
Programmes were mainly targeted at the development of core competences 
and offer a catch-up training for grades 7 to 8 of the primary school. Partici-
pants received payment during training on the basis of the six hours a day spent 
in training. The number of participants was around 50 thousand. As a result 
of the wintertime public works programme the number of people involved 
in public works programmes increased from 88 thousand to 203 thousand, 
a large gain compared to the same month in the previous year.
As of 1 January 2014 the yearly amount of contracted work in public works 
programmes must not exceed 11 months for a single person. This rule can be 
overridden only by permission from the minister in charge of public works 
programmes for cost-efficiency considerations and without risking people’s 
chances of getting admitted to the public works programme.
Major regulations: Act CVI of 2011 on public works and amending acts re-
lated to public works and other acts; Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code, Gov-
ernment Decree 375/2010. (XII. 31.) on the subsidies related to public works 
programmes; Government Decree 170/2011. (VIII. 24.) on setting the wage 
for public works and the guaranteed minimum wage for public works.
New regulations: Act XLI of 2013 amending specific acts in relation to social 
cooperatives and in relation to public works; Government Decree 85/2013. 
(III. 21.) amending specific Government Decrees in relation to public works.
Government Decree 382/2013. (XI. 4.) amending Government Decree 
375/2010. (XII. 31.) on the subsidies related to public works programmes; 
Ministerial Decree 41/2012. (XII. 20) of the Ministry for the Economy 
amending specific Ministerial Decrees on health in employment; Gov-
ernment Decision 1141/2013. (III. 21.) amending Government Decision 
1044/2013. (II. 5.) in relation to decisions concerning public works pro-
grammes; Government Decision 1142/2013. (III. 21.) to transfer certain 
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pieces of land by the National Fund of Land for free use to the local gov-
ernments to implement public works programmes; Government Decision 
1624/2013. (IX. 5.) to prepare for the implementation of training related to 
public works programmes.
7. Start-up incentives
The system of subsidies promoting entrepreneurship for unemployed people 
and coordinated by the labour centres did not change significantly in 2013.
As of November 2013 funding for starting micro enterprises became avail-
able in the framework of the Social Renewal Operational Programme call 
for proposals entitled “Promoting entrepreneurship for young people in the 
convergence regions” (no. 2.3.6/B). Young people between the ages of 18–35 
successfully accomplishing their tasks in project no. TÁMOP 2.3.6/A and 
who have elaborated their business plans become entitled to a non-refunda-
ble grant. The envisaged budget of the programme is HUF 5 billion (approx. 
EUR 16,129 thousand), co-financed by the European Social Fund and the 
central state budget. 90% of the costs incurred in the course of launching an 
enterprise can be reimbursed by using the grant.
As of 1 January 2014 the former condition of eligibility for the subsidies 
promoting entrepreneurship for unemployed people was reduced from three 
months to one month spent on the register for unemployed people.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 on promoting employment and unemploy-
ment benefits (Section 17); Ministerial Decree 6/1996. (VII. 16.) issued by the 
Minister of Labour on financial support promoting employment and on tack-
ling employment crisis situations from the Labour Market Fund (Section 10).
New regulations: Ministerial Decree 66/2013. (XII. 23.) of the Ministry for 
the Economy amending specific labour-related Ministerial Decrees.
On-line source: http://www.nfu.hu/doc/3581.
subsIdIes
8. Subsidies and support for the unemployed (job-seekers)
The characteristic features of the system of subsidies and the conditions of ac-
cess to these subsidies did not change over the period observed. The maximum 
amounts of subsidies at the end of the period are calculated as a percentage of 
the minimum wage, as shown in Table 1. The minimum amount of old age 
pension did not change, so the extent of the employment substitution subsidy 
(in Hungarian: foglalkoztatást helyettesítő támogatás) also remained the same.
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Table 1: The amount of subsidies paid to unemployed people and working age 
unemployed people on 1 January 2014
Type of subsidy Amount of subsidy
Unemployment insurance
60% of the total of social security contributions on the basis 
of which the contribution payable to the Labour Market Fund 
is calculated, maximized at 100% of the minimum wage in 
effect on the first day of eligibility, which is HUF 101,500 
(approx. EUR 327) per month, HUF 3,383 (approx. EUR 10.9) 
per day;
Unemployment benefit  
prior to old age pension
40% of the minimum wage, which is HUF 40,600 (approx. 
EUR 131) per month, HUF 1,353 (approx. EUR 4.4) per day;
Employment substitution subsidy 80% of the all-time minimum amount of old age pension: HUF 22,800 (approx. EUR 74) per month
Regular social benefit
The amount depends on the income-level of the family, a 
maximum amount of HUF 45,568 (approx. EUR 147) per 
month, or a maximum of HUF 22,768 (approx. EUR 73) per 
month if a family member receives an employment substitu-
tion subsidy.
As of 1 April 2013 regular social benefits must not be disbursed during the 
period of participation in a public works programme, although the person’s 
income from a public works programme is not taken into account upon the 
calculation and revision of the amount of regular social benefits.
With these changes the rules regulating public works programmes became 
identical with the rules applied on regular social benefits and the employment 
substitution subsidy.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 on promoting employment and unemploy-
ment benefits; Act III of 1993 on social administration and social benefits 
(Section 25).
New regulations: Act XXVII of 2013 amending acts on social affairs and 
child-protection in relation to the Simplification Programme and other acts.
9. Early retirement
As of 1 January 2012 early retirement is not an option. Instead of the pen-
sions previously awarded below the age threshold for old age pensions, eligible 
persons receive a subsidy preceding old age pensions, without further rights 
that old age pensioners have.
ComprehensIve InterventIons (ComprehensIve 
programmes)
The Social Renewal Operational Programme remains the most important 
comprehensive programme during the period. The modifications of the action 
Changes of regular social 
benefits in relation to 
public works programmes
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plans approved for the years 2011–2013 were mainly related to the funds allo-
cated to the individual programmes. The funds allocated to the measure enti-
tled “Supporting training at the workplace” (no. 2.1.3) increased significantly.
Within the “Decentralized programmes for the employment of disadvan-
taged groups” (no. 1.1.2.) and the “Programme for the employment of disad-
vantaged groups in the region of Central Hungary” (no. 1.1.4.) the groups of 
eligible participants were extended to persons receiving child-care allowances, 
child-care benefits or child-care support provided that they had no paid work, 
and also to young people below the age of 25 no longer registered as unem-
ployed as of 1 October 2012 only because they are involved in labour market 
services. Eligible costs were also extended in the programme to finance hous-
ing support and support promoting entrepreneurship.
Major regulations: Government Decree 132/2009. (VI. 19.) on the types of 
support eligible in the framework of the programmes entitled “Decentralized 
programmes for the employment of disadvantaged groups” (no. 1.1.2.) and 
“Promoting the vocational rehabilitation and employment of people with a 
changed working capacity” (no. 1.1.1) in Priority 1 of the Social Renewal Op-
erational Programme; Government Decree 175/2010. (V. 13.) on the types 
of support eligible in the framework of the programme entitled “Programme 
for the employment of disadvantaged groups in the region of Central Hun-
gary” (no. 1.1.4.).
New regulations: Government Decree 272/2012. (IX. 28.) amending specific 
Government Decrees on employment; Government Decision 1527/2012. (XI. 
28.) on the approval of Priority 1 of the action plans for the years 2011–2013 
related to Priority 1 of the Social Renewal Operational Programme and on 
the modifications related to the funds allocated to the individual programmes; 
Government Decision 1016/2013. (I. 18.) on the approval of Priority 1 of the 
action plans for the years 2011–2013 of the Social Renewal Operational Pro-
gramme and of individual calls for proposals.
polICy tools wIth an effeCt on the labour 
market
10. System of taxes and social security contributions
The major changes in the system of taxes were manifested in changes related 
to employees’ income tax burden and the new taxation opportunities intro-
duced as part of the Job Protection Act for small and medium-sized enterprises.
In the system of personal income tax the 27% gross-up factor added pre-
viously to the tax base in the case of incomes above HUF 2,424 thousand 
(approx. EUR 7,819) per year was abolished. As a result, the system of per-
Extension of the range  
of participants
Changes with an effect 
on the net salary
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sonal income tax became a one-key system with a unified tax rate of 16%. As 
compared to the personal income tax rules in effect in 2012 this change re-
sulted in the decrease of the tax rate for people with an income above HUF 
2,424,000 (approx. EUR 7,819) per year, while the change had no effect on 
those with an income below this threshold. In 2014 the personal income tax 
rules in effect in 2013 remain.
The rules concerning family tax credits did not change in 2013. As of 1 Jan-
uary 2014, besides tax credits, family-level credits on social security contribu-
tions may also be effected, in other words, the amounts deductible as per the 
number of children can be effected by reducing either the personal income 
tax or social security (pensions- and health-care) contributions.
A further change with an effect on the net income is the termination of 
the upper ceiling of the social security contribution to pensions whose base 
amount in 2012 was HUF 7,942,200 (EUR 25,620). Thus for people with 
an income above this amount the payable social security contribution to pen-
sions, the rate of which is 10% of the tax base, significantly increased.
The amount of social security contribution to health-care increased in 2013 
to HUF 6,660 (approx. EUR 21) per month, HUF 222 (approx. EUR 0.72) 
per day, and in 2014 to HUF 6,810 (approx. EUR 22) per month and HUF 
227 (approx. EUR 0.73) per day.
The elements of fringe benefits are identical with the former ones. The 
amount of employers’ contribution to health-care payable after income taxed 
separately increased from the former 10% to 14% in 2013.
The Job Protection Act introduced new taxation opportunities for small 
and medium-sized enterprises, targeting the improvement of tax conditions. 
The first time the new forms of taxation could be selected was in 2013.
The tax for small taxpayers (in Hungarian: KATA) can be selected by en-
trepreneurs, individual businesses and small enterprises owned exclusively by 
individuals. The small taxpayer enterprise is required to pay a rate of HUF 50 
thousand (approx. EUR 161) per month for each full-time contracted small 
taxpayer employees and a rate of HUF 25 thousand (approx. EUR 81) per 
month for each non-full-time contracted small taxpayer employees. If the en-
terprise has a contracted employee who is not considered a small taxpayer, the 
regular tax rates apply. Beyond that, a tax rate of 40% is to be applied above 
the amount of HUF 6 million (approx. EUR 19,355) per year.
Another new type of tax is the small enterprise tax (in Hungarian: KIVA), 
which can be selected by individual businesses and small enterprises, limited 
liability companies, public limited companies and cooperatives if the num-
ber of employees stays below 25 and the income and balance sheet total below 
HUF 500 million (approx. EUR 1,613 thousand) in the given tax year. The 
tax base for those applying the small enterprise tax is calculated by adding to-
gether the cash income and the personnel costs, and the related tax rate is 16%. 
Tax for small taxpayers 
and small enterprise tax
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By applying this type of tax enterprises are exempt from paying the corporate 
tax, the social contribution tax and the vocational education contribution.
As regards the tax for small taxpayers the administrative burden of enter-
prises is significantly reduced. Since the rate is fixed below the amount of 
HUF 6 million (approx. EUR 19,355) per year, the enterprises that operate at 
low costs and whose income stays below this amount can save on tax-paying 
liabilities by applying this type of tax.
The small enterprise tax aims primarily at the increase of employment, since 
the amounts of contributions payable after employees are significantly lower 
by applying this type of tax.
Major regulations: Act CXVII of 1995 on the personal income tax; Act 
LXXXI of 1996 on the corporate tax and the tax on dividends; Act LXXXI 
of 1997 on social security pensions; Act XCII of 2003 on the procedures of 
taxation; Act CXX of 2005 on the simplified contributions concerning pub-
lic dues; Act CXXVII of 2007 on the value-added tax; Act LXXV of 2010 
on simplified employment.
New regulations: Act CXLVII of 2012 on the tax for small taxpayers and the 
small enterprise tax; Act CLXXVIII of 2012 amending specific acts on taxa-
tion and related acts.
On-line source: http://www.nav.gov.hu/.
11. Other transfers
Child-care benefits
The child-care benefits available in 2013 are characterized by the content of 
Table 5 by Busch and Cseres-Gergely (2012).
As of 15 July 2013 social security child-care benefits are calculated solely on 
the basis of the income received from the employer from whom the employee 
takes parental leave. For a transitional period the amount of benefit must be 
calculated in both the old and the new way for children born before 11 May 
2014, and the bigger amount must be disbursed.
As of 1 January 2014 a number of new rules came into effect to motivate 
people to have children and in favour of the improvement of the labour mar-
ket situation of parents with small children. Persons receiving child-care al-
lowances or child-care benefits are free to enter employment after their child 
is one year old. People having more children – provided that the younger child 
was born after 1 January 2014 – are entitled to a child-care benefit for each 
child below the age of three. Persons having an active full-time student status 
are entitled – within one year after pausing or terminating their status – to a 
child-care allowance which is available also to persons studying in higher edu-
Changes in calculating 
maternity benefits and 
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cation, regardless of whether they are in employment or not. The base of the 
benefit is the guaranteed minimum wage for persons studying for a master’s 
degree, and the minimum wage for persons studying for a bachelor degree.
Major regulations: Act LXXX of 1997 on the eligibility rules concerning so-
cial security benefits and private pensions, and the financial cover of these 
services; Act LXXXIII of 1997 on the services of mandatory health insur-
ance; Act LXXXIV of 1998 on the support for families; Government De-
cree 328/2011. (XII. 29.) on the fees payable for basic child-care well-being 
services and professional child protection services and the evidence accept-
able when applying for such services.
New regulations: Act CXXVII of 2013 amending specific acts on health-
care and health insurance and related acts; Act CCXXIV of 2013 amend-
ing specific acts related to the modifications of child-care benefits and to the 
extension of the range of exemption from paying the social contribution tax.
12. Contractual terms of employment, labour law
The new Labour Code, which was in effect from 1 July 2012, comprised a 
number of stipulations which came into effect only later, on 1 January 2013. 
On forms of employment different from contractual agreements, the rules 
concerning leave and disbursements during permanent leave of absence see 
in detail Busch, Cseres-Gergely and Neumann (2013). The Labour Code is 
analyzed in detail in the section entitled In Focus in the present yearbook.
The first amendments of the new Labour Code are primarily corrections 
based on the arguments of the Court of Justice of the European Union relat-
ed to labour law. As of 1 August 2013 the rules stipulating holidays were also 
corrected. The conditions of entitlement for fathers’ five-day extra holidays 
were amended to include people with a health-impairment of at least 50% 
and people entitled to disabled subsidies or to blind people’s personal allow-
ances. The five-day paternity leave means five full days, even if the employ-
ment contract was signed in the same year. From this point on only holidays 
calculated on the basis of the employee’s age are allowed to be transferred up 
to the end of the following year, in contrast to previous rules allowing for a 
transfer of one third of the regular holidays and the extra days calculated on 
the basis of the employee’s age.
The method of calculating remuneration for leave and other allowances was 
corrected. Thus the amount of salary is not subject to change depending on 
the month the holiday is taken. On calculating remuneration for leave, ex-
tra allowances for Sunday work must be taken into account if the employee 
spent their work time with scheduled work on at least one third of the Sun-
days in the period in question.
The new Labour Code 
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Major regulations: Act LXXV of 2010 on simplified employment; Act I of 
2012 on the Labour Code.
New regulations: Act CIII of 2013 amending specific acts in relation to the 
calculation of remuneration for leave and the regulation of public funds.
13. Old age and disability pensions – disability subsidies
Retirement prior to the statutory pension age was abolished as of 1 January 
2012, but entitlement can be obtained for the new type of allowances up to 
31 December 2014 on the basis of the old rules applied before the changes 
in the system.
As of 1 January 2013 the amounts of old age pensions are calculated in the 
same gradually decreasing way as in 2012. It has been changed, however, so 
that instead of regulations in decrees the law itself specifies the limits of de-
crease. As a consequence of the former termination of the cap on social secu-
rity contribution, it is now payable without maximum.
An important change relates to those retiring from the public sector, inas-
much as the disbursement of pensions is temporarily paused as of 1 July 2013 
for those employed in the public sector on 1 January 2013, with no effect on 
their status as old age pensioners whatsoever. Due to the labour demand of 
the public health-care system, however, public service employees and govern-
ment civil servants who are considered health-care employees may be exempted 
from this rule. Public service employees remaining in employment – with a 
license – in health-care are entitled to extra income the net amount of which 
must not exceed the amount of old age pension to which they are entitled and 
which they do not receive temporarily by reason of being in employment. Af-
ter three years their legal status must be authorized again.
Employers operating from central budget funds may apply for financing 
of the extra income.
Disability pensions – disability subsidies
The amounts of rehabilitation and disability subsidies must be calculated on 
the basis of a changed rule as of 1 January 2013. The essence of this rule is 
that the subsidy may be calculated – instead of the minimum wage – on the 
basis of the period of 180 days immediately preceding the period of 180 days 
which forms the basis of calculation if the entitled person has no income in 
the whole period due to an accident or received decreased amounts as pay-
ments on sick leave.
Rehabilitation subsidies are temporarily paused if the entitled person is 
employed and earns an income, participates in a public works programme 
by working more than 20 hours a week, or is unable to earn an income. In 
any of these cases the subsidy must be reduced in the following month by the 
In the public sector  
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amount disbursed for the period of temporary pause. The deduction must not 
exceed 50% of the rehabilitation subsidy. Tasks related to the calculations are 
performed by the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance.
As of 1 January 2014 the condition of entitlement to subsidies for disabled 
people became less constrained. Entitlement is obtained by proving the pay-
ment of social security contributions for 1,095 days in five years, or, if this 
is not feasible, the payment of social security contributions for 2,555 days in 
ten years or 3,650 days in 15 years, which are also accepted.
Major regulations: Act LXXXI of 1997 on social security pensions; Act CXCI 
of 2011 on the allowances of people with a changed working capacity and 
the amendment of specific acts; Government Decree 327/2011. (XII. 29.) 
on the procedural rules related to the allowances of people with a changed 
working capacity.
New regulations: Act CCVIII of 2012 on the amendment of specific acts re-
lated to the establishment of the act on the central budget and to other objec-
tives; Act CCXXV of 2013 amending Act CXCI of 2011 on the allowances 
of people with a changed working capacity and the amendment of specific 
acts; Government Decision 1150/2013. (III. 22.) on the implementation in 
the public health sector of Government Decision 1700/2012. (XII. 29.) on 
the pension policy principles to be applied in the public sector; Government 
Decision 1599/2013. (IX. 3.) on the implementation in education and voca-
tional education of Government Decision 1700/2012. (XII. 29.) on the pen-
sion policy principles to be applied in the public sector.
14. Wage bargaining, wage regulation and interest 
representation
As of 1 January 2013 the types of set minimum wages were differentiated by 
introducing the minimum wage and wage minimum to be paid to workgroup 
leaders employed in public works programmes. In a job requiring no voca-
tional qualification or secondary school qualification the monthly minimum 
wage in 2013 was HUF 83,050 (approx. EUR 268), while the guaranteed wage 
of a workgroup leader working in a job requiring a vocational qualification 
or secondary school qualification was HUF 106,480 (approx. EUR 343). In 
2014 the amounts increased to HUF 101,500 (approx. EUR 327) and HUF 
118,000 (approx. EUR 381) respectively. The types and amounts of minimum 
wages currently in effect are summarized in Table 2.
The system of wages also changed for those employed in public works pro-
grammes. The former system of weekly wages was replaced by the disburse-
ment of monthly salaries as of 1 April 2013. In specified sectors employers 
had the opportunity also in 2013 to receive financial support from the labour 
Regulation of the wage 
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centres to compensate for the increase in the minimum wages. Employers may 
apply for such support for employees employed on 31 December 2012 and 
whose salary remained below the relevant minimum wage set as of 2013. The 
maximum amount of support is the sum total of the amounts calculated on 
the basis of the difference between the minimum wages set for each year, in-
cluding employers’ taxes. Employees financed from other sources of support 
are not eligible for this support.
Table 2: Amounts of minimum wages on 1 January 2014 (HUF/day)
Minimum wage Guaranteed wage minimum
Regular 4,510 5,250
Employed in a public works programme 3,560 4,568
Workgroup leader employed in a public works 
programme 3,820 4,900
Simplified employment 3,834 4,568
Major regulations: Act XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social 
Council; Government Decree 170/2011. (VII. 24.) on setting the minimum 
wage and the guaranteed wage minimum to be applied in public works pro-
grammes.
New regulations: Government Decree 390/2012. (XII. 20.) on setting the 
mandatory minimum wage and the guaranteed wage minimum; Govern-
ment Decree 421/2012. (XII. 29.) amending specific Government Decrees 
in relation to public works programmes; Government Decree 103/2013. (IV. 
5.) on the financial support to compensate for the increase in the mandatory 
minimum wage and the guaranteed wage minimum by employers operating 
in specific sectors and on the amendment of Government Decree 323/2011. 
(XII. 28.) on the roles and responsibilities of the National Labour Office 
and the bodies directed and professionally supervised by it; Government De-
cree 483/2013. (XII. 17.) on setting the mandatory minimum wage and the 
guaranteed wage minimum; Government Decree 496/2013. (XII. 29.) on 
the amendment of Government Decree 170/2011. (VII. 24.) on setting the 
mandatory minimum wage and the guaranteed wage minimum to be applied 
in public works programmes.
15. Measures related to migration and mobility
In order to facilitate mobility by financial means, housing subsidies are dis-
bursed to persons entering at least 20 hours of employment for six months af-
ter three months of registered unemployment and whose permanent address 
and place of work are located at least 100 kilometres apart, or for whom the 
amount of time spent commuting would reach six hours a day. As of 6 June 
Supporting mobility
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2013 the conditions of support became less constrained. The time limit spent 
commuting was reduced to five hours and another condition set for eligibil-
ity was abolished, namely the condition that the new place of work must not 
be the same as the former place of work. The condition that the employer 
must be the same remains unchanged. As of 6 June 2013 the duration of reg-
istered unemployment is not checked in the case of unemployed people laid 
off in mass redundancies and those entering public works programmes. Sup-
port may be disbursed to career-starters as well, with no modification of the 
conditions which are irrelevant in their case.
A further condition of support is that the monthly salary must not exceed 
three times the minimum wage. The request for support must be made prior 
to employment, however, as of 6 June 2013 this request may be made within 
30 days after the starting date of employment.
In the case of rentals the housing support can be used to pay rents and over-
heads. The duration of support is a maximum of 18 months and its amount 
was set at HUF 100 thousand (approx. EUR 323) for the first six months, 
HUF 60 thousand (approx. EUR 194) for the second six, and HUF 40 thou-
sand (approx. EUR 129) afterwards. In the case of more entitled persons the 
housing support may be increased. As of 6 June 2013 the maximum limits 
of support are divided into thirds.
The conditions of issuing work permits for citizens from third countries 
were loosened. Reporting labour demand and submitting a request for a work 
permit to the labour centre can be done simultaneously. As regards work per-
mits that are valid for more than one county, it is possible to include counties 
where an appropriate labour force is not available. Considering multiple re-
quests for work permits, these can be issued in a number equalling the short-
age of an appropriate labour force in the register.
Work permits must be prolonged without checks, if the request was report-
ed 15 days prior to the expiry date.
The rules of rejection changed, too. If an employer was penalized for em-
ploying people without a permit, but failed to pay the fine to the National 
Employment Fund, the issue of work permits to such an employer could for-
merly be rejected for three years. This duration has now been reduced to one 
year. The request for a work permit can be rejected if the employer offers pay-
ment to a third country employee at an amount below 80% of the national 
average in the relevant job, or, if the employer submits fake or forged docu-
ments as proof of qualifications and of schools attended.
The duration of permits for agricultural seasonal work increased from 150 
to 180 days. For employment contracts below the duration of 60 days permits 
must be issued without checking the labour market situation.
As of 1 January 2014 the issue of work permits for citizens from third coun-
tries can be made on the basis of united and non-united request procedures. 
Changing conditions 
of work permits
Changes of the procedure 
of requesting work permits
cseres-gergely & VaradoVics
240
On the basis of a united request procedure the employee has the opportunity 
to obtain a residence permit allowing for both staying in the country and en-
tering employment. The immigration authority makes a decision on the re-
quest on the basis of the official opinion of the labour centre operating in the 
area where the employer is based. After the issue of the permit the employer 
and the citizen from a third country sign a preliminary agreement establish-
ing a legal relationship aimed at employment for a period of a maximum of 
two years. Exceptions are the residence permits issued for family reunifica-
tion (valid for a maximum of five years), requests for the EU blue card (valid 
for a maximum of four years) and humanitarian residence permits (valid for a 
maximum of six months, one or three years, depending on the cause of issue).
The practical arrangements for non-united request procedures are identical 
with the procedure followed formerly. The cases when united request proce-
dures are not required are regulated in detail.
Major regulations: Act IV of 1991 on promoting employment and unemploy-
ment benefits; Government Decree 39/1998. (III. 4.) on support aimed at 
the reduction of burdens related to commuting to work, and on the support 
of labour force recruitment; Government Decree 355/2007. (XII. 23.) on the 
transitional rules related to the free movement of the labour force applied by 
the Republic of Hungary for persons having the right to free movement and 
residing in the country; Government Decree 355/2009. (XII. 30.) on the rules 
regulating the employment of citizens from third countries without a work per-
mit in the territory of the Republic of Hungary; Government Decree 168/2011. 
(VIII. 24.) on the rules regulating the official opinion of the labour centre of 
the county (capital) government office on the issue of the EU blue card, and 
on the amendment of specific Government Decrees on migration and other 
Government Decrees; Ministerial Decree 16/2010. (V. 13.) of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Labour on the regulation of the procedure of issuing a work 
permit to citizens from third countries to be employed in Hungary.
New regulations: Act CLXXXIX of 2013 amending specific acts on employ-
ment; Government Decree 272/2012. (IX. 28.) amending specific Govern-
ment Decrees on employment; Government Decree 167/2013. (V. 29.) amend-
ing Government Decree 39/1998. (III. 4.) on support aimed at the reduction 
of burdens related to commuting to work, and on the support of labour force 
recruitment; Government Decree 445/2013. (XI. 28.) on the issue of work 
permits for citizens from third countries on the basis of non-united request 
procedures, on the exemptions from the obligation for obtaining a work per-
mit; on the tasks of the labour centre of the county (capital) government of-
fice on the issue of an opinion as an official authority in the united procedure, 
on reporting the employment of citizens from third countries who can be 
employed without a work permit in Hungary, and the reimbursement of re-
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munerations; Ministerial Decree 35/2012. (XII. 14.) of the Ministry for the 
Economy amending specific Ministerial Decrees on employment.
16. The institutions of management, financing and 
evaluation of employment policy
By 2013 the transformation of the institutional system of employment policy 
had basically ended by the establishment of government offices, the shortening 
of the period of passive unemployment benefits, the transformation of the for-
mer National Employment Service and the focus on public works programmes.
The Minister for National Economy enforced in a Ministerial Decree the 
rules of managing and using the National Employment Fund. The tasks of 
planning the allocations of the Fund and setting the central and decentral-
ized budgets and the independent allocations provided to the government of-
fice labour centres belong to the Minister responsible for employment policy. 
The professional and financial activities of the county labour centres are su-
pervised by the National Labour Office. The National Labour Office is also 
in charge of coordinating the employment and related programmes financed 
from EU funds and other foreign funds.
The financing structure of the National Employment Fund did not change 
considerably. The number of separate allocations within the National Em-
ployment Fund increased by the amount of support available for increasing 
the mandatory minimum wages. The government allocated HUF 3.7 billion 
(approx. EUR 11,935 thousand) in the framework of the Social Renewal Op-
erational Programme to the National Labour Office to enhance the efficiency 
of labour inspection, and HUF 6 billion (approx. EUR 19,355 thousand) in 
the framework of the Social Infrastructure Operational Programme to im-
prove the infrastructural circumstances of the services and to increase the 
capacities of the public employment service, and also to install the facilities 
necessary to perform the new tasks of the service.
Developments throughout the year are related primarily to the EU-fund-
ed programmes and to the continuation of former policy action. Especially 
important is the transformation related to the infrastructure of implemen-
tation and evaluation of EU-funded programmes, which also forms a basis 
for future programmes.
The implementation of EU-funded programmes were supervised until the 
end of 2013 by the individual managing authorities of the National Devel-
opment Agency, while the evaluation of programmes was performed by the 
relevant department of the National Development Agency by involving ex-
ternal experts.
As of 1 January 2014 the situation changed. The managing authorities were 
integrated in line ministries and the task of evaluation was transferred, among 
National Employ-
ment Fund
European Union Funds 
and their infrastructure
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other central tasks, to the Prime Minister’s Office. The change in the status 
of the managing authorities has no major effect in the programming period 
ending in 2013, since their major task is to implement current programmes 
till their conclusion, without launching new calls for proposals. It is particu-
larly true for the major employment policy programmes implemented under 
the Social Renewal Operational Programme, whose coordinator, the Human 
Resource Programmes Managing Authority, was integrated into the Ministry 
of Human Resources. The influence of these changes will be manifested in the 
next programming period when the management of EU-funded programmes 
will be close to policy-making. An advantage of this arrangement could be 
better coordination between national and EU-funded measures, while it is a 
potential risk that professional and political decisions become more closely 
linked and generate overlaps.
The elaboration of the documents of the 2014–2020 programming period 
was simultaneous with the transformation of the institutional set-up. Among 
these we must mention the so called partnership agreement, to be signed be-
tween the EU and Hungary as a member state, which will be the basis for the 
individual operational programmes and the related action plans. The support 
schemes that serve the implementation of the employment policy will belong 
to the Economic Development and Innovation Operational Programme. Al-
though the new period starts in 2014, the new programmes and action plans 
will not be settled before the middle of the year, and the first calls for proposal 
are therefore not expected before the end of the year. The new programmes 
will reveal the emphatic areas of intervention in employment policy.
The importance of employment policy programmes and the changes of their 
importance are shown by the data derived from the source of financing. The 
starting point is again the National Employment Fund (the former Labour 
Market Fund). Table 3 shows the income and the disbursement sides of the 
Fund in the structure used beyond 2011, with some add-ups and extensions, 
and occasional renaming of elements.
The government formed in 2010 accomplished the change of the structure 
of employment policy in two stages – in 2011 and 2012, and later reinforced 
the changed structure. The employment policy budget in 2010 was determined 
by two major items: passive unemployment benefits and the extended public 
works programme entitled “Road to work”, organized by local governments. 
The first item accounted for HUF 137 billion (approx. EUR 441,935 thou-
sand) and the latter for HUF 101 billion (approx. EUR 325,806 thousand) 
in the labour market budget of HUF 389 billion (approx. EUR 1,254,839 
thousand) (2010 final report on the state budget and State Audit Office of 
Hungary, 2013). In 2011 a major change commenced. Except for vocation-
al education, almost all items were heavily reduced, and the total amounts 
were reduced by some 25%. With the reorganization of the tasks of labour 
The priorities of 
employment policy
labour market policy interVentions
243
Table 3: Income and expenditure related to employment policy in the central state budget 2011–2014 (in million HUF)
2011 2012 2013 2014
allocated disbursed allocated disbursed allocatedc allocated
Expenditure
1. Active measures
Employment and training subsidies 40,519.8 25,774.8 25,600.0 22,017.2 27,000.0 27,000.0
EU co-financing for employability (and adaptability) 4,820.7 3,970.7 6,967.0 6,967.0 16,279.6 17,130.0
Public works programmesa 64,000.0 59,799.8 132,182.5 131,910.7 179,897.8 183,805.3
Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP, TÁMOP), Measure 1.1. 
Employment services and assistance 30,925.2 19,754.4 37,900.0 29,772.3 35,000.0 41,000.0
Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP, TÁMOP), Measure 1.2. 
Normative employment incentives 5,500.0 9,774.8 8,500.0 16,250.1 11,000.0 3,200.0
Reimbursement of contribution discount 5,800.0 5,147.7 6,000.0 4,784.1 6,000.0 5,000.0
Pre-financing of 2014–2020 labour market programmes 10,000.0
2. Vocational training and adult training subsidies 33,091.1 27,921.1 23,483.0 16,516.0 27,500.0 26,400.0
4. Expenditure on passive measures
Unemployment benefits (job seekers’ assistance) 134,800.0 124,543.2 57,000.0 64,067.2 59,000.0 56,000.0
Transfer to Pension Insurance Fund 681.3 1,221.5 1,700.0 907.0 361.9 313.9
5. Wage guarantee payments 7,000.0 5,363.0 6,000.0 6,606.6 6,000.0 6,000.0
6. Operating costs 100.0 86.7 300.0 100.0 300.0 1,600.0
9. Technical expenses of debt release incurred upon equity 303.6
13. Retention balance and risk management allocation 10,000.0 2,000.0 2,919.3
15. Employers’ supplemental support 5,222.9
16. Sectoral support to the increase in the minimum wage 10,000.0
Total expenditure 337,238.1 283,661.3 307,632.3 305,121.1 381,258.6 377,449.2
Income
25. Income from the Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP, 
TÁMOP) measures 30,588.1 26,247.6 41,065.2 42,827.3 39,000.0 46,000.0
26. Other income
Territorial other income 800.0 734.2 830.0 559.0 850.0 750.0
Central other income 2,600.0 1,316.8 1,000.0 1,113.6 1,000.0 1,000.0
Vocational training and adult training other income 1,000.0 781.2 1,000.0 1,020.1 800.0 650.0
31. Vocational training contribution 49,000.0 49,415.5 52,700.0 80,352.5 54,814.6 57,071.1
33. Redemption of wage guarantee support 1,000.0 977.8 1,000.0 792.0 1,000.0 1,000.0
34. Technical income from debt release incurred upon equity 303.6
35. Share of the health insurance and labour market contribution 
payable to the Labour Market Fund 187,700.0 186,596.3 119,900.0 127,096.6 120,133.3 125,041.5
36. Central budget support 64,000.0 64,000.0 50,000.0 71,273.8 20,000.0
Share of the social contribution tax payable to the Labour Market Fund 73,630.0 67,284.5
Contribution related to the Job Protection Act 91,542.7 95,936.7
Total income 337,238.1 330,373 341,125.2 392,319.4 329,140.6 327,449.3
Pending itemsb 550.0 202.0 270.3
Changes in deposits 46,913.7 33,492.9 87,468.6 –52,118.0 –50,000.0
Total 337,238.1 330,596.9 341,125.2 393,040.4 381,258.6 377,449.3
Deflating by 3% per year at 2011 prices 337,238.1 330,596.9 331,189.6 381,592.5 359,372.8 345,419.6
a Including the expenditure on public works programmes in 2011 and the expenditure on the Start Employment 
Programme beyond 2011.
b In 2011 also including income from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.
c Including interim amendments of the budget.
Source: Act on the central state budget (plan) and the implementation of the central state budget of the re-
lated year, 153 779,8 in 2013 amended by the stipulations of Government Decisions 1507/2013. (VIII. 1.) and 
1783/2013. (XI. 4.) (HUF 26 118 million extra funds allocated to public works programmes).
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centres in the government offices, the operational costs were reallocated and 
taken from the Fund. As of 2011 public works programmes are financed from 
funds within the National Employment Fund. After the termination of the 
rehabilitation contribution the balance of the Fund is maintained by trans-
fers from the central budget.
After the preparation in 2011, in the years 2012 and 2013 the focus was 
shifted from passive benefits – and to a lesser extent from active labour market 
programmes – to public works programmes. The proportions of expenses on 
public works programmes versus passive benefits measured before at the lev-
els of 20:40 changed to the opposite by 2012, and the target is a proportion 
of 50:15. The change is significant: in parallel with the reduction of passive 
benefits the costs of public works programmes goes back to, or even beyond, 
the levels measured in 2010. Although the structure of the new programme 
is very much different from that of the 2010 programme, no major difference 
is observed in the results of the two programmes (Mód, 2013).
The significance of balanced finances for the National Employment Fund is 
marginal. The appearance of items related to budget subsidies, deposits, and 
later on transfers within the framework of the Job Protection Act all dimin-
ish the separated nature of the Fund. The Fund operates more and more as 
a regular budget heading of the state budget, so its existence facilitates the 
gathering of information by structuring items that are logically inter-related.
Previously we summed up how the expenses of the National Employment 
Fund should be complemented in order to obtain a realistic picture (see: Busch, 
Cseres-Gergely and Neumann, 2013), but it turned out that by using the avail-
able data most corrections cannot be made in a methodologically appropriate 
manner. As a consequence, we corrected only the expenses of EU-(co)funded 
projects, more specifically of Priorities 1 and 2 of the Social Renewal Opera-
tional Programme, with the costs actually incurred. Fact-based data show that 
the correction entails an increase of HUF 10 billion (approx. EUR 32,258 
thousand) on a yearly basis, which is a significant amount, but it has no ma-
jor impact on the conclusions drawn.
As part of the European Semester the European Council examined the 
national reform programme of Hungary for the year 2013 and made a num-
ber of so called country-specific recommendations, including employment 
policy. The Europe 2020 growth programme of the European Union for the 
period 2010–2020 is implemented in the form of yearly cycles called Euro-
pean Semester. The European Commission publishes the annual growth re-
port at the beginning of the given year (for the first time on 12 January 2011), 
on the basis of which member states submit their convergence and national 
reform programmes in April. In these programmes they respond to sugges-
tions made in the report and also give an account of earlier results. Compar-
ing these to the plans the Commission establishes its opinion which is then 
Country-specific recom-
mendations – more at-
tention to marginalized 
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published in June in the form of country-specific recommendations. Member 
states are required to reflect on these recommendations in the programme 
for the following year.
The 2013 country-specific recommendations for Hungary (EC, 2013) list a 
number of recommendations related to employment policy, more specifically 
to taxation, active labour market programmes, public works programmes and 
the operation of the public employment service:
“3. … Continue making taxation of labour more employment-friendly by 
alleviating the tax burden on low wage earners, inter alia by refining the 
eligibility criteria for the Job Protection Act, and by shifting taxation 
away to environmental taxes. …
4. Address youth unemployment, for example through a Youth Guarantee 
(2). Strengthen active labour market policy measures and enhance the 
client profiling system of the Public Employment Service. Reduce the 
dominance of the public works scheme within employment measures 
and strengthen its activation elements. Reinforce training programmes 
to boost participation in lifelong learning. Continue to expand child-care 
facilities to encourage women’s participation…” (EC, 2013, p. 7.).
Major regulations: Act CXXX of 2009 on the 2010 central budget of Hunga-
ry; Act CLXIX of 2010 on the 2011 central budget of Hungary; Act CXXX-
III of 2011 on the implementation of the 2010 central budget of Hungary; 
Act CLXXXVIII of 2011 on the 2012 central budget of Hungary; Govern-
ment Decree 169/2011. (VIII. 24.) on the Employment and Public Works 
Database; Government Decree 248/2011. (XII. 1.) on the establishment of 
the Office for National Economic Planning; Government Decree 323/2011. 
(XII. 28.) on the roles and responsibilities of the National Labour Office and 
the bodies directed and professionally supervised by it.
New regulations: Act CLV of 2012 on the implementation of Act CLXIX 
of 2010 on the implementation of the 2011 central budget of Hungary; Act 
CCIV of 2012 on the 2013 central budget of Hungary; Act CXCIII of 2013 
on the implementation of Act CLXXXVIII of 2011 on the implementation 
of the 2012 central budget of Hungary; Act XLI of 2013 amending specific 
acts on social cooperatives and on public works programmes; Act CCXXX 
of 2013 on the 2014 central budget of Hungary; Government Decree 7/2013. 
(I. 18.) amending specific Government Decrees related to the Government 
Decree on the detailed rules of market supervisory activities; Government 
Decree 414/2012. (XII. 29.) amending specific Government Decrees relat-
ed to the operation of the capital and county government offices; Govern-
ment Decision 1426/2012. (X. 4.) on the approval of the special project no. 
TÁMOP 2.4.8-12/1 (entitled “Development of health and safety at work, de-
velopment of labour inspection”) and its inclusion in the action plan; Gov-
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ernment Decision 1507/2012. (XI. 16.) on the approval of the special project 
no. TIOP-3.2.1-12/1-2012-0001 (entitled “Establishment of an integrated 
system by developing the infrastructure of the public employment service”) 
and its inclusion in the action plan; Ministerial Decree 18/2013. (VI. 11.) of 
the Ministry for the Economy on the management and use of the National 
Employment Fund.
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Statistical tables on labour market trends that have been published in The Hungarian 
Labour Market Yearbook since 2000 can be downloaded in full from the website of the 
Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies: http://adatbank.krtk.mta.hu
1. Basic economic indicators
2. Population
3. Economic activity
4. Employment
5. Unemployment
6. Wages
7. Education
8. Labour demand indicators
9. Regional inequalities
10. Industrial relations
11. Welfare provisions
12. The tax burden on work
13. International comparison
14. Description of the main data sources
Data SourceS
CIRCA Communication & Information Resource Centre Administrator
KSH Table compiled from regular Central Statistical Office publications [Központi 
Statisztikai Hivatal]
KSH IMS CSO institution-based labour statistics [KSH intézményi munkaügyi statisz-
tika]
KSH MEF CSO Labour Force Survey [KSH Munkaerő-felmérés]
KSH MEM CSO Labour Force Account [KSH Munkaerő-mérleg]
NAV National Tax and Customs Administration [Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal]
NEFMI Ministry of National Resources [Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium]
NEFMI EMMI STAT Ministry of National Resources, Educational Statistics [Nemzeti Erőforrás 
Minisztérium, Oktatásstatisztika]
NFA National Market Fund [Nemzeti Foglalkoztatási Alap]
NFSZ National Employment Service [Nemzeti Foglalkoztatási Szolgálat]
NFSZ IR NFSZ integrated tracking system [NFSZ Integrált (nyilvántartási) Rendszer]
NFSZ REG National Employment Service Unemployment Register [NFSZ regisztere]
NGM Ministry of National Economy [Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium]
NMH National Labour Office [Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal]
NMH BT National Labour Office Wage Survey [NMH Bértarifa-felvétel]
NMH PROG National Labour Office Short-term Labour Market Projection Survey [NMH 
Rövid Távú Munkaerőpiaci Prognózis]
NSZ Population Census [Népszámlálás]
NYUFIG Pension Administration [Nyugdíjfolyósító Igazgatóság]
ONYF Central Administration of National Pension Insurance [Országos Nyugdíjbizto-
sítási Főigazgatóság]
TB Social Security Records [Társadalombiztosítás]
explanation of SymbolS
( – ) Non-occurence
( .. ) Not available
( n.a.) Not applicable
( ... ) Data cannot be given due to data privacy restrictions
This logo indi-
cates that you can 
click anywhere on 
tables/figures for 
downloading xls 
source files.
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Table 1.1: Basic economic indicators
Year
GDPa
Industrial 
produc­
tionb
Exportc Importc Real  earningsd
Employ­
mentd
Consumer 
price  
indexd
Unemploy­
ment rate
1989 100.7 95.0 100.3 101.1 99.7 98.2 117.0 ..
1990 96.5 90.7 95.9 94.8 94.3 97.2 128.9 ..
1995 101.5 104.6 108.4 96.1 87.8 98.1 128.2 10.2
1996 100.2 103.4 104.6 105.5 95.0 99.1 123.6 9.9
1997 103.1 111.1 129.9 126.4 104.9 100.1 118.3 8.7
1998 104.7 112.5 122.5 124.9 103.6 101.4 114.3 7.8
1999 103.2 110.4 115.9 114.3 102.5 103.2 110.0 7.0
2000 104.2 118.1 121.7 120.8 101.5 101.0 109.8 6.4
2001 103.7 104.0 107.7 104.0 106.4 100.3 109.2 5.7
2002 104.5 103.8 105.9 105.1 113.6 100.1 105.3 5.8
2003 103.9 107.2 109.1 110.1 109.2 101.3 104.7 5.9
2004 104.8 107.9 118.4 115.2 98.9 99.4 106.8 6.1
2005 104.0 106.9 111.5 106.1 106.3 100.0 103.6 7.2
2006 103.9 110.2 118.0 114.4 103.6 100.7 103.9 7.5
2007 100.1 107.9 115.8 112.0 95.4 99.9 108.0 7.4
2008 100.9 99.9 104.2 104.3 100.8 98.8 106.1 7.8
2009 93.2 82.1 87.3 82.9 97.7 97.5 104.2 10.0
2010 101.1 110.8 116.9 115.1 101.8 100.0 104.9 11.2
2011 101.6 105.5 109.9 106.7 102.4 100.8 103.9 10.9
2012 98.3 98.3 100.7 99.9 96.6 101.7 105.7 10.9
2013 101.2 101.4 104.8 105.0 103.1 101.6 101.7 10.2
a Data adjusted for seasonality and variations in the number of workdays. After 1996 there 
was a change in the methodology for accounting the undivided service fee of financial inter-
mediation. Previous year = 100.
b 1989–2000: those with more than 5 employees, 2001–: without water and waste manage-
ment, including businesses with fewer than 5 employees. Previous year = 100.
c Volume index. Previous year = 100.
d Previous year = 100.
Source: GDP: 1989–2013: STADAT (2013. 03. 30. version), Industrial production index: 
2001–: STADAT (2014. 02. 12. version); Export and import: 2001–: STADAT (2014. 03. 05. 
version); Employment: 1989–1990: KSH MEM; 1995–: KSH MEF. Consumer price index: 
1989–: STADAT (2014.01.05. version). Unemployment rate: 1989–: STADAT (2014.03.05. 
version). Other data: CSO.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent01_01
Figure 1.1: Annual changes of basic economic indicators
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena01_01
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Figure 1.2: Annual GDP time series (2000 = 100%)
Source: Eurostat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena01_02
Figure 1.3: Employment rate of population aged 15–64
Source: Eurostat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena01_03
100
125
150
175
Slovakia
Poland
Hungary
Czech Republic
EU-15
20132012201120102009200820072006200520042003200220012000
Per cent
50
55
60
65
70
Slovakia
Poland
Hungary
Czech Republic
EU-15
20132012201120102009200820072006200520042003200220012000
Per cent
PoPulation
251
Table 2.1: Populationa
Year
In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual changes
Population 
age 15–64,  
in thousands
Demographic dependency rate
Total 
populationb Old age
c
1980 10,709 103.6 n.a. 6,918.9 0.54 0.21
1990 10,375 100.4 –0.2 6,870.4 0.51 0.20
1995 10,337 99.6 –0.1 6,986.9 0.48 0.21
2000 10,221 98.5 –0.3 6,961.3 0.47 0.21
2005 10,098 97.3 –0.2 6,940.3 0.45 0.23
2006 10,077 97.1 –0.2 6,931.8 0.45 0.23
2007 10,066 97.0 –0.1 6,931.3 0.45 0.23
2008 10,045 96.8 –0.2 6,912.7 0.45 0.24
2009 10,031 96.7 –0.1 6,898.1 0.45 0.24
2010 10,014 96.5 –0.1 6,874.0 0.46 0.24
2011 9,986 96.3 –0.2 6,857.4 0.46 0.24
2012 9,932 95.7 .. 6,815.7 0.46 0.25
2013 9,909 95.5 –0.2 6,776.3 0.46 0.25
a January 1st. The data for 1980 and 1990 are based on the censuses of those years. Those for 
1995–2011 are estimates based on the 2001 census and demographic data (reference date 
2001.02.01.). Those for 2012 and 2013 are estimates based on the 2011 census (reference day 
2011.10.01.) and demographic data.
b (population age 0–14 + 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
c (population age 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent02_01
Table 2.2: Population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 2,341.2 1,464.4 4,399.8 1,054.7 1,449.4 10,709.5
1990 2,130.5 1,445.5 4,231.4 1,193.5 1,373.9 10,374.8
1995 1,891.7 1,610.1 4,250.6 1,126.2 1,458.0 10,336.7
2000 1,729.2 1,526.5 4,291.4 1,143.4 1,531.1 10,221.6
2005 1,579.7 1,322.0 4,409.1 1,209.2 1,577.6 10,097.6
2006 1,553.5 1,302.0 4,399.8 1,230.0 1,590.7 10,076.6
2007 1,529.7 1,285.9 4,393.9 1,251.5 1,605.1 10,066.1
2008 1,508.8 1,273.3 4,377.1 1,262.3 1,623.9 10,045.4
2009 1,492.6 1,259.9 4,346.1 1,292.0 1,640.3 10,030.9
2010 1,476.9 1,253.4 4,293.7 1,326.9 1,663.5 10,014.4
2011 1,457.2 1,231.7 4,257.7 1,367.8 1,671.3 9,985.7
2012 1,440.3 1,214.1 4,164.6 1,437.0 1,675.9 9,931.9
2013 1,430.9 1,196.4 4,144.8 1,435.0 1,701.7 9,908.8
a January 1st. The data for 1980 and 1990 are based on the censuses of those years. Those for 
1995–2011 are estimates based on the 2001 census and demographic data (reference date 
2001.02.01.). Those for 2012 and 2013 are estimates based on the 2011 census (reference day 
2011.10.01.) and demographic data.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent02_02
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Figure 2.1: Age structure of the Hungarian population, 1980, 2013
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena02_01
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Table 2.3: Male population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–59 60–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 1,205.4 749.9 2,475.6 170.5 587.3 5,188.7
1990 1,090.4 740.3 2,366.9 259.9 527.5 4,984.9
1995 967.4 824.0 2,353.3 246.1 550.8 4,941.6
2000 885.0 780.9 2,403.8 224.8 570.8 4,865.2
2004 823.0 691.9 2,470.3 244.4 574.5 4,804.1
2005 809.5 674.6 2,480.0 252.2 576.8 4,793.1
2006 796.7 664.0 2,493.7 249.3 580.9 4,784.6
2007 784.5 655.4 2,503.7 249.4 586.1 4,779.1
2008 773.9 649.2 2,501.3 252.5 592.8 4,769.6
2009 765.8 642.7 2,497.0 258.4 599.2 4,763.1
2010 757.7 640.4 2,488.8 261.7 608.3 4,756.9
2011 747.6 629.7 2,480.4 274.7 611.5 4,743.9
2012 739.5 623.1 2,449.9 294.1 617.9 4,724.6
2013 734.7 614.4 2,439.4 297.0 630.5 4,716.0
a January 1st. The data for 1980 and 1990 are based on the censuses of those years. Those for 
1995–2011 are estimates based on the 2001 census and demographic data (reference date 
2001.02.01.). Those for 2012 and 2013 are estimates based on the 2011 census (reference day 
2011.10.01.) and demographic data.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent02_03
Table 2.4: Female population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 1,135.8 714.5 2,232.8 365.3 1,072.4 5,520.8
1990 1,040.1 705.2 2,144.4 327.6 1,172.5 5,389.9
1995 924.4 786.2 2,151.0 312.6 1,221.0 5,395.1
2000 844.3 745.6 2,170.5 334.8 1,261.3 5,356.5
2004 783.1 663.1 2,220.8 338.5 1,307.1 5,312.6
2005 770.2 647.4 2,221.9 341.7 1,323.1 5,304.3
2006 756.8 638.6 2,213.0 356.6 1,327.0 5,292.0
2007 745.1 630.6 2,206.8 369.6 1,335.0 5,287.1
2008 734.9 624.1 2,194.5 373.2 1,349.1 5,275.8
2009 726.8 617.2 2,176.0 381.8 1,366.1 5,267.9
2010 719.2 613.1 2,145.5 396.8 1,382.8 5,257.4
2011 709.6 601.9 2,124.0 404.4 1,401.9 5,241.8
2012 700.8 590.9 2,079.5 416.2 1,419.9 5,207.3
2013 696.2 582.0 2,066.5 411.2 1,436.9 5,192.8
a January 1st. The data for 1980 and 1990 are based on the censuses of those years. Those for 
1995–2011 are estimates based on the 2001 census and demographic data (reference date 
2001.02.01.). Those for 2012 and 2013 are estimates based on the 2011 census (reference day 
2011.10.01.) and demographic data.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent02_04
statistical data
254
Table 3.1: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, in thousandsa
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of males over 59  and females over 54
Employed Un em­ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Un em­ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 4,887.9 0.0 300.8 370.1 259.0 339.7 1,269.6 6,157.5 570.3 0.0 1,632.1 2,202.4
1990 4,534.3 62.4 284.3 548.9 249.7 297.5 1,380.4 5,977.1 345.7 0.0 1,944.9 2,290.6
1991 4,270.5 253.3 335.6 578.2 259.8 317.1 1,490.7 6,014.5 249.5 0.0 2,045.2 2,294.7
1992 3,898.4 434.9 392.7 620.0 262.1 435.9 1,710.7 6,044.0 184.3 9.8 2,101.7 2,295.8
1993 3,689.5 502.6 437.5 683.9 270.5 480.1 1,872.0 6,064.1 137.5 16.3 2,141.2 2,295.0
1994 3,633.1 437.4 476.5 708.2 280.9 540.7 2,006.3 6,076.8 118.4 11.9 2,163.8 2,294.1
1995 3,571.3 410.0 495.2 723.4 285.3 596.1 2,100.0 6,081.3 107.5 6.4 2,180.6 2,294.5
1996 3,546.1 394.0 512.7 740.0 289.2 599.4 2,141.2 6,081.3 102.1 6.1 2,184.6 2,292.8
1997 3,549.5 342.5 542.9 752.0 289.0 599.9 2,183.8 6,075.8 96.9 6.3 2,189.0 2,292.2
1998 3,608.5 305.5 588.8 697.0 295.5 565.7 2,147.0 6,061.0 89.3 7.5 2,197.6 2,294.4
1999 3,701.0 283.3 534.7 675.6 295.3 549.8 2,055.4 6,039.6 110.4 1.4 2,185.2 2,297.0
2000 3,745.9 261.4 517.9 721.7 281.4 571.4 2,092.4 6,099.7 130.3 2.3 2,268.0 2,400.6
2001 3,742.6 231.7 516.3 717.9 286.6 601.6 2,122.4 6,096.7 140.7 2.4 2,271.8 2,414.9
2002 3,719.6 235.7 507.1 738.3 286.8 593.0 2,125.2 6,080.5 164.1 3.2 2,263.9 2,431.2
2003 3,719.0 239.6 485.0 730.7 286.9 595.0 2,097.6 6,056.2 202.9 4.9 2,245.6 2,453.4
2004 3,663.1 247.2 480.5 739.8 282.4 622.4 2,125.1 6,035.4 237.3 5.7 2,236.1 2,479.1
2005 3,653.9 296.0 449.7 740.8 278.6 590.3 2,059.4 6,009.3 247.6 7.9 2,258.3 2,513.8
2006 3,679.6 308.8 432.9 810.9 270.0 500.7 2,014.5 6,002.9 250.5 8.4 2,268.0 2,526.9
2007 3,676.6 303.7 426.8 832.6 267.2 475.8 2,002.4 5,982.7 249.5 8.2 2,296.1 2,553.8
2008 3,631.4 318.5 408.6 819.6 279.8 493.1 2,001.1 5,951.0 248.1 10.7 2,327.7 2,586.5
2009 3,516.8 406.4 364.5 814.6 278.7 529.3 1,987.1 5,910.3 265.1 14.3 2,348.0 2,627.4
2010 3,485.7 455.2 338.7 814.6 267.0 500.7 1,921.0 5,861.9 295.5 19.6 2,356.0 2,671.1
2011 3,484.2 444.1 290.7 794.4 280.5 519.0 1,884.6 5,813.0 327.7 23.8 2,357.6 2,709.1
2012 3,552.2 451.6 250.6 770.0 269.2 496.5 1,786.3 5,790.1 325.6 24.0 2,376.2 2,725.8
2013 3,599.2 425.1 245.8 751.2 257.2 368.4 1,622.6 5,647.0 339.2 23.8 2,346.2 2,709.1
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to the year 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 
2000 the data is updated based on the 2001 population census.
Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiving pension or child 
support. The data on students for 1995–97 are estimates.
’Other inactive’ is a residual category calculated by deducting the sum of the figures in the 
indicated categories (i) from the population of January 1, 2012., in 2012 (ii) from the mid-
year population, in other years, so it includes the institutional population not observed by 
MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the 
year 1997 TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–
: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent03_01
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Table 3.2: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, males, in thousandsa
Year
Population of males 15–59 Population of males 60 and over
Employed Unem­ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem­ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,750.5 0.0 173.8 196.3 0.0 99.1 469.2 3,219.7 265.3 0.0 491.8 757.1
1990 2,524.3 37.9 188.4 284.2 1.2 80.3 554.1 3,116.3 123.7 0.0 665.5 789.2
1991 2,351.6 150.3 218.7 296.5 1.5 115.0 631.7 3,133.6 90.4 0.0 700.7 791.1
1992 2,153.1 263.2 252.0 302.4 1.7 174.8 730.9 3,147.2 65.1 3.2 722.1 790.4
1993 2,029.1 311.5 263.2 346.9 2.0 203.3 815.4 3,156.0 47.9 4.5 735.7 788.1
1994 2,013.4 270.0 277.6 357.1 3.7 239.6 878.0 3,161.4 41.6 3.8 740.0 785.4
1995 2,012.5 259.3 282.2 367.4 4.9 237.8 892.3 3,164.1 37.1 2.1 742.6 781.8
1996 2,007.4 242.4 291.9 372.8 3.3 248.3 916.3 3,166.1 28.9 1.3 746.3 776.5
1997 2,018.0 212.2 306.0 377.6 1.5 251.6 936.7 3,166.9 25.5 1.9 743.5 770.9
1998 2,015.5 186.5 345.4 350.4 1.0 264.2 961.0 3,163.0 26.2 2.8 737.3 766.3
1999 2,068.4 170.3 312.7 338.8 4.2 261.5 917.2 3,155.9 34.7 0.4 727.2 762.3
2000 2,086.0 158.2 315.2 358.2 4.1 261.7 939.2 3,183.4 39.8 0.7 758.8 799.3
2001 2,087.6 141.6 311.0 353.4 4.3 283.2 951.9 3,181.1 41.1 0.9 763.0 805.0
2002 2,080.4 137.3 307.5 370.3 5.0 273.4 956.2 3,173.9 45.2 0.7 764.4 810.3
2003 2,073.5 137.6 293.6 367.9 4.3 288.1 953.9 3,165.0 53.0 0.9 762.5 816.4
2004 2,052.7 136.2 293.5 371.2 4.6 300.2 969.5 3,158.4 64.6 0.6 758.8 824.0
2005 2,050.7 158.2 278.8 375.4 5.8 288.8 948.8 3,157.7 65.4 0.9 763.9 830.2
2006 2,076.5 163.6 268.1 404.1 7.0 239.3 918.5 3,158.4 60.5 1.0 770.9 832.8
2007 2,082.6 163.2 267.7 412.3 3.8 225.2 909.0 3,154.8 60.4 1.0 779.0 840.4
2008 2,052.0 173.4 266.3 408.2 4.8 240.4 919.7 3,145.1 58.8 0.9 791.7 851.4
2009 1,983.6 232.3 241.8 410.8 4.6 261.6 918.8 3,134.4 61.6 1.3 800.7 863.6
2010 1,960.1 262.5 228.3 410.2 4.6 254.0 897.1 3,119.7 62.6 1.9 813.6 878.1
2011 1,987.3 250.4 198.8 399.6 3.8 261.6 863.8 3,101.6 70.0 2.9 819.6 892.5
2012 2,013.4 259.0 178.8 390.8 4.0 247.1 820.7 3,093.1 68.9 3.6 826.4 898.9
2013 2,047.1 238.8 167.8 379.6 4.1 164.6 716.1 3,002.0 81.4 4.3 819.4 905.1
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to the year 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 
2000 the data is updated based on the 2001 population census. Data on ‘employed’ includes 
conscripts and those working while receiving pension or child support. The data on students 
for 1995–97 are estimates.
’Other inactive’ is a residual category calculated by deducting the sum of the figures in the 
indicated categories (i) from the population of January 1, 2012., in 2012 (ii) from the mid-
year population, in other years, so it includes the institutional population not observed by 
MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the 
year 1997 TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 
1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent03_02
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Table 3.3: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, females, in thousandsa
Year
Population of females 15–54 Population of females 55 and over
Employed Unem­ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem­ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,137.4 0.0 127.0 173.8 259.0 240.6 800.4 2,937.8 305.0 0.0 1,140.3 1,445.3
1990 2,010.0 24.5 95.8 264.7 248.5 217.3 826.3 2,860.8 222.0 0.0 1,279.4 1,501.4
1991 1,918.9 103.1 116.9 281.8 258.3 201.9 858.9 2,880.9 159.1 0.0 1,344.5 1,503.6
1992 1,745.3 171.7 140.8 317.6 260.4 261.1 979.9 2,896.9 119.2 6.6 1,379.6 1,505.4
1993 1,660.4 191.1 174.3 337.0 268.5 276.8 1,056.6 2,908.1 89.6 11.8 1,405.5 1,506.9
1994 1,619.7 167.4 198.9 351.1 277.2 301.1 1,128.3 2,915.4 76.8 8.1 1,423.8 1,508.7
1995 1,558.8 150.7 213.0 356.0 280.4 358.3 1,207.7 2,917.2 70.4 4.3 1,438.0 1,512.7
1996 1,538.7 151.6 220.7 367.2 285.9 351.1 1,224.9 2,915.2 73.2 4.8 1,438.3 1,516.3
1997 1,531.5 130.3 236.9 374.4 287.5 348.3 1,247.1 2,908.9 71.4 4.4 1,445.3 1,521.1
1998 1,593.0 119.0 243.4 346.6 294.5 301.5 1,186.0 2,898.0 63.1 4.7 1,460.3 1,528.1
1999 1,632.6 113.0 222.0 336.8 291.1 288.3 1,138.2 2,883.8 75.8 1.0 1,458.0 1,534.8
2000 1,659.9 103.2 202.7 363.5 277.3 309.7 1,153.2 2,916.3 90.5 1.6 1,509.2 1,601.3
2001 1,655.0 90.1 205.3 364.5 282.3 318.3 1,170.4 2,915.5 99.6 1.5 1,508.8 1,609.9
2002 1,639.2 98.4 199.6 368.0 281.8 319.6 1,169.0 2,906.6 118.9 2.5 1,499.5 1,620.9
2003 1,645.6 102.0 191.4 362.8 282.6 306.9 1,143.7 2,891.2 149.9 4.0 1,483.2 1,637.1
2004 1,610.2 111.0 186.8 368.6 277.8 322.2 1,155.4 2,876.6 172.8 5.1 1,477.3 1,655.2
2005 1,603.2 137.8 170.9 365.4 272.8 301.5 1,110.6 2,851.6 182.2 7.0 1,494.4 1,683.6
2006 1,603.1 144.8 164.8 406.8 263.0 262.0 1,096.6 2,844.5 189.6 7.4 1,497.1 1,694.1
2007 1,594.0 140.5 159.1 420.3 263.4 250.6 1,093.4 2,827.9 189.1 7.2 1,517.1 1,713.4
2008 1,579.4 145.1 142.3 411.4 276.0 252.7 1,082.4 2,806.9 189.3 9.8 1,536.0 1,735.1
2009 1,533.5 174.1 122.7 403.8 274.1 267.7 1,068.3 2,775.9 203.5 13.0 1,547.3 1,763.8
2010 1,525.6 192.8 110.4 404.4 262.4 246.6 1,023.8 2,742.2 233.0 17.7 1,542.3 1,793.0
2011 1,496.9 193.7 91.9 394.8 276.7 257.4 1,020.8 2,711.4 257.7 20.9 1,538.0 1,816.6
2012 1,538.8 192.6 71.8 379.2 265.2 249.4 965.6 2,697.0 256.7 20.4 1,550.0 1,826.9
2013 1,552.1 186.4 78.0 371.6 253.1 203.8 906.5 2,645.0 257.8 19.4 1,526.8 1,804.0
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to the year 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, 
since 2000 the data is updated based on the 2001 population census. Data on ‘employed’ 
includes conscripts and those working while receiving pension or child support. The data 
on students for 1995–97 are estimates.
’Other inactive’ is a residual category calculated by deducting the sum of the figures in the 
indicated categories (i) from the population of January 1, 2012., in 2012 (ii) from the mid-
year population, in other years, so it includes the institutional population not observed by 
MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the 
year 1997 TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NMH REG, 
1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent03_03
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Table 3.4: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, per cent
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of males over 59  and females over 54
Employed Unem­ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem­ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 79.4 0.0 4.9 6.0 4.2 5.5 20.6 100.0 25.9 0.0 74.1 100.0
1990 75.9 1.0 4.8 9.2 4.2 5.0 23.1 100.0 15.1 0.0 84.9 100.0
1995 58.7 6.7 8.1 11.9 4.7 9.8 34.5 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 58.3 6.5 8.4 12.2 4.8 9.9 35.2 100.0 4.5 0.3 95.3 100.0
1997 58.4 5.6 8.9 12.4 4.8 9.9 35.9 100.0 4.2 0.3 95.5 100.0
1998 59.5 5.0 9.7 11.5 4.9 9.3 35.4 100.0 3.9 0.3 95.8 100.0
1999 61.3 4.7 8.9 11.2 4.9 9.1 34.0 100.0 4.8 0.1 95.1 100.0
2000 61.4 4.3 8.5 11.8 4.6 9.4 34.3 100.0 5.4 0.1 94.5 100.0
2001 61.4 3.8 8.5 11.8 4.7 9.9 34.8 100.0 5.8 0.1 94.1 100.0
2002 61.2 3.9 8.3 12.1 4.7 9.8 35.0 100.0 6.7 0.1 93.1 100.0
2003 61.4 4.0 8.0 12.1 4.7 9.8 34.6 100.0 8.3 0.2 91.5 100.0
2004 60.7 4.1 8.0 12.3 4.7 10.3 35.2 100.0 9.6 0.2 90.2 100.0
2005 60.8 4.9 7.5 12.3 4.6 9.8 34.3 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.8 100.0
2006 61.3 5.1 7.2 13.5 4.5 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.9 0.3 89.8 100.0
2007 61.5 5.1 7.1 13.9 4.5 7.9 33.5 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.9 100.0
2008 61.0 5.3 6.9 13.8 4.7 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.6 0.4 90.0 100.0
2009 59.5 6.9 6.2 13.8 4.7 9.0 33.6 100.0 10.1 0.5 89.4 100.0
2010 59.5 7.8 5.8 13.9 4.6 8.5 32.8 100.0 11.1 0.7 88.2 100.0
2011 59.9 7.6 5.0 13.7 4.8 8.9 32.4 100.0 12.1 0.9 87.0 100.0
2012 61.3 7.8 4.3 13.3 4.6 8.6 30.9 100.0 11.9 0.9 87.2 100.0
2013 63.7 7.5 4.4 13.3 4.6 6.5 28.7 100.0 12.5 0.9 86.6 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NFSZ REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent03_04
Figure 3.1: Labour force participation of population for males 15–59 and females 15–54, total
Source: Pensioners: 1990–90: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 
1997 TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990-91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013hua03_01
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Table 3.5: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, males, per cent
Year
Population of males 15–59 Population of males 60 and over
Employed Unem­ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem­ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 85.4 0.0 5.4 6.1 0.0 3.1 14.6 100.0 35.0 0.0 65.0 100.0
1990 81.0 1.2 6.0 9.1 0.0 2.6 17.8 100.0 15.7 0.0 84.3 100.0
1995 63.6 8.2 8.9 11.6 0.2 7.5 28.2 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 63.4 7.7 9.2 11.8 0.1 7.8 28.9 100.0 3.7 0.2 96.1 100.0
1997 63.7 6.7 9.7 11.9 0.0 7.9 29.6 100.0 3.3 0.2 96.4 100.0
1998 63.7 5.9 10.9 11.1 0.0 8.4 30.4 100.0 3.4 0.4 96.2 100.0
1999 65.5 5.4 9.9 10.7 0.1 8.3 29.1 100.0 4.6 0.1 95.4 100.0
2000 65.5 5.0 9.9 11.3 0.1 8.2 29.5 100.0 5.0 0.1 94.9 100.0
2001 65.6 4.5 9.8 11.1 0.1 8.9 29.9 100.0 5.1 0.1 94.8 100.0
2002 65.5 4.3 9.7 11.7 0.2 8.6 30.1 100.0 5.6 0.1 94.3 100.0
2003 65.5 4.3 9.3 11.6 0.1 9.1 30.1 100.0 6.5 0.1 93.4 100.0
2004 65.0 4.3 9.3 11.8 0.1 9.5 30.7 100.0 7.8 0.1 92.1 100.0
2005 64.9 5.0 8.8 11.9 0.2 9.1 30.0 100.0 7.9 0.1 92.0 100.0
2006 65.7 5.2 8.5 12.8 0.2 7.6 29.1 100.0 7.3 0.1 92.6 100.0
2007 66.0 5.2 8.5 13.1 0.1 7.1 28.8 100.0 7.2 0.1 92.7 100.0
2008 65.2 5.5 8.5 13.0 0.2 7.6 29.2 100.0 6.9 0.1 93.0 100.0
2009 63.3 7.4 7.7 13.1 0.1 8.3 29.3 100.0 7.1 0.2 92.7 100.0
2010 62.8 8.4 7.3 13.1 0.1 8.1 28.8 100.0 7.1 0.2 92.7 100.0
2011 64.1 8.1 6.4 12.9 0.1 8.4 27.9 100.0 7.8 0.3 91.8 100.0
2012 65.1 8.4 5.8 12.6 0.1 8.0 26.5 100.0 7.7 0.4 91.9 100.0
2013 68.2 8.0 5.6 12.6 0.1 5.5 23.9 100.0 9.0 0.5 90.5 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 
1997 TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NFSZ REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent03_05
Figure 3.2: Labour force participation of population at male 15–59
Source: Pensioners: 1990–90: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena03_02
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Table 3.6: Labour force participation of the population over 14 years, females, per cent
Year
Population of females 15–54 Population of females 55 and over
Employed Unem­ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem­ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 72.8 0.0 4.3 5.9 8.8 8.2 27.2 100.0 21.1 0.0 78.9 100.0
1990 70.3 0.9 3.3 9.3 8.7 7.6 28.9 100.0 14.8 0.0 85.2 100.0
1995 53.4 5.2 7.3 12.2 9.6 12.3 41.4 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.1 100.0
1996 52.8 5.2 7.6 12.6 9.8 12.0 42.0 100.0 4.8 0.3 94.9 100.0
1997 52.6 4.5 8.1 12.9 9.9 12.0 42.9 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1998 55.0 4.1 8.4 12.0 10.2 10.4 40.9 100.0 4.1 0.3 95.6 100.0
1999 56.6 3.9 7.7 11.7 10.1 10.0 39.5 100.0 4.9 0.1 95.0 100.0
2000 56.9 3.5 7.0 12.5 9.5 10.6 39.5 100.0 5.7 0.1 94.2 100.0
2001 56.8 3.1 7.0 12.5 9.7 10.9 40.1 100.0 6.2 0.1 93.7 100.0
2002 56.4 3.4 6.9 12.7 9.7 11.0 40.2 100.0 7.3 0.2 92.5 100.0
2003 56.9 3.5 6.6 12.5 9.8 10.6 39.6 100.0 9.2 0.2 90.6 100.0
2004 56.0 3.9 6.5 12.8 9.7 11.2 40.2 100.0 10.4 0.3 89.3 100.0
2005 56.2 4.8 6.0 12.8 9.6 10.6 38.9 100.0 10.8 0.4 88.8 100.0
2006 56.4 5.1 5.8 14.3 9.2 9.2 38.6 100.0 11.2 0.4 88.4 100.0
2007 56.4 5.0 5.6 14.9 9.3 8.9 38.7 100.0 11.0 0.4 88.6 100.0
2008 56.3 5.2 5.1 14.7 9.8 9.0 38.6 100.0 10.9 0.6 88.5 100.0
2009 55.2 6.3 4.4 14.5 9.9 9.6 38.5 100.0 11.5 0.8 87.7 100.0
2010 55.6 7.0 4.0 14.7 9.6 9.0 37.5 100.0 13.0 1.0 86.0 100.0
2011 55.2 7.1 3.4 14.6 10.2 9.5 37.6 100.0 14.2 1.2 84.7 100.0
2012 57.1 7.1 2.7 14.1 9.8 9.2 35.8 100.0 14.1 1.1 84.8 100.0
2013 58.7 7.0 2.9 14.0 9.6 7.7 34.3 100.0 14.3 1.1 84.6 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 
1997 TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NFSZ REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent03_06
Figure 3.3: Labour force participation of population at female 15–54
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Source: Pensioners: 1990–90: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: up to the year 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena03_03
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Table 3.7: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), in thousands
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Together
In work 3,827.4 3,827.1 3,843.6 3,834.4 3,852.2 3,864.1 3,857.2 3,800.7 3,715.3 3,709.8 3,746.7 3,799.9 3,872.5
Unemployed 414.5 410.4 431.8 451.0 488.2 468.1 448.3 481.4 592.5 676.0 678.7 697.9 675.8
Students, 
pupils 739.9 763.1 767.7 783.8 792.0 847.8 870.4 868.9 864.5 861.8 848.3 811.5 772.9
Pensioner 990.8 940.4 856.4 800.3 755.6 617.8 568.6 611.0 600.9 579.3 570.3 605.1 593.6
Disabled 251.0 284.4 338.3 370.4 359.7 520.4 560.3 530.0 495.5 482.1 448.4 343.5 330.5
On child care 
leave 272.3 278.3 281.7 274.7 272.4 273.5 279.7 292.4 290.5 280.5 288.3 271.5 260.7
Dependent 170.7 160.4 135.1 133.3 134.6 116.1 111.9 106.2 105.6 100.4 110.5 96.7 102.7
Out of work for 
other reasons 184.7 185.7 181.7 178.4 160.0 108.0 103.3 103.6 106.4 79.3 83.8 89.7 77.4
Total 6,851.3 6,849.8 6,836.3 6,826.3 6,814.7 6,815.8 6,799.7 6,794.2 6,771.2 6,769.2 6,775.0 6,715.7 6,686.1
Males
In work 2,089.5 2,090.2 2,087.3 2,082.8 2,088.3 2,105.0 2,108.9 2,074.0 2,013.1 1,989.1 2,026.4 2,042.3 2,090.1
Unemployed 255.2 239.3 244.2 247.7 265.2 251.6 241.9 257.5 334.2 376.5 373.4 379.5 368.3
Students, 
pupils 363.6 380.9 383.7 391.1 398.5 418.9 430.2 431.5 432.9 431.2 425.5 411.2 390.5
Pensioner 386.3 368.1 337.4 322.5 304.5 236.0 205.2 233.8 235.1 240.4 243.4 241.8 223.2
Disabled 134.2 148.1 169.9 184.5 178.7 250.4 269.9 259.4 237.1 231.0 212.7 168.4 158.8
On child care 
leave 4.0 4.9 4.7 4.9 6.1 5.5 4.1 5.8 6.0 6.7 4.7 4.0 4.3
Dependent 6.3 5.1 5.3 6.0 7.0 5.8 6.6 7.2 7.3 10.3 10.0 7.5 10.3
Out of work for 
other reasons 100.8 101.2 97.5 89.6 80.1 54.9 52.1 52.1 50.1 36.1 37.5 41.0 36.1
Total 3,339.9 3,337.8 3,330.0 3,329.1 3,328.4 3,328.1 3,318.9 3,321.3 3,315.8 3,321.3 3,333.6 3,295.6 3,281.6
Females
In work 1,737.9 1,736.9 1,756.3 1,751.6 1,763.9 1,759.1 1,748.3 1,726.6 1,702.2 1,720.7 1,720.4 1,757.7 1,782.2
Unemployed 159.3 171.1 187.6 203.3 223.0 216.5 206.4 223.8 258.3 299.5 305.4 318.4 307.5
Students, 
pupils 376.3 382.2 384.0 392.7 393.5 428.9 440.2 437.4 431.6 430.6 422.8 400.3 382.4
Pensioner 604.5 572.3 519.0 477.8 451.1 381.8 363.4 377.2 365.7 338.9 326.9 363.4 370.4
Disabled 116.8 136.3 168.4 185.9 181.0 270.0 290.4 270.6 258.4 251.1 235.7 175.1 171.8
On child care 
leave 268.3 273.4 277.0 269.8 266.3 268.0 275.6 286.7 284.5 273.9 283.6 267.4 256.4
Dependent 164.4 155.3 129.8 127.3 127.6 110.3 105.3 99.1 98.3 90.1 100.4 89.3 92.4
Out of work for 
other reasons 83.9 84.5 84.2 88.8 79.9 53.1 51.2 51.4 56.3 43.1 46.3 48.7 41.3
Total 3,511.4 3,512.0 3,506.3 3,497.2 3,486.3 3,487.7 3,480.8 3,472.8 3,455.3 3,447.9 3,441.5 3,420.1 3,404.4
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent03_07
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Table 3.8: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), per cent
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Together
In work 55.9 55.9 56.2 56.2 56.5 56.7 56.7 55.9 54.9 54.8 55.3 56.6 57.9
Unemployed 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.1 8.8 10.0 10.0 10.4 10.1
Students, pupils 10.8 11.1 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.4 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.7 12.5 12.1 11.6
Pensioner 14.5 13.7 12.5 11.7 11.1 9.1 8.4 9.0 8.9 8.6 8.4 9.0 8.9
Disabled 3.7 4.2 4.9 5.4 5.3 7.6 8.2 7.8 7.3 7.1 6.6 5.1 4.9
On child care 
leave 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.0 3.9
Dependent 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5
Out of work for 
other reasons 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Males
In work 62.6 62.6 62.7 62.6 62.7 63.2 63.5 62.4 60.7 59.9 60.8 62.0 63.7
Unemployed 7.6 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.6 7.3 7.8 10.1 11.3 11.2 11.5 11.2
Students, pupils 10.9 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.6 13.0 13.0 13.1 13.0 12.8 12.5 11.9
Pensioner 11.6 11.0 10.1 9.7 9.1 7.1 6.2 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.3 6.8
Disabled 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.5 5.4 7.5 8.1 7.8 7.2 7.0 6.4 5.1 4.8
On child care 
leave 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dependent 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
Out of work for 
other reasons 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Females
In work 49.5 49.5 50.1 50.1 50.6 50.4 50.2 49.7 49.3 49.9 50.0 51.4 52.4
Unemployed 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.4 6.2 5.9 6.4 7.5 8.7 8.9 9.3 9.0
Students, pupils 10.7 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.3 12.3 12.6 12.6 12.5 12.5 12.3 11.7 11.2
Pensioner 17.2 16.3 14.8 13.7 12.9 10.9 10.4 10.9 10.6 9.8 9.5 10.6 10.9
Disabled 3.3 3.9 4.8 5.3 5.2 7.7 8.3 7.8 7.5 7.3 6.8 5.1 5.1
On child care 
leave 7.6 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.2 7.9 8.2 7.8 7.5
Dependent 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.7
Out of work for 
other reasons 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent03_08
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Table 4.1: Employment
Year In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual changes Employment ratioa
1980 5,458.2 133.7 .. 65.3
1990 4,880.0 119.5 .. 59.0
1991 4,520.0 110.7 –7.4 54.4
1992 4,082.7 100.0 –9.7 49.0
1993 3,827.0 93.7 –6.2 45.8
1994 3,751.5 91.9 –2.0 44.8
1995 3,678.8 90.1 –1.9 43.9
1996 3,648.2 89.4 –0.9 43.6
1997 3,646.4 89.3 0.0 43.6
1998 3,697.8 90.6 1.4 44.3
1999 3,811.4 93.4 3.2 45.7
2000 3,849.1 94.3 1.0 46.2
2001 3,883.3 95.1 0.3 45.6
2002 3,883.7 95.1 0.0 45.6
2003 3,921.9 96.1 1.2 46.2
2004 3,900.4 95.5 –0.5 45.8
2005 3,901.5 95.6 0.0 45.7
2006 3,930.1 96.3 0.7 46.0
2007 3,926.2 96.2 0.0 46.0
2008 3,879.4 95.0 –1.2 45.4
2009 3,781.9 92.6 –2.4 44.3
2010 3,781.2 92.6 0.0 44.3
2011 3,811.9 93.4 0.8 44.7
2012 3,877.9 95.0 1.7 ..
2013 3,938.4 96.5 1.6 ..
a Per cent of the population over 14 years of age.
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_01
Figure 4.1: Employed
Source: 1990–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena04_01
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Table 4.2: Employment by gender
Year
Males Females Share of females 
(%)In thousands 1992 = 100 In thousands 1992 = 100
1980 3,015.8 136.0 2,442.4 131.0 44.7
1990 2,648.0 119.4 2,232.0 119.7 45.7
1991 2,442.0 110.1 2,078.0 111.5 46.0
1992 2,218.2 100.0 1,864.5 100.0 45.7
1993 2,077.0 93.6 1,750.0 93.9 45.7
1994 2,055.0 92.6 1,696.5 91.0 45.2
1995 2,049.6 92.4 1,629.2 87.4 44.3
1996 2,036.3 91.8 1,611.9 86.5 44.2
1997 2,043.5 92.1 1,602.9 86.0 44.0
1998 2,041.7 92.0 1,656.1 88.8 44.8
1999 2,103.1 94.8 1,708.4 91.6 44.8
2000 2,122.4 95.7 1,726.7 92.6 44.9
2001 2,128.7 96.0 1,754.6 94.1 45.2
2002 2,125.6 95.8 1,758.1 94.3 45.3
2003 2,126.5 95.6 1,795.4 96.2 45.8
2004 2,117.3 95.5 1,783.1 95.6 45.7
2005 2,116.1 95.4 1,785.4 95.8 45.8
2006 2,137.4 96.4 1,792.7 96.1 45.6
2007 2,143.0 96.6 1,783.2 95.6 45.5
2008 2,110.8 95.2 1,768.6 94.9 45.6
2009 2,044.9 92.2 1,737.0 93.2 45.9
2010 2,022.6 91.2 1,758.6 94.4 46.5
2011 2,057.3 92.7 1,754.6 94.1 46.0
2012 2,082.4 93.9 1,795.5 96.3 46.3
2013 2,128.5 96.0 1,809.9 97.1 46.0
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1990–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_02
Figure 4.2: Employment by gender
Source: 1990–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena04_02
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Table 4.3: Composition of the employed by age groups, males, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1990 5.0 10.8 64.1 8.6 6.8 4.7 100.0
1998 2.3 13.4 67.6 10.3 5.1 1.3 100.0
1999 1.9 13.2 67.1 10.5 5.6 1.6 100.0
2000 1.5 12.4 67.3 10.6 6.4 1.8 100.0
2001 1.2 10.4 68.6 11.1 6.7 2.0 100.0
2002 0.9 9.4 69.4 11.3 6.9 2.1 100.0
2003 0.7 8.6 69.1 11.8 7.3 2.5 100.0
2004 0.7 7.4 69.5 12.0 7.3 3.0 100.0
2005 0.6 6.8 68.9 12.7 7.9 3.1 100.0
2006 0.6 6.6 68.5 13.0 8.4 2.9 100.0
2007 0.5 6.5 68.7 13.0 8.5 2.8 100.0
2008 0.5 6.3 69.0 13.1 8.3 2.8 100.0
2009 0.4 5.6 69.6 12.2 9.2 3.0 100.0
2010 0.3 5.7 69.3 12.0 9.6 3.1 100.0
2011 0.3 5.5 69.5 11.5 9.7 3.4 100.0
2012 0.3 5.5 69.5 11.2 10.2 3.3 100.0
2013 0.3 5.7 68.4 11.3 10.4 3.8 100.0
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1990: Census based estimates. 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_03
Table 4.4: Composition of the employed by age groups, females, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55+
Total
years old
1990 5.2 8.6 66.2 10.0 10.0 100.0
1998 2.3 12.2 71.2 10.5 3.8 100.0
1999 1.7 12.1 70.2 11.6 4.4 100.0
2000 1.4 11.1 69.6 12.7 5.2 100.0
2001 1.1 9.6 70.5 13.1 5.7 100.0
2002 0.8 9.2 69.4 13.8 6.8 100.0
2003 0.5 8.2 68.8 14.0 8.5 100.0
2004 0.5 7.1 68.2 14.6 9.7 100.0
2005 0.4 6.4 67.6 15.4 10.2 100.0
2006 0.4 6.1 66.8 16.2 10.6 100.0
2007 0.3 5.8 67.3 16.0 10.6 100.0
2008 0.3 5.5 67.4 16.1 10.7 100.0
2009 0.3 5.4 67.2 15.4 11.7 100.0
2010 0.3 5.3 66.3 14.8 13.2 100.0
2011 0.3 5.4 66.0 13.8 14.5 100.0
2012 0.2 5.3 66.3 13.9 14.3 100.0
2013 0.2 5.1 66.9 13.6 14.2 100.0
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1990: Census based estimates. 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_04
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Table 4.5: Composition of the employed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational 
school Secondary school
College,  
university Total
1990 37.6 30.5 20.1 11.8 100.0
2000 16.1 41.6 26.7 15.6 100.0
2001 15.6 42.8 26.0 15.6 100.0
2002 14.6 43.2 26.4 15.8 100.0
2003 14.0 41.3 27.7 17.0 100.0
2004 13.0 40.4 28.0 18.6 100.0
2005 13.0 40.8 27.7 18.5 100.0
2006 12.3 40.8 28.3 18.6 100.0
2007 11.8 40.8 28.7 18.7 100.0
2008 11.7 39.4 29.0 19.8 100.0
2009 10.9 38.6 30.1 20.3 100.0
2010 10.7 38.2 30.6 20.5 100.0
2011 10.6 37.1 30.4 21.9 100.0
2012 10.6 36.9 30.0 22.5 100.0
2013 10.1 37.5 30.0 22.4 100.0
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 
2000, slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: 1990: Census based estimates. 2000–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_05
Table 4.6: Composition of the employed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational 
school Secondary school
College,  
university Total
1990 43.4 13.4 31.4 11.8 100.0
2000 19.1 20.9 40.8 19.2 100.0
2001 19.1 21.3 40.3 19.3 100.0
2002 18.5 21.5 40.2 19.8 100.0
2003 16.4 21.5 40.9 21.2 100.0
2004 15.9 20.5 40.2 23.4 100.0
2005 15.4 20.2 40.0 24.4 100.0
2006 14.3 20.7 40.1 24.9 100.0
2007 13.6 21.2 40.1 25.1 100.0
2008 13.3 20.3 39.3 27.1 100.0
2009 12.5 19.9 39.2 28.4 100.0
2010 12.4 20.2 38.7 28.7 100.0
2011 11.5 20.0 38.3 30.1 100.0
2012 11.0 19.5 38.7 30.8 100.0
2013 11.0 19.5 38.1 31.4 100.0
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 
2000, slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: 1990: Census based estimates. 2000–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_06
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Table 4.7: Employed by employment status, in thousands
Year
Employees Member of  cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self­employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1998 3,088.5 55.8 132.5 397.9 3,674.7
1999 3,201.3 42.5 111.8 435.9 3,791.5
2000 3,255.5 37.1 129.4 407.1 3,829.1
2001 3,313.6 31.4 118.9 404.4 3,868.3
2002 3,337.2 22.5 109.9 401.0 3,870.6
2003 3,399.2 8.6 114.7 399.4 3,921.9
2004 3,347.8 8.1 136.6 407.8 3,900.3
2005 3,367.3 5.8 146.7 381.7 3,901.5
2006 3,431.4 4.8 126.7 367.2 3,930.1
2007 3,439.7 4.4 123.2 358.9 3,926.2
2008 3,405.1 2.3 122.5 349.5 3,879.4
2009 3,309.9 2.0 136.8 333.2 3,781.9
2010 3,317.5 3.0 140.0 320.7 3,781.2
2011 3,352.4 1.9 134.3 323.3 3,811.9
2012 3,424.7 2.4 145.7 305.1 3,877.9
2013 3,501.0 3.5 157.3 276.6 3,938.4
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Con-
scripts are excluded.
Source: 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_07
Table 4.8: Composition of the employed persons by employment status, per cent
Year
Employees Member of  cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self­employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1998 84.0 1.5 3.6 10.8 100.0
1999 84.4 1.1 2.9 11.5 100.0
2000 85.0 1.0 3.4 10.6 100.0
2001 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.5 100.0
2002 86.2 0.6 2.8 10.4 100.0
2003 86.7 0.2 2.8 10.3 100.0
2004 85.8 0.2 3.5 10.5 100.0
2005 86.3 0.1 3.8 9.8 100.0
2006 87.3 0.1 3.2 9.4 100.0
2007 87.6 0.1 3.1 9.2 100.0
2008 87.7 0.1 3.2 9.0 100.0
2009 87.5 0.1 3.6 8.8 100.0
2010 87.7 0.1 3.7 8.5 100.0
2011 87.9 0.0 3.5 8.5 100.0
2012 88.3 0.1 3.8 7.9 100.0
2013 88.9 0.1 4.0 7.0 100.0
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Con-
scripts are excluded.
Source: 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_08
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Table 4.9: Composition of employed persons by sectora, by gender, per cent
2010 2011 2012 2013
Males Females Together Males Females Together Males Females Together Males Females Together
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 5.0 1.6 3.4 5.6 2.0 3.8 5.7 2.0 3.9 5.2 1.9 3.6
Mining and quarrying 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2
Manufacturing 26.1 18.3 22.3 27.0 18.6 23.0 26.5 17.9 22.4 26.7 17.9 22.5
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 1.5 0.7 1.1 1.6 0.6 1.1 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.3 0.5 0.9
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities
2.3 0.6 1.4 2.2 0.8 1.5 2.6 0.9 1.8 2.6 0.8 1.7
Construction 11.7 1.2 6.6 11.0 0.9 6.2 9.9 1.0 5.7 10.1 0.9 5.7
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
11.4 16.1 13.6 11.5 15.8 13.6 10.9 15.8 13.2 10.5 15.6 12.9
Transportation and storage 10.1 3.8 7.1 9.5 4.1 6.9 9.9 3.7 6.9 9.7 3.8 6.9
Accommodation and food 
service activities 3.2 5.0 4.1 3.1 5.3 4.1 3.1 5.2 4.1 3.0 5.0 4.0
Information and communica­
tion 3.0 1.7 2.4 2.9 1.6 2.3 3.3 1.7 2.5 3.1 2.0 2.6
Financial and insurance 
activities 1.3 3.6 2.4 1.5 3.3 2.4 1.6 3.4 2.4 1.8 3.3 2.5
Real estate activities 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 2.4 3.4 2.9 2.1 3.3 2.6 1.9 3.4 2.6 2.2 3.8 3.0
Administrative and support 
service activities 3.3 2.8 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.0 3.9 2.9 3.4 4.2 2.8 3.5
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security
8.5 9.8 9.1 8.7 9.6 9.2 9.0 10.0 9.5 9.9 11.0 10.4
Education 4.1 15.0 9.4 4.0 14.9 9.2 4.0 14.5 9.0 3.8 14.3 8.8
Human health and social 
work activities 2.8 12.2 7.3 2.8 11.8 7.1 2.6 12.4 7.3 2.6 12.2 7.2
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.3
Other services 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.2 1.6 1.2 2.3 1.7 1.3 2.1 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a By TEÁOR’08.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_09
Table 4.10: Employed in their present job for 0–6 months, per cent
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hungary 8.2 8.5 6.8 7.2 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.0 6.7 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.9 7.3 8.4 9.1
Source: MEF, IV. quarterly waves.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_10
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Table 4.11: Distribution of employees in the competitive sectora by firm size, per cent
Year
Less than 20 20–49 50–249 250–999 1000 and more
employees
2000 20.2 7.0 23.5 22.5 26.8
2001 18.5 7.5 24.3 23.0 26.7
2002 21.6 14.0 21.5 20.1 22.9
2003 23.0 15.3 20.5 19.3 21.8
2004 23.6 14.8 21.3 18.3 22.0
2005 27.0 15.0 20.5 17.5 20.0
2006 15.7 10.7 25.7 24.3 23.6
2007 25.2 14.2 20.0 18.4 22.2
2008 26.0 15.7 20.7 18.9 18.6
2009 23.4 15.7 19.7 18.4 22.8
2010 23.5 15.7 18.6 18.0 24.2
2011 24.9 15.6 18.5 17.7 23.4
2012 24.2 14.7 18.3 18.6 24.1
2013 23.2 14.5 18.1 19.0 25.2
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_11
Table 4.12: Employees of the competitive sectora by the share of foreign ownership, per cent
Share of foreign 
ownership 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
100% 17.5 19.0 17.7 16.5 17.7 18.6 19.0 19.4 20.4 17.5 19.2 20.2 21.1 21.8
Majority 11.7 11.0 9.2 8.8 7.8 8.5 7.5 7.4 6.4 6.3 5.4 5.7 6.5 7.8
Minority 5.3 4.9 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.1 2.2 2.9 2.2 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.5 2.9
0% 65.5 65.1 69.5 70.8 70.7 69.8 71.3 70.3 71.0 74.6 73.5 72.4 70.9 67.5
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_12
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena04_03
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Figure 4.3: Employees of the corporate sector by firm size and by the share of foreign ownership
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Table 4.13: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, males, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 14.6 64.7 82.8 71.8 48.7 17.1 9.9 58.9
1998 11.4 59.9 78.8 66.0 38.3 10.0 3.2 54.4
1999 10.6 60.3 80.5 69.0 44.0 10.4 3.8 56.2
2000 8.4 58.9 80.9 69.6 49.6 11.8 3.8 56.8
2001 7.9 56.7 81.6 68.2 51.3 13.1 3.1 57.1
2002 5.6 53.1 81.9 68.6 52.8 14.4 3.4 57.1
2003 4.8 51.8 82.2 69.7 55.2 16.8 3.8 57.6
2004 4.5 46.5 82.7 69.7 54.0 20.1 4.3 57.5
2005 4.0 43.6 82.5 70.1 56.6 20.9 4.2 57.4
2006 4.2 43.9 83.3 70.3 58.6 19.2 4.3 58.0
2007 3.7 43.8 83.7 70.7 58.2 18.9 4.7 58.0
2008 3.5 42.2 83.1 71.2 55.1 16.8 4.9 57.2
2009 2.5 36.6 80.5 70.5 57.1 17.2 5.0 55.5
2010 2.1 36.8 79.6 69.6 57.4 16.9 4.8 54.9
2011 2.2 35.9 81.0 72.0 58.1 17.9 5.9 55.8
2012 2.2 35.8 81.4 74.4 62.5 17.4 5.6 56.6
2013 2.8 39.4 82.2 75.1 66.1 22.2 4.9 58.0
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_13
Table 4.14: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group,  
females, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 16.0 54.0 72.2 58.4 18.2 10.7 5.3 46.6
1998 10.7 47.5 66.3 52.3 13.6 5.0 1.2 41.0
1999 8.7 48.1 67.3 59.4 16.2 5.5 1.6 42.3
2000 8.0 45.9 67.8 62.5 20.0 5.1 1.8 43.0
2001 6.3 44.2 68.0 62.1 23.2 5.5 1.3 43.1
2002 4.3 44.2 67.0 64.0 28.3 6.0 1.5 43.3
2003 3.1 41.9 67.8 65.8 35.1 7.3 2.0 44.3
2004 2.7 37.4 67.2 66.0 39.8 9.0 1.9 44.1
2005 2.6 34.7 67.4 66.6 41.7 9.6 1.5 44.2
2006 2.5 33.9 67.5 67.9 42.6 8.9 1.6 44.4
2007 2.1 32.5 67.8 68.3 40.0 9.7 2.1 44.3
2008 1.9 31.0 67.7 68.7 38.7 10.0 2.3 44.0
2009 1.5 30.0 66.6 68.5 41.1 10.0 2.2 43.4
2010 1.9 30.3 66.5 69.7 46.9 9.8 2.5 43.9
2011 1.6 30.2 66.1 68.9 50.7 11.1 2.6 44.0
2012 1.4 31.1 68.0 73.1 50.5 11.2 2.4 45.1
2013 1.7 30.3 69.0 74.4 51.8 11.3 2.3 45.7
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_14
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Table 4.15: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education,  
males, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational 
school Secondary school
College,  
university Total
1993 35.6 75.8 71.8 86.3 60.0
1998 35.0 75.3 67.0 84.9 60.4
1999 33.6 76.8 68.3 86.8 62.4
2000 33.6 77.4 67.9 87.1 63.1
2001 33.0 77.6 67.3 87.4 62.9
2002 32.0 77.6 67.1 85.8 62.9
2003 32.4 76.5 67.8 86.4 63.4
2004 31.0 75.7 67.3 87.1 63.1
2005 31.6 74.7 66.9 86.9 63.1
2006 31.5 75.2 67.5 85.7 63.8
2007 31.6 74.6 67.5 85.9 64.0
2008 31.3 72.6 66.5 84.7 63.0
2009 29.0 69.9 65.1 83.1 61.1
2010 28.7 68.1 64.6 82.1 60.4
2011 29.6 68.4 64.6 83.8 61.2
2012 30.8 69.7 65.1 85.2 62.5
2013 31.1 71.7 67.7 85.4 64.3
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_15
Figure 4.4: Activity rate by age groups, males aged 15–64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena04_04
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Table 4.16: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education,  
females, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational 
school Secondary school
College,  
university Total
1993 30.8 65.0 64.0 79.2 49.3
1998 26.6 60.5 58.1 76.9 47.3
1999 26.1 61.4 59.0 77.5 49.0
2000 26.0 61.0 59.3 77.8 49.7
2001 26.1 60.8 59.2 77.8 49.8
2002 26.0 60.4 58.6 77.9 49.8
2003 25.3 59.7 59.5 78.3 50.9
2004 25.0 58.8 58.1 78.1 50.7
2005 25.1 57.6 57.9 78.9 51.0
2006 24.5 58.2 57.5 77.6 51.1
2007 24.0 57.8 57.2 75.4 50.9
2008 23.9 55.5 56.4 75.5 50.6
2009 23.0 54.3 54.9 74.4 49.9
2010 23.6 56.4 54.3 74.6 50.6
2011 22.5 56.4 54.2 74.4 50.6
2012 23.0 57.1 56.7 74.0 52.1
2013 24.0 57.0 56.8 74.2 52.8
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent04_16
Figure 4.5: Activity rate by age groups, females aged 15–64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena04_05
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Table 5.1: Unemployment rate by gender and share of long term unemployed, per cent
Year
Unemployment rate Share of long term 
unemployedaMales Females Total
1992 10.7 8.7 9.8 ..
1993 13.2 10.4 11.9 ..
1994 11.8 9.4 10.7 43.2
1995 11.3 8.7 10.2 50.6
1996 10.7 8.8 9.9 54.4
1997 9.5 7.8 8.7 51.3
1998 8.5 7.0 7.8 48.8
1999 7.5 6.3 7.0 49.5
2000 7.0 5.6 6.4 49.1
2001 6.3 5.0 5.7 46.7
2002 6.1 5.4 5.8 44.9
2003 6.1 5.6 5.9 43.9
2004 6.1 6.1 6.1 45.0
2005 7.0 7.5 7.2 46.2
2006 7.2 7.8 7.5 46.8
2007 7.1 7.6 7.4 48.2
2008 7.6 8.1 7.8 47.6
2009 10.3 9.7 10.0 43.0
2010 11.6 10.7 11.2 50.9
2011 11.0 10.9 10.9 49.6
2012 11.2 10.6 10.9 46.7
2013 10.2 10.2 10.2 50.4
a Long term unemployed are those who have been without work for 12 months or more, the 
denominator does not include those starting new jobs.
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Con-
scripted soldiers are included in the denominator.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_01
Figure 5.1: Unemployment rates by gender
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena05_01
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Table 5.2: Unemployment rate by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational 
school Secondary school
College,  
university Total
1999 14.3 8.2 5.0 1.5 7.5
2000 13.4 7.7 4.8 1.6 7.0
2001 13.6 6.4 4.3 1.2 6.3
2002 14.1 6.2 4.0 1.4 6.1
2003 13.6 6.6 3.9 1.6 6.1
2004 14.3 6.4 4.1 1.7 6.1
2005 15.6 7.4 4.9 2.3 7.0
2006 17.3 7.0 5.2 2.7 7.2
2007 18.4 6.8 5.1 2.4 7.1
2008 19.8 7.6 5.3 2.3 7.6
2009 24.4 10.6 7.7 3.8 10.3
2010 26.9 12.1 8.4 4.9 11.6
2011 25.0 12.0 8.2 4.3 11.0
2012 25.1 11.8 9.4 4.2 11.2
2013 25.4 10.7 8.3 3.6 10.2
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_02
Table 5.3: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational 
school Secondary school
College,  
university Total
1999 34.5 45.3 17.4 2.8 100.0
2000 32.9 45.8 17.9 3.4 100.0
2001 36.5 43.2 17.5 2.8 100.0
2002 36.7 43.3 16.7 3.3 100.0
2003 34.0 44.7 17.2 4.1 100.0
2004 33.9 42.6 18.6 4.9 100.0
2005 32.1 43.1 19.0 5.8 100.0
2006 33.4 40.0 20.0 6.6 100.0
2007 34.9 38.8 20.3 6.0 100.0
2008 35.2 39.4 19.8 5.6 100.0
2009 31.0 40.1 21.9 7.0 100.0
2010 30.1 40.2 21.5 8.2 100.0
2011 28.8 41.2 22.1 7.9 100.0
2012 28.1 39.4 24.8 7.7 100.0
2013 29.6 39.2 23.8 7.4 100.0
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_03
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Table 5.4: Unemployment rate by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational 
school Secondary school
College,  
university Total
1999 10.5 8.0 5.2 1.3 6.3
2000 9.1 7.4 4.9 1.5 5.6
2001 8.4 6.4 4.0 1.6 5.0
2002 9.3 6.5 4.4 2.4 5.4
2003 10.5 7.2 4.4 1.9 5.6
2004 10.3 8.0 5.3 2.9 6.1
2005 13.0 9.8 6.7 3.1 7.5
2006 15.8 10.1 6.4 2.8 7.8
2007 16.0 9.4 6.2 3.3 7.6
2008 17.5 9.5 6.9 3.2 8.1
2009 21.6 12.4 7.7 4.1 9.7
2010 22.8 12.6 9.5 4.5 10.7
2011 24.3 12.6 9.9 4.6 10.9
2012 24.3 12.6 9.4 4.7 10.6
2013 22.9 12.8 9.1 4.4 10.2
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_04
Table 5.5: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of  
primary school  
or less
Vocational 
school Secondary school
College,  
university Total
1999 36.2 26.2 33.8 3.8 100.0
2000 31.8 28.2 35.0 5.0 100.0
2001 33.7 28.0 32.2 6.1 100.0
2002 33.2 26.0 32.2 8.5 100.0
2003 32.7 28.3 32.0 7.0 100.0
2004 27.8 27.4 34.2 10.6 100.0
2005 28.2 27.1 35.2 9.5 100.0
2006 31.5 27.5 32.5 8.5 100.0
2007 31.2 26.6 31.7 10.5 100.0
2008 32.2 24.3 33.3 10.2 100.0
2009 32.1 26.1 30.3 11.4 100.0
2010 30.5 24.3 34.0 11.2 100.0
2011 30.2 23.6 34.4 11.8 100.0
2012 29.8 23.6 33.7 12.9 100.0
2013 28.8 25.2 33.4 12.6 100.0
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_05
unemPloyment
275
Figure 5.2: Intensity of quarterly flows between labour market status, population between 15–64 years
 Employment Unemployment Inactivity
Note: The calculations were carried out for the age group between 15–64 based on KSH la-
bour force survey microdata. The probability of transition is given by the number of people 
who transitioned from one status to the other in the quarter, divided by the initial size of the 
group in the previous quarter, which were then corrected to preserve the consistency of 
stock flows. The red curves show the trend smoothed using a 4th degree polynomial.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena05_02
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Table 5.6: The number of unemployeda by duration of job search, in thousands
Year
Length of job search, weeks [month]
Total1–4 
[<1]
5–14 
[1–3]
15–26 
[4–6]
27–51 
[7–11]
52 
[12]
53–78 
[13–18]
79–104 
[19–24]
105– 
[>24]
1992 43.9 90.9 96.4 110.7 10.6 41.7 38.4 n.a. 432.6
1993 36.2 74.8 87.9 120.5 14.7 75.1 83.7 n.a. 492.9
1994 30.5 56.5 65.0 91.9 8.4 63.0 73.8 40.4 429.5
1995 23.0 51.0 56.5 69.4 20.2 57.2 34.3 93.2 404.8
1996 19.9 46.4 49.3 61.5 18.2 56.1 37.1 100.2 388.7
1997 16.1 43.7 45.9 54.4 15.7 44.5 31.1 77.3 328.7
1998 12.9 44.2 44.5 45.7 16.0 39.0 27.6 63.5 293.4
1999 15.4 44.1 38.8 46.0 13.2 38.1 26.8 62.3 284.7
2000 16.7 38.5 35.1 42.8 12.7 36.9 23.6 55.4 261.3
2001 14.9 37.0 33.2 38.6 11.5 31.6 20.9 44.2 231.9
2002 15.5 39.4 34.8 40.7 11.6 32.7 19.8 42.5 237.0
2003 15.9 42.1 38.9 42.0 14.5 27.6 17.6 43.0 241.6
2004 13.0 42.0 39.9 41.8 13.5 33.4 19.6 47.2 250.4
2005 14.8 48.9 44.1 51.3 14.1 41.0 27.4 54.3 295.9
2006 13.3 50.7 48.3 51.9 17.4 41.5 26.6 58.8 308.5
2007 13.8 49.4 44.3 50.1 12.7 43.3 26.0 64.9 304.5
2008 13.7 50.4 47.8 53.5 13.4 39.6 27.2 74.8 320.4
2009 18.8 71.9 67.0 77.4 18.1 51.2 19.8 88.4 412.6
2010 16.9 64.9 63.1 84.3 23.6 75.9 43.3 95.4 467.4
2011 28.7 70.7 62.8 70.1 18.3 64.6 40.4 105.3 460.8
2012 39.4 65.0 63.3 81.9 22.3 59.5 36.6 100.6 468.6
2013 48.9 50.3 55.1 63.0 25.9 51.5 46.9 96.9 438.5
a Not including those unemployed who will find a new job within 30 days; since 2003: within 
90 days.
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_06
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Figure 5.3: Unemployment rate by age groups, males aged 15–59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena05_03
Figure 5.4: Unemployment rate by age groups, females aged 15–59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena05_04
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Table 5.7: Registered unemployeda and LFS unemployment
Year
Registered unemployed LFS unemployed, total LFS unemployed, age 15–24
In thousands rate in % In thousands rate in % In thousands rate in %
1990 47.7 – .. .. .. ..
1991 227.3 4.1 .. .. .. ..
1992 557.0 10.3 444.2 9.8 120.0 17.5
1993 671.8 12.9 518.9 11.9 141.3 21.3
1994 568.4 11.3 451.2 10.7 124.7 19.4
1995 507.7 10.6 416.5 10.2 114.3 18.6
1996 500.6 11.0 400.1 9.9 106.3 17.9
1997 470.1 10.5 348.8 8.7 95.8 15.9
1998 423.1 9.5 313.0 7.8 87.6 13.4
1999 409.5 9.7 284.7 7.0 78.6 12.4
2000 390.5 9.3 262.5 6.4 70.7 12.1
2001 364.1 8.5 232.9 5.7 55.7 10.8
2002 344.7 8.0 238.8 5.8 56.5 12.3
2003 357.2 8.3 244.5 5.9 54.9 13.4
2004 375.9 8.7 252.9 6.1 55.9 15.5
2005 409.9 9.4 303.9 7.2 66.9 19.4
2006 393.5 9.0 316.8 7.5 64.1 19.1
2007 426.9 9.7 311.9 7.4 57.6 18.0
2008 442.3 10.0 329.2 7.8 61.0 19.9
2009 561.8 12.8 420.7 10.0 79.2 26.4
2010 582.7 13.3 474.8 11.2 79.2 26.6
2011 582.9 13.2 467.9 10.9 76.9 26.1
2012 559.1 12.6 475.6 10.9 84.6 28.1
2013 527.6 11.9 448.9 10.2 84.2 27.2
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
Note: the denominator of registered unemployment/jobseekers’ rate in the economically ac-
tive population on 1st January the previous year.
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: NFSZ; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_07
Figure 5.5: Registered and LFS unemployment rates
Note: Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers.
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: NMH; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena05_05
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Table 5.8: Composition of the registered unemployeda by educational attainment, yearly averages, per cent
Educational  
attainment 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
8 grades of primary 
school or less 40.6 40.4 41.0 42.0 42.4 42.7 42.3 41.9 42.0 42.4 43.3 40.1 39.3 40.3 40.3 40.5
Vocational school 36.0 35.7 34.9 34.1 33.5 32.9 32.3 32.4 32.1 31.5 30.9 32.5 31.4 29.8 29.2 29.0
Vocational second­
ary school 12.9 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.1 14.4 15.0 14.9 15.1 15.3
Grammar school 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.5 9.1 9.5 9.7 9.8
College 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.6
University 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the 
Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_08
Table 5.9: The distribution of registered unemployed school-leaversa by educational attainment,  
yearly averages, per cent
Educational  
attainment 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
8 grades of primary 
school or less 23.4 25.3 26.8 31.1 33.7 34.7 35.2 36.1 38.2 40.1 41.3 37.7 35.2 35.6 34.9 35.5
Vocational school 34.1 30.9 27.8 23.7 20.6 20.4 20.2 20.5 19.7 18.1 17.3 18.9 18.9 18.5 19.8 20.1
Vocational secondary 
school 24.2 25.0 25.4 25.3 25.5 23.2 22.1 21.5 20.3 20.7 21.2 23.1 23.9 23.6 23.7 23.1
Grammar school 14.0 13.6 13.7 12.6 11.6 10.8 10.7 10.8 11.7 12.8 13.3 13.7 14.3 15.0 14.9 14.9
College 3.4 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.2 7.7 8.1 7.8 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.5 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.4
University 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.4 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.8 3.1 3.0 3.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered school-leaver jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_09
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Table 5.10: Registered unemployeda by economic activity as observed in the LFS, per cent
Year Employed LFS­unemployed Inactive Total Year Employed LFS­unemployed Inactive Total
1994 14.4 54.5 31.1 100.0 2005 2.3 59.7 38.0 100.0
1995 11.8 53.7 34.5 100.0 2006 3.9 58.7 37.5 100.0
1996 13.7 51.8 34.5 100.0 2007 3.7 62.6 33.7 100.0
1999 6.7 55.8 37.5 100.0 2008 3.7 63.1 33.2 100.0
2000 4.7 54.3 41.0 100.0 2009 3.7 67.5 28.8 100.0
2001 6.5 45.2 48.3 100.0 2010 3.0 71.1 25.9 100.0
2002 4.4 47.4 48.2 100.0 2011 3.3 67.2 29.5 100.0
2003 9.4 44.1 46.5 100.0 2012 3.5 65.9 30.6 100.0
2004 3.0 53.5 43.5 100.0 2013 4.9 62.2 32.9 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. The 
data pertain to those who consider themselves registered jobseekers in the KSH MEF. From 
1999 those who reported that their last contact with the employment centre was more than 
two months ago were filtered from among those who reported themselves as registered un-
employed.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_10
Table 5.11: Monthly entrants to the unemployment registera, monthly averages, in thousands
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
First time entrants 12.8 11.2 11.2 10.4 10.0 10.5 10.8 8.6 8.0 7.1 8.3 7.2 6.6 7.5 7.3
Previously registered 44.4 42.9 45.8 45.6 44.8 47.3 50.0 42.2 43.4 46.9 60.7 58.1 64.3 62.0 58.2
Together 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0 69.0 65.3 70.9 69.5 65.5
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the 
Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_11
Figure 5.6: Entrants to the unemployment register, monthly averages, in thousands
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena05_06
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Table 5.12: Selected time series of registered unemployment, monthly averages, in thousands and per cent
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Registered unemploymenta 423.1 409.5 390.5 364.1 344.7 357.2 375.9 409.9
Of which: School­leavers 32.5 29.9 26.0 26.8 28.5 31.3 33.8 40.9
Non school­leavers 390.6 379.6 364.4 337.4 316.2 325.9 342.2 369.1
Male 233.4 221.4 209.7 196.4 184.6 188.0 193.3 210.4
Female 189.7 188.1 180.8 167.7 160.1 169.2 182.6 199.5
25 years old and younger 89.9 85.4 79.1 75.6 71.1 71.6 71.4 78.9
Manual workers 349.0 336.8 321.2 302.0 286.3 296.2 308.5 336.2
Non manual workers 74.1 72.7 69.3 62.1 58.4 61.0 67.4 73.7
Unemployment benefit recipientsb 130.7 140.7 131.7 119.2 114.9 120.0 124.0 134.4
Unemployment assistance recipientsc 182.2 148.6 143.5 131.2 113.4 116.2 120.4 133.4
Unemployment rated 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4
Shares within registered unemployed, %
School­leavers 7.7 7.3 6.7 7.3 8.3 8.8 9.0 10.0
Male 55.2 54.1 53.7 53.9 53.5 52.6 51.4 51.3
25 years old and younger 21.3 20.9 20.3 20.8 20.6 20.0 19.0 19.2
Manual workers 82.5 82.3 82.2 82.9 83.1 82.9 82.1 82.0
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 55.4 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7
Of which: school­leavers 9.8 9.3 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.6 8.2
Outflow from the Register 60.4 57.2 56.8 59.4 55.8 53.5 54.4 59.8
Of which: school­leavers 11.0 9.4 8.2 7.7 7.5 7.6 7.1 7.9
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Registered unemploymenta 393.5 426.9 442.3 561.8 582.7 582.9 559.1 527.6
Of which: School­leavers 38.7 40.4 41.4 49.3 52.6 52.9 61.5 66.0
Non school­leavers 354.7 386.5 400.9 512.5 530.1 529.9 497.6 461.6
Male 200.9 219.9 228.3 297.9 305.0 297.1 275.8 267.7
Female 192.5 207.0 214.0 263.9 277.7 285.8 283.3 259.9
25 years old and younger 75.8 80.3 75.9 104.3 102.8 102.3 101.1 97.8
Manual workers 321.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Non manual workers 71.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Unemployment benefit recipientsb 151.5 134.6 136.5e 202.1 187.7 159.9 71.1 61.2
Unemployment assistance recipientsc 121.8 133.0 147.5 156.0 167.8 182.1 200.3 184.4
Unemployment rated 9.0 9.7 10.0 12.8 13.3 13.2 12.6 11.9
Shares within registered unemployed, %
School­leavers 9.8 9.5 9.4 8.8 9.0 9.1 11.0 12.5
Male 51.1 51.5 51.6 53.0 52.3 51.0 49.3 50.8
25 years old and younger 16.5 18.8 17.2 18.6 17.6 17.5 18.1 18.5
Manual workers 81.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 50.8 51.4 54.0 69.0 65.3 70.9 69.5 65.5
Of which: school­leavers 7.0 6.2 6.3 7.5 7.9 8.2 10.0 10.8
Outflow from the Register 51.4 48.4 51.3 58.4 66.4 74.2 68.1 78.4
Of which: school­leavers 7.1 6.0 6.2 6.7 7.5 8.1 8.6 11.8
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. (The data concern the closing date of 
each month.) From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition 
of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
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b Since 1st of November, 2005: jobseeker benefit recepients. From 2011. September 1, the 
system of jobseeking support changed.
c Only recipients who are in the NMH register. Those receiving the discontinued income sup-
port supplement were included in the number of those receiving income support supplement 
up to the year 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular social assistance from 2005 
to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, 
the on call support. This allowance was replaced by the wage replacement support from Jan-
uary 1, 2011, then from September 1, 2011, the name was changed to employment substitu-
tion support.
d Relative index: registered unemployment rate in the economically active population. From 
1st of November, 2005, registered jobseekers’ rate in the economically active population.
e The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes pos-
sible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those enter-
ing or leaving the different types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are 
work for short time periods, receipt of child support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in 
training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first 
accounting of the jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
2008 data, comparable to 2009: 141.5 thousand people.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_12
Table 5.13: The number of registered unemployeda who became employed on subsidised  
and non-subsidised employmentb
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent
Subsidised employ­
ment 118,703 34.0 170,464 40.0 198,974 38.5 282,673 48.5 261,631 50.0 359,962 60.2
Non­subsidised 
employment 230,558 66.0 255,356 60.0 317,622 61.5 299,716 51.5 261,581 50.0 237,795 39.8
Total 349,261 100.0 425,820 100.0 516,596 100.0 582,389 100.0 523,212 100.0 597,757 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the 
Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Annual totals, the number of jobseekers over the year who were placed in work. It reflects 
the placements at the time of their exit from the registry.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_13
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Table 5.14: Benefit recepients and participation in active labour market programmes
Year
Unemploy­
ment  
benefita
Regular 
social  
assistance b
UA for 
school­
leavers
Do not 
receive 
provision
Public workc Retrainingc Wage  subsidyc
Other pro­
grammesc Total
1990
In thousands 42.5 – – 18.6 .. .. .. .. 61.0
Per cent 69.6 n.a. n.a. 30.4 .. .. .. .. 100.0
2000
In thousands 117.0 139.7 0.0 106.5 26.7 25.3 27.5 73.5 516.2
Per cent 22.7 27.1 0.0 20.6 5.2 4.9 5.3 14.2 100.0
2001
In thousands 111.8 113.2 0.0 105.2 29.0 30.0 25.8 37.2 452.2
Per cent 24.7 25.0 0.0 23.3 6.4 6.6 5.7 8.2 100.0
2002
In thousands 104.8 107.6 – 115.3 21.6 23.5 21.2 32.8 426.8
Per cent 24.6 25.2 – 27.0 5.1 5.5 5.0 7.7 100.0
2003
In thousands 105.1 109.5 – 125.0 21.2 22.5 20.1 36.6 440.0
Per cent 23.9 24.9 – 28.4 4.8 5.1 4.6 8.3 100.0
2004
In thousands 117.4 118.4 – 132.3 16.8 12.6 16.8 28.5 442.8
Per cent 26.5 26.7 – 29.9 3.8 2.8 3.8 6.4 100.0
2005
In thousands 125.6 127.8 – 140.2 21.5 14.7 20.8 31.0 481.6
Per cent 26.1 26.5 – 29.1 4.5 3.1 4.3 6.4 100.0
2006
In thousands 117.7 112.9 – 146.4 16.6 12.3 14.6 13.8 434.3
Per cent 27.1 26.0 – 33.7 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.2 100.0
2007
In thousands 128.0 133.1 – 151.8 19.3 14.6 23.4 6.8 477.0
Per cent 27.6 28.7 – 32.7 2.7 2.3 3.7 2.3 100.0
2008
In thousands 120.7d 145.7 – 158.2 21.2 21.2 25.0 14.1 506.1
Per cent 23.8 28.8 – 31.3 4.2 4.2 4.9 2.8 100.0
2009
In thousands 202.8 151.9 – 215.0 135.3 13.6 17.8 54.1 790.5
Per cent 25.7 19.2 – 27.2 17.1 1.7 2.3 6.8 100.0
2010
In thousands 159.6 163.5 – 222.4 164.5 17.8 26.7 40.3 794.8
Per cent 20.1 20.6 – 28.0 20.7 2.2 3.4 5.1 100.0
2011
In thousands 122.8 168.2 – 239.8 91.6 13.6 20.4 39.9 696.3
Per cent 17.6 24.2 – 34.4 13.2 2.0 2.9 5.7 100.0
2012
In thousands 56.3 185.6 – 281.1 92.4 15.4 30.0 2.2 663.0
Per cent 8.5 28.0 – 42.4 13.9 2.3 4.5 0.3 100.0
2013
In thousands 55.3 169.3 – 264.0 149.5 42.0e 31.7 3.8 715.5
Per cent 7.7 23.6 – 36.9 20.9 5.9 4.4 0.5 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: jobseeker benefit recepients. From September 1, 2011, the sys-
tem of jobseeking support changed.
b Only recipients who are in the NFSZ register. Those receiving the discontinued income sup-
port supplement were included in the number of those receiving income support supplement 
up to the year 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular social assistance from 2005 
to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, 
the on call support. This allowance was replaced by the wage replacement support from Jan-
uary 1, 2011, then from September 1, 2011, the name was changed to employment substitu-
tion support.
c Up to the year 2008 the number financed from the MPA Decentralized Base, since 2009 the 
number financed from MPA, TAMOP.
Public-type employment: community service, public service, public work programmes.
Wage subsidy: wage subsidy, wage-cost subsidy, work experience acquisition assstance to ca-
reer-starters, support for employment of availability allowance recipients, part-time employ-
ment, wage support for those losing their job due to the crisis.
Other support: job preservation support, support to would-be entrepreneurs, contribution to 
costs related to commuting to work, job creation support, jobseeker’s clubs.
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d The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes pos-
sible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after a break or starting a break from the number of 
those entering or leaving the different types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a 
break are work for short time periods, receipt of child support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or in-
volvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first 
accounting of the jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
2008 data, comparable to 2009: 134.1 thousand people.
e In 2013, 18.1 thousand trainees were simultaneously involved in public works programmes.
Note: The closing numbers from October of each year. For the percentage data, the sum of 
those registered and those taking part in labour market programmes ≈100.0.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_14
Table 5.15: The ratio of those who are employed among the former participants of ALMPsa, per cent
Active labour market 
programmes 1999
b 2000b 2001b 2002b 2003b 2004b 2005b 2006b 2007b 2008b 2009c 2010c 2011c 2012c 2013c
Suggested training 
programmesd 46.8 48.4 45.4 43.3 43.0 45.5 43.8 41.1 37.5 42.2 40.4 49.4 42.6 44.9 55.1
Accepted training 
programmese 50.0 52.0 49.3 45.8 46.0 45.6 51.4 50.9 47.6 48.0 41.9 48.8 41.6 56.7 65.9
Retraining of those 
who are employedf 94.8 94.9 94.2 92.7 93.3 92.1 90.4 .. 92.3 93.9 .. 59.9 75.0 65.7 72.7
Support for self­
employmentg 90.5 89.4 89.2 90.7 89.6 90.7 89.6 86.4 87.6 83.6 73.1 76.4 71.5 72.6 74.1
Wage subsidy pro­
grammesh 59.7 62.3 59.7 62.9 62.0 64.6 62.6 62.3 63.4 65.0 72.4 90.9 69.6 70.3 73.0
Work experience 
programmesi 55.8 57.9 64.5 66.9 66.1 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.3 74.6 .. .. 72.0 69.9 68.5
Further employment 
programmej 68.5 73.8 71.6 78.4 78.2 71.5 70.9 65.0 77.5 – – – – – –
a The data relate to people having completed their courses successfully.
b Three months after the end of programmes.
c Six months after the end of programmes.
d Suggested training: group traning programmes for jobseekers organized by the NFSZ.
e Accepted training: participation in programmes initiated by the jobseekers and accepted by 
NFSZ for full or partial support.
f Training for employed persons: training for those whose jobs are at risk of termination, if 
new knowledge allows them to adapt to the new needs of the employer.
g Support to help entrepeneurship: support of jobseekers in the amount of the monthly mini-
mum wage or maximum HUF 3 million lump sum support (to be repaid or not), aimed at 
helping them become individual entrepreneurs or self-employed.
h Wage support: aimed at helping the employment of disadvantaged persons, who would not 
be able to, or would have a harder time finding work without support.
i Work experience-gaining support: the support of new entrants with no work experience for 
6–9 months, the amount of the support is equal to 50–80% of the wage costs. The instru-
ment was discontinued after December 31, 2006.. In 2009 they reintroduced the work expe-
rience gaining support for skilled new entrants, for employers who ensure employment of at 
least 4 hours a day and for 365 days. The amount of the support is 50–100% of the wage cost. 
Monitoring for the first exiters is available from 2011.
j Further employment programmes: to support the continued employment of new entrants 
under the age of 25 for 9 months. Discontinued from December 31, 2006.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_15
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Table 5.16: Distribution of registered unemployeda, unemployment benefit recipientsb and unemployment 
assistance recipientsc by educational attainment
Educational attainment 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008e 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Registered unemployed
8 grades of primary school or less 41.8 41.5 42.8 43.8 – 40.0 39.2 39.9 40.1 40.1
Vocational school 32.6 32.3 31.5 30.7 – 33.1 31.4 29.8 29.1 28.9
Vocational secondary school 13.6 13.6 13.2 12.8 – 14.4 15.0 15.0 15.2 15.6
Grammar school 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.1 – 8.3 9.1 9.7 9.8 10.0
College 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.2 – 3.0 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.6
University 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.9
Total
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
388.1 359.6 402.7 415.6 – 549.0 546.0 553.3 524.4 497.0
Unemployment benefit recipientsd
8 grades of primary school or less 28.2 25.4 25.4 24.4 26.3 25.7 24.1 23.4 20.2 21.8
Vocational school 39.3 39.5 37.4 37.0 39.2 39.4 36.2 34.5 34.5 34.8
Vocational secondary school 17.9 18.7 19.2 19.3 18.3 18.5 19.7 20.1 21.2 21.2
Grammar school 9.5 10.1 10.9 11.0 10.6 10.1 11.6 12.3 12.7 12.0
College 3.7 4.5 5.0 6.0 5.7 4.5 5.8 6.7 7.6 6.7
University 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.7 2.6 3.1 3.8 3.6
Total
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
104.9 91.5 119.3 92.5 126.9 200.5 165.8 145.9 53.1 53.0
Unemployment assistance recipientsc
8 grades of primary school or less 60.4 60.1 60.3 60.3 – 59.4 56.4 56.1 53.4 52.4
Vocational school 27.8 27.7 27.1 26.5 – 26.6 27.4 26.1 26.4 26.6
Vocational secondary school 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.8 – 7.5 8.6 9.0 10.3 10.9
Grammar school 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.7 – 4.8 5.6 6.3 7.1 7.3
College 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 – 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.0
University 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 – 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8
Total
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
127.8 116.5 130.9 145.8 – 144.1 161.7 174.7 193.5 177.4
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the 
definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: those receiving jobseeking support. From the 1st of September 2011, the system of jobseek-
ing support changed.
c Only recipients who are in the NFSZ register. Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were included 
in the number of those receiving income support supplement up to the year 2004, and in the number of those receiving 
regular social assistance from 2005 to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support 
type, the on call support. This allowance was replaced by the wage replacement support from January 1, 2011, then from 
September 1, 2011, the name was changed to employment substitution support.
d After 1st of November, 2005: jobseeking support. Does not contain those receiving unemployment aid prior to pension in 
2004. From the 1st of September 2011 , the system of jobseeking support changed.
e The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the different 
types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child support 
(GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the jobseeking 
support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The right-hand column of 2008 contains the 2008 data in a form comparable to the 2009 data.
Note: Data from the closing date of June in each year.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_16
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Table 5.17: Outflow from the Register of Beneficiaries
Year
Total number of 
outflows
Of which:
Year
Total number of 
outflows
Of which:
became em­
ployed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
became em­
ployed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
1995 370,941 27.7 .. 2005 329,738 27.2 63.0
1996 408,828 24.2 58.4 2006 234,273 33.2 53.7
1997 327,486 26.8 58.7 2007 251,889 33.4 46.9
1998 322,496 26.5 64.5 2008 232,151 40.0 48.7
1999 320,132 26.0 67.4 2008a 261,573 43.4 48.9
2000 325,341 28.1 64.6 2009 345,216 37.9 56.0
2001 308,780 27.2 65.1 2010 352,535 38.9 55.8
2002 303,288 27.6 66.7 2011 329,728 39.2 55.7
2003 297,640 26.7 65.2 2012 368,803 21.9 77.8
2004 308,027 27.4 64.6 2013 328,508 21.3 75.6
a The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes pos-
sible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those enter-
ing or leaving the different types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are 
work for short time periods, receipt of child support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in 
training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first 
accounting of the jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The row of 2008a contains the data from 2008 in the form comparable to the 2009 data.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_17
Table 5.18: The distribution of the total number of labour market training participantsa
Groups of training participants 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Participants in suggested training 48,558 52,045 52,198 53,447 46,802 45,261 33,002 29,252
Participants in accepted training 26,906 28,311 30,949 32,672 31,891 28,599 19,406 9,620
One Step Forward (OFS) programme – – – – – – – –
Non­employed participants together 75,465 80,356 83,147 86,211 78,693 73,859 52,407 38,872
Of which: school­leavers 24,359 25,260 22,131 20,592 19,466 18,320 12,158 9,313
Employed participants 4,139 4,408 5,026 5,308 4,142 9,036 7,487 4,853
Total 79,604 84,764 88,173 91,519 82,835 82,895 59,894 43,725
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013b
Participants in suggested training 36,212 32,747 48,561 41,373 50,853 32,172 43,438 22,574
Participants in accepted training 7,327 5,766 4,939 8,241 6,853 2,495 2,446 22,574
One Step Forward (OFS) programme – 270 59,347 11,169 2,316 – – –
Non­employed participants together 43,539 38,783 112,847 60,783 57,706 34,667 45,884 132,587
Of which: school­leavers 1,365 1,111 18,719 21,103 12,030 7,935 9,976 106,333
Employed participants 3,602 3,467 37,466 12,496 336 908 716 631
Total 47,141 42,250 150,313 73,279 60,358 35,575 46,600 133,218
a The data contain the number of those financed from the NFA decentralized employment 
base, as well as those involved in training as a part of the HEFOP 1.1 and the TÁMOP 1.1.2 
programmes.
b The data include 88,004 public works participants simultaneously involved in training.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_18
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Table 5.19: Employment ratio of participants ALMPs by gender, age groups and educational attainment for the 
programmes finished in 2013a, per cent
Non­employed participants Supported  
self­employmentb
Wage subsidy  
programmesuggested training accepted training total
By gender
Males 53.0 63.6 53.7 72.5 71.8
Females 57.3 69.0 58.0 75.5 73.9
By age groups
–20 43.7 67.2 45.1 89.5 66.0
20–24 52.6 63.5 53.2 75.6 71.2
25–29 55.1 65.0 55.7 75.8 74.4
–29 together 52.9 64.3 53.5 76.1 71.8
30–34 55.2 64.2 55.6 73.2 75.9
35–39 57.4 66.0 57.9 75.4 74.4
40–44 57.5 61.5 57.7 73.9 73.5
45–49 56.4 68.0 57.1 69.4 73.0
50–54 58.6 74.7 59.6 75.0 75.1
55+ 53.9 66.7 54.9 71.6 72.0
By educational attainment
Less than primary school 61.3 60.0 61.2 50.0 48.0
Primary school 54.0 61.1 54.4 68.7 66.4
Vocational school for skilled workers 56.6 63.2 57.0 74.3 73.8
Vocational school 56.2 60.9 56.4 71.4 69.2
Vocational secondary school 55.3 71.2 56.5 76.4 75.0
Technicians secondary school 55.8 65.2 56.5 75.4 74.8
Grammar school 53.2 68.9 53.9 72.1 72.7
College 56.3 76.2 58.1 76.7 80.7
University 57.9 89.7 60.2 75.8 82.9
Total 55.1 65.9 55.8 74.1 72.9
a Includes all kinds of wage subsidies except financial support for student work during vacation.
b Survival rate.
Note: 6 months after the end of each programme.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_19
Table 5.20: Distribution of the average annual number of those with no employment status who participate in 
training categorised by the type of training, percentage
Types of training 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Approved qualifi­
cation 77.9 79.8 79.6 78.8 78.7 77.6 78.3 75.1 72.9 71.5 69.0 65.8 63.6 65.2 68.6 71.6 50.2
Non­approved 
qualification 16.0 14.4 14.7 14.7 14.0 13.6 12.6 15.0 14.5 16.9 19.9 22.8 26.4 25.4 21.1 19.0 44.2
Foreign language 
learning 6.1 5.7 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.8 9.1 9.9 12.6 11.5 11.1 11.4 10.0 9.4 10.3 9.4 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_20
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Table 5.21: The distribution of those entering training programmes by age groups and educational level
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2013
training
training for 
public 
works par­
ticipants
together
Total number of 
entrants 45,092 25,760 27,727 26,459 25,353 42,710 37,467 39,780 18,464
a 33,540 28,089 78,052 106,141
By age groups, %
–20 10.4 9.0 9.7 8.7 7.0 8.1 4.9 3.8 4.0 3.2 5.6 2.8 3.6
20–24 24.1 22.3 23.1 23.0 24.7 26.9 25.1 23.9 27.2 23.4 33.8 12.7 18.3
25–44 54.7 54.9 52.3 52.0 51.3 48.3 51.5 52.4 46.5 46.7 43.8 47.3 46.4
45–49 6.5 7.9 7.8 7.8 8.0 7.0 8.5 8.8 8.3 10.0 7.1 12.9 11.3
50+ 4.3 5.9 7.1 8.4 9.2 9.7 10.0 11.0 14.0 16.6 9.7 24.3 20.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
By level of education, %
Less than 
primary school 1.3 1.7 2.3 1.2 1.6 2.1 7.5 3.0 0.7 2.7 1.0 9.7 7.4
Primary school 23.1 23.8 26.3 25.1 24.0 28.1 22.8 24.5 28.2 34.4 24.9 53.3 45.8
Vocational 
school 26.9 26.6 25.7 26.8 24.5 21.9 22.0 25.5 24.8 26.2 22.3 25.6 24.7
Vocational and 
technical 
secondary 
school
25.7 24.5 23.3 23.5 23.9 22.6 24.8 23.7 24.2 19.0 27.1 6.5 11.9
Grammar 
school 15.5 14.2 14.4 15.0 16.3 15.9 15.3 15.8 15.7 12.9 19.0 4.2 8.1
College, univer­
sity 7.6 9.2 8.1 8.4 9.8 9.4 7.6 7.5 6.4 4.8 5.8 0.7 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a The drastic decrease in the number of training programmes offered was due to the centraliza-
tion of decision-making regarding the financing of training programmes, and the concur-
rent new requirement according to which only training programmes with a verifiable direct 
effect on employment were approved. Due to these, the number of preventative and general 
knowledge training programmes among those supported decreased. The majority of training 
participants were enrolled within the framework of EU programmes.
The significant growth in the number of trainees, during and following 2012, was predomi-
nantly explained by the inclusion into training of public works participants. The data for 
2013 make a distinction between those and other trainees.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent05_21
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Table 6.1: Nominal and real earnings
Year
Gross earnings Net earnings Gross earnings index
Net earnings 
index
Consumer 
price index
Real earnings 
index
HUF previous year = 100
1990 13,446 10,108 128.6 121.6 128.9 94.3
1991 17,934 12,948 130.0 125.5 135.0 93.0
1992 22,294 15,628 125.1 121.3 123.0 98.6
1993 27,173 18,397 121.9 117.7 122.5 96.1
1994 33,939 23,424 124.9 127.3 118.8 107.2
1995 38,900 25,891 116.8 112.6 128.2 87.8
1996 46,837 30,544 120.4 117.4 123.6 95.0
1997 57,270 38,145 122.3 124.1 118.3 104.9
1998 67,764 45,162 118.3 118.4 114.3 103.6
1999 77,187 50,076 116.1 112.7 110.0 102.5
2000 87,750 55,785 113.5 111.4 109.8 101.5
2001 103,554 64,913 118.0 116.2 109.2 106.4
2002 122,481 77,622 118.3 119.6 105.3 113.6
2003 137,193 88,753 112.0 114.3 104.7 109.2
2004 145,523 93,715 106.1 105.6 106.8 98.9
2005 158,343 103,149 108.8 110.1 103.6 106.3
2006 171,351 110,951 108.2 107.6 103.9 103.6
2007 185,018 114,282 108.0 103.0 108.0 95.4
2008 198,741 121,969 107.4 107.0 106.1 100.8
2009 199,837 124,116 100.6 101.8 104.2 97.7
2010 202,525 132,604 101.3 106.8 104.9 101.8
2011 213,094 141,151 105.2 106.4 103.9 102.4
2012 223,060 144,085 104.7 102.1 105.7 96.6
2013 230,664 151,085 103.4 104.2 101.7 103.1
Source: KSH IMS (earnings) and consumer price accounting. Gross earnings, gross earnings 
index: 2000–: STADAT (2014. 02. 21. version). Net earnings, net earnings index: 2008–: 
STADAT (2014.02.21.version). Consumer price index: 1990–: STADAT (2014. 01. 15. ver-
sion). Real earnings index: 1990–: STADAT (2014. 02.24. version).
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent06_01
Figure 6.1: Annual changes of gross and net real earnings
Source: KSH IMS (earnings) and consumer price accounting (STADAT, 2014. 02. 21. version).
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena06_01
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Table 6.2.a: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, HUF/person/month
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 89,446 97,219 103,190 112,388 122,231 133,570 137,101 143,861 153,301 164,136 171,921
Mining and quarrying 142,882 158,945 171,465 190,530 202,985 225,650 244,051 234,243 254,607 271,012 279,577
Manufacturing 123,914 136,354 145,997 158,597 172,277 183,081 190,331 200,692 213,281 230,877 241,170
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 198,733 223,541 243,039 265,912 294,241 321,569 345,035 363,900 379,606 404,073 410,485
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remedia­
tion activities
119,341 129,486 140,699 151,912 164,572 178,049 181,818 193,604 207,614 223,206 224,654
Construction 94,193 100,124 106,608 117,626 136,301 146,475 152,204 153,130 156,682 163,649 177,790
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
115,922 122,538 131,068 145,243 158,077 171,780 175,207 185,812 196,942 212,521 218,936
Transportation and storage 124,419 137,526 149,068 162,091 173,776 186,376 196,350 200,129 210,146 217,794 223,410
Accommodation and food 
service activities 87,115 90,089 95,823 102,908 112,222 120,600 122,561 122,699 125,757 139,731 147,023
Information and communica­
tion 250,308 273,606 288,876 306,792 328,902 358,217 366,752 368,113 392,963 410,045 426,460
Financial and insurance activi­
ties 274,081 324,295 349,809 401,580 390,511 431,601 427,508 433,458 456,980 459,744 470,966
Real estate activities 122,087 126,388 134,409 145,550 159,225 169,845 177,747 182,903 184,829 219,287 212,391
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 167,758 182,970 200,830 212,963 244,998 281,150 292,974 297,489 303,292 330,860 320,422
Administrative and support 
service activities 107,250 113,276 119,555 128,486 139,127 147,125 149,131 145,576 149,675 163,300 169,223
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security
180,866 184,357 207,356 223,009 253,335 267,657 234,696 242,958 252,848 247,139 258,803
Education 162,293 159,803 181,444 191,211 193,250 204,600 194,958 195,930 192,984 197,344 216,927
Human health and social work 
activities 129,995 130,509 144,100 151,889 160,050 169,977 161,265 142,282 153,832 151,446 151,287
Arts, entertainment and rec­
reation 137,826 141,957 154,312 161,416 183,898 183,813 179,199 179,976 192,407 209,930 216,869
Other service activities 103,554 127,136 133,846 140,893 153,512 157,950 160,375 150,025 162,490 175,872 174,777
National economy, total 137,193 145,523 158,343 171,351 185,018 198,741 199,837 202,525 213,094 223,060 230,664
Of which:
– Business sector 127,032 138,926 148,555 162,531 177,415 192,044 200,304 206,863 217,932 233,829 242,191
– Budgetary institutions 160,844 161,559 182,185 193,949 206,225 219,044 201,632 195,980 203,516 200,027 207,191
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 
2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent06_02a
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Table 6.2.b: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, per cent
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 65.2 66.8 65.2 65.6 66.1 67.2 68.6 71.0 72.0 73.6 74.5
Mining and quarrying 104.1 109.2 108.3 111.2 109.7 113.5 122.1 115.5 119.5 120.9 121.2
Manufacturing 90.3 93.7 92.2 92.6 93.1 92.1 95.2 99.1 100.0 103.4 104.6
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 144.9 153.6 153.5 155.2 159.0 161.8 172.7 179.6 178.2 181.1 178.0
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities
87.0 89.0 88.9 88.7 88.9 89.6 91.0 95.6 97.4 100.0 97.4
Construction 68.7 68.8 67.3 68.6 73.7 73.7 76.2 75.5 73.5 73.4 77.1
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
84.5 84.2 82.8 84.8 85.4 86.4 87.7 91.7 92.4 95.3 94.9
Transportation and storage 90.7 94.5 94.1 94.6 93.9 93.8 98.3 98.9 98.6 97.8 96.9
Accommodation and food ser­
vice activities 63.5 61.9 60.5 60.1 60.7 60.7 61.3 60.6 59.0 62.7 63.7
Information and communication 182.4 188.0 182.4 179.0 177.8 180.2 183.5 181.7 184.4 183.9 184.9
Financial and insurance activi­
ties 199.8 222.8 220.9 234.4 211.1 217.2 213.9 214.0 214.5 206.2 204.2
Real estate activities 89.0 86.9 84.9 84.9 86.1 85.5 88.9 90.2 86.8 98.3 92.1
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 122.3 125.7 126.8 124.3 132.4 141.5 146.6 146.9 142.4 148.4 138.9
Administrative and support 
service activities 78.2 77.8 75.5 75.0 75.2 74.0 74.6 71.9 70.3 73.3 73.4
Public administration and de­
fence; compulsory social secu­
rity
131.8 126.7 131.0 130.1 136.9 134.7 117.4 120.2 118.7 110.8 112.2
Education 118.3 109.8 114.6 111.6 104.4 102.9 97.6 96.7 90.6 88.5 94.0
Human health and social work 
activities 94.8 89.7 91.0 88.6 86.5 85.5 80.7 70.3 72.2 67.9 65.6
Arts, entertainment and recrea­
tion 100.5 97.5 97.5 94.2 99.4 92.5 89.7 88.8 90.3 94.1 94.0
Other service activities 75.5 87.4 84.5 82.2 83.0 79.5 80.3 74.1 76.1 78.9 75.8
National economy, total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Of which:
– Business sector 92.6 95.5 93.8 94.9 95.9 96.6 100.2 102.1 102.3 104.8 105.0
– Budgetary institutions 117.2 111.0 115.1 113.2 111.5 110.2 100.9 96.8 95.5 89.7 89.8
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent06_02b
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Table 6.3: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Male 0.1410 0.1480 0.1490 0.1500 0.1550 0.1790 0.1700 0.1500 0.1550 0.1570 0.1560 0.1330
Less than primary 
school –0.4550 –0.4110 –0.3900 –0.4800 –0.4010 –0.4390 –0.3970 –0.5750 –0.5110 –0.5350 –0.4850 –0.5230
Primary school –0.3640 –0.3550 –0.3670 –0.3730 –0.3800 –0.4170 –0.4010 –0.4540 –0.4280 –0.4220 –0.4160 –0.4140
Vocational school –0.2730 –0.2550 –0.2650 –0.2750 –0.2840 –0.2920 –0.2770 –0.3050 –0.2810 –0.2640 –0.2660 –0.2260
College, university 0.5400 0.6190 0.5870 0.5900 0.5810 0.5620 0.5580 0.6190 0.6220 0.6160 0.5750 0.6000
Estimated labour 
market experience 0.0213 0.0216 0.0237 0.0238 0.0252 0.0255 0.0248 0.0259 0.0267 0.0257 0.0238 0.0244
Square of esti­
mated labour 
market experience
–0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004
Public sector –0.0581 0.1120 0.1600 0.1130 0.0876 –0.0009 0.0257 –0.1260 –0.1440 –0.1670 –0.2790 –0.2590
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the refer-
ence group in log points (approximately percentage points). All parameters are significant at 
the 0.01 level. The region parameters can be seen in Table 9.6.
Reference categories: female, with leaving certificate (general education certificate), not in the 
public sector, working in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent06_03
Figure 6.2: The percentage of low paid workers by gender, per cent
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena06_02
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Table 6.4: Percentage of low paid workersa by gender, age groups, level of education and industries
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
By gender
Males 18.8 22.1 20.7 22.3 24.8 25.1 25.4 26.7 21.9 21.2 21.1 21.2 20.5 15.5 15.3
Females 26.4 26.8 25.0 22.5 21.6 22.8 22.9 21.9 21.3 20.8 21.7 21.2 20.8 18.2 18.4
By age groups
–24 37.9 37.0 35.5 37.6 39.9 43.9 44.2 46.3 40.1 34.6 38.9 38.2 36.6 26.4 31.7
25–54 21.3 22.8 21.9 21.8 22.3 23.6 24.0 24.2 21.4 20.6 21.0 20.9 20.4 16.3 16.4
55+ 17.2 19.8 18.1 16.2 15.3 16.5 16.5 16.4 15.8 15.5 17.6 18.1 17.6 17.0 15.0
By level of education
8 grades of primary school 
or less 43.9 43.4 40.4 38.3 37.1 39.6 41.2 40.1 41.4 41.3 47.4 43.4 45.4 38.6 41.1
Vocational school 28.6 31.2 29.4 32.1 35.4 35.7 36.8 37.9 32.9 32.1 33.5 33.3 31.3 25.2 24.7
Secondary school 15.4 18.8 18.0 16.5 17.7 18.6 18.6 19.7 16.1 15.4 16.4 17.3 17.2 13.7 15.1
Higher education 3.2 4.7 4.7 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.8 4.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.9 2.7 2.0 2.0
By industriesb
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 38.1 38.0 34.3 37.9 37.3 37.1 37.5 41.6 37.9 36.6 36.7 34.6 31.8 21.8 26.2
Manufacturing 18.9 20.0 19.1 19.4 25.4 24.7 22.1 24.1 20.8 23.5 23.0 20.5 19.4 13.7 15.1
Construction 36.7 42.9 41.7 44.8 49.8 51.2 50.2 55.2 43.1 37.5 38.1 43.0 41.9 31.8 34.1
Trade, repairing 36.8 42.8 41.3 44.0 49.0 49.3 51.5 49.4 40.9 35.9 35.2 36.4 35.2 24.2 27.7
Transport, storage, com­
munication 9.0 11.3 10.6 10.5 13.6 12.6 13.8 15.1 13.2 14.6 11.2 13.3 13.1 10.1 10.2
Financial intermediation 21.1 25.3 22.6 20.7 23.1 23.9 24.6 26.2 20.9 20.0 20.5 20.7 19.6 15.0 16.6
Public administration and 
defence, compulsory 
social security
16.0 13.7 13.8 9.3 6.6 8.2 6.0 6.3 7.4 6.7 8.7 8.8 9.8 13.4 10.7
Education 23.8 21.5 22.6 16.0 4.8 6.9 8.8 6.1 9.0 7.2 11.9 10.6 11.2 16.3 17.9
Health and social work 28.0 26.7 19.9 16.1 6.3 8.4 10.3 8.6 12.6 11.1 14.5 13.8 14.3 18.2 15.6
Total 22.7 24.4 22.8 22.4 23.2 24.0 24.2 24.3 21.6 21.0 21.4 21.2 20.7 16.8 16.8
a Percentage of those who earn less than 2/3 of the median earning amount.
b 1999–2008: by TEÁOR’03, 2009: by TEÁOR’08.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent06_04
Figure 6.3: The dispersion of gross monthly earnings
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena06_03
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Figure 6.4: Age-income profiles by education level in 1998 and 2013, women and men
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena06_04
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Figure 6.5: The dispersion of the logarithm of gross real earnings (2013 = 100%)
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena06_05
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Table 7.1: School-leavers by level of education, full-time education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 119,809 49,232 43,167 14,859
1990 164,614 54,933 53,039 15,963
1991 158,907 59,302 54,248 16,458
1992 151,287 66,261 59,646 16,201
1993 144,200 66,342 68,607 16,223
1994 136,857 62,902 68,604 18,041
1995 122,333 57,057 70,265 20,024
1996 120,529 54,209 73,413 22,128
1997 116,708 46,868 75,564 24,411
1998 113,651 42,866 77,660 25,338
1999 114,302 38,822 73,965 27,049
2000 114,250a 35,500a 72,200a 29,843
2001 114,200a 33,500a 70,372 29,746
2002 113,923 26,941 69,612 30,785
2003 117,747 26,472 71,944 31,911
2004 113,179 26,620 76,669 31,633
2005 115,626 25,519 77,025 32,732
2006 114,240 24,427 76,895 29,871
2007 108,889 17,967 77,527 29,059
2008 106,426 19,289 68,453 28,957
2009 102,798 20,138 78,004 36,064
2010 103,643 20,693 77,930 38,456
2011 96,825 20,720 76,354 35,433
2012 92,254 29,299 73,802 36,262
2013b 88,913 21,948 68,407 37,047
a Estimated data.
b Preliminary data.
Note: Primary school: completed the 8th grade. Other levels: received certificate. Excluding 
special schools, from the year 2000 excluding special education. College, university: from 
2007 including graduates in BA/BSc, MA/MSc and undivided (joint bachelor and master 
courses) training.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent07_01
Figure 7.1: Full time students as a percentage of the different age groups
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena07_01
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Table 7.2: Pupils/students entering the school system by level of education,  
full-time education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 171,347 60,865 57,213 17,886
1990 125,665 87,932 83,939 22,662
1995 123,997 65,352 82,665 42,433
1996 124,554 58,822 84,773 44,698
1997 127,214 53,083 84,395 45,669
1998 125,875 39,965 86,868 48,886
1999 121,424 33,570 89,184 51,586
2000 117,000a 33,900a 90,800a 54,100a
2001 112,144 34,210 92,322 56,709
2002 112,345 33,363 94,223 57,763
2003 114,020 33,394 92,817 59,699
2004 101,021 32,645 93,469 59,783
2005 97,810 33,114 96,181 61,898
2006 95,954 32,732 95,989 61,231
2007 98,766 31,897 92,957 55,789
2008 97,345 32,774 90,667 52,755
2009 97,083 34,177 87,731 61,948
2010 95,469 35,177 88,644 68,715
2011 96,455 35,420 83,025 70,954
2012 98,013 36,954 78,090 67,014
2013b 105,075 34,927 83,198 96,775c
a Estimated data.
b Preliminary data.
c Students with less than 60 
credits. The figure cannot 
be compared with earlier 
data.
Note: Excluding special 
schools, from the year 
2000 excluding special 
education. College, uni-
versity: from the 
2005/2006 school year 
including students in BA/
BSc, MA/MSc and undi-
vided (joint bachelor and 
master courses) training.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent07_02
Figure 7.2: Flows of the educational system by level
Source: NEFMI EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena07_02
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Table 7.3: The number of full time pupils/students by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1990/91 1,130,656 222,204 291,872 76,601
2000/01 918,976a 120,330a 417,800a 176,046
2001/02 905,932 124,615 420,889 184,071
2002/03 893,261 123,069 426,384 193,155
2003/04 874,296 123,206 437,909 204,910
2004/05 854,930 123,008 438,496 212,292
2005/06 828,594 121,815 441,002 217,245
2006/07 800,635 119,520 443,166 224,616
2007/08 783,948 122,973 441,886 227,118
2008/09 765,822 123,640 439,957 224,894
2009/10 752,896 128,479 443,078 222,564
2010/11 736,977 129,076 438,892 218,057
2011/12 729,000 129,250 428,122 218,304
2012/13 725,068 117,356 413,531 214,320
2013/14 730,664 104,927 388,717 209,208
a Estimated data.
b Preliminary data.
Note: Excluding special education schools, from the 2000/2001 schoolyear excluding special 
education. From the 2001/2002 school year, students in grades 5–8 who attend a 6 or 8 year 
secondary general school are included in the number of high school students. College, uni-
versity: from the 2005/2006 school year, includes students in BA/BSc, MA/MSc and undi-
vided (joint bachelor and master courses) training.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent07_03
Table 7.4: The number of part-time pupils/students by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1990/91 11,536 – 68,162 25,786
2000/01 2,940a 1,070a 91,700a 118,994
2001/02 2,793 2,453 95,231 129,167
2002/03 2,785 3,427 93,172 148,032
2003/04 3,190 3,216 93,322 162,037
2004/05 2,766 3,505 90,321 166,174
2005/06 2,543 4,049 89,950 163,387
2006/07 2,319 4,829 91,035 151,203
2007/08 2,245 5,874 83,008 132,273
2008/09 2,083 4,983 74,008 115,957
2009/10 2,035 6,594 70,124 105,511
2010/11 1,997 8,068 76,404 99,962
2011/12 2,264 10,383 74,204 98,081
2012/13 2,127 12,776 72,808 85,316
2013/14b 2,587 12,140 70,783 73,088
a Estimated data.
b Preliminary data.
Note: College, university: from the 2005/2006 school year, including students in BA/BSC, 
MA/MSc and undivided (joint bachelor and master courses) training.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent07_04
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Table 7.5: Number of applicants for full-time high school courses
Year
Applying Admitted
Admitted as a 
percentage of 
applied
Applying Admitted
as a percentage of the secondary 
school graduates in the given year
1980 33,339 14,796 44.4 77.2 34.3
1989 44,138 15,420 34.9 84.0 29.3
1990 46,767 16,818 36.0 88.2 31.7
1991 48,911 20,338 41.6 90.2 37.5
1992 59,119 24,022 40.6 99.1 40.3
1993 71,741 28,217 39.3 104.6 41.1
1994 79,805 29,901 37.5 116.3 43.6
1995 86,548 35,081 40.5 123.2 49.9
1996 79,369 38,382 48.4 108.1 52.3
1997 81,924 40,355 49.3 108.4 53.4
1998 81,065 43,629 53.8 104.4 56.2
1999 82,815 44,538 53.8 112.0 60.2
2000 82,957 45,546 54.9 114.9 63.1
2001 84,380 49,874 59.1 119.8 70.8
2002 88,978 52,552 59.1 127.8 75.5
2003 87,110 52,703 60.5 121.1 73.3
2004 95,871 55,179 57.6 125.0 72.0
2005 91,583 52,863 57.7 118.9 68.6
2006 84,262 53,983 64.1 109.6 70.2
2007 74,849 50,941 68.1 96.5 65.7
2008 66,963 52,081 77.8 97.8 76.1
2009 90,878 61,262 67.4 116.5 78.5
2010 100,777 65,503 65.0 129.3 84.1
2011 101,835 66,810 65.6 133.4 87.5
2012 84,075 61,350 73.0 113.9 83.1
2013 75,392 56,927 75.5 110.2 83.2
Note: Including students applying and admitted to BA/BSc, MA/MSc and undivided (joint 
bachelor and master courses) training. From 2008 students applying and admitted in repeat-
ed, spring and autumn admission procedures altogether.
Source: EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent07_05
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Table 8.1: The number of vacanciesa reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
Year
Number of vacancies  
at closing day
Number of registered unem­
ployedb at closing date
Vacancies per 100 registered 
unemployedb
1991 14,343 227,270 6.3
1992 21,793 556,965 3.9
1993 34,375 671,745 5.1
1994 35,569 568,366 6.3
1995 28,680 507,695 5.6
1996 38,297 500,622 7.6
1997 42,544 470,112 9.0
1998 46,624 423,121 11.0
1999 51,438 409,519 12.6
2000 50,000 390,492 12.8
2001 45,194 364,140 12.4
2002 44,603 344,715 12.9
2003 47,239 357,212 13.2
2004 48,223 375,950 12.8
2005 41,615 409,929 10.2
2006 41,677 393,465 10.6
2007 29,933 426,915 7.0
2008 25,386 442,333 5.7
2009 20,739 561,768 3.7
2010 22,241 582,664 3.8
2011 41,123 582,868 7.1
2012 35,850 559,102 6.4
2013 51,524 527,624 9.8
a Monthly average stock figures.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent08_01
Figure 8.1: The number of vacancies reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena08_01
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Table 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staffa, per cent
Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase
1993
I. 34.7 23.6
2001
I. 25.3 40.0
II. 28.5 22.3 II. 28.6 32.6
1994
I. 24.5 29.1
2002
I. 25.6 39.2
II. 21.0 29.7 II. 27.9 35.4
1995
I. 30.1 32.9
2003
I. 23.6 38.5
II. 30.9 27.5 II. 32.1 34.3
1996
I. 32.9 33.3 2004 30.0 39.8
II. 29.4 30.4 2005 25.3 35.0
1997
I. 29.6 39.4 2006 26.6 36.2
II. 30.7 36.8 2007 20.4 27.0
1998
I. 23.4 42.7 2008 26.9 23.2
II. 28.9 37.1 2009 18.4 26.8
1999
I. 25.8 39.2 2010 15.4 26.0
II. 28.8 35.8 2011 17.2 25.5
2000
I. 24.4 41.0 2012 19.9 29.2
II. 27.2 36.5 2013 21.3 30.1
a In the period of the next half year following the interview date, in the sample of NMH 
PROG, since 2004: 1 year later from the interview date.
Source: NMH PROG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent08_02
Figure 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff
Source: NMH PROG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena08_02
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Table 9.1: Regional inequalities: Employment ratea
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1992 62.3 57.7 62.0 57.2 52.2 52.5 57.9 58.0
1993 58.4 55.2 60.5 52.9 49.3 48.4 53.4 54.5
1994 57.2 54.4 59.9 52.4 47.7 47.5 53.0 53.5
1995 57.1 53.1 58.5 48.8 46.3 46.4 53.0 52.5
1996 56.8 52.7 59.3 50.3 45.7 45.6 52.8 52.4
1997 56.8 53.6 59.8 50.0 45.7 45.2 53.6 52.5
1998 57.7 56.0 61.6 51.5 46.2 46.4 54.2 53.7
1999 59.7 58.5 63.1 52.8 48.1 48.8 55.3 55.6
2000 60.5 59.2 63.4 53.5 49.4 49.0 56.0 56.3
2001 60.6 59.3 63.1 52.3 49.7 49.5 55.8 56.2
2002 60.9 60.0 63.7 51.6 50.3 49.3 54.2 56.2
2003 61.7 62.3 61.9 53.4 51.2 51.6 53.2 57.0
2004 62.9 60.3 61.4 52.3 50.6 50.4 53.6 56.8
2005 63.3 60.2 62.0 53.4 49.5 50.2 53.8 56.9
2006 62.7 61.4 62.8 53.6 50.4 51.1 54.3 57.3
2007 62.7 61.8 63.4 51.2 50.8 50.5 55.2 57.3
2008 62.7 60.3 62.1 51.0 49.5 49.9 54.5 56.7
2009 61.6 57.8 59.7 52.1 48.6 48.1 53.2 55.4
2010 60.3 57.3 59.0 53.1 48.7 49.3 54.4 55.4
2011 60.2 59.9 60.2 51.8 48.7 50.3 54.5 55.8
2012 62.2 59.9 61.7 52.9 49.3 52.1 55.8 57.2
2013 62.8 61.0 62.0 55.7 51.7 53.3 56.9 58.4
a Age: 15–64.
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent09_01
Figure 9.1: Regional inequalities: Labour force participation rates,  
gross monthly earnings and gross domestic product in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: Employment rate: KSH MEF; gross domestic product: KSH; earnings: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena09_01
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Table 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment ratea
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central 
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1995 7.4 11.0 6.9 12.1 16.0 13.8 9.3 10.3
1996 8.2 10.4 7.1 9.4 15.5 13.2 8.4 10.0
1997 7.0 8.1 6.0 9.9 14.0 12.0 7.3 8.8
1998 5.7 6.8 6.1 9.4 12.2 11.1 7.1 7.8
1999 5.2 6.1 4.4 8.3 11.6 10.2 5.8 7.0
2000 5.3 4.9 4.2 7.8 10.1 9.3 5.1 6.4
2001 4.3 4.3 4.1 7.7 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2002 3.9 5.0 4.0 7.9 8.8 7.8 6.2 5.8
2003 4.0 4.6 4.6 7.9 9.7 6.8 6.5 5.9
2004 4.5 5.6 4.6 7.3 9.7 7.2 6.3 6.1
2005 5.2 6.3 5.9 8.8 10.6 9.1 8.2 7.2
2006 5.1 6.1 5.7 9.0 11.0 10.9 7.8 7.5
2007 4.7 5.0 5.0 10.0 12.3 10.8 7.9 7.4
2008 4.6 5.8 5.0 10.3 13.4 12.0 8.8 7.8
2009 6.6 9.3 8.6 11.0 15.2 14.2 10.9 10.0
2010 8.9 10.3 9.2 12.1 16.0 14.5 10.6 11.2
2011 8.8 9.3 7.4 12.7 16.7 14.5 10.6 10.9
2012 9.2 9.8 7.4 12.0 16.6 13.9 10.5 10.9
2013 8.7 8.8 7.8 9.1 12.9 14.4 11.3 10.2
a Age: 15–74.
Note: Up to the year 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent09_02
Figure 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment rates in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_02
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Table 9.3: Regional differences: The share of registered unemployeda relative  
to the economically active populationb, per cent
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1998 4.7 8.6 6.1 11.8 16.0 15.0 10.1 9.5
1999 4.5 8.7 5.9 12.1 17.1 16.1 10.4 9.7
2000 3.8 7.5 5.6 11.8 17.2 16.0 10.4 9.3
2001 3.2 6.7 5.0 11.2 16.0 14.5 9.7 8.5
2002 2.8 6.6 4.9 11.0 15.6 13.3 9.2 8.0
2003 2.8 6.7 5.2 11.7 16.2 14.1 9.7 8.3
2004 3.2 6.9 5.8 12.2 15.7 14.1 10.4 8.7
2005 3.4 7.4 6.9 13.4 16.5 15.1 11.2 9.4
2006 3.1 7.0 6.3 13.0 15.9 15.0 10.7 9.0
2007 3.5 6.9 6.3 13.6 17.6 16.6 11.7 9.7
2008 3.6 7.1 6.3 14.3 17.8 17.5 11.9 10.0
2009 5.4 11.5 9.5 17.8 20.9 20.2 14.4 12.8
2010 6.6 11.8 9.3 17.1 21.5 20.9 15.2 13.3
2011 6.8 10.9 8.0 16.6 21.5 22.0 14.5 13.2
2012 6.6 9.9 7.4 16.4 21.2 21.0 13.6 12.6
2013 6.4 9.5 7.4 15.4 19.5 19.4 19.0 13.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
b The denominator of the ratio is the economically active population on January 1st of the 
previous year.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_03
Figure 9.3: Regional inequalities: The share of registered unemployed relative to the economically active 
population, per cent, in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_03
1993
2013
6.4
9.5
7.4
15.4
19.0
19.5
19.4
9.1
8.0
12.8
13.1
14.7
19.1
18.2
regional inequalities
305
Table 9.4: Annual average registered unemployment ratea by counties, per centb
County 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Budapest 0.1 5.7 3.0 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 4.6 5.9 6.2 6.1 5.8
Baranya 1.1 11.8 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.9 11.6 13.4 13.3 12.9 13.6 14.7 17.1 16.6 16.4 15.0
Bács­Kiskun 1.1 11.0 10.0 9.3 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.2 11.4 12.0 17.9 15.6 14.8 13.7 13.3
Békés 1.1 14.0 13.1 11.9 11.2 11.5 12.0 13.0 13.5 15.0 14.8 17.3 18.1 17.8 15.8 14.8
Borsod­Abaúj­Zemplén 2.3 16.7 20.3 19.0 19.1 19.6 18.3 18.9 18.0 19.9 20.1 23.1 23.7 23.5 22.9 20.9
Csongrád 1.0 9.9 8.6 8.3 8.1 8.5 9.7 10.7 8.8 9.2 9.3 11.6 12.4 11.5 11.5 11.0
Fejér 1.0 10.6 7.2 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.5 11.5 12.4 12.1 10.8 10.1
Győr­Moson­Sopron 0.5 6.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 5.4 4.6 4.1 4.1 6.9 6.8 5.7 5.0 4.6
Hajdú­Bihar 0.9 14.2 14.7 13.6 12.8 13.1 12.9 14.0 13.9 15.6 16.5 19.1 20.3 20.7 19.9 18.6
Heves 1.6 12.5 12.0 10.6 9.8 10.0 10.6 11.3 11.1 12.2 12.7 15.8 16.1 16.1 15.7 15.0
Jász­Nagykun­Szolnok 1.6 14.6 13.4 11.5 10.2 10.7 11.2 12.0 11.4 11.8 12.2 15.5 16.4 18.1 16.8 15.4
Komárom­Esztergom 1.0 11.3 8.3 7.0 6.7 6.0 5.8 6.8 5.8 5.4 5.5 10.2 10.4 9.5 8.9 8.7
Nógrád 2.4 16.3 14.9 14.3 13.8 14.6 14.6 16.1 16.1 17.7 17.8 21.2 22.0 22.9 23.9 21.7
Pest 0.5 7.6 5.2 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.4 6.7 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.2
Somogy 1.4 11.2 11.9 11.6 11.5 12.2 13.4 14.5 14.6 16.2 16.9 19.4 18.9 18.3 18.2 17.1
Szabolcs­Szatmár­Bereg 2.6 19.3 19.5 17.8 16.7 17.7 17.5 18.6 18.8 21.0 22.4 24.7 24.8 26.0 25.0 23.0
Tolna 1.6 12.2 11.8 11.0 10.0 10.7 11.6 11.8 10.5 11.5 12.1 15.2 14.7 14.2 13.7 13.7
Vas 0.4 7.2 5.2 4.9 4.5 5.0 6.0 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.1 9.8 9.6 7.7 6.7 6.9
Veszprém 0.9 10.0 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 8.0 7.7 8.0 8.2 12.6 12.3 10.8 9.6 9.4
Zala 0.8 9.2 7.2 6.5 6.4 7.0 7.4 9.3 9.0 9.3 9.4 13.0 12.9 11.7 11.6 12.3
Total 1.0 10.6 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0 12.8 13.3 13.2 12.6 11.9
a Since 1st of November, 2005: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
b The denominator of the ratio is the economically active population on January 1st of the 
previous year.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent09_04
Figure 9.4: Regional inequalities: Means of registered unemployment rates in the counties, 2013
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_04
10.1
5.8
7.2
4.6
6.9
8.7
9.4
12.3
17.1 13.7
15.0
13.3
11.0
15.4
14.8
15.0
21.7
20.9
23.0
18.6
statistical data
306
Table 9.5: Regional inequalities: Gross monthly earningsa
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1998 86,440 68,297 64,602 60,736 60,361 58,208 58,506 69,415
1999 101,427 77,656 74,808 70,195 70,961 68,738 68,339 81,067
2000 114,637 87,078 83,668 74,412 77,714 73,858 73,591 90,338
2001 132,136 100,358 96,216 86,489 88,735 84,930 84,710 103,610
2002 149,119 110,602 106,809 98,662 102,263 98,033 97,432 117,672
2003 170,280 127,819 121,464 117,149 117,847 115,278 113,532 135,472
2004 184,039 137,168 131,943 122,868 128,435 124,075 121,661 147,111
2005 192,962 147,646 145,771 136,276 139,761 131,098 130,406 157,770
2006 212,001 157,824 156,499 144,189 152,521 142,142 143,231 171,794
2007 229,897 173,937 164,378 156,678 159,921 153,241 153,050 186,229
2008 245,931 185,979 174,273 160,624 169,313 160,332 164,430 198,087
2009 254,471 187,352 182,855 169,615 169,333 160,688 164,638 203,859
2010 258,653 194,794 183,454 171,769 173,696 162,455 169,441 207,456
2011 264,495 197,774 184,311 181,500 185,036 173,243 177,021 214,540
2012 279,073 215,434 202,189 208,895 196,566 191,222 187,187 230,073
2013 290,115 220,495 209,418 190,126 188,635 178,499 187,762 230,018
a Gross monthly earnings (HUF/person), May.
Note: The data refer to full-time employees in the budgetary sector and firms employing at 
least 10 workers (1998–99), and at least 5 workers (2000–), respectively.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_05
Table 9.6: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
Year
Central  
Hungary
Western  
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern  
Hungary
Northern  
Great Plain
Southern  
Great Plain
2000 0.0729 –0.0067 –0.1610 –0.1320 –0.1500 –0.1660
2001 0.0739 –0.0200 –0.1500 –0.1400 –0.1550 –0.1630
2002 0.0903 –0.0378 –0.1120 –0.0950 –0.1170 –0.1070
2003 0.0493 –0.0542 –0.1220 –0.1220 –0.1400 –0.1410
2004 0.0648 –0.0313 –0.1410 –0.0953 –0.1400 –0.1270
2005 0.0291 –0.0372 –0.1310 –0.1010 –0.1450 –0.1390
2006 0.0660 –0.0214 –0.1400 –0.0874 –0.1380 –0.1100
2007 0.0636 –0.0840 –0.1420 –0.1290 –0.1590 –0.1450
2008 0.0446 –0.0904 –0.1750 –0.1350 –0.1920 –0.1660
2009 0.0791 –0.0464 –0.1270 –0.1210 –0.1420 –0.1490
2010 0.0689 –0.0746 –0.1390 –0.1270 –0.1720 –0.1500
2011 0.1060 –0.0301 –0.0806 –0.0058 –0.0886 –0.0947
2012 0.0673 –0.0439 –0.0784 –0.1020 –0.1320 –0.1250
2013 0.0411 –0.0543 –0.1180 –0.1190 –0.1630 –0.1350
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the refer-
ence group in log points (approximately percentage points). All parameters are significant at 
the 0.01 level.
Reference category: women, with leaving certificate (general education certificate), not in the 
public sector, working in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent09_06
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Figure 9.5: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 
1st quarter 2007, per cent
Note: The ratio of registered unemployed was calculated using the following method: number 
of registered unemployed divided by the permanent population of age 15–64. The number of 
registered unemployed is a quarterly average. The permanent population data is annual.
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena09_05
Figure 9.6: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 
1st quarter 2013, per cent
Note: The ratio of registered unemployed was calculated using the following method: number 
of registered unemployed divided by the permanent population of age 15–64. The number of 
registered unemployed is a quarterly average. The permanent population data is from the 
year 2012 (since 2013 data is not yet available).
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena09_06
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Figure 9.7: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 
3rd quarter 2007, per cent
Note: The ratio of registered unemployed was calculated using the following method: number 
of registered unemployed divided by the permanent population of age 15–64. The number of 
registered unemployed is a quarterly average. The permanent population data is annual.
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena09_07
Figure 9.8: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 
3rd quarter 2013, per cent
Note: The ratio of registered unemployed was calculated using the following method: number 
of registered unemployed divided by the permanent population of age 15–64. The number of 
registered unemployed is a quarterly average. The permanent population data is from the 
year 2012 (since 2013 data is not yet available).
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ena09_08
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Table 9.7: Regional inequalities: Gross domestic product
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central 
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
Thousand HUF/person/month
2000 2,014 1,255 1,468 957 827 815 918 1,290
2001 2,311 1,372 1,539 1,074 947 965 1,031 1,458
2002 2,701 1,462 1,703 1,204 1,050 1,062 1,136 1,648
2003 2,940 1,719 2,001 1,321 1,186 1,213 1,254 1,841
2004 3,237 1,953 2,143 1,468 1,366 1,351 1,439 2,021
2005 3,564 2,056 2,169 1,517 1,439 1,390 1,483 2,185
2006 3,921 2,127 2,359 1,591 1,505 1,487 1,563 2,359
2007 4,105 2,300 2,430 1,691 1,587 1,563 1,643 2,485
2008 4,335 2,401 2,575 1,813 1,652 1,664 1,782 2,644
2009 4,275 2,133 2,390 1,773 1,570 1,664 1,699 2,557
2010 4,355 2,318 2,642 1,812 1,615 1,693 1,733 2,651
2011 4,531 2,436 2,819 1,845 1,648 1,794 1,829 2,771
2012 4,578 2,485 2,905 1,929 1,683 1,817 1,934 2,827
Per cent
2000 152.2 97.3 113.9 74.8 64.6 63.4 71.8 100.0
2001 158.5 94.1 105.6 73.7 64.9 66.2 70.7 100.0
2002 163.9 88.7 103.4 73.0 63.7 64.4 68.9 100.0
2003 161.1 92.4 107.6 71.6 64.0 65.3 68.0 100.0
2004 157.9 95.3 104.5 71.6 66.6 65.9 70.2 100.0
2005 163.2 94.0 99.2 69.4 65.9 63.6 67.8 100.0
2006 166.2 90.2 100.0 67.4 63.8 63.0 66.3 100.0
2007 165.2 92.6 97.8 68.0 63.9 62.9 66.1 100.0
2008 164.0 90.8 97.4 68.6 62.5 62.9 67.4 100.0
2009 167.2 83.4 93.5 69.3 61.4 65.1 66.4 100.0
2010 164.2 87.4 99.7 68.4 60.9 63.9 65.4 100.0
2011 163.5 87.9 101.7 66.6 59.5 63.7 66.0 100.0
2012 161.9 87.9 102.8 68.2 59.5 64.3 68.4 100.0
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent09_07
Table 9.8: Commuting
Year
Working in the residence Commuter
in thousands per cent in thousands per cent
1980 3,848.5 76.0 1,217.2 24.0
1990 3,380.2 74.7 1,144.7 25.3
2001 2,588.2 70.1 1,102.1 29.9
2005 2,625.1 68.2 1,221.3 31.8
2011 2,462.8a 62.5 1,479.8 37.2
a Includes those working abroad but classified by the respondents of LFS as household mem-
bers.
Source: NSZ, microcensus.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent09_08
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Table 10.1: Strikes
Year Number of strikes Number of persons involved Hours lost, in thousands
1995a 7 172,048 1,708
1996 8 4,491 19
1997 5 853 15
1998 7 1,447 3
1999 5 16,685 242
2000 5 26,978 1,192
2001 6 21,128 61
2002 4 4,573 9
2003 7 10,831 19
2004 8 6,276 116
2005 11 1,425 7
2006 16 24,665 52
2007 13 64,612 186
2008 8 8,633 ..
2009 9 3,134 8.6
2010 7 3,263 133.1
2011 1 … …
2012 3 1,885 4.6
2013 1 .. ..
a Teachers strikes number partly estimated.
Source: KSH strike statistics.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_01
Table 10.2: National agreements on wage increase recommendationsa
Year
OÉT – from 2013 VKF – Recommendations Actual indexes
Minimum Average Maximum Budgetary sector Competitve sector
2000 108.5 .. 111.0 112.3 114.2
2001 .. .. .. 122.9 116.3
2002 108.0 .. 110.5 129.2 113.3
2003 .. 4.5 % real wage growth .. 117.5 108.9
2004 .. 107.0–108.0 .. 100.4 109.3
2005 .. 106.0 .. 112.8 106.9
2006 .. 104.0–105.0 .. 106.4 109.3
2007 .. 105.5–108.0 .. 106.4 109.1
2008 .. 105.0–107.5 .. 106.2 108.4
2009 .. 103.0–105.0 .. 92.1 104.3
2010 .. real wage preservation .. 100.5b 102.6b
2011 .. 104.0–106.0 .. 103.8 105.3
2012 – no wage recommendations – 98.3 107.2
2013 .. real wage preservation .. 102.9b 103.4b
a Average increase rates of gross earnings from recommendations by the National Interest 
Reconciliation Council (OÉT) and the Permanent Consultation Forum of the Business Sec-
tor and the Government (VKF, from 2013 onwards). Previous year = 100.
b Mean real wage index.
Source: KSH, NGM.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent10_02
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Table 10.3: Single employer collective agreements in the business sector
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of 
agreements 1,333 1,277 1,272 1,295 1,025 1,033 1,032 1,027 962 966 959 942 951
Number of per­
sons covered 698,262 667,634 649,861 637,508 513,118 489,568 532,065 467,964 432,086 448,138 448,980 442,723 448,087
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent10_03
Table 10.4: Single institution collective agreements in the public sector
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of 
agreements 2,077 2,019 2,026 2,020 1,750 1,435 1,711 1,710 1,737 1,751 1,744 1,735 1,736
Number of per­
sons covered 268,139 251,849 251,352 250,492 228,080 203,497 224,246 222,547 225,434 224,651 222,136 261,401 260,388
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_04
Table 10.5: Multi-employer collective agreements in the business sector
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of 
agreements 68 66 71 79 71 75 74 78 80 82 81 81 83
Number of per­
sons covered 213,443 206,729 261,848 263,752 92,196 86,079 83,117 80,506 222,236 221,627 202,005 187,952 173,614
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_05
Table 10.6: Multi-institution collective agreements in the public sector
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of agreements 10 9 9 10 5 4 2 1 1 1 1 0 0
Number of persons covered 2,081 2,045 2,042 2,072 403 360 238 .. .. .. 320 0 0
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_06
Table 10.7: The number of firm wage agreementsa, the number of affected firms,  
and the number of employees covered
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of agree­
ments 471 531 545 515 298 302 214 202 785 905 888 863 874
Number of per­
sons covered 259,033 279,753 316,585 347,223 169,639 151,022 171,259 100,206 377,677 414,522 416,562 415,751 422,887
a Until 2008, the data relate to the number of ’wage agreements’ concerning the next year’s 
average wage increase, in the typical case. In and after 2009, the figures relate to resolutions 
within collective agreements, which affect the remuneration of workers (including long-
term agreements on wage supplements, bonuses, premia, non-wage benefits and rights and 
responsibilities connected with wage payments).
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent10_07
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Table 10.8: The number of multi-employer wage agreementsa, the number of affected firms,  
and the number of covered companies and employees
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of agree­
ments 19 18 22 19 40 44 40 45 62 68 68 73 74
Number of com­
panies 181 172 243 145 145 162 147 150 2,350 2,460 2,199 1,942 1,096
Number of per­
sons covered 68,882 76,129 88,855 25,175 35,039 42,817 33,735 40,046 191,258 211,753 180,131 191,013 160,092
a Until 2008, the data relate to the number of ’wage agreements’ concerning the next year’s 
average wage increase, in the typical case. In and after 2009, the figures relate to resolutions 
within collective agreements, which affect the remuneration of workers (including long-
term agreements on wage supplements, bonuses, premia, non-wage benefits and rights and 
responsibilities connected with wage payments).
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent10_08
Table 10.9: The share of employees covered by collective agreements, percenta
Industries
Multi­employer collective agreements  
in the business sectorb
Single employer collective agreements  
in the national economy
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agriculture 23.02 27.28 27.80 21.93 23.08 8.13 12.82 12.47 9.81 11.71
Mining and quarrying 5.85 6.16 6.37 5.27 5.36 29.67 36.15 37.84 57.86 40.51
Manufacturing 11.36 11.95 11.40 12.78 11.95 23.32 24.35 23.36 25.94 25.95
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 72.48 72.05 69.28 70.27 69.67 63.83 63.69 60.04 59.16 53.09
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities 23.31 24.59 25.15 24.32 23.87 52.65 59.58 55.95 46.97 46.61
Construction 99.13 99.40 98.93 98.27 99.88 6.72 6.73 6.74 5.47 5.84
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 2.88 3.36 3.41 6.71 6.83 12.01 11.07 11.22 7.74 7.82
Transportation and storage 13.17 15.07 15.27 15.69 14.82 45.84 57.57 56.26 58.68 56.65
Accommodation and food service activities 94.44 94.31 94.28 93.24 92.42 10.42 9.98 9.94 8.23 6.49
Information and communication 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.88 0.88 21.59 21.76 20.25 18.93 20.14
Financial and insurance activities 5.90 6.10 4.97 5.72 5.24 31.75 33.94 32.36 35.11 33.41
Real estate activities 37.08 38.06 39.78 16.37 15.73 29.69 30.95 29.30 25.69 24.61
Professional, scientific and technical activities 2.26 2.47 2.32 4.01 4.58 8.72 9.37 8.53 10.97 12.24
Administrative and support service activities 15.57 13.87 12.59 6.33 6.22 7.70 8.43 7.78 8.17 8.01
Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security .. .. .. .. .. 6.06 51.22 6.89 14.48 14.52
Education 0.04 .. .. 4.79 3.91 41.63 43.03 40.51 44.83 41.94
Human health and social work activities .. .. .. .. .. 42.49 50.35 35.88 38.24 34.48
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.98 1.31 1.28 0.14 0.16 19.58 22.81 19.79 23.57 24.01
Other service activities 0.71 0.93 0.84 0.62 0.63 13.33 9.70 6.78 7.07 8.76
National economy, total 19.13 20.43 19.86 19.94 19.34 23.20 27.18 23.52 25.05 24.24
a Percentage share of employees covered by collective agreements.
b In the observed period only a single multi-employer collective agreement was in effect in the 
public sector.
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System, Register of Collective Agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent10_09
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Table 10.10: Single employer collective agreements in the national economy
Industries
Number of collective agreements The number of employees covered  by collective agreements
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agriculture 63 65 64 65 66 6,728 9,765 9,310 7,628 8,709
Mining and quarrying 9 10 10 9 9 1,273 1,474 1,491 2,142 1,475
Manufacturing 336 339 344 344 354 140,956 142,402 144,844 157,710 157,659
Electricity, gas, steam and 
air conditioning supply 50 50 48 47 45 15,998 16,003 14,581 13,807 12,194
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities
69 70 69 67 68 23,815 24,236 23,737 19,175 19,010
Construction 49 49 48 45 45 7,917 7,917 7,800 6,153 6,190
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles
127 126 126 119 118 41,485 38,031 37,973 25,686 25,573
Transportation and storage 55 59 60 57 59 85,067 102,452 102,164 104,150 98,748
Accommodation and food 
service activities 38 38 37 36 35 8,384 8,337 8,342 6,576 4,944
Information and communi­
cation 12 15 15 14 15 14,082 14,256 14,256 13,540 13,727
Financial and insurance 
activities 24 26 27 27 26 22,080 22,729 20,997 22,300 20,892
Real estate activities 32 33 31 31 32 8,781 8,781 8,522 6,957 7,100
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 51 54 55 53 54 6,319 6,822 6,795 8,628 10,047
Administrative and support 
service activities 26 24 25 24 25 8,464 10,507 11,359 11,080 11,206
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security
99 103 105 102 105 17,796 16,433 17,015 37,643 38,313
Education 1,288 1,293 1,292 1,295 1,291 106,785 106,485 106,233 113,995 102,582
Human health and social 
work activities 245 241 239 236 226 90,648 77,719 88,141 100,879 92,631
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 90 92 94 92 91 7,382 7,242 7,109 7,786 7,637
Other service activities 20 19 18 18 19 2,361 1,422 1,482 1,515 1,514
National economy, total 2,683 2,706 2,707 2,681 2,683 616,321 623,013 632,151 667,350 640,151
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System, Register of Collective Agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent10_10
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Table 10.11: Multi-employer collective agreements in the business sectora
Industries
The number of firms covered by the multi­employerb 
collective agreements
The number of employees covered by multi­employer 
collective agreements
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agriculture 596 601 601 600 27 17,969 20,724 20,416 16,833 17,098
Mining and quarrying 5 5 5 5 3 251 251 251 195 195
Manufacturing 605 604 601 179 155 66,956 69,871 68,953 75,700 70,908
Electricity, gas, steam and air condi­
tioning supply 30 36 36 34 35 18,164 18,096 16,818 16,393 15,991
Water supply; sewerage, waste man­
agement and remediation activities 24 23 23 23 22 9,769 9,769 9,769 9,229 9,229
Construction 494 489 491 486 484 116,643 116,745 113,936 110,173 105,521
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 124 127 125 68 47 9,934 11,538 11,551 22,258 22,316
Transportation and storage 195 197 155 157 155 23,207 26,780 26,780 26,867 24,972
Accommodation and food service 
activities 37 37 37 31 29 62,600 65,581 65,410 63,526 61,204
Information and communication 11 10 10 12 12 543 543 543 597 597
Financial and insurance activities 12 12 12 13 7 4,082 4,082 3,215 3,626 3,269
Real estate activities 56 56 56 47 28 10,829 10,579 10,579 4,048 4,048
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 48 43 43 39 33 1,486 1,621 1,621 2,755 3,293
Administrative and support service 
activities 67 87 87 84 82 16,903 16,862 16,862 7,855 7,888
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 1 0 0 0 0 .. 0 0 0 0
Education 21 17 17 17 20 8 .. .. 171 171
Human health and social work activi­
ties 1 1 1 1 0 .. .. .. .. ..
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1 1 1 1 1 127 127 127 13 13
Other service activities 8 8 8 7 2 121 133 121 88 83
National economy, total 2,336 2,354 2,309 1,804 1,142 359,592 373,302 366,952 360,327 346,796
a In the observed period only a single multi-employer collective agreement was in effect in the 
public sector.
b Multi-employer collective agreements are those concluded and/or extended by several em-
ployers or employer organizations.
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System, Register of Collective Agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent10_11
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Table 11.1: Family benefits
Year
Tax credit for familiesa Child benefitb Regular child protection allowancec
Wage related maternity 
benefitd
Flat rate maternity ben­
efitsd
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount per 
family, HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
2003 6,841 1,009,660 11,283 1,292,000 4,705 704,000 48,742 77,942 22,091 214,640
2004 6,941 969,512 11,971 1,290,200 5,236 670,000 54,322 83,678 24,174 210,509
2005 6,979 924,263 12,596 1,264,500 5,619 663,000 58,676 87,172 25,706 208,708
2006 9,392 122,883 21,637 1,269,000 – – 63,221 91,678 27,102 212,741
2007 .. .. 23,031 1,224,000 – – 68,763 93,973 28,496 207,608
2008 .. .. 24,521 1,246,600 – – 74,518 94,514 30,880 208,652
2009 .. .. 24,524 1,245,900 – – 78,725 95,050 30,328 214,416
2010 .. .. 24,442 1,224,000 – – 83,959 94,682 30,041 217,807
2011 .. .. 24,528 1,190,707 – – 84,929 87,717 .. 207,550
2012 .. .. 24,491 1,167,640 – – 91,050 81,839 .. 206,645
2013 .. .. 24,257 1,149,796 – – 96,661 81,234 .. 198,685
a Introduced in 1999. Beginning in 2006, this became a part of family benefits, only families with 3 or 
more children are entitled to tax credits to the amount of 4,000 HUF per child.
b Annual mean. From 1999 to November 8, 2002, the child care benefit includes the family allowance 
and schooling support. Beginning in 2002, the benefits paid in the 13th month are included as well.
c Annual average. Was in use from 1998 to 2005. d Annual average.
Source: NAV, KSH Welfare Statistics.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_01
Table 11.2: Unemployment benefits and average earnings
Year
Insured unemployment benefit and 
other non­means tested benefitsa
Means tested unemployment as­
sistanceb Net monthly earnings, HUF
c
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients Male Female Together
2003 34,762 107,226 15,010 138,127 94,612 84,632 89,906
2004 37,107 109,654 15,864 144,853 98,101 87,710 93,233
2005 39,593 111,732 16,991 158,565 108,139 98,625 103,727
2006 43,344 109,095 23,771 160,426 .. .. 110,951
2007 46,208 96,463 25,705 194,779 .. .. 114,282
2008 49,454 97,047 27,347 213,436 .. .. 121,969
2009 51,831 152,197 23,117 167,287 .. .. 124,116
2010 50,073 125,651 27,574 174,539 .. .. 132,604
2011 52,107 110,803 25,139 209,918 .. .. 141,151
2012 63,428 62,380 21,943 236,609 .. .. 144,085
2013 68,730 48,019 .. .. .. .. 151,085
a Average of headcount at the end of the month. Includes the pre-pension allowance (2000).
b This scheme changed substantially in July 2006, therefore figures for 2006 are given for the period 
July-December 2006.
c The average net wage refers to the entire economy, competitive sector after 2001: firms with at least 
4 employees.
Source: NFSZ: Labour Market Report, 2001. KSH: Welfare systems 2007, Welfare Statistics, Year-
book of Demographics. KSH Social Statistics Yearbooks. KSH Stadat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_02
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Table 11.3.a: Number of those receiving pensiona, and the mean sum of the provisions  
they received in January of the given year
Year
Old age pension Disability pension under and above retirement age
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, 
HUF
Average amount 
after increase,  
HUF
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, 
HUF
Average amount 
after increase,  
HUF
2005 1,643,409 63,185 67,182 808,107 52,259 55,563
2006 1,658,387 69,145 72,160 806,147 56,485 58,935
2007 1,676,477 74,326 78,577 802,506 59,978 63,120
2008 1,716,315 81,975 87,481 794,797 65,036 69,160
2009 1,731,213 90,476 93,256 779,130 70,979 73,166
2010 1,719,001 94,080 98,804 750,260 73,687 77,500
2011 1,700,800 99,644 104,014 721,973 77,945 81,367
2012 1,959,202b 99,931 104,610 302,990c .. ..
a Pension: Excludes survivors pensions
b From 2012 onwards, the disability pensions of persons older than the mandatory retirement 
age are granted as old-age pensions.
c Excludes persons older than the mandatory retirement age.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_03a
Table 11.3.b: Number of those receiving pensiona, and the mean sum of the provisions  
they received in January of the given year, from 2011
Type of benefit
2011 2012 2013
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount 
before 
increase, 
HUF
Average 
amount 
after in­
crease, 
HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount 
before 
increase, 
HUF
Average 
amount 
after in­
crease, 
HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount 
before 
increase, 
HUF
Average 
amount 
after in­
crease, 
HUF
Old age pension 1,700,800 99,644 104,014 1,959,202 99,931 104,610 2,000,128 107,236 112,781
Old age pension of persons above 
the mandatory retirement age 1,462,449 97,072 101,335 1,487,697 102,332 107,138 1,518,977 109,841 115,521
Pension for women entitled to 
retire before the mandatory age 
after having accumulated at least 
40 accrual years
0 – – 62,955 102,402 106,731 90,166 109,803 115,474
Old age pension of persons 
younger than the mandatory 
retirement age
238,351 115,427 120,449 11,664 174,326 182,542 9,301 188,664 198,473
Disability pension for persons 
older than the mandatory retire­
ment age
384,443 84,928 88,662 396,886 88,351 92,507 381,684 94,276 99,151
a Pension: Excludes survivors pensions
From 2012 onwards, no old-age pension is granted to persons younger than the mandatory 
retirement age. Exceptions are pensions for women having accumulated 40 or more accrual 
years, and allotments for miners, ballet dancers and servicemen in the military, frontier 
guards, police and fire departments. Early retirement pensions granted before 2012 have 
been transformed to ’allotments’ paid prior to the recipient reaching the mandatory retire-
ment age.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_03b
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Table 11.4.a: Number of those receiving social annuities for people with damaged health, and the mean sum  
of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Temporary annuity Regular social annuity Health damage annuity  for miners Total
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
2004 11,949 33,798 207,300 21,370 2,950 69,777 222,199 22,681
2005 13,186 36,847 207,091 22,773 2,839 74,161 223,116 24,259
2006 14,945 40,578 195,954 23,911 2,786 77,497 213,685 25,776
2007 19,158 42,642 184,845 25,050 2,693 80,720 206,696 27,406
2008 21,538 46,537 170,838 27,176 2,601 85,805 194,977 30,096
2009 21,854 46,678 159,146 27,708 2,533 86,165 183,533 30,774
2010 20,327 47,060 148,704 27,645 2,448 86,252 171,479 30,783
2011 16,448 47,096 139,277 27,588 2,371 86,411 158,096 30,500
2012a 13,090 .. 127,408 .. 2,279 86,542 142,787 ..
a Disability pensions and temporary provisions for disability groups 1-2, granted prior to 2012, 
have been transformed to ’disability allotments’. The provisions for permanent social benefit 
recipients born before 1955 have also been transformed to ’disability allotments’. Disability 
pensions and permanent social benefits granted before 2012 to the members of disability 
group 3 have been transformed to ’rehabilitation allotment’. The conditions of these provi-
sions will be set in the framework of a complex revision of entitlement and eligibility.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_04a
Table 11.4.b: Number of those receiving social annuities for people with damaged health, and the mean sum  
of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year, from 2012
Support for disabled persons
2012 2013
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, 
HUF
Average amount 
after increase, 
HUF
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, 
HUF
Average amount 
after increase, 
HUF
Disability and rehabilitation provision 473,360 59,899 62,278 444,014 62,780 66,035
Of which:
– Disability provision for persons 
growing older than the mandatory 
retirement age
15,636 30,320 30,326 41,162 63,260 66,542
– Disability provision for persons 
younger than the mandatory retire­
ment
237,323 68,542 71,475 209,264 70,753 74,422
– Rehabilitation provision 192,331 49,467 51,244 178,112 51,718 54,398
– Rehabilitation benefit 25,791 73,754 77,164 13,265 80,101 84,256
– Annuity for miners with damaged 
health 2,279 86,434 86,542 2,211 86,455 90,915
Disability pensions and temporary provisions for disability groups 1-2, granted prior to 2012, 
have been transformed to ’disability allotments’. The provisions for permanent social benefit 
recipients born before 1955 have also been transformed to ’disability allotments’. Disability 
pensions and permanent social benefits granted before 2012 to the members of disability 
group 3 have been transformed to ’rehabilitation allotment’. The conditions of these provi-
sions will be set in the framework of a complex revision of entitlement and eligibility.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_04b
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Table 11.5: The median age for retirement and the number of pensioners
Pension
Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Females
Old age and similar pensions 57.6 36,806 57.7 45,115 57.5 46,093 57.8 62,015 57.3 39,290
Disability and accident­related 
disability pension 48.7 19,901 49.1 19,250 49.3 18,488 49.8 15,837 50.5 8,565
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – – – – – 44.1 1,604
Total 54.5 56,707 55.1 64,365 55.2 64,581 56.2 77,852 55.7 49,459
Males
Old age and similar 60.1 36,111 59.9 30,560 59.9 33,134 59.7 50,878 59.8 25,749
Disability and accident­related 
disability pension 50.1 24,915 50.5 24,565 50.6 23,045 51.1 19,032 51.9 11,069
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – – – – – 44.5 1,556
Total 56.0 61,026 55.7 55,125 56.1 56,179 57.4 69,910 56.9 38,374
Together
Old age and similar pensions 58.9 72,917 58.6 75,675 58.5 79,227 58.7 112,893 58.3 65,039
Disability and accident­related 
disability pension 49.5 44,816 49.9 43,815 50.0 41,533 50.5 34,869 51.3 19,634
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – – – – – 44.3 3,160
Total 55.3 117,733 55.4 119,490 55.6 120,760 56.8 147,762 56.2 87,833
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013a
Females
Old age and similar pensions 59.9 15,243 60.7 13,617 58.5 84,922 59.1 53,581 59.4 38,512
Pension for women entitled to 
retire before the mandatory age 
after having accumulated at 
least 40 accrual years
– – – – 57.6 54,770 57.8 27,588 57.9 20,515
Disability and accident­related 
disability pension 51.1 9,065 50.8 10,478 50.7 8,667 – – – –
Rehabilitation annuity 44.9 6,574 47.6 6,789 47.2 4,386 .. .. .. ..
Total 54.1 30,882 54.4 30,884 57.3 97,975 .. .. .. ..
Males
Old age and similar pensions 59.7 37,116 60.2 37,219 60.3 43,240 62.0 21,996 62.2 19,163
Disability and accident­related 
disability pension 52.3 11,992 52.1 13,345 51.9 10,673 – – – –
Rehabilitation annuity 44.8 6,278 47.4 6,123 47.0 4,102 .. .. .. ..
Total 56.4 55,386 56.9 56,687 57.8 58,015 .. .. .. ..
Together
Old age and similar pensions 59.7 52,359 60.3 50,836 59.0 128,162 60.0 75,577 60.3 57,675
Disability and accident­related 
disability pension 51.8 21,057 51.5 23,823 51.3 19,340 – – – –
Rehabilitation annuity 44.9 12,852 47.5 12,912 47.1 8,488 .. 25,791 .. 13,265
Total 55.6 86,268 56.0 87,571 57.5 155,990 .. 101,368 .. 70,940
a Preliminary data.
Note: The source of these statistics is data from the pension determination system of the 
ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so these do not include the data for the armed forces and the police. 
Data on MÁV is included from 2008.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_05
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Table 11.6: The number of those receiving a disability annuity and the mean sum  
of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Disability annuity
Year
Disability annuity
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
2000 25,267 13,746 2007 30,039 30,219
2001 25,490 18,220 2008 30,677 32,709
2002 26,350 20,931 2009 31,263 33,434
2003 27,058 23,884 2010 31,815 33,429
2004 27,923 25,388 2011 32,314 33,429
2005 28,738 27,257 2012 32,560 33,426
2006 29,443 28,720 2013 32,463 33,422
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_06
Table 11.7: Newly determined disability pension claims and detailed data on the number  
of newly determined old-age pension claims
Year
Disability and 
accident­relat­
ed disability 
pensions
Old­age and old­age type pensionsa From the total: at the age limit From the total: under the age limit
Total Male Female Together Male Female Together Male Female Together
1996 59,967 31,770 59,939 91,709 9,893 20,073 29,966 18,681 31,857 50,538
1997 48,262 37,886 32,614 70,500 10,630 1,138 11,768 24,308 28,154 52,462
1998 42,975 12,908 17,841 30,749 385 882 1,267 11,461 15,244 26,705
1999 46,701 15,181 24,418 39,599 2,601 5,808 8,409 11,494 16,922 28,416
2000 55,558 18,071 29,526 47,597 613 813 1,426 16,089 26,859 42,948
2001 54,645 28,759 14,267 43,026 2,200 4,882 7,082 25,175 7,396 32,571
2002 52,211 30,209 25,719 55,928 2,593 646 3,239 26,346 23,503 49,849
2003 48,078 32,574 13,574 46,148 3,058 5,098 8,156 28,064 6,537 34,601
2004 44,196 35,940 36,684 72,624 3,842 989 4,831 30,234 33,817 64,051
2005 41,057 33,175 48,771 81,946 4,035 6,721 10,756 27,719 40,142 67,861
2006 36,904 34,207 47,531 81,738 4,013 732 4,745 29,025 45,675 74,700
2007 34,991 51,037 62,168 113,205 3,722 6,660 10,382 45,731 54,177 99,908
2008 19,832 25,912 39,423 65,335 3,154 288 3,442 22,180 38,761 60,941
2009 21,681 37,468 15,468 52,936 4,193 6,692 10,885 32,452 8,289 40,741
2010 24,094 37,394 13,719 51,113 6,350 7,213 13,563 29,990 5,801 35,791
2011 19,340 43,240 84,922 128,162 9,058 7,938 16,996 32,400 76,019 108,419
2012 – 21,996 53,581 75,577 11,054 9,471 20,525 8,317 42,624 50,941
2013b – 19,163 38,512 57,675 17,270 12,497 29,767 282 24,991 25,273
a Old-age type pensions include: old-age pensions given with a retirement age threshhold 
allowance (early retirement), artists’ pensions, pre-pension up until 1997, miners’ pensions.
b Preliminary data.
Note: Pensions disbursed in the given year (determined according to the given year’s rules). 
The source of these statistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF 
(NYUGDMEG), so these do not include the data for the armed forces and the police.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_07
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Table 11.8: Retirement age threshhold
Birth year
Calendar year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
1948 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
1949 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
1950 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
1951 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
1952 I. 57 58 59 60 61 62.5 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
1952 II. 57 58 59 60 60 62 62.5 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
1953 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
1954 I. 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63.5 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
1954 II. 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 63.5 65 66 67 68 69 70
1955 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
1956 I. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64.5 65 66 67 68
1956 II. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 64.5 66 67 68
1957 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
1958 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
1959 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
1960 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
Those persons are entitled to receive an old age pension who are at least of the age of the old 
age pension threshold indicated in the legislature – marked grey in the table – relevant to 
them (uniform for men and women), who have fulfilled the required number of years of 
service, and who are not insured. In the case of full old age pension, the minimum service 
time is 20 years, for partial pension it is 15 years. The table displays the old age pension age 
threshold in the case of a “representative person”. The cells show the age, based on the calen-
dar year, of a person born in the given year.
Women who have accumulated at least 40 years towards entitlement (which is not necessarily 
the same as 40 years of service) are entitled to an old age pension, regardless of their age.
According to the 2011 legislature number CLXVII, following December 31st, 2011, no pen-
sion can be determined prior to the age threshold. At the same time, the legislature ensures 
allowances that had been determined earlier to be continued under different legal titles (pre-
retirement age pension is replaced by pre-retirement age provision, service pension by ser-
vice salary), as well as closure of acquisitions, and the opportunity for the enforcement of 
acquired rights.
Pre-retirement age pension: early and reduced amount early old age pension, pensions with 
age preference, miner’s pension, artist’s pension, pre-retirement age old age pension of par-
liamentary and European parliamentary representatives and mayors, pre-pension, service 
pension of professional members of the armed forces.
Source: 1997. legislature number LXXXI.; 2011. legislature number CLXVII., http://www.
jozsefvaros.hu/dokumentumok/234_korhatar_elotti_nyudij_ellatasok.pdf.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent11_08
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Table 12.1: The mean, minimum, and maximum value  
of the personal income tax key, per cent
Year
Mean tax burden,  
per cent
The personal income tax key  
projected on the gross wage
minimum maximum
1988 .. 0 60
1989 .. 0 56
1990 .. 0 50
1991 .. 0 50
1992 .. 0 40
1993 .. 0 40
1994 .. 0 44
1995 .. 0 44
1996 .. 20 48
1997 .. 20 42
1998 .. 20 42
1999 .. 20 40
2000 .. 20 40
2001 .. 20 40
2002 .. 20 40
2003 .. 20 40
2004 .. 18 38
2005 18.89 18 38
2006 19.03 18 36
2007 18.63 18 36
2008 18.86 18 36
2009 18.10 18 36
2010a 16.34 21.59 40.64
2011a 13.78 20.32 20.32
2012b 14.90 16 20.32
2013 .. 16 16
a In 2010 the nominal tax rate was 17% for annual incomes lower than 5,000,000 HUF. For 
incomes higher than 5,000,001 HUF it was 850,000 HUF plus 32% of the amount exceeding 
5,000,000 HUF. In 2011, the nominal tax key was 16%. The joint tax base is the amount of 
income appended with the tax base supplement (equal to 27%).
b In 2012 the nominal tax key was 17%. The joint tax base is the amount of income appended 
with the tax base supplement.
The amount of the tax base supplement:
– does not need to be determined for the part of the income included in the joint tax base that 
does not surpass 2 million 424 thousand HUF,
– should be determined as 27 % of the part of the income included in the joint tax base that is 
over 2 million 424 thousand HUF.
Source: Mean tax burden: http://nav.gov.hu/nav/szolgaltatasok/adostatisztikak/szemelyi_jo-
vedelemado/szemelyijovedelemado_adostatiszika.html. Other data: http://nav.gov.hu/nav/
szolgaltatasok/adokulcsok_jarulekmertekek/adotablak.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent12_01
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Table 12.2: Changes in the magnitude of the tax wedge in the case  
of minimum wage and the temporary work booklet (AMK)
Year
Minimum wage
Total wage cost in 
the case of minimum 
wage
Mini­
mum 
wage tax 
wedge, 
%
AMK public burdena, 
HUF/day
Total wage costa, 
HUF/day AMK tax wedge, %
a
gross, 
HUF/
month
gross, 
HUF/day
net, 
HUF/
month
net, 
HUF/day
HUF/
month HUF/day general
regis­
tered 
unem­
ployed
general
regis­
tered 
unem­
ployed
general
regis­
tered 
unem­
ployed
1997 17,000 783 15,045 693 26,450 1,196 43.1 500 500 1,193 1,193 41.9 41.9
1998 19,500 899 17,258 795 30,297 1,369 43.0 500 500 1,295 1,295 38.6 38.6
1999 22,500 1,037 18,188 838 34,538 1,546 47.3 500 500 1,338 1,338 37.4 37.4
2000 25,500 1,175 20,213 931 38,963 1,746 48.1 800 800 1,731 1,731 46.2 46.2
2001 40,000 1,843 30,000 1,382 58,400 2,638 48.6 1,600 1,600 2,982 2,982 53.6 53.6
2002 50,000 2,304 36,750 1,694 71,250 3,226 48.4 1,000 500 2,694 2,194 37.1 22.8
2003 50,000 2,304 42,750 1,970 70,200 3,191 39.1 1,000 500 2,970 2,470 33.7 20.2
2004 53,000 2,442 45,845 2,113 74,205 3,376 38.2 1,000 500 3,113 2,613 32.1 19.1
2005 57,000 2,627 49,305 2,272 79,295 3,572 37.8 700 500 2,972 2,772 23.6 18.0
2006 62,500 2,880 54,063 2,491 85,388 3,910 36.7 700 700 3,191 3,191 21.9 21.9
2007 65,500 3,018 53,915 2,485 89,393 4,095 39.7 700 700 3,185 3,185 22.0 22.0
2008 69,000 3,180 56,190 2,589 94,065 4,310 40.3 900 900 3,489 3,489 25.8 25.8
2009 71,500 3,295 57,815 2,664 97,403b 4,464 40.6 900 900 3,564 3,564 25.3 25.3
2010 73,500 3,387 60,236 2,776 94,448 4,352 36.2 900 900 3,676 3,676 24.5 24.5
Minimum wage
Total wage cost in 
the case of minimum 
wage Mini­
mum 
wage tax 
wedge, 
%
Simplified employ­
mentc, Ft/day
Total wage cost, 
HUF/day
Tax wedge, simpli­
fied employment, %
gross, 
HUF/
month
gross, 
HUF/day
net, 
HUF/
month
net, 
HUF/day
HUF/
month HUF/day
tempo­
rary work
seasonal 
agricul­
tural/
tourism 
work
tempo­
rary work
seasonal 
agricul­
tural/
tourism 
work
tempo­
rary work
seasonal 
agricul­
tural/
tourism 
work
2011 78,000 3,594 60,600 2,793 100,230 4,619 39.5 1,000 500 3,793 3,293 26.4 15.2
2012 93,000 4,280 60,915 2,803 119,505 5,500 49.0 1,000 500 3,803 3,303 26.3 15.1
2013 98,000 4,510 64,190 2,954 125,930 5,795 49.0 1,000 500 3,954 3,454 25.3 14.4
a Wage paid at the amount in accordance with the gross daily minimum wage column and in 
the case of work performed with a temporary work booklet. The basis for the comparison 
with the minimum wage is the assumption that employers pay temporary workers the small-
est possible amount.
b According to regulations pertaining to the first half of 2009.
c From April 1st, 2010. the temporary work booklets and the public contribution tickets were 
discontinued, these were replaced by simplified employment.
Note: The tax wedge is the quotient of the total public burden (tax and contribution) and the 
total wage cost, it is calculated as: tax wedge = (total wage cost – net wage)/total wage cost.
Source: Minimum wage: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_qli041.html. 
Public contribution ticket: 1997. legislation number LXXIV. Simplified employment: 2010. 
legislation number LXXV. Based on calculations of Ágota Scharle.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent12_02
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Table 12.3: The monthly amount of the minimum wage, the guaranteed wage minimum, 
and the minimum pension, in thousands of current-year HUF
Date
Monthly amount 
of the minimum 
wage, HUF
As a percentage 
of mean gross 
earnings
As a ratio of APW, 
%
Guaranteed 
skilled workers 
minimum wage, 
HUF
Minimum pen­
sion, HUF
1990. II. 1. 4,800 .. 40.9 – 4,300
1991. IV.1. 7,000 .. .. – 5,200
1992. I. 1. 8,000 35.8 41.4 – 5,800
1993. II. 1. 9,000 33.1 39.7 – 6,400
1994. II. 1. 10,500 30.9 37.8 – 7,367
1995. III. 1. 12,200 31.4 37.0 – 8,400
1996. II. 1. 14,500 31.0 30.1 – 9,600
1997. I. 1. 17,000 29.7 35.1 – 11,500
1998. I. 1. 19,500 28.8 34.4 – 13,700
1999. I. 1. 22,500 29.1 34.6 – 15,350
2000. I. 1. 25,500 29.1 35.0 – 16,600
2001. I. 1. 40,000 38.6 48.3 – 18,310
2002. I. 1. 50,000 40.8 54.5 – 20,100
2003. I. 1. 50,000 36.4 51.5 – 21,800
2004. I. 1. 53,000 37.2 50.7 – 23,200
2005. I. 1. 57,000 33.6 49.2 – 24,700
2006. I. 1. 62,500 36.5 52.3 68,000 25,800
2007. I. 1. 65,500 35.4 49.2 75,400 27,130
2008. I. 1. 69,000 34.7 49.5 86,300 28,500
2009. I. 1. 71,500 35.8 50.0 87,500 28,500
2010. I. I. 73,500 36.3 49.5 89,500 28,500
2011. I. I. 78,000 36.6 49.8 94,000 28,500
2012. I. I. 93,000 43.6 54.3 108,000 28,500
2013. I. I. 98,000 43.9 .. 114,000 28,500
2014. I. I. 101,500 .. .. 118,000 28,500
Notes: Up to the year 1999, sectors employing unskilled labour usually received an extension 
of a few months for introducing the new minimum wage. The guaranteed wage minimum 
applies to skilled employees, the minimum wage and the skilled workers minimum wage are 
gross amounts. The minimum wage is exempt from the personal income tax from September 
2002. This policy resulted in a 15.9% increase in the net minimum wage. APW: mean wage 
of workers in the processing industry, based on the NMH BT. In 1990, the data is the previ-
ous year’s data, indexed (since there was no NMH BT conducted in 1990).
Source: Minimum wage: 1990–91: http://www.mszosz.hu/files/1/64/345.pdf, 1992–: CSO. 
Guaranteed wage minimum: http://www.nav.gov.hu/nav/szolgaltatasok/adokulcsok_jarule-
kmertekek/minimalber_garantalt. Minimum pension: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xtab-
la/nyugdij/tablny11_03.html. APW: NMH BT, http://nfsz.munka.hu/sysres/adattar2012/
tables/V01_03.html.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent12_03
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Table 12.4: The tax burden on work as a ratio of tax revenue and earnings
Year
Tax burden on work as a 
ratio of tax revenuea, % Implicit tax key
b Tax wedge on 67% 
level of mean earnings
Tax wedge on the  
minimum wagec
1990 .. .. 38.2
1991 52.4 .. .. 40.4
1992 54.8 .. .. 40.9
1993 54.4 .. .. 42.3
1994 53.7 .. .. 41.2
1995 52.1 42.3 .. 44.2
1996 52.5 42.1 .. 41.8
1997 54.2 42.5 .. 43.1
1998 53.1 41.8 .. 43.0
1999 51.5 41.9 .. 47.3
2000 51.8 41.4 51.4 48.1
2001 53.1 40.9 50.9 48.6
2002 53.7 41.2 48.2 48.4
2003 51.8 39.3 44.5 39.1
2004 50.1 38.3 44.8 38.2
2005 51.1 38.4 43.1 37.8
2006 51.7 38.8 43.3 36.7
2007 52.0 41.0 46.0 39.7
2008 53.0 42.3 46.7 40.3
2009 51.4 40.2 46.3 40.6d
2010 49.7 38.4 43.6 36.2
2011 48.6 38.4 45.2 39.5
2012 .. .. 47.6 49.0
2013 .. .. .. 49.0
a Tax burden on work and contributions as a ratio of tax revenue from all tax forms.
b The implicit tax key is the quotient of the revenue from taxes and contributions pertaining 
to work and the income derived from work.
c The tax wedge is the quotient of the total public burden (tax and contribution) and the total 
wage cost, it is calculated as: tax wedge = (total wage cost – net wage)/total wage cost.
d The tax wedge of the minimum wage is the 2009 annual mean (the contributions decreased 
in June).
Source: 1991–1995: estimate of Ágota Scharle based on Ministry of Finance (PM) balance 
sheet data. 1996–2009: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/econom-
ic_analysis/tax_structures/index_en.htm. 2010: Eurostat online database. Implicit tax key: 
Eurostat online database (gov_a_tax_itr). Tax wedge on the 67 percent level of the mean 
wage: OECD: Taxing wages 2010, Paris 2011, tax wedge at the level of the minimum wage: 
calculations of Ágota Scharle.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent12_04
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Table 13.1: Employment and unemployment rate of population  
aged 15–64 by gender in the EU, 2013
Country
Employment rate Unemployment rate
males females together males females together
Austria 77.1 67.6 72.3 5.0 5.0 5.0
Belgium 66.4 57.2 61.8 8.7 8.2 8.5
Bulgaria 62.1 56.8 59.5 14.1 11.9 13.0
Cyprus 67.0 56.9 61.7 16.8 15.3 16.1
Czech Republic 75.7 59.6 67.7 6.0 8.4 7.0
Denmark 75.0 70.0 72.5 6.9 7.4 7.2
United Kingdom 75.6 65.9 70.8 8.1 7.2 7.7
Estonia 71.4 65.7 68.5 9.2 8.5 8.9
Finland 69.9 67.8 68.9 9.0 7.6 8.3
France 67.9 60.4 64.1 10.1 9.8 9.9
Greece 58.4 40.1 49.3 24.5 31.5 27.5
Netherlands 78.7 69.9 74.3 7.1 6.3 6.7
Croatia 56.5 48.5 52.5 18.0 17.0 17.5
Ireland 65.1 55.9 60.5 15.4 10.8 13.3
Poland 66.6 53.4 60.0 9.8 11.2 10.5
Latvia 66.8 63.4 65.0 12.8 11.4 12.1
Lithuania 64.7 62.8 63.7 13.4 10.6 12.0
Luxembourg 72.1 59.1 65.7 5.5 6.4 5.9
Hungary 64.3 52.8 58.4 10.3 10.3 10.3
Malta 74.1 47.0 60.8 6.6 6.3 6.5
Germany 77.7 68.8 73.3 5.7 5.0 5.4
Italy 64.8 46.5 55.6 11.7 13.2 12.4
Portugal 64.0 58.2 61.1 17.0 17.0 17.0
Romania 66.8 52.6 59.7 8.1 6.9 7.6
Spain 59.2 50.3 54.8 25.7 26.8 26.2
Sweden 76.3 72.5 74.4 8.4 8.0 8.2
Slovakia 66.4 53.4 59.9 14.0 14.6 14.3
Slovenia 67.1 59.2 63.3 9.6 11.1 10.3
EU­28 69.4 58.8 64.1 11.0 10.9 11.0
Source: Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent13_01
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Table 13.2: Employment composition of the countries in the EUa, 2013
Country
Self em­
ployedb Part time
Fix term 
contract Agriculture Industry
Market 
services
Non market 
servicesc
Austria 11.4 26.6 9.2 4.7 25.9 41.7 27.6
Belgium 14.2 24.7 8.2 1.4 21.7 40.3 36.6
Bulgaria 11.5 2.7 5.7 6.7 30.2 40.6 22.5
Cyprus 15.9 12.7 17.4 3.1 17.6 48.9 30.4
Czech Republic 16.9 6.6 9.6 3.0 37.5 35.7 23.8
Denmark 8.8 25.4 8.8 2.5 19.4 38.9 38.8
United Kingdom 14.2 26.9 6.2 1.1 18.7 43.9 35.3
Estonia 8.9 10.2 3.5 4.3 30.2 38.9 26.4
Finland 13.0 15.1 15.5 4.1 22.8 38.9 33.7
France 10.8 18.4 16.5 3.1 20.8 37.8 36.1
Greece 32.4 8.4 10.0 13.7 15.7 42.8 27.8
Netherlands 15.6 50.8 20.6 1.9 15.1 41.6 33.0
Croatia 16.5 6.5 14.5 10.8 27.6 37.6 23.9
Ireland 16.5 24.1 10.0 5.7 18.2 44.8 31.3
Poland 18.5 7.8 26.9 12.0 30.5 33.8 23.6
Latvia 10.7 8.1 4.4 8.0 23.9 40.7 27.1
Lithuania 10.6 9.0 2.7 8.4 25.2 39.3 26.6
Luxembourg 8.4 19.2 7.1 1.6 11.6 43.2 40.8
Hungary 10.8 6.7 10.8 4.9 29.9 37.8 27.4
Malta 13.9 15.2 7.8 1.3 21.5 44.8 31.9
Germany 10.7 27.3 13.4 1.4 27.8 40.1 30.6
Italy 23.3 17.9 13.2 3.6 27.3 41.1 28.0
Portugal 20.9 14.0 21.5 9.9 24.2 36.8 29.0
Romania 19.9 9.9 1.5 28.5 28.6 27.3 15.6
Spain 17.2 15.8 23.1 4.3 19.8 45.5 30.4
Sweden 10.4 26.2 16.9 2.0 19.1 40.6 37.8
Slovakia 15.5 4.8 6.9 3.3 35.8 35.1 25.7
Slovenia 12.1 10.1 16.4 8.5 30.9 35.7 24.4
EU­28 15.1 20.3 13.8 4.9 24.2 39.8 30.4
a Per cent of employment, except for employees with fixed-term contracts: per cent of employ-
ees.
b Includes the members of cooperatives and business partnerships.
c One-digit industries O-U.
Source: Eurostat (Newcronos) Labour Force Survey.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2014ent13_02
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DeScription of the main Data SourceS
The data have two main sources in terms of which of-
fice gathered them: the regular institutional and pop-
ulation surveys of the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office (CSO, in Hungarian: Központi Statisztikai Hi-
vatal, KSH), and the register and surveys of the Nation-
al Labour Office (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Munkaügyi 
Hivatal, NMH).
main Data SourceS of the kSh
Labour Force Survey – KSH MEF
The KSH has been conducting a new statistical survey 
since January 1992 to obtain ongoing information on 
the labour force status of the Hungarian population. 
The MEF is a household survey which provides quar-
terly information on the non-institutional population 
aged 15–74. The aim of the survey is to observe employ-
ment and unemployment according to international 
statistical recommendations based on the concepts and 
definitions recommended by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), independently from existing na-
tional labour regulations or their changes.
In international practice, the labour force survey is 
a widely used statistical tool to provide simultaneous, 
comprehensive, and systematic monitoring of employ-
ment, unemployment, and underemployment. The sur-
vey techniques minimise the subjective bias in classi-
fication (since people surveyed are classified by strict 
criteria), and provide freedom to also consider national 
characteristics.
In the MEF, the surveyed population is divided into 
two main groups according to the economic activity 
performed by them during the reference week (up to 
the year 2003, this was always on the week contain-
ing the 12th of the month): economically active per-
sons (labour force), and economically inactive persons.
The group of economically active persons consists of 
those in the labour market either as employed or unem-
ployed persons during the reference week.
The definitions used in the survey follow ILO rec-
ommendations. According to these, those designated 
employed are persons who, during the reference week 
worked one hour or more earning some form of income, 
or had a job from which they were only temporarily ab-
sent (on leave, illness, etc.).
Work providing income includes all activities that:
– result in monetary income, payment in kind, or
– that were carried out in the hopes of income realized 
in the future, or
– were performed without payment in a family business 
or on a farm (i.e. unpaid family workers).
From the survey’s point of view the activities below 
are not considered as work:
– work done without payment for another household or 
institution (voluntary work),
– building or renovating of an own house or flat, intern-
ships tied to education (not even if it is compensated),
– housework, including work in the garden. Work on a 
person’s own land is only considered to generate in-
come if the results are sold in the market, not pro-
duced for self-consumption.
Persons on child-care leave are classified – based on 
the 1995 ILO recommendations for transitional coun-
tries determined in Prague – according to their activity 
during the survey week.
Since, according to the system of national account-
ing, defense activity contributes to the national prod-
uct, conscripts are generally considered as economi-
cally active persons, any exceptions are marked in the 
footnotes of the table. The data regarding the number 
of conscripts comes from administrative sources. (The 
retrospective time-series based on CSO data exclude 
coscripted soldiers. This adjustment affects the data 
until 2003, when military conscription was abolished.)
Unemployed persons are persons aged 15–74 who:
– were without work, i.e. neither had a job nor were at 
work (for one hour or more) in paid employment or 
self-employment during the reference week,
– had actively looked for work at any time in the four 
weeks up to the end of the reference week,
– were available for work within two weeks following 
the reference week if they found an appropriate job.
Those who do not have a job, but are waiting to start 
a new job within 30 days (since 2003 within 90 days) 
make up a special group of the unemployed.
Active job search includes: contacting a public or 
private employment office to find a job, applying to an 
employer directly, inserting, reading, answering adver-
tisements, asking friends, relatives or other methods.
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The labour force (i.e. economically active population) 
comprises employed and unemployed persons.
Persons are defined economically inactive (i.e. not 
in the labour force) if they were neither employed in 
regular, income-earning jobs, nor searching for a job, 
or, if they had searched, had not yet started work. Pas-
sive unemployed are included here - those who would 
like a job, but have given up any active search for work, 
because they do not believe that they have a chance of 
finding any.
The MEF is based on a multi-stage stratified sample 
design. The stages of sampling are defined as follows: 
primary sampling units (PSUs) are enumeration dis-
tricts (EDs) and secondary sampling units (SSUs) are 
dwellings in settlements with 15,000 or more inhabit-
ants, while PSUs are settlements, SSUs are EDs and ul-
timate sampling units are dwellings in all other cases. 
In the MEF sample design strata are defined in terms 
of geographic units, size categories of settlements and 
area types such as city centres, outskirts, etc.
The size of the sample means that the main indica-
tors of the labour market are representative in terms 
of regions (NUTS2) as well. The quarterly MEF sam-
ple includes a sample of three randomly selected dwell-
ings, and labour market information is collected from 
one household each month. From 1998, the quarterly 
sample contains about 33,000 households and 66,000 
persons. The sample has a simple rotation pattern: any 
household entering the sample at some time is expected 
to provide labour market information for six consecu-
tive quarters, then leave the sample permanently. The 
intersection of the samples of two consecutive periods 
tend to be less than the 5/6th that would be obtained 
at a 100 per cent response rate.
Since 2003, the weights used to make the sample rep-
resentative are based on the 2001 census population re-
cord base. At the same time, the 2001–2002 data was 
recalculated and replaced as well. The sampling weights 
for 1992–2000 data are based on the 1990 census. In 
this publication the LFS data for 2012-2013 have been 
weighted using population estimates based on the 2001 
Census. See the CSO webpage and publications for ret-
rospective time series re-weighted using population es-
timates based on the 2011 Census.
Institution-Based Labour Statistics – KSH IMS
The source of the earnings data is the monthly (annual) 
institutional labour statistical survey. The sample frame 
covers enterprises with at least 5 employees, and public 
and social insurance and non-profit institutions irre-
spective of the staff numbers of employees.
The earnings data relate to the full-time employees 
on every occasion. The potential elements of the pre-
vailing monthly average earnings are: base wage, al-
lowances (including the miner’s loyalty bonus, and the 
Széchenyi and Professor’s scholarships), supplementary 
payments, bonuses, premiums, and wages and salaries 
for the 13th and further months.
Net average earnings are calculated by deducting 
from the institution’s gross average earnings the em-
ployer’s contributions, the personal income tax, the em-
ployee’s social security contributions, etc., according to 
the actual rates (i.e. taking into account the threshold 
concerning the social security contributions and em-
ployee deductions). The personal income tax is calcu-
lated based on the actual withholding rate applied by 
the employers when disbursing monthly earnings in 
the given year, the net values are calculated at the in-
stitutional and monthly level.
The size and direction of the difference between the 
gross and the net (after-tax) income indexes depends 
on actual annual changes in the tax table (tax brack-
ets) and in the tax allowances. Thus the actual size of 
the differences are also influenced by the share of indi-
viduals at given firms that fall outside the bracket for 
employee allowances.
The indexes pertain to the comparable sample, tak-
ing changes in the definitions, and of the sample frame 
into account. The KSH traditionally publishes the main 
average index as the earnings growth measure. Thus 
the indicator of change in earnings reflects both the 
changes in the number of observations and the actual 
earnings changes simultaneously. The change of net 
real earnings is calculated from the ratio of net income 
index and the consumer price index in the same period.
Non-manual workers are persons with occupa-
tions classified by the standardized occupational code 
(FEOR) in major groups 1–4., manual workers are per-
sons with occupations classified in major groups 5–9.
Labour Force Accounting Census – KSH MEM
Before the publication of the MEF, the annual MEM 
gave account of the total labour force in the time pe-
riod between the two censuses.
The MEM, as its name shows, is a balance-like ac-
count that compares the labour supply (human resourc-
es) to the labour demand at an ideal moment (1 Janu-
ary). Population is taken into account by economic 
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activity, with a differentiation between statistical data 
of those of working age and the population outside of 
the working age. Source of data: Annual labour survey 
on employment since 1992 of enterprises and of all gov-
ernment institutions, labour force survey, census, na-
tional healthcare records, social security records, and 
company registry. Data on unemployment comes from 
the registration system of the NMH.
Other data sources
Census data were used for the estimation of the employ-
ment data in 1980 and 1990. The aggregate economic 
data are based on national account statistics, the con-
sumer’s and producer’s price statistics and industrial 
surveys. A detailed description of the data sources are 
to be found in the relevant publications of the KSH.
main nmh Data SourceS
Unemployment (Jobseekers’) Register Database 
– NFSZ-REG
The other main source of unemployment data in Hun-
gary – and in most of the developed countries – is the 
huge database containing so called administrative re-
cords which are collected monthly and include the in-
dividual data of the registered unemployed/jobseekers.
The register actually includes all jobseekers, but from 
these, at a given point of time, only those are regarded 
as registered unemployed/jobseekers, who:
– had themselves registered with a local office of the 
NFSZ as unemployed/jobseekers (i. e. he/she has no 
job but wishes to work, for which they seek assistance 
from the labour market organisation).
– at the time of the examination (on the final day of any 
month), the person is not a pensioner or a full-time 
student, does not receive any rehabilitation provision 
or benefit, and is ready to co-operate with the local 
employment office in order to become employed (i. e. 
he/she accepts the suitable job or training offered to 
him/her, and keeps the appointments made with the 
local employment office’s placement officer/counsel-
lor/benefit administrator).
If a person included in the register is working under 
any subsidised employment programme on the clos-
ing day, or is a participant of a labour market training 
programme, her/his unemployed/jobseeker status is 
suspended.
If the client is not willing to co-operate with the lo-
cal office, he/she is removed from the register of the 
unemployed/ jobseekers.
The data – i. e. the administrative records of the reg-
ister – allow not only for the identification of date-re-
lated stock data, but also for monitoring flows, inflows 
as well as outflows, within a period.
The database contains the number of decrees pertain-
ing to the removal or suspension of jobseeking benefits, 
the number of those receiving monetary support based 
on accounting items, support transactions, the exact 
date of entry and exit and the reason for the exit (for ex-
ample, job placement, the end of entitlement, disqualifi-
cation, entry into a subsidized employment programme, 
etc.), as well as the financial data of jobseeking benefits 
(for example, average monthly amount, average support 
paid for the number of participants on the closing date, 
for exiters, and those who found placement).
The jobseeking benefit register can also monitor the 
average duration of the period of benefit allocation and 
the average monthly amount of the benefits allocated.
For the period between 1991 and 1996, the register 
also contains the stock and flow data of the recipients 
of new entrant’s unemployment benefit. Between 1997–
2005, the system also contained the recipients of pre-
retirement unemployment benefit.
Jobseeking allowance recipients: from September 1, 
2011 the conditions for determining and disbursing the 
jobseeking allowance changed. The two phases of the 
jobseeking allowance were discontinued and the peri-
od of entitlement decreased from 270 days to 90 days. 
Jobseekers needed to have at least 360 days of worktime 
counting towards entitlement in the 5 years prior to be-
coming a jobseeker (prior to September 1, 2011, this was 
365 days in the previous 4 years). Its amount is 60% of 
the allowance base, but maximum the amount of the 
smallest mandatory wage on the first day of the enti-
tlement (allowance base: the monthly average amount 
from the four calendar quarters preceding the submis-
sion of the application).
Jobseeking assistance recipients: from September 1, 
2011 the conditions for determining and disbursing the 
jobseeking assistance changed. The “a” and “b” type of 
benefit were discontinued, jobseekers can still request 
the “c” type of benefit under the title of pre-retirement 
jobseeking benefit, but the period of entitlement (and 
depletion) of at least 140 days decreased to 90 days.
Regular social assistance recipients: those from 
among the regular registered jobseekers who are of 
active age and are in a disadvantaged labour market po-
sition, and who receive social assistance to complement 
or substitute their income. From January 1, 2009, those 
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receiving regular social assistance were included in two 
categories: regular social assistance recipients, and re-
cipients of on call support. This support was replaced by 
a new type of assistance, the wage replacement support 
from January 1, 2011, then from September 1, 2011, the 
name was changed to employment substitution support. 
(Legislation III. of 1993 pertaining to social manage-
ment and social assistance).
Based on the records of labour demand needs re-
ported to the NFSZ, the stock and flow data of vacan-
cies are also processed and published for each month.
Furthermore, detailed monthly statistics of partici-
pation in the different active programmes, number of 
participants, and their inflows and outflows are also 
prepared based on the assistance disbursed.
The very detailed monthly statistics – in a breakdown 
by country, region, county, local employment office ser-
vice delivery area and community – build on the sec-
ondary processing of administrative records that are 
generated virtually as the rather important and useful 
“by-products” of the accomplishment of the NFSZ’s 
main functions (such as placement services, payment 
of benefits, active programme support, etc.).
The NMH (and its predecessors, i. e. OMK – Na-
tional Labour Centre, OMMK and OMKMK) has pub-
lished the key figures of these statistics on a monthly 
basis since 1989. The denominators of the unemploy-
ment rates calculated for the registered unemployed/
jobseekers are the economically active population data 
published by the KSH MEM.
The figures of the number of registered unemployed/
jobseekers and the registered unemployment rate are 
obviously different from the figures based on the KSH 
MEF. It is mainly the different conceptual approach, 
definition, and the fundamentally different monitor-
ing/measuring methods that account for this variance.
Short-Term Labour Market Projection Surveys 
– NMH PROG
At the initiative and under the co-ordination of the 
NMH (and its legal predecessors), the NFSZ has con-
ducted the so-called short term labour market projec-
tion since 1991, twice a year, in March and September, 
by interviewing over 7,500 employers. Since 2004 the 
survey is conducted once a year, in the month of Sep-
tember.
The interviews focus on the companies’ projections 
of their material and financial processes, their devel-
opment and human resource plans, and they are also 
asked about their concrete lay-off or recruitment plans, 
as well as their expected need for any active labour mar-
ket programmes.
The surveys are processed from bottom up, from the 
service delivery areas, through counties, to the whole 
country, providing useful information at all levels for 
the planning activities of the NFSZ.
The survey provides an opportunity and possibility 
for the regions, the counties and Budapest to analyse 
in greater depth (also using information from other 
sources) the major trends in their respective labour mar-
kets, to make preparations for tackling problems that 
are likely to occur in the short term, and to effectively 
meet the ever-changing needs of their clients.
The forecast is only one of the outputs of the survey. 
Further very important “by-products” include regular 
and personal liaison with companies, the upgraded 
skills of the placement officers and other administra-
tive personnel, enhanced awareness of the local circum-
stances, and the adequate orientation of labour market 
training programmes in view of the needs identified 
by the surveys.
The prognosis surveys are occasionally supplemented 
by supplementary questions and sets of questions to ob-
tain some further useful information that can be used 
by researchers and the decision-makers of employment 
and education/ training policy.
From 2005, the surveys are conducted in cooperation 
with the Institute for Analyses of the Economy and En-
trepreneurship of the Hungarian Chamber of Industry 
and Commerce (in Hungarian: Magyar Kereskedelmi 
és Iparkamara Gazdaság- és Vállalkozáskutató Intézet, 
MKIK GVI), with one additional benefit being that 
with the help of the surveyors of the Institute, the sam-
ple size has increased to nearly 8,000.
Wage Survey Database – NMH BT
The NMH (and its legal predecessors) has conducted 
since 1992, once a year, a representative survey with a 
huge sample size to investigate individual wages and 
earnings, at the request of the Ministry of National 
Economy (and its legal predecessors).
The reference month of data collection is the month 
of May in each year, but for the calculation of the 
monthly average of irregularly paid benefits (beyond 
the base wage/salary), 1/12th of the total amount of 
such benefits received during the previous year is used.
In the competitive sector, the data collection only 
covered initially companies of over 20 persons; it was 
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incumbent on all companies to provide information, 
but the sample includes only employees born on cer-
tain dates in any month of any year.
Data collection has also covered companies of 10–19 
since 1995, and companies of 5–9 have been covered 
since 2000, where the companies actually involved in 
data collection are selected at random (ca. 20 per cent), 
and the selected ones have to provide information about 
all of their full-time employees.
Data on basic wages and earnings structure can only 
be retrieved from these surveys in Hungary, thus it is, 
in practice, these huge, annually generated databases 
that can serve as the basis of the wage reconciliation 
negotiations conducted by the social partners.
In the budgetary sector, all budgetary institutions 
provide information, regardless of their size, in such a 
way that the decisive majority of the local budgetary 
institutions – the ones that are included in the TAKEH 
central payroll accounting system – provide fully com-
prehensive information, and the remaining budgetary 
institutions provide information only about their em-
ployees who were born on certain days (regarded as 
the sample).
Data has only been collected on the professional 
members of the armed forces since 1999.
Prior to 1992, such data collection took place in every 
third year, thus we are in possession of an enormous 
database for the years of 1983, 1986 and also 1989.
Of the employees included in the sample, the follow-
ing data are available:
– the sector the employer operates in, headcount, em-
ployer’s local unit, type of entity, ownership structure
– employee’s wage category, job occupation, gender, age, 
educational background.
Based on the huge databases which include the data 
by individual, the data is analysed every year in the 
following ways:
– Standard data analysis, as agreed upon by the social 
partners, used for wage reconciliation negotiations 
(which is received by every confederation participat-
ing in the negotiations).
– Model calculations to determine the expected impact 
of the rise of the minimum wage.
- Analyses to meet the needs of the Wage Policy De-
partment, Ministry of National Resources, for the 
analysis and presentation of wage ratios
- Analyses for the four volume statistical yearbook (to-
tal national economy, competitive sector, budgetary 
sector, and regional volumes).
The entire database is adopted every year by the KSH, 
which enables the Office to also provide data for cer-
tain international organisations, (e. g. ILO and OECD). 
The NMH also regularly provides special analyses for 
the OECD.
The database containing the data by individual al-
lows for a) the analysis of data for groups of people de-
termined by any combination of pre-set criteria, b) the 
comparison of basic wages and earnings, with special 
regard to the composition of the different groups ana-
lysed, as well as c) the analysis of the dispersion of the 
basic wages and earnings.
Since 2002, the survey of individual wages and earn-
ings was substantially developed to fulfill all require-
ments of the EU, so from this time on it serves also 
for the purposes of the Structure of Earnings Survey 
(SES), which is obligatory for each member state in eve-
ry fourth year. One important element of the changes 
was the inclusion of part-time employees in the sam-
ple since 2002.
SES 2002 was the first, and recently the databases 
of SES 2006 and 2010 was also sent to the Eurostat in 
anonymized form in accordance with EU regulations.
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